Perspectives on the Concept of Doctrine

 

Many thanks to our newest member, Marc DeGirolami, for his November 3^rd contribution “On the Idea of Doctrine.” It may be possible to consider that other disciplines such as economics, political science, literature, the physical sciences, etc. rely on doctrines, i.e., principles, canons, policies, guidelines, etc.

Here I express a different take from Marc when he suggests that these other disciplines may regard doctrine as an impediment. Might it be more the case that within these other disciplines the argument really is a disagreement over which doctrines should be recognized and which should not? Marc offers the distinction between dogma and doctrine, but it is quite permissible from the study of the meaning of language to consider the two synonymous. Nevertheless, I appreciate Marc’s offering the distinction as he explains it. Of course, the same kinds of disagreements to which he refers emerge in theology and law. For example, we need to take stock of doctrinal disagreements today that are prominent within the study of scripture, moral theology, and fundamental—systematic—theology. Within law, there is often the conflict between the positivist and natural law lawyers.

I agree with Marc that theology and law are surely prominent as disciplines having attachment to doctrine.

Being more familiar with law and theology, I strongly concur that doctrinal and dogmatic concepts are vital to both of these fields. One objective of my post today is to offer a suggestion that theology and civil law are historically related. In some ways, we can consider that law did emerge from theology when we consider the Jewish faith and ancient legal precepts. Within Christianity, it is clear that the Church’s teachings and practices provided a foundation for the development of European legal institutions. (The work of John M. Kelly and Harold Berman is illuminating in this regard.) For example, the civil courts of England emerged from the ecclesiastical courts. Within the realm of public international law, the natural law and theological works of Augustine, Aquinas, de Vitoria, and Suárez are important sources upon which the often-called “father” of international law, Hugo Grotius, relied.

I think an important common denominator for acknowledging the nexus today is found in the work of John Courtney Murray, S.J., where he stated in his “The Origins and Authority of the Public Consensus,” that there is a three-fold proposition crucial to legal theory and the natural law: (1) the human person is intelligent; (2) reality is intelligible; and, (3) this reality, as comprehended by intelligence, imposes upon the human will the obligation to formulate norms of action and abstention that accord to reality of intelligible nature.

Marc offers a good point that doctrine (and adherence to it) bespeaks of the relevance and significance of authority and of authoritative pronouncements. Indeed, both theology and law have authorities that determine what is orthodox and what is not. But do not learned societies and professional associations in other disciplines also provide a kind of authority which establishes a framework of commitment or a coordinating function to what is appropriate and what is inappropriate within the context of the discipline for which the authority speaks?

May I suggest that most, if not all, disciplines rely on a past that helps charter their present and future courses. Members of the disciplines, including theology and law, can and do make departures from what has taken place, e.g., the reversal of precedent in the law. But for all disciplines, to borrow an expression, is not the past prologue?

Welcome, again, Marc!

RJA sj