Thanks to Steve, Rob, and Rick who have recently posted several contributions that address Catholics—clerical and lay—on the exercise of citizenship, the role of moral deliberation, and, last but not least, the upcoming mid-term election.
I was planning on writing to address some of the points made by Professor Cathy Kaveny in her “Catholics As Citizens” America entry to which Steve kindly directed us. However, Fr. Charles Curran, in a report of his recent October 28th lecture at Southern Methodist University, brings together a few more points worth addressing. Therefore my posting today will be geared more to what he, Curran, appears to have said about why, in his judgment, the response by U.S. bishops to “abortion laws” is “flawed.” Regrettably, I have not been able to find a complete transcript of his lecture yet; however, the National Catholic Reporter has provided some significant coverage of the lecture [HERE], so I shall rely on this periodical’s reporting and the quotations they attribute to Fr. Curran in this post.
This article, signed by Tom Roberts (the NCR editor at large), reports that the efforts to the U.S. bishops to change laws on abortion have been given “preeminence.” Given that we—Curran, Kaveny, others, and I—appear to be addressing issues dealing with the upcoming election on Tuesday, it is unclear if this NCR report is referring to some other position taken by the Catholic bishops after their 2007 quadrennial statement on political responsibility, “Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship—A Call to Political Responsibility.” If this is in fact the source of criticism offered by Fr. Curran regarding the bishops and their “flawed” position vis-à-vis abortion, it is important to recall with precision what the bishops did say in this 2007 statement. And what they actually said is this:
There are some things we must never do, as individuals or as a society, because they are always incompatible with love of God and neighbor. Such actions are so deeply flawed that they are always opposed to the authentic good of persons. These are called “intrinsically evil” actions. They must always be rejected and opposed and must never be supported or condoned. A prime example is the intentional taking of innocent human life, as in abortion and euthanasia. In our nation, “abortion and euthanasia have become preeminent threats to human dignity because they directly attack life itself, the most fundamental human good and the condition for all others” (Living the Gospel of Life, no. 5). It is a mistake with grave moral consequences to treat the destruction of innocent human life merely as a matter of individual choice. A legal system that violates the basic right to life on the grounds of choice is fundamentally flawed. (N. 22)
Furthermore, this quadrennial statement reiterates what the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith stated in its Doctrinal Note of 2002 regarding “The Participation of Catholics in Public Life”:
It must be noted also that a well-formed Christian conscience does not permit one to vote for a political program or an individual law which contradicts the fundamental contents of faith and morals. The Christian faith is an integral unity, and thus it is incoherent to isolate some particular element to the detriment of the whole of Catholic doctrine. A political commitment to a single isolated aspect of the Church’s social doctrine does not exhaust one’s responsibility towards the common good. (Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regarding the Participation of Catholics in Political Life, no. 4)
It is critical to acknowledge that these statements refer to proper responses by Catholics to laws or law-making rather than to candidates. Regarding candidates, the bishops remarked:
Catholics often face difficult choices about how to vote. This is why it is so important to vote according to a well-formed conscience that perceives the proper relationship among moral goods. A Catholic cannot vote for a candidate who takes a position in favor of an intrinsic evil, such as abortion or racism, if the voter’s intent is to support that position. In such cases a Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in grave evil. At the same time, a voter should not use a candidate’s opposition to an intrinsic evil to justify indifference or inattentiveness to other important moral issues involving human life and dignity. (N. 34)
Furthermore, the bishops stated that,
As Catholics we are not single-issue voters. A candidate’s position on a single issue is not sufficient to guarantee a voter’s support. Yet a candidate’s position on a single issue that involves an intrinsic evil, such as support for legal abortion or the promotion of racism, may legitimately lead a voter to disqualify a candidate from receiving support. (N. 42)
And, finally, one other passage from the 2007 Faithful Citizenship document merits quoting in full:
Our 1998 statement Living the Gospel of Life declares, “Abortion and euthanasia have become preeminent threats to human life and dignity because they directly attack life itself, the most fundamental good and the condition for all others” (no. 5). Abortion, the deliberate killing of a human being before birth, is never morally acceptable and must always be opposed. Cloning and destruction of human embryos for research or even for potential cures are always wrong. The purposeful taking of human life by assisted suicide and euthanasia is not an act of mercy, but an unjustifiable assault on human life. Genocide, torture, and the direct and intentional targeting of noncombatants in war or terrorist attacks are always wrong. (N. 64, bold in the original)
Fr. Curran makes four points why he considers that the bishops’ position regarding abortion is flawed: (1) speculative doubt about when human life begins; (2) the fact that possibility and feasibility are necessary aspects involved in discussions about abortion laws; (3) the understanding and role of civil law; and, (4) the weakness of the intrinsic evil argument.
