Robby George and many others have made strong arguments in this blog for the continuity of human life and dignity. Yet some rational folks on the other side find those arguments not so much unconvincing as absurd. Witness the ridicule that the defense of human embryos sometimes draws. It is this sense of absurdity that must be explained.
I submit that the pro-life arguments seem absurd to any listener who has in the back of the mind a sense that the embryo or fetus is being constructed in the womb. Here’s an analogy: At what point in the automobile assembly line process can a “car’ be said to exist? I suppose most of us would point to some measure of minimum functionality (viability), like having wheels and/or a motor, but some might insist on the need for windshield wipers or might say it’s not fully a car until it rolls out onto the street (is born). We would all understand, however, that there’s no clearly “right” answer as to when a car is there. And we would also agree that someone who claimed the car to be present from the insertion of the first screw at the very beginning of the assembly line would be taking an utterly absurd position. To someone who conceives of gestation as intrauterine construction, pro-life people sound just this absurd. For a thing being constructed is truly not there until it is nearly complete. (Moving from ordinary language to metaphysics, we would say that a constructed thing does not have its essential form until it is complete or nearly complete. And it can’t be that thing without the form of that thing.)
Now, this way of thinking (treating gestation as construction, fabrication, making) has not only intuitive appeal today but a grand pedigree. For thousands of years it was the dominant (though not the exclusive) way to conceive of what was happening in the womb. Thus Job exclaims to God “You poured me out like milk and curdled me like cheese. You clothed me with skin and flesh and knit me together…” No one knew of the ovum (until the 1830s), and, despite its name, semen ("seed") didn’t seem to develop on its own. So it made sense to posit an outside constructor or fabricator, either God or one of the parents, who worked inert seminal material up into a human shape during the early stages of pregnancy. And, quite reasonably, abortion of this still relatively amorphous mass was not considered the destruction of someone with an essential human form.
But at quickening (enlivening), the unborn child exhibited something that no merely constructed thing could do: it could move itself. [This was judged to occur in mid-pregnancy, a position that did not become untenable until, again, after the 1830s when the invention of the stethoscope first made possible the detection of the early fetal heartbeat.] The greatest of all fabrications must therefore have taken place, an animal soul (anima) must have been inserted by God. From this point on, construction from the outside was over and development from the inside began. And so now abortion constituted homicide. For, unlike a constructed entity, which (as we have seen) is not present until nearly the end of the construction process, a developing being is already there as soon as it starts developing.
Why does self-development entail continuity of being? There are many ways to access the answer here. For Heideggerian aficionados, one could point to “de-velop” as an un-veiling or un-wrapping (cf. “en-velop”). [Heidegger would no doubt privilege German and point to “ent-wickeln” (un-wrap). In Spanish, one would unwrap in the sense of un-roll: des-arrollar]. One could also just point to ordinary language today, in which development connotes continuity. We would say that the first little spout we saw come out of the ground five years ago is the same plant as the pear tree we now see, unless someone told us that some construction had occurred (i.e. that the pear branches had been grafted onto non-pear stock).
But the difference between making and developing is not just an accident of language. Suppose we’re back in the pre-digital days and you’ve just taken a fabulous photo, one you know you will prize, with your Polaroid camera. (Say it’s a picture of a jaguar that has now darted back into the jungle so that the photo is unrepeatable.) You are just starting to let the photo hang out to develop when I grab it and rip its cover off (perhaps because I’m eager to see it; my reason doesn’t matter here) thus destroying it. What would you think if I responded to your dismay with the assertion “Hey man, it was still in the brown-smudge stage. Why should you care about brown smudges?” I submit that you would find my defense utterly absurd. [By contrast, if I had simply destroyed a blank, unexposed piece of your film, you would have been much less upset. You really would have lost little more than a smudge. Passive potential does not count for much. Only developing potential already contains its own form (or essence or identity), is already the what that it is in the process of manifesting.]
I conclude that pro-choice folks think pro-life claims re embryos to be not only wrong but absurd whenever (even unconsciously, in the back of their minds) they think that embryos are under construction in the womb. And pro-life folks find pro-choice denials of prized human dignity in embryos to be equally absurd whenever they think that the unborn child develops (indeed, develops itself, unlike the Polaroid photo) from the moment of fertilization.
The two sides are not quite parallel in this, however: Human beings do develop. To think they are constructed is flat error. This error remains intuitively plausible and has a decent cultural pedigree, so those who make it should not be dismissed as utterly irrational or evil, even though they may seem so from the viewpoint of one who bears in mind the facts of human development. But they are absolutely wrong. We know with certainty that quickening is an illusion, that the child is developing from the beginning, not being made from the outside, for its form lies within it, in its active potency, in its activated DNA. From the point of view of natural science (and natural theology) delayed ensoulment has lost its reason for being and Occam’s razor should cut it out of our debates.
