Paul Horwitz has a post over at Prawfsblawg about a new article by Angela Riley, "Sovereignty and Illiberalism," and also about Professor Riley's new course, "Illiberal Groups in the Liberal State." Both the article, and the course, look fascinating. Here's the blurb about the course:
Democracies within which ethnic, indigenous, religious or national minorities exist attempt to impose on them the values of the dominant society.Illiberal groups respond to this pressure with claims for equality, fair representation in the political process, and, perhaps most importantly, autonomy. This seminar will discuss the challenges of accommodating the rights and needs of illiberal groups within the liberal state.It will focus, in particular, on the pressing philosophical and legal questions.Of particular import will be an examination of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence (e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez; Wisconsin v. Yoder; etc.) in which the claims of illiberal groups have been examined by American courts.
Professor Riley is taking suggestions, in the comments box, for additional readings.
On February 8, 2002, Jean Porter--who is the
John A. O'Brien Professor of Theology at the University of Notre Dame, specializing in moral theology/Christian ethics--published an article in Commonweal: Is the Embryo a Person? Arguing with the Catholic Traditions. Click here to read the whole article. Here is a lengthy excerpt:
What can we say to convince men and women of good will who do not share
our theological convictions or our allegiance to a teaching church that
early-stage embryos have exactly the same moral status as we and they
do? It will not serve us to fall back at this point on blanket
denunciations such as "the culture of death." Naturally, these tend to
be conversation stoppers. What is worse, they keep us from considering
the possibility that others may not be convinced by what we are saying
because what we are saying is--not convincing. titled
According to Catholic teaching, from
conception, the embryo has the same status as any other living human
being, and for this reason, the intentional destruction of the embryo
is tantamount to murder. That, at least, is the official teaching of
the Catholic Church as it has been represented in the press. The
official teaching is qualified in one important respect, and I will
consider this qualification in a moment. But first we need to examine
what might be called the simplified public version of the teaching on
the status of the early embryo.
Very often, the claim that the early-stage
embryo is a person just like any other is put forward as if it were
obvious. When pressed to defend this view, its proponents argue that
the early-stage embryo is a living human organism, genetically distinct
from both its parents and already on a developmental continuum that
will lead eventually to the birth of a child. From this standpoint, it
is obvious that this individual human organism must also be a human
person in the fullest sense. As Donum vitae asks rhetorically, "How
could a human individual not be a human person?"
Yet this is precisely what is not obvious to
many of our fellow citizens. What is more, until relatively recently it
would not have been obvious to most Catholic theologians, either. The
view that even early abortion is equivalent to murder did not begin to
dominate official Catholic teachings until the nineteenth century,
although it had been proposed earlier. Before that point, the majority
view in the Western church, as reflected in canon law as well as
theological opinion, drew a distinction between early- and late-stage
abortions. Certainly, an early-stage abortion was considered to be a
grave sin, but it was not regarded as equivalent to murder. This
distinction, in turn, rests on the view, defended by Aquinas among many
others, that the developing fetus does not receive a rational soul, and
therefore does not attain full human status, until after a certain
point in the process of development-a view sometimes described as
"delayed hominization." These theologians were well aware that the
early-stage embryo was an organism distinct from the body of its
mother, but they denied precisely what we are now claiming to be not
only true, but obviously true-namely, that this human organism is a
human person in the full sense.
if we are going to defend immediate
hominization, it is not enough simply to point to facts about the
early-stage embryo-its genetic uniqueness, its capacity for further
growth and development, and the like. We need to offer a systematic
argument for why these facts support the fully personal status of very
early-stage embryos, an argument that will convince our fellow
citizens, most of whom know the facts as well as we do. This we have so
far failed to do.
That fact brings me to the qualification in
the official teaching on the status of the early embryo noted above.
When we turn to recent magisterial statements, we find that they do
acknowledge the difficulty of this question and the diversity of views
that it has engendered. But these debates finally do not matter,
because even if we cannot say for sure when the embryo attains fully
personal status, we are sure enough to act as if it does: "What is at
stake is so important that, from the standpoint of moral obligation,"
John Paul II writes in Evangelium vitae, "the mere probability that a
human person is involved would suffice to justify an absolutely clear
prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo." The
encyclical speaks of a probability, but some theologians and Catholic
activists go even further, arguing that the possibility that the embryo
is a person is enough to justify treating it as if it were. In other
words, we are faced here with a situation in which a fully personal
human life may be present, and therefore we are morally obliged to
resolve our doubts on the side of protecting life.