He was quoted by the NCR in a statement preliminary to the elaboration of his four points where he asserts that, “In my judgment, the U.S. bishops claim too great a certitude for their position on abortion law and fail to recognize that their own position logically entails prudential judgment so that they cannot logically distinguish it from most of the other issues such as the death penalty, health care, nuclear deterrence, housing... Voters should examine the candidates on a full range of issues, and with a consideration for the candidates’ integrity, philosophy and performance. The document lists eight issues in alphabetical order, beginning with abortion, but does not give priority to any of these issues.” With respect, I do not see how these contentions nor his four points are accurate depictions of what the bishops presented in their 2007 statement on Faithful Citizenship. Therefore, I cannot see how his argument that their position [that “abortion is the primary issue”] is “flawed” can be maintained.
Let me very briefly consider each of his four points seriatim.
1. Regarding “speculative doubt about when human life begins.”
Fr. Curran bases much of his argument from the science of the times of St. Thomas Aquinas rather than modern medical science. Although Curran notes that Aquinas’s biology was faulty, he insists that the Catholic tradition “recognizes speculative doubt about when the soul is infused or when the human person comes into existence.” He attributes his error to an imagined error of the bishops and, for that matter, the Universal Church. Moreover, he insists that, “from the beginning, the matter of what we now call the fetus is not apt or suitable for receiving the human soul. Some growth and development are necessary before the human soul can be infused.” It is ironic that he, Curran who is a theologian, fails to take stock of Psalm 139: “You formed my inmost being; you knit me in my mother’s womb.” Hmmmm, sounds like something was going on regarding recognition of the pre-birth human person long before Thomas Aquinas but of which Fr. Curran does not acknowledge.
Moreover, he does not take account of the fact that there is no scientific “doubt about when human life begins.” As O’Rahilly and Műller state in their 1996 Human Embryology and Teratology, “life is continuous, as is also human life, so that the question ‘When does (human) life begin?’ is meaningless in terms of ontogeny. Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.” (p. 8) In a similar fashion, Moore and Persaud, authors of another prominent medical text book on human embryology (2003), note that: “The intricate processes by which a baby develops from a single cell are miraculous… Human development is a continuous process that begins when an oocyte (ovum) from a female is fertilized by a sperm (spermatozoon) from a male. Cell division, cell migration, programmed cell death, differentiation, growth, and cell rearrangement transform the fertilized oocyte, a highly specialized, totipotent cell—a zygote—into a multicellular human being.” [The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryology, Seventh Edition, 2003, p. 2. (Italics in the original)]
Fr. Curran emphasizes the 1974 CDF “Declaration on Procured Abortion” footnote statement that on the ensoulment question to argue that the Church’s teachings are behind the times: “There is not a unanimous tradition on this point and authors are as yet in disagreement.” Ironically, he fails to mention that the CDF also said this to say about the role of modern science in formulating Church teachings:
To this perpetual evidence—perfectly independent of the discussions on the moment of animation—modern genetic science brings valuable confirmation. It has demonstrated that, from the first instant, there is established the program of what this living being will be: a man, this individual man with his characteristic aspects already well determined. Right from fertilization is begun the adventure of a human life, and each of its capacities requires time—a rather lengthy time—to find its place and to be in a position to act. The least that can be said is that present science, in its most evolved state, does not give any substantial support to those who defend abortion. (N. 13)
This statement of the CDF and relied upon by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops is in accord with my previous references to current texts about human embryology. In this light, I fail to see how Fr. Curran can sustain his critique of the bishops that, “from the moment of conception, each member of the human species must be given the full respect due to a human person is accurate but not totally forthcoming.” It seems that the bishops, the CDF, and medical experts are in accord, an accord which Fr. Curran elects not to join.
2. Possibility and Feasibility.
Here Fr. Curran addresses compromises which elected officials sometimes must make. As he states, public officials “from the president on down have to recognize this reality [of making compromises] and often have to be willing to settle for half a loaf rather than none.” This may be the case when politicians are making the law, but how about when citizens are selecting their representatives who will make the law? I believe that this is the issue which the bishops are addressing, not, as Fr. Curran implies, the need to be flexible in getting “half a loaf rather than none.” I do not think that a candidate can be the subject of compromise in the same fashion as a bill that is on its way to becoming law. Law-making may require the “prudential judgment” of which the bishops speak so that less rather than more harm is result. It may be that a Catholic can elect a candidate—who is clearly pro-life, that is, against abortion—who may have to compromise in order to reduce the spread or expansion of abortion. But this is not the same thing as saying that a faithful Catholic voter can make this compromise. The motivation behind the bishops’ reasoning is that Catholics cannot compromise on the issue of abortion itself—be they voters, candidates for office, or office holders. In the context of office-holders, they may have to “settle for half a loaf rather than none,” but only as a way to reduce the access to abortion and its impact until the law can be revisited again. While referring to Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Evangelium Vitae, Curran fails to state the pope’s pertinent remark, “when it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known, could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.” (EV, N. 73) So, it should be clear that the Catholic voter, candidate, and office holder must be opposed to abortion; however, it is the Catholic office holder who has the capacity to enter the compromise, a compromise that involves the law-making but not the position on abortion itself.