I know from conversations with Jean Porter that she is quite familiar with the argument (indeed, arguments--about a host of matters) of Robby George, John Finnis, et al. (Jean was at Emory this past weekend, and will be here again in two weeks for John Witte's Christian Juriprudence Project, in which she, Rick Garnett, and I, among others, participate.) May I suggest that you ask Jean directly why she is not convinced by the argument in question: [email protected]
But the fundamental question between us is not about the reasonableness vel non of Jean Porter. The question is whether one can reasonably reject Robby's argument. (There is no question, in my judgment, that one can reasonably accept the argument!) Let's take a secular philosopher: David Boonin, author of In Defense of Abortion (Cambridge 2002) and now a member of the Rutgers/Brunswick philosophy department. Boonin was careful in writing his book to seek clarifying and critical feedback from many people, including George's sometimes co-author, Patrick Lee of the Franciscan University in Steubenville, Ohio. Now, is Boonin unreasonable too? Is everyone who rejects the argument unreasonable? What do we gain, Michael, by accusing those who disagree with us of being not merely wrong or mistaken (in our view) but unreasonable? Isn't it more productive--isn't it enough--just to state our reasons as carefully and clearly as we can in explaining why we think that our position is the right (correct) one and, therefore, why we think that it is wrong (incorrect, mistaken) to reject our position?
Let me hasten to add that I am not claiming that it is never right--that it is always inappropriate --to accuse those who reject our position as being not merely wrong but unreasonable. But I strongly doubt that the question of the moral status of human life at its earliest stage of development is a fitting occasion for that kind of rhetoric.
I'm reminded of the mocking sign my wife gave me that hangs in my office (better in my office than around my neck): "Be reasonable. Think like I do!"
Best,
Michael P.
In my post, I wasn't referring to Jean Porter's essay specifically or the debate over the destruction of embryos more generally. I was merely sharing my intuition (formed by experience) that sound reason (on any subject) is often not sufficient to persuade one who has strongly held beliefs or desires.
But, since you mention Jean Porter’s essay…
Robby George and others have set forth with care and precision arguments designed to show the unsoundness of theories of delayed hominization, such as the one evidently endorsed by Professor Porter. You say that "the fact that someone who has listened carefully to the (reasonable) argument of a Robby George, as Jean Porter has, but still does not find the argument convincing does not mean that she is unreasonable. " What is your evidence that Professor Porter has "listened carefully" (or listened at all) to Robby's argument, or to the arguments of other eminent philosophers (Finnis, Anscombe, Grisez, Haldane, etc.) who share his basic point of view? Nothing in the Commonweal article shows that she has. What is most remarkable about the article is that it does not address the arguments made by Robby and the others I've mentioned at all. It provides no reasons---let me emphasize the point---no reasons to doubt either the factual and normative premises of these arguments or the inferences to the conclusions Robby and the others draw.
By contrast to what Professor Porter fails to provide in her article, Robby and the others name the names of their interlocutors and address their arguments directly. Robby tells his readers what he believes is unsound or inadequate in the scientific or normative premises of the arguments of, say, Peter Singer or Lee Silver or Ronald Dworkin or Michael Gazzaniga or Michael Sandel, or what he believes is unwarranted or logically fallacious in inferences they draw from those premises. Readers can judge for themselves who has the stronger case. But readers of Professor Porter's article are provided with nothing even remotely equivalent. Appealing to Professor Porter's authority is simply not good enough. She may very well be as eminent as you say she is. But we'll know whether there is anything unsound or "unreasonable" in her defense of delayed hominization only when she tells us her reasons for believing it and provides reasons for rejecting the arguments against it that have been advanced by people at least as eminent as she is---arguments that appear to be decisive by virtue of the apparent soundness of their premises and warrantedness of their inferences.
Perhaps you know of writings in which Professor Porter addresses the analytically rigorous case presented by philosophers who defend the proposition that human life in all stages and conditions possesses profound, inherent, and equal dignity. If so, I would be grateful if you would tell us where precisely she identifies a factual or logical error in their argument about the status of human life in the embryonic stage. Her Commonweal argument does not do that. In fact, it does not address (even implicitly, much less by specific reference) the arguments advanced by those (including, most recently, John Finnis) who deny her assertion that Aquinas's belief in delayed hominization did not depend on faulty premises drawn from what no one denies was his misunderstanding of the facts of human embryogenesis and early intrauterine human development. My understanding is that Professor Porter's main field is the interpretation of Aquinas. In this area, at least, she should provide arguments and address the counterarguments advanced by critics of her views.
In short, I do not claim that Professor Porter is unreasonable; but neither do I accept the soundness or even reasonableness of her rejection of careful or precise argumentation against her positions on the basis of her professorial standing or prestige. Those of us who want to know whether her rejection is warranted will need to be given her reasons.
Pax,
Michael S.