But these are weak arguments, at least
insofar as they are offered as a basis for public policy. Have we
established even a probability that the early-stage embryo has fully
personal status? This claim stands or falls on an assessment of the
strength of our arguments. So far, it does not seem that we have
convinced our fellow citizens that these arguments are sound enough to
justify even a probable conclusion. As for the contention that the
sheer possibility that the early-stage embryo is a fully personal
entity requires us to act as if it were, this claim will rightly not
carry much weight in the public square.
What this latter claim amounts to is this:
Because there are philosophical arguments to the effect that the
early-stage embryo is fully personal, and these arguments convince some
persons, therefore we should all act as if we were convinced by those
arguments. But no society can afford to determine difficult questions
of public policy on such a basis. There are serious philosophical
arguments that nonhuman animals have the same status as human persons,
and these arguments convince many men and women of good faith. Does
that mean that the rest of us are morally obliged to act as if we were
convinced by those arguments, because nonhuman animals may have the
same moral status as the rest of us? Should we outlaw animal
experimentation and slaughterhouses on this basis? I think most of us
would demand to be convinced by the relevant arguments, before we think
about enacting them into law. We should not be surprised when our
fellow citizens hold us to the same standards of persuasiveness with
regard to the status of the early embryo.
No doubt it will have occurred to many of my
readers that if our current position on the status of the early embryo
is not convincing to our fellow citizens, we will surely not get much
further with Aquinas’s abstruse metaphysics. Actually, I am not so sure
about that. I myself find Aquinas’s view to be convincing, and since I
believe that this view is intrinsically credible, I am inclined to
think that at least some of our fellow citizens would believe it if it
were fairly presented. We have been in the habit of dismissing this
view for so long that we have not even tried to understand it
ourselves, much less to render it intelligible to others.
Nonetheless, it is probably the case that
Aquinas’s views on ensoulment, which after all do presuppose a fairly
specific set of philosophical and theological assumptions, will never
carry much general conviction. And many Catholics will believe that
whatever the merits of this view, any effort to develop it in a
direction that would allow for the destruction of early-stage embryos
has been definitively ruled out by the magisterium. (I do not agree
with this position, although I respect it. For the record, and since I
will be accused of cowardice unless I declare my own position, I do not
believe that there are any conclusive moral grounds ruling out
embryonic stem-cell research. Hence, I do support such research, under
some conditions. I reserve the right to change my mind. And I don’t
know what Aquinas himself would have said on the subject.)
My point is not that we should return to the
earlier position on ensoulment and the status of the early embryo. What
I do want to suggest, however, is that if we are to develop adequate
and convincing arguments on this difficult issue, we need to engage the
arguments of our forerunners in a serious way-especially those
arguments that we find most challenging to our own views. In this case,
it would be especially advisable for us to do so, because the arguments
of our forerunners challenge today’s official Catholic view just at the
point at which most of our contemporaries would also challenge it-that
is, they call into question the claim that the early-stage embryo, as a
human organism, must necessarily be a human person in the full sense.
If we cannot answer our own forerunners’ objections to this claim, we
can scarcely hope to answer the objections of our contemporaries.
Catholics are defined by our past in a way
that many of our fellow citizens are not. Not only does the
institutional church give a high positive value to continuity and
tradition, most individual Catholics do so as well. Yet ironically,
when we attempt to bring our insights to bear on public debates, we
sometimes argue in ways that undercut the very continuity with
tradition that has historically been our strength. I do not want to
suggest that we should simply retreat into an uncritical affirmation of
the views of the past. But I do want to say that when we find ourselves
at variance with our inherited moral tradition, we should face that
fact squarely and attempt to develop our own views in conversation with
our forerunners, taking their views seriously even when these are not
our own. Only in this way can we maintain a genuine, and not merely a
verbal respect for our inherited tradition-and only in this way can we
develop arguments that will be convincing to our fellow citizens today.
Lisa, I am intrigued by what you are suggesting - "perhaps ...our strongest arguments are not philosophical ones." What alternative source of reasoning do you suggest?