3. No claim of certitude.
Here the NCR quotes Fr. Curran making the remarkable statement that, “neither the bishops nor anyone else can claim certitude as to how Catholics should decide about abortion legislation.” Curran appears to rely on the work of the Second Vatican Council to substantiate and justify his claim. As he asserts, “one is not supporting a false religion, but rather the freedom of the person to choose.” He appears to suggest that the Declaration on Religious Freedom would enable a Catholic to have a more flexible position on abortion based on the grounds of religious freedom. Yet, he is not attributed by NCR as referring to any passage in the Declaration on Religious Freedom that would support this contention. However, any view that the Second Vatican Council offered support for abortion or abortion access under some circumstances, such as religious freedom, would be gravely mistaken. As the Council Fathers stated in Gaudium et Spes, “whatever is opposed to life itself, such as any type of murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia or willful self-destruction, whatever violates the integrity of the human person... all these things and others of their like are infamies indeed. They poison human society, but they do more harm to those who practice them than those who suffer from the injury. Moreover, they are supreme dishonor to the Creator.” (GS, N. 27) Fr. Curran does not appear to take stock of this crucial statement of the Council in his no-claim-of-certitude argument.
4. The weakness of the intrinsic evil argument.
Fr. Curran is, unfortunately, one of the many contemporary moral theologians who dismiss the significance of the concerns about intrinsic evil. He maintains that, at best, it “is a moral term and not a legal term.” But is he absolutely right in making this claim? First of all, we might consider the fact that the Nuremberg trials had to address the commission of terrible things that were evil—evil as inherent, essential, fundamental, real, and genuine—intrinsic evil. If I might present a rhetorical question here: is not the fact that we, as the American people, still suffer over a million abortions every year evidence that intrinsic evil is with us? And, is it not more of an intrinsic evil that we can actually do something by a few strokes of the pen—called legislation—to come to the aid of mothers who consider abortion and their targeted children who presently have little or no legal say in the matter? If wars of aggression, violence, crimes against humanity, torture, human trafficking, etc. are evils and subject to the sanction of the law, so is abortion—for it intentionally targets the most defenseless of the defenseless. Fr. Curran is quoted as saying that the weakness of arguments founded on intrinsic evil, “once again undermines the position of the bishops wanting to see the public policy position on abortion as differing from public policies on most other issues.” He relies on an analogy between adultery and abortion, but the only thing they have in common, other than they are both wrong, is that they begin with the letter “a.”
RJA sj
Saturday, October 23, 2010
In my Natural Law and Natural Rights course, I rely on the repetitio of three points: that the human person is intelligent (intelligence); that the world and what it contains is intelligible (place); and that the combination of these two components enable the community of human persons to formulate norms by which they live their lives in common (composition). I have just come across an episode at Boston College which will be an illustration of the improper and proper appropriation of this repetitio.
Over the past several days some interesting developments addressing the elements of this repetitio have taken place at Boston College. On October 13, Lindsey Hennawi wrote about her unrecognized organization’s, the Boston College Students for Sexual Health (BCSSH), project of handing free condoms out to students on a sidewalk adjacent to the university in the student newspaper The Heights. [Here] In writing this essay, Ms. Hennawi argues that “We do not do these things in spite of our place at a Jesuit institution, but in keeping with it. It is expressly because we have the privilege of attending a University so dedicated to the development of the self—both the body and the soul—that we find it both appropriate and necessary to advocate for these sexual health issues that are an integral aspect of that process.” Ms. Hennawi further argues that the BCSSH “respects and works within the framework of BC’s Catholic tradition, but we refuse to accept that it must invariably bar us from pursuing an open dialogue and concrete action around this issue.” Well, there you have it: a new definition of what it means to be Catholic. I find this approach to developing norms for an institution that attempts to present an image of being Catholic as a pure exercise of the will that neglects the intellect and, therefore, intelligence and that which is intelligible surrounding the matter. The norms that BCSSH are pressuring BC to adopt are flawed in my opinion.