In your post below, you write that "often times human beings (myself
included) will hold on to a set of very dearly held beliefs (or
desires) long after the unreasonableness of those beliefs has been
exposed." Whatever one might want to say about Jean Porter's Commonweal essay, in which, inter alia, she espouses a position on the moral status of human life at its earliest stage of development different from the position of the magisterium and (e.g.) Robby George, one cannot fairly say that her essay is "unreasonable". Jean Porter is one of the most rigorously reasonable Christian moral theologians--in particular, one of the most rigorously reasonable Catholic natural lawyers--now writing. She richly merits her chair at Notre Dame and is a credit to the university. The fact that someone who has listened carefully to the (reasonable) argument of a Robby George, as Jean Porter has, but still does not find the argument convincing dooes not mean that she is unreasonable. (In a way, I think I am simply concurring here in what Lisa Schiltz has been suggesting.)
All the best,
Michael P.
I think Lisa is right. Reason and reasoned argument are essential foundations for seeking the truth and attempting to share with others the truth we have found, but they are not always sufficient in the task of persuading others to that truth no matter how reasonable. We are not Vulcans. My experience suggests to me that often times human beings (myself included) will hold on to a set of very dearly held beliefs (or desires) long after the unreasonableness of those beliefs has been exposed.
Steve,
You write, "As to Professor [Green]'s point that aliens from other
planets can be persons without having brains or nervous systems. Certainly the
latter is true (and angels can lack both), but they can not be human beings. And
the question remains, how do you prove that an embryo is a human being (or, if
you prefer, a human person) rather than a mere human
organism)?"
The aliens example
was only part one of my suggested response. Step one, a brain itself is
not required for personhood (even for materially-embodied beings).
That's where the aliens come in. Step two, the human embryo has the moral
equivalent of a brain. Why? Because the human
embryo contains the physical material that will build a
brain through the embryo's self-directed processes, and so the
embryo contains within itself the physical basis for behavior
characteristic of persons. I don't claim that I have given a proof, but I
do challenge those attracted to brain-&-nervous-system criteria of human
personhood to explain the moral difference between a brain--the brain possessed
by a reversibly-comatose person who will not wake up for a month, say--and
the epigenetic primordium of a brain possessed by the embryo. It doesn't
seem to me that there is any moral difference between the two, and I haven't
seen anyone explain what the moral
difference might be.
There are other
interesting things to say about "human beings," but I don't think the term is
essential to an argument for the moral status of the embryo. The short
form of my argument is simply that embryos are morally equivalent to
reversibly-comatose people, who are obviously persons. (If a being's
past exercise of capacities becomes an issue, I'll turn
to replicated reversibly-comatose people, who also seem to me
obviously to be persons.)
In general, I don't
think that anything more is required for thinking about the moral status of
the embryo than the same sort of distinction-drawing and case-to-case
reasoning that drives discussion about any other secular philosophical or
legal topic.
Chris
In response to your question, Michael, I'm definitely not trying to suggest anything profound about the limits of natural law or anything like that. Sometimes on this topic I feel like Anne Frank, who could write in her diary from her hiding place in the attic: "I still believe, in spite of everything, that people are really good at heart." I still believe, in spite of everything, that the truth about the humanity of embryos really must be written in all our hearts. Because my faith and my reason lead me to the same conclusion, though, I don't have to sort out which of these is the most persuasive in making that seem so self-evident to me.
I just wonder, on the very pragmatic level of trying to get others to see what I perceive as so self-evident, if philosophical or logical arguments are going to ever be enough. Not that I would ever want to suggest giving up on that effort, and not that I won't myself continue trying. (In that regard, I'm so grateful to Michael P. for bringing Jean Porter's article to our attention.) But I sometimes wonder if maybe, in the end, what might have a better chance of actually changing people's minds on this issue are arguments based on common faith convictions, or forthright appeals to emotions, or simply lots and lots of prayer.
Lisa
Here (thanks to Professor Friedman) is commentary on the decision by the New York Court of Appeals upholding that state's narrow religious-employer exemption to its contraception-coverage mandate. The commentary includes a line from the opinion that I had overlooked:
"[W]hen a religious organization chooses to hire non-believers it must . . . be prepared to accept neutral regulations imposed to protect those employees' legitimate interests in doing what their own beliefs permit," Judge Smith wrote. "This would be a more difficult case if plaintiffs had chosen to hire only people who share their belief in the sinfulness of contraception."
Why, exactly, is this true? That is, why should a religious organization's decision to "hire non-believers" require it to compromise its identity and commitments? It seems to me that this line of reasoning would have dramatic effects on, say, Catholic universities that (a) are committed to being meaningfully Catholic but who (b) believe also that their Catholic mission is enhanced by the presence of engaged, sympathetic non-Catholics.
Also, Eugene Volokh has some thoughts about the court's standard-of-review ("mystery scrutiny") in state-constitution free-exercise cases.