Steve, you are right, every claimed starting point is open to challenge, including mine. To be clear, my position is that every human organism, at whatever stage of development, is entitled to full worth and dignity by the fact that it is a human organism. In other words, my position is inclusive, not making distinctions that would exclude some but not all human organisms from being worthy of the state's protection. As I said earlier, history is full of justifications for treating some human organisms as less than worthy than others (slavery, treatment of Jews, etc). History has shown that we should be skeptical of any line drawing among human organisms because such lines have proven attempts by the powerful to take advantage of the less powerful.
But, even if my reasoning (borrowed from many others) is sound, we are still left with Steve's pressing question: "why [do] so many people have contrary intuitions" and how does the Church employ its prophetic voice to engage them?
One of my favorite disability rights websites is The Ragged Edge. (Another favorite is Not Dead Yet.) The Ragged Edge site currently features two articles presenting the infrequently-aired perspectives of the disability rights community on two issues often discussed on MOJ: New Urbanism and single issue voting.
On New Urbanism, Ragged Edge reports about disability rights activists' complaints that these communities are not typically accessible:
The contradiction is that, by and large, the homes constructed in these "ideal" communities are neither livable nor visitable by people with mobility impairments-- and not a wise choice for temporarily able-bodied older people, either. New Urbanists have been the chief designers who, beginning in the 1980's, brought back the "classic" multi-stepped houses with front porches high above grade -- houses that are worse for disabled and older people than the typical house styles of 40's, 50's, 60's, 70's -- this at a time when the aging of the population is a widely reported trend, and younger disabled people are surviving longer than ever before.
"advocates should examine each campaign individually, on a non-partisan basis. There are Republicans and Independents who are supportive of our goals. We need to avoid simplistic and reflexive actions such as reaching out only to Democrats."
Although I am in full sympathy with the position on the humanity of the embryo staked out by Professor George and Michael S. in recent posts, I have to say that I’m not convinced that George’s philosophical argument adequately responds to Eduardo’s challenge.
Eduardo is asking whether there is some principled way to distinguish between embryos and more fully developed humans – such as infants – that would lead us to a different conclusion about the morality of destroying embryos in connection with potentially life-saving research than we would reach with respect to infants.He’s suggesting that we do have some sort of intuition (“I think we by and large do favor certain life stages over others, particularly at the earliest stages of development”) that does suggest to us that there is such a distinction, and he’s searching for the reasoning behind that.
In his “Embryo Ethics” article, George in essence argues that for Eduardo (or anyone else) to make a principled argument that embryos are morally distinguishable from more fully developed human beings, that person has to identify some acquired characteristic that allows him to make this distinction, and that this acquired characteristic would have to be some sort of capacity for certain mental functions.George concludes every such capacity one could identify is equally present in the embryo in a nascent, undeveloped form – it simply isn’t immediately exercisable in the embryo.What gives every human equal moral worth is that innate capacity, not the ability to exercise it;since that’s present in every embryo, there’s no tenable moral distinction between embryos and more fully developed humans.
I think that Eduardo’s intuition about the distinctions “we by and large do” make is in fact a recognition that most of society today is NOT convinced by one of the philosophical arguments that George lays out to support his conclusion that these distinctions are untenable.But most of society avoids confronting the consequences of rejecting that argument because it deludes itself into thinking that it agrees with another one of George’s arguments. Let me explain.
One of the arguments George makes for rejecting the ability to exercise a capacity as morally significant is that the difference between an immediately exercisable capacity and an undeveloped capacity is a mere quantitative difference – the more fully developed human who can exercise her mental capacity just has more of the mental capacity than she had as an embryo.George argues “A mere quantitative difference (having more or less of the same feature, such as the development of a basic natural capacity) cannot by itself be a justificatory basis for treating different entities in radically different ways.”
Another argument George makes is that the difference between the two types of capacities is a qualitative difference that we don’t think should be a legitimate basis of distinction, because we all fundamentally believe that at least the humans we do conclude are worthy of full moral rights are all entitled to the same full moral rights.George says it much better that I can (no surprise), so let me quote him on this:“. . . the acquired qualities that could be proposed as criteria for personhood come in varying and continuous degrees:there are an infinite number of degrees of the relevant developed abilities or dispositions, such as for self-consciousness or rationality.So, if human beings were worthy of full moral respect only because of such qualities, then, since such qualities come in varying degrees, no account could be given of why basic rights are not possessed by human beings in varying degrees.The proposition that all human beings are created equal would be relegated to the status of a myth; since some people are more rational than others (that is, have developed that capacity to a greater extent than others), some people would be greater in dignity than others, and the rights of the superiors would trump those of the inferiors.”