Ms. Hennawi continues by expressing disagreement with a colloquy she had with a Jesuit resident chaplain, Fr. Chris Collins. She indicates that she has “never before been accused of degrading students’ dignity, nor told I am less than human, I was taken aback by this attack on my freedom to educate students and my personal freedom in making informed decisions related to sexuality.” Well, I guess there is always a first time, and, given the context, the exchange was long overdue. She then asserts that “students turned down life-saving health materials because they were intimidated by a University figure employed to support and guide them. [italics by Araujo] Whether this was his intent, this Jesuit’s actions directly infringed not just upon students’ personal comfort, but also their very freedom to make decisions for themselves. In so doing, he jeopardized students’ health and safety.” While Hennawi took to task Collins’s intervention, she concluded her article by stating, “I am more than ever committed to the BCSSH mission... This Jesuit accused us of being ‘animals’ who ignore the consequences of our actions... Our health and safety are too important. Please consider this letter an open offer to the BC community to engage in conversation and meaningful dialogue. We hope that as a community we can respect students’ rights to pursue choices about their health in a judgment-free environment. Human dignity and respect for the self means nothing without respect for others.”
Fr. Collins offers a different take on the matter a few days later on October 17. [Here] He presents something not contained in the Hennawi account that the BCSSH students were in fact encouraging their fellow students to take the condoms and “have a safe weekend.” I would imagine that the students could also have a safe weekend by going to a sports event, visiting the Museum of Fine Arts, participating in Mass or attending other religious services, studying and writing papers, and abstaining from sex, but I digress. Fr. Collins continues his account by stating that he was seeking to engage the students to think, yes, think about what they were doing; as he says,
Lindsey says I tried to “take away her freedom to educate.” That’s simply not true. Never did I say they should not be allowed to be there. On the contrary, I tried to appeal to their ability to reason and be guided by their respective consciences. What I attempted was to urge them to think more deeply about the dignity of the human person, the gift of sexuality, and what is at stake when people engage in “safe sex.” Lindsey says that I called those students handing out the condoms “animals.” That is not true. What I did say to Lindsey and her friends is that by virtue of the fact that this initiative is undertaken on Friday afternoons, the obvious context is that students will soon be getting drunk and engaging in reckless sexual behavior. I told them I found this presumption offensive in that it is implicitly treating their fellow students as if they are animals, incapable of making rational, responsible, loving—and therefore human—choices. I pointed out that the presumption here is that college students are unable to control themselves and act rationally and responsibly, so they need artificial means to keep them from hurting themselves and those with whom they will have sex. I find this a sad presumption and more than a little demeaning.
In his conclusion, Collins indicates that he cares “about these students and their futures.” I am certain that he does. He also asks for forgiveness if Ms. Hennawi and her colleagues thought he was “intimidating,” but he clearly states that “all of us, ... please think more deeply about what is at stake in all of this. Let’s think in terms of the well being not only of our bodies—certainly that—but also of our hearts.” And I would hasten to add our souls as well.
It seems to me that Fr. Collins did well and correctly to emphasize the intelligence of young people, their ability to apprehend the intelligible world that encompasses them, and to seek the moral norms that will guide them not only in the present moment but for the rest of their lives.
I would end here, but I must note that on October 20, the Executive Board of the BCSSH published in The Heights a ten point manifesto entitled “Ten Misconceptions about Sexual Health” in which the wise counsel of Fr. Collins is not in evidence. In point of fact, it is rejected. [Here] The Executive Board’s text encourages students to pursue promiscuity, and their emphasis is on latex rather than love. As a Jesuit, I find this misappropriation of the BCSSH Executive Board in their point number 6 disheartening: “Our understanding of the Jesuit tradition is men and women for others—including those who are sexually active.” Their understanding about the “Jesuit tradition” is deeply flawed. Furthermore, I find not intelligence in this statement, but I do find an aggressive will at work. That will is exemplified in the Executive Board’s concluding remark that, “Understanding sex and sexuality and making informed decisions about our health is important. So if it’s okay with you (and, frankly, even if it’s not), we’re going to keep doing what we do.”
I, for one, pray that Fr. Collins continues doing what he’s doing knowing that the BCSSH has a poor understanding of composition, place, and, sadly, intelligence. But with our additional prayers, this, too, can be remedied.
RJA sj
Saturday, October 16, 2010
I would like to thank Patrick and Susan as the inspiration for this posting—Patrick for his earlier posting “Governing in the Church—one among many reasons for libertas ecclesiae” and Susan for hers “What Role for Theologians.” While they both may be scratching their respective heads as they think about how could they have been catalysts for what follows, I can take them off the hook by stating that elsewhere in the Catholic news services reports of the issues they addressed have recently appeared.
My task today is to talk a bit about the question of how ecclesial governance is not so much an exercise in authority as it is an exercise of service that must remain free and how the role of the theologian plays into all this. So, here goes:
I had previously seen the short essay written by Professor Regina Schulte to which Susan referred us that expresses Schulte’s outrage over the rebuke issued to Professors Todd Salzman and Michael Lawler by the Committee on Doctrine of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops regarding their recent book The Sexual Person. The twenty-four page September 15, 2010 report of the Committee on Doctrine can be downloaded HERE: Download Sexual_Person_2010-09-15[1].
At the outset I am intrigued that Schulte concentrates on the last thirty to forty years by asserting that “the Catholic church [sic] has seen no progress in formulating a contemporary understanding of human sexuality...” In reading her claim, I wondered what developments in human sexuality have occurred during these three-plus decades that had not already occurred in the several thousand preceding years which would necessitate a response of reconsideration by the Church which has been around for two thousand years?
The answer, or at least the beginning of one, comes in the context of two different views of Church authority that have appeared in this recent three-plus decades. The first view contains the perspectives of Paul VI and John Paul II; the second contains the views of many contemporary moral theologians/theological ethicists. In short, the Schulte project brings to the surface the opposition between what I see as the magisterium and the shadow magisterium.
Regarding issues of sexual ethics, Pope Paul VI’s encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968) set the stage for Schulte’s essay. She encapsulates this in her statement: “By rejecting the book as in opposition to ‘authentic’ teaching, the bishops once again reeled this vital issue back to the 1966 [sic] papal encyclical Humanae Vitae. It was then [sic] that Pope Paul VI stunned the church [sic] by writing that allowing contraceptive practice as a moral choice for married couples would break with traditional church teaching.” With all due respect to Professor Schulte, Paul VI said a great deal more in the encyclical, and it is hyperbole to argue that he “stunned” the Church in saying what he did. Tolle, lege: Humanae Vitae.
Knowing that the teaching authority—the magisterium—is an issue in this posting and that the nature of the magisterium is of major concern to Professor Schulte, here is an important, sensitive, and correct pastoral statement offered by Pope Paul in Humanae Vitae that explains his proper authority and competence that is so much a source of contention with some theologians of the present age:
However, the conclusions arrived at by the commission could not be considered by Us as definitive and absolutely certain, dispensing Us from the duty of examining personally this serious question. This was all the more necessary because, within the commission itself, there was not complete agreement concerning the moral norms to be proposed, and especially because certain approaches and criteria for a solution to this question had emerged which were at variance with the moral doctrine on marriage constantly taught by the magisterium of the Church. Consequently, now that We have sifted carefully the evidence sent to Us and intently studied the whole matter, as well as prayed constantly to God, We, by virtue of the mandate entrusted to Us by Christ, intend to give Our reply to this series of grave questions. (N. 6)
Professor Schulte then makes an argument from “democracy” when she contends that a majority of the laity “had already concluded that artificial birth control was a necessity.” The fact that a majority of Catholics may vote for candidate X rather than candidate Y; or, the fact that a majority of Catholics think this rather than that does not make doctrine of the Church. If it did, what could we say about the views of a majority of Catholics on sensitive subjects in the past such as slavery? But does Professor Schulte or, for that matter, anyone else really know what a majority of Catholics think about the “necessity” of birth control? Some may employ it, but do they consider it a “necessity”? Allow me to posit that no one really knows the answer to this question posed by Schulte’s assertion.
Professor Schulte then goes on to mention some of the current, explosive issues of the day that have been addressed by competent Church authorities and others: surrogate motherhood; sex-change surgery; IVF; cohabitation before marriage; physical expression of homosexual love; same-sex “marriage”; abortion; and, “the growing and unsustainable overpopulation of our planet.” We know that competent Church authorities have addressed all these and other important issues in recent years; and, some moral theologians/theological ethicists have registered their opposition of Church teachings with countering opinions. Taking note of these opposing views and in the exercise of his competence and legitimate authority, John Paul said this in Veritatis Splendor [more Tolle, lege HERE]:
In their desire, however, to keep the moral life in a Christian context, certain moral theologians have introduced a sharp distinction, contrary to Catholic doctrine, between an ethical order, which would be human in origin and of value for this world alone, and an order of salvation, for which only certain intentions and interior attitudes regarding God and neighbour would be significant. This has then led to an actual denial that there exists, in Divine Revelation, a specific and determined moral content, universally valid and permanent. The word of God would be limited to proposing an exhortation, a generic paraenesis, which the autonomous reason alone would then have the task of completing with normative directives which are truly “objective”, that is, adapted to the concrete historical situation. Naturally, an autonomy conceived in this way also involves the denial of a specific doctrinal competence on the part of the Church and her Magisterium with regard to particular moral norms which deal with the so-called “human good”. Such norms would not be part of the proper content of Revelation, and would not in themselves be relevant for salvation. No one can fail to see that such an interpretation of the autonomy of human reason involves positions incompatible with Catholic teaching. (N. 37)
John Paul II’s correction did not go unanswered. Schulte presents her challenge to this by stating that “It is apparent that the hierarchy has usurped the entire teaching office—the “magisterium”—for themselves... [Here Schulte offers her take on the role of “theologians” and the sensus fidei] It would seem, then, that the appropriate exercise of their distinctive roles requires that bishops collaborate rather than compete.” Another influential theologian’s voice has stated that, “Moral theologians were quite angry about [Veritatis Splendor], especially with the implicit charge that moral theologians were teaching moral relativism. Inasmuch as we search for moral truth, to suggest that we were advancing moral relativism is probably the most serious attack to be made on us.” I does not appear that the bishops or any other competent authorities are trying to “compete” with anyone; rather, they are fulfilling the service responsibilities with which they have been charged in the Dogmatic Constitution of the Church. The competition comes from voices, quoting from the same source just mentioned, which argue that there are no longer universal moral responses to ethical issues; rather, these voices further contend that it is the duty of “contemporary moralists” to help “persons to rightly realize their moral truth.” Well, when all is said and done, this is nothing more than relativism and subjectivism, and this was of the concern of Paul VI and John Paul II, as I know it is of the concern of Benedict XVI as well.