I think most of society accepts the qualitative argument – that’s what’s enshrined in all our civil rights laws.However, it doesn’t really accept the quantitative argument. And I’m not sure that George presents (at least in this excerpt of his argument) a really compelling philosophical reason for accepting it.Most of society does, as Eduardo suggests, think that there is some morally significant distinction based on how much mental capacity a human can actually manifest. How else can you explain a society that has no trouble accepting selective abortion or destruction of embryos created through IVF if there’s some indication that the developing embryo or fetus will be severely disabled (ie, have less of a capacity for mental functioning), while it (at least rhetorically) balks at selective abortion or destruction of embryos created through IVF if there’s some indication that the developing embryo or fetus will be a woman rather than a man?
This is why I agree with George that Eduardo is quite wrong in claiming that most people would “find some random way to choose” whether to rescue the disabled person in one room or the healthy person in the other.If the disability is mental, rather than physical, and if it is severe, rather than mild, I don’t think most would even think they need to bother claiming they are being guided some sort of random criteria.If the disability is physical, many might try to disguise what they’re doing, but it wouldn’t affect the outcome – witness the numbers of abortions conducted on children diagnosed in utero with cleft palate.As I’ve argued elsewhere, I agree with both George and Michael S. that this is a great tragedy. And I think that society's willingness to start with accepting the quantitative distinction can't help but lead it towards getting more and more comfortable with accepting putatively quantitative distinctions that in fact bleed into qualitative distinctions. But I think that we either need to come up with even stronger philosophical arguments about why that is an untenable position, or perhaps accept that our strongest arguments are not philosophical ones.
Michael says, “The point is, you have switched from saying
that the human organism has worth because of what it is to saying that a human
organism has worth because it happens at the moment to possess certain
characteristics, and this does undercut the argument that infants possess full
moral worth and dignity.” But the question to be decided is what an embryonic
human organism “is” namely is it yet
a human being. Is it a human being when it possesses neither a nervous system nor
a brain? Michael says that the nervous system/brain approach opens one up to
other line drawing challenges as to when humanity begins. Perhaps so, but the
presence of other challenges does not itself justify any particular different
starting point; and every claimed starting point is open to challenge
(including Michael’s).
I, of course, understand that those who opt for the nervous
system/brain option can not prove they are right. But that does not show they
are wrong. It may well be that no one can prove that the starting point they
think is correct is in fact correct. In other words, Michael believes an embryo
without a nervous system or brain is a human being and deserves to be treated
as the moral equivalent as an infant. My question remains: can you prove it to
people whose intuitions are different?
As to Professor Hill’s point that aliens from other planets can
be persons without having brains or nervous systems. Certainly the latter is
true (and angels can lack both), but they can not be human beings. And the
question remains, how do you prove that an embryo is a human being (or, if you
prefer, a human person) rather than a mere human organism)?
To summarize some points I have put forward in this thread.
The view that an embryo or first trimester fetus is a human being full stop is
not shared by an overwhelming majority of the American people. If they really
thought the fetus was a human being, they could not possibly support some of
the exceptions to abortion that they do. They apparently believe that the
interest in life of such an entity is entitled to substantial moral weight but
not to absolute weight. Consistent with this, many millions believe that Roe v. Wade should be overturned. But very
small percentages of those on that side of the culture divide support the view
that an embryo or fetus is a human being full stop. If a fetus or embryo is a
human being full stop, the idea that abortion or embryonic stem cell research
is the major civil rights issue of our time (as stated in Rick’s church
bulletin) or an overriding political issue (as stated by Father Araujo or
Robert George) follows naturally. Moreover,
the failure of embryos to attach to uterine walls resulting in their demise
would be regarded as a major worldwide health problem. If I understand Robert
George, he so regards it. But he is surely joined in the latter by relatively
few. This does not mean he is wrong. It is a function of the Church to be
prophetic. But, if the truth is written on our hearts (Evangelium Vitae, 2.2), I still believe more explanation is needed
as to why so many people have contrary intuitions. Perhaps, however, contrary
to the Pope, this is not an area in which the truth is written on our hearts. The
question I have pursued may or may not reveal the limits of secular reason in
this area (which in no way means there is not a right answer). I apologize for
the repetition on my part. I am wondering whether we are near the end of this
thread. If so, I am happy to let others
have the last words (at least, in the absence of severe provocation). I am grateful for the many excellent contributions.