Regina Schulte concludes that theologians are not mere catechists because they have a role to move Catholic moral theology forward. If that is the case, where is the “forward,” i.e., what is the destination? The Committee on Doctrine has answered that question in the context of The Sexual Person, and their decision is well reasoned and demonstrates the proper exercise of their teaching role that is once again defined by the Dogmatic Constitution of the Church. The remaining issue is this: will the bishops remain free to exercise properly their competence and their service of authority to the Church? Regina Schulte does not seem to think so.
RJA sj
Wednesday, October 13, 2010
For those of you who may be in or near Chicago next Thursday, October 21, you may be interested in the following:
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Second Annual John Courtney Murray, S.J., University Chair Lecture
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by Rev. Robert John Araujo, S.J., Loyola's John Courtney Murray, S.J. University Chair
Political debate in America today is often characterized by exchanges of loud or angry words. Reasoned discourse is often absent, and it seems an artifact relegated to the days of a nobler past. But should this be so? John Courtney Murray argued why reasoned and civil debate are essential to the American experiment and republican democracy. The meaning of his statement, "Civility dies with the death of dialogue," will be explored in detail.
5 PM · RSVP
312.915.7126
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Philip H. Corboy Law Center · Power Rogers & Smith Ceremonial Courtroom · 10th Floor · 25 East Pearson Street · Chicago
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October 21, 2010
RJA sj
Sunday, October 10, 2010
Thank you, Rob, for your clarification. I am sincerely grateful to you.
You make an interesting and important statement regarding the role of the media when you say, "the only mention of the Church's advocacy during that news cycle focused on the DVDs." That implies incorrectly that the archdiocese is only concerned about certain matters when, in fact, that is not true. When reporting sensitive and strong-response raising issues, do those who control, direct, manipulate the "news cycle" have a duty to state fully the efforts of the Church and anyone else involved with the issue being reported and whose role is either being critiqued or will reasonably be critiqued by others? It strikes me that if the media are going to publish "all the news that's fit to print" they should do precisely that in order that the public who will be exposed to the reporting will be fully rather than partially informed. Otherwise, the publishing motto will become "all the news that's fit to tint."
RJA sj
Saturday, October 9, 2010
I thank Rob for his post on the Twin Cities church’s efforts in the ongoing marriage debate and the perception of some who choose to respond to the Church and her teachings in a particular way such as that depicted in the cartoon posted by Rob and upon which he commented. I take this opportunity to respond to two friends, Rob and to Russ for whom I have great respect and affection. Russ’s posting addressed the issues of gay teen suicides and complicity. While I disagree with some of what they said, I take this opportunity to state and briefly explain my disagreement. However, if my disagreements stem from a misperception of their positions and arguments, I welcome any necessary correction.
Let me begin with Rob’s discussion of the public perception of discrimination. I conclude that this issue emerges from the further perception that the Church’s teachings on homosexuality discriminates against homosexual persons when the question of marriage is under discussion. If the Church’s teachings discriminate in that some individuals may be excluded from marriage due to their particular status, the real question then becomes this: is this discrimination unjust? The Church in her teachings has long made the distinction between just and unjust discrimination. If we think about it, discrimination surrounds us every day, but these discriminations are not necessarily unjust and are probably based on objective reasoning if they are accepted as the foundation of how we live our lives in common. For example, when a faculty is hiring someone for a teaching post, it has to select one candidate and discriminate against others who are not hired. Their decision is presumably based on the school’s teaching needs, respective credentials of the candidates, and other justifiable concerns. When a teacher gives an “A” to one student and an “F” to another student, there is discrimination, but again is this discrimination unjust? If the two students’ respective performances were evaluated on the basis of the same criteria, this discrimination is not unjust. When a licensing authority denies a motor vehicle operator’s license to a candidate who cannot read road signs and whose impaired vision does not permit safe operation of a motor vehicle, there is discrimination but it is not unjust. If a doctor prohibits a chemotherapy patient from consuming alcohol because of the potential conflict between the two types of cocktails, there is discrimination but it is not unjust. Hence, there is a need to be clear about what kind of discrimination—just or unjust—is being addressed. The Church’s discrimination is not unjust when it advances the position that homosexual couples are not the same as heterosexual couples in spite of the counterargument that they are “equal”.