Here is a link to an op-ed piece of mine, which appears in the Los Angeles Daily Journal, about the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in the Faith Center case. In that case (more info here), the panel, per Judge Paez, concluded that a public library may exclude "religious worship" from a policy that opens library rooms broadly to "meetings, programs, or activities of educational, cultural, or community interest." My piece focused more on Judge Karlton's opinion, in which he wrote, among other things:
Where government plays a role in the religious life of a pluralist society, there is the danger that government will favor the majority religion and seek to control or prohibit the rites of minority religions. Such favor can only lead to alienation and social unrest. . . .
The wall of separation between church and state that Thomas Jefferson thought the First Amendment raised, in no way prejudices the practice of anyone?s religion. Instead, it serves the salutary purpose of insulating civil society from the excesses of the zealous. . . .
In the piece, I write:
[Judge] Karlton asserted that the "wall of separation between church and state that Thomas Jefferson thought the First Amendment raised, in no way prejudices the practice of anyone's religion." True enough. The separation of church and state is crucial to any clear vision of religious freedom. He continued, however: "Instead, it serves the salutary purpose of insulating civil society from the excesses of the zealous."
This claim - that the First Amendment should be applied by judges to safeguard a tranquil, God-free public square - is badly misguided.
Religion matters, and people care about it. The excesses of religious believers does not mean that judges should be particularly suspicious of the zealous. Those who crafted our Constitution knew better. They believed that both authentic freedom and effective government should be secured through checks and balances rather than standardization. It is both mistaken and quixotic to employ the First Amendment to smooth out the divisions that are an unavoidable part of the political life of a diverse people.
For a more developed argument that judicial observations or predictions of "religious divisiveness" should do little work in supplying the First Amendment's enforceable content, see this article of mine.
The New York Court of Appeals has decided -- following the California Supreme Court -- that New York's contraception-coverage mandate, which exempts "religious employers" but defines "religious employers in a very narrow way," violates neither the federal nor the New York free-exercise clause.
For commentary on the California case, which is relevant to New York's decision, go here, or here, or here. As I wrote, more than two years ago -- time flies, when you're bloggin' --
But perhaps the most provocative and unsettling feature of the California law — and of the majority's constitutional defense of it — is the distinction that it both presumes and polices between "the inculcation of religious values" and (mere?) works of mercy. Justice Kennard confessed, in a short concurring opinion, "I have serious doubt that the First Amendment...allows California to limit its religious employer exemption to religious entities that have as their purpose the inculcation of religious values, denying that exemption to religious entities...that are organized for the purpose of feeding the hungry, caring for the sick, and providing shelter to the homeless." As well she should. The court's opinion, in Justice Brown's words, begs a crucial question: "may the government determine which parts of bona fide religious organizations are religious and which parts are secular...in order to infringe the religious freedom of that portion of the organization the government characterizes as secular?" Justice David Souter's concerns — expressed in Lee v. Weisman, a Supreme Court case about prayers at graduation — seem applicable here: "I can hardly imagine," he observed, "a subject less amenable to the competence of [government officials], or more deliberately to be avoided where possible," than "comparative theology."
The problem with the distinction that the act presumes is not simply that state actors are incompetent to draw and administer it. More fundamentally, we should worry that, by determining for its own purposes the meaning and significance of religious organizations' work, and by allocating burdens and benefits on the basis of state-crafted distinctions between "religious" and "secular" activities, the government can subtly but powerfully reshape and domesticate the content and challenge of faith. As Justice Brown put it, through the act, "the government is not accidentally or incidentally interfering with religious practice; it is doing so willfully by making a judgment about what is or is not religious." In a sense, the act's "religious employer" exemption's criteria reflect, and reinforce, a controversial, sectarian, privatized notion of what religion is, and what religious communities do: Religion is about belief and values, not service, sacrifice, and engagement. By requiring, as a condition of participation in public life, that Catholic Charities acquiesce to this notion, California is not only taking sides in an irreducibly religious debate about human sexuality. It also, in Justice Brown's words, "impoverish[es] our political discourse and imperil[s] the foundations of liberal democracy."