I am in agreement with both Rob that it is wrong to express “the vilest sentiments” about any person including members of so-called sexual minorities. However, I must recall here what the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith stated in its “Some Considerations Concerning the Response to Legislative Proposals on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons” (1992) quoting from its 1986 “Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons” about this very issue:
It is deplorable that homosexual persons have been and are the object of violent malice in speech or in action. Such treatment deserves condemnation from the Church’s pastors wherever it occurs. It reveals a kind of disregard for others which endangers the most fundamental principles of a healthy society. The intrinsic dignity of each person must always be respected in word, in action and in law. But the proper reaction to crimes committed against homosexual persons should not be to claim that the homosexual condition is not disordered.
But I must respectfully register my disagreement with what appears to be Rob’s conclusion that an expression of “the vilest sentiments about gays and lesbians is simply a difference in degree from excluding gays and lesbians from the institution of marriage.” One does not express “the vilest sentiments about gays and lesbians” or anyone else excluded from marriage such as children, persons within certain degrees of consanguinity, or polygamists when the speaker demonstrates objective reasons supporting the argument that not all persons may marry the person or persons whom they wish to marry. To point out why marriage should be restricted to certain individuals and not open to others is not to express anything vile about those persons in the second category.
As I read his posting, Rob relies on certain claims to individual liberty which are presumably an “organizing principle.” I’ll have to raise one more time my concern that the individual liberty principle must have some sensible limit if it is to mean anything in the law and if it is to avoid the inherent problems with self-definition. In regard to the last statement, I have argued on several previous occasions at the MoJ that the Supreme Court’s expression about liberty in Planned Parenthood v. Casey leads inevitably to a head-on collision of competing liberty claims. Authentic liberty cannot be without limit, it cannot be solely defined by the person claiming its exercise, and it must be ordered if it is to have any meaning.
While Rob acknowledges that the Church has not been silent about the humanity of homosexual persons (as noted above), I think it wrong to question Archbishop Nienstedt for not addressing the recent teen suicides in his public statements about the marriage question that is before the citizens of Minnesota. Whether silence is relative or not, it should not be mistaken for approval. It is significant to note here that in other fora, the Archdiocese (in August of this year) addressed the very question of bullying and cyber-bullying that has been responsible for or implicated in the recent deaths of young people. The critique of Archbishop Nienstedt and the Twin Cities Archdiocese in this regard for presumably missing the opportunity to address these tragedies is misplaced.
While I am on this issue, I wonder if Rob thinks that Church officials should also address at this time other issues that harmfully affect gay and lesbian persons. I stopped by the digital information commons earlier today and read some articles in the Journal of Homosexuality published by Routledge which are illuminating about the harms that gay and lesbian persons confront in their lives. I believe it is fair to say that most of the articles I looked at are written by authors who are very sympathetic to the claims made by or on behalf of homosexual persons. But I discovered something of which I was previously unaware, namely, the body of literature that addresses abuse and bullying by members of the homosexual community itself; moreover, I saw a number of essays dealing with other issues, e.g., chemical dependency, that are linked with depression and suicidal thoughts and acts by homosexual persons. I just wonder if there is an expectation that Archbishop Nienstedt should have also addressed these important subjects since he was discussing the marriage issue and homosexuality? If there is an expectation that the Church address these matters too “early and often,” I am sure that the major media outlets should also do the same knowing that the Journal of Homosexuality has.
Unrelated to Rob’s or Russ’s specific posts but related to the issue of the recent teen suicides and Church teachings are many contemporary web and other media discussions on these which have appeared over the past several days. One that caught my attention was the October 7th editorial in The Heights, an independent student publication at Boston College. This editorial, “A Call for Reconciliation,” [HERE] is a strong critique against the Church and her teachings. While the editorial presumes to be a call for reconciliation, I don’t think it is. What is to be reconciled? If reconciliation means that the Church must surrender certain fundamental teachings involving sexual morality, then I guess that’s what it means to reconcile. This editorial takes the opportunity to identify the Church’s teachings as “homophobic” and intolerant. I am doubtful that such an approach promotes reconciliation. The authors of the editorial desperately want the Church to alter dramatically her position in order for “the great theological question of our time” to be addressed quickly. The editorial posits that if Boston College “aspires to be a leader in the Catholic world,” then it has to “explore ways to submit the question [meaning Church teachings] to rigorous examination.” The coup de grace of the editorial is found in its unsubstantiated allegation that “The Church can no longer choose to speak abstractly about the reality in the lives of Catholics.” If the editors cared to investigate, they would see concrete treatments of issues dealing with sexual morality issued by Rome, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, and individual bishops. By ignoring these concrete endeavors of the Church, the editors’ heroic efforts hope that Boston College will be the “place where the tangled knot of Catholic moral theology on GLBTQ issues can be unraveled and debated by intelligent, thinking believers” where the Church will be compelled to change her positions on these matters.