I love Cormac McCarthy's work. It's not exactly cheery stuff, but the prose is incredible and the themes are deep. His new novel, "The Road," has been getting rave reviews, and I cannot wait to read it. Here, just for a taste, is William Kennedy in the New York Times:
Cormac McCarthy’s subject in his new novel is as big as it gets: the end of the civilized world, the dying of life on the planet and the spectacle of it all. He has written a visually stunning picture of how it looks at the end to two pilgrims on the road to nowhere. Color in the world — except for fire and blood — exists mainly in memory or dream. Fire and firestorms have consumed forests and cities, and from the fall of ashes and soot everything is gray, the river water black. Hydrangeas and wild orchids stand in the forest, sculptured by fire into “ashen effigies” of themselves, waiting for the wind to blow them over into dust. Intense heat has melted and tipped a city’s buildings, and window glass hangs frozen down their walls. On the Interstate “long lines of charred and rusting cars” are “sitting in a stiff gray sludge of melted rubber. ... The incinerate corpses shrunk to the size of a child and propped on the bare springs of the seats. Ten thousand dreams ensepulchred within their crozzled hearts.” . . .
The overarching theme in McCarthy’s work has been the face-off of good and evil with evil invariably triumphant through the bloodiest possible slaughter. Had this novel continued his pattern, that band of marching thugs would have been the focus — as it was with the apocalyptic horsemen of death in his second novel, “Outer Dark,” or the blood-mad scalp-hunters in his masterpiece, “Blood Meridian,” or the psychopathic killer in his recent novel, “No Country for Old Men.” But evil victorious is not this book’s theme. . . .
(Here is another review, from Slate.com.) Now, at one point in the book, the two main characters (the boy and his father) narrowly escape a gang of cannibals:
When six of the cannibals return to the house the man and boy barely escape the same fate. Hiding, afraid to breathe, the father tells the boy it’s going to be O.K. He says that often.
The boy asks: “We wouldn’t ever eat anybody, would we?”
“No. Of course not. ...”
“No matter what.”
“No. No matter what.”
“Because we’re the good guys.”
“Yes.”
“And we’re carrying the fire.”
“And we’re carrying the fire. Yes.”
Here's a question, which resonates, I think, with the recent renewal of interest in some quarters in "torture warrants": What has to be true about the world in order for it to be true -- really true -- that there are some things that "the good guys" do not do, no matter what? That is, what are the premises of the claim implicit in the father's assurance to his son that, "no matter what," to be a "good guy" is to be someone who does not do certain things, e.g., kill other human beings for food?
Following on the heels of Rep. Katherine Harris (see here), Julaine Appling, of the Wisconsin Family Research Institute, is reported here to have said, in the context of a same-sex-marriage debate, the "separation of church and state" is a "fictitious wall" and a "fabrication." Certainly, few concepts are at the same time so important, so misused, and so misunderstood as separation.
Consider this, from Pope Benedict (in The Salt of the Earth). After observing that, in fact, it was Christianity that brought the separation of Church and state into the world, he continues:
“Until then the political constitution and religion were always united.It was the norm in all cultures for the state to have sacrality in itself and be the supreme protector of sacrality. . . .Christianity did not accept this but deprived the state of its sacral nature.. . . In this sense, this separation is ultimately a primordial Christian legacy and also a decisive factor for freedom.Thus, the state is not itself a sacred power but simply an order that finds its limits in a faith that worships, not the state, but a God who stands over against it and judges it.”
Or this, from Deus Caritas Est:
Fundamental to Christianity is the distinction between what belongs to Caesar and what belongs to God (cf. Mt 22:21), in other words, the distinction between Church and State, or, as the Second Vatican Council puts it, the autonomy of the temporal sphere. . . . The State may not impose religion, yet it must guarantee religious freedom and harmony between the followers of different religions. For her part, the Church, as the social expression of Christian faith, has a proper independence and is structured on the basis of her faith as a community which the State must recognize. The two spheres are distinct, yet always interrelated.