If there is a robust critique of the Church’s teachings going on at Boston College, are the Church’s teachings and the explanations of why she teaches what she teaches receiving their due there? I’ll leave the answer to that question for another time. However, it does appear that Archbishop Nienstedt is, in fact, working hard to fulfill his responsibilities as a teacher of what the Church teaches. It is a pity that some folks, especially the editors of this editorial, fail to recognize this. Worse yet, some think it their duty to stop him from doing his.
RJA sj
Friday, October 1, 2010
I begin this posting by thanking Rob for his recent post of September 28 entitled “Human Rights Campaign gets nasty.” His subject deals with the launching of a new campaign against the National Organization for Marriage. But that’s not the point of the organizers of the campaign; rather, the point is to introduce odium against a group of dedicated folks whose sin or crime, take your pick, is to support the traditional notion that marriage is the union of one man and one woman. The purpose of the campaign is not to engage in robust political debate but to demonize people with whom one disagrees. While this tactic may be the hallmark of totalitarianism, it is not what’s expected in and of a democracy.
Now our friends at the National Catholic Reporter pick up the task of advancing the assault on traditional marriage not by the same tactics employed by the Human Rights Campaign but by news manipulation, another tactic of totalitarian dictatorship. It is hard to come by an article (there are exceptions) in this periodical that treats fairly or tries to explain to the faithful—and anyone else who may be interested—the teachings of the Church and why the Church teaches what it teaches. The publication’s recent article of September 29 entitled Group aims to mobilize Catholics for equality [HERE] represents a new frontier in journalism that claims to be faith-based in a particular faith—or as it self-explains: “the only truly independent, journalistic outlet for Catholics and others who struggle with the complex moral and societal issues of the day...and the NCR is the only significant alternative Catholic voice that provides avenues for expression of diverse perspectives, promoting tolerance and respect for differing ideas.” I wish this were true, but if I may borrow from the film Jerry Maguire, show me the differing ideas! As I survey the internet, I see lots of avenues for expression of diverse and independent perspectives on issues important to Catholics and others. I do wonder if the publication meets the standard of N. 24 of Apostolicam Actuositatem (Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity) that “no project... may claim the name ‘Catholic’ unless it has obtained the consent of the lawful Church authority,” but I digress.
The NCR’s September 29 article offers little help in explaining the Church’s position on marriage and why she teaches what she teaches. Moreover, the article is patently critical of her teachings and actions when asserting that the Church and “Catholic allies have used deep pockets and organizational strength to speak out for state laws that would define marriage as between a man and a woman.” I wonder who the allies were and what deep pockets were behind the 1983 Charter of the Rights of the Family issued by the Holy See, which had the temerity to declare that marriage is “that intimate union of life in complementarity between a man and a woman”? And, what is the retort of the NCR?
The NCR champions a “group of politically savvy Catholics” who claim that “the bishops are out of step with the majority of Catholics on this question” regarding the definition of marriage and who further profess that 62 percent of American Catholics think otherwise and believe “that gay and lesbian relations are morally acceptable.” Taking this important point and applying it in another context, one could conclude that Bishop Clemens August von Galen was out of step with the “politically savvy” of his time.
It is disheartening to believe the implied claim that only those who can agree with the Human Rights Campaign’s views “know love when they see it.” Can it not be that those who disagree with the organization’s position—and, perhaps, the position of the NCR—can also love, but can they also say that this organization’s (and the NCR’s) views are wrong?
The NCR article takes great care in noting who contributed how much to various citizen initiatives designed to safeguard the traditional view of marriage. The article is silent on who contributed how much to citizen initiatives that were a counterpoint and support same-sex marriage. While critical of those Catholics who are exercising their rights as citizens—be they clerical or lay—to support traditional marriage, the article applauds those who have different views and assert them, sometimes in an un-Christian manner.
I fear that the Church and her faithful are in for more difficult times. But, I also see hope because it is difficult times which bring out the best in many.
RJA sj
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
I would offer a quick response to Rob's hypothetical by offering these two points that should be taken into consideration when searching for the distinctions between religious faith and sexual orientation.
The first consideration is the need to acknowledge that Catholic social thought makes a distinction between just and unjust discrimination.
The second consideration is that the Constitution's text addresses the free exercise of religion, but it is silent on the matter of sexual orientation.
RJA sj
