Over at Law Religion Ethics blog, Rutgers law prof Perry Dane compares the proposed mosque near Ground Zero to the controversy over crosses at Auschwitz. (I'm not opening comments here because comments are open there.)
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
A mosque near Ground Zero and crosses at Auschwitz
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
Citizens United and the culture wars
Saturday, August 14, 2010
The mosque near ground zero
A reader asks why there has been no debate on MoJ about the proposal to build an Islamic center and mosque 2-4 blocks from the World Trade Center site. I'm guessing there hasn't been any debate because there isn't much disagreement among MoJers. I could be wrong, so let me throw this out there: I support the building of the center at the proposed site, and I strongly oppose the idea that the government should forbid a religious body from building in a particular area based on the identity of the religion in question (as opposed to neutral zoning requirements, though even those can get tricky). I realize that this liberty is not extended to Christian churches in many Islamic countries, but that doesn't change the analysis, in my view. Further, if one legacy of 9/11 becomes "no Muslim presence anywhere near here!," I think we've played into the narrative sought by the Islamic radicals -- some grand religious and cultural war. Thoughts?
UPDATE: I like the way William Saletan puts it:
This was never a war between us and the Muslim world. It's a war between us and al-Qaida. The central battleground in this war isn't Iraq, Afghanistan, or Lower Manhattan. It's Islam. That's the ground al-Qaida is fighting for. It's the ground Imam Rauf wants to take back. He wants to build an Islam that loves America, embraces freedom, and preaches coexistence. Let's help him.
Friday, August 13, 2010
Proposition 8 and the Rule of Facts
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
A new "conservative" Christian law school
The universe of Christian law schools is apparently set to expand, thanks to the folks at Louisiana College, who are reportedly set to announce the opening of a law school in Shreveport that "will have a 'biblical worldview' . . . to train future lawyers to defend conservative Christian values in courtrooms and politics." It would be nice, I think, for the school's founders to acknowledge that a biblical worldview might not always call lawyers to "defend conservative Christian values," but might sometimes call them to "advocate for culturally transformative and difficult-to-pin-down-on-the-American-political-spectrum Christian values." Not as catchy, I realize.
Monday, August 9, 2010
Is Judge Walker's ruling wrong or just premature?
I was out of town last week, so I just now had the chance to sit down and read Perry v. Schwarzenegger. A few initial reactions: First, what were the proponents' counsel (pro-Prop 8) thinking in only putting on two experts, neither of whom strike me as especially strong under Daubert/Kumho Tire? To be clear, I think David Blankenhorn is a very thoughtful writer and effective advocate, but that doesn't make him a good choice as a testifying expert witness. More broadly, if constitutional litigation is a battle of public policy arguments (and I'm not saying it should be), this one was no contest.
Second, Judge Walker's sweeping findings of fact strike me as overconfident in portraying as conclusively settled issues that, at least in my understanding, are still being debated, see, e.g., #55 ("Permitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex relationships."), #70 ("The gender of a child's parent is not a factor in a child's adjustment."), #71 ("[H]aving both a male and a female parent does not increase the likelihood that a child will be well-adjusted."). Elsewhere, he frames the finding in a way that begs the question, see, e.g., #34 (adopting definition of marriage that would cover nonsexual relationships), #77 ("Same-sex couples are identical to opposite-sex couples in the characteristics relevant to the ability to form successful marital unions."), or is quick to attribute the most harmful of implications to Prop 8, see, e.g., #58 (Prop 8 "places the force of law behind [the stigma] that gays and lesbians are not as good as heterosexuals").
Third, to the extent that Judge Walker's findings are based on the paucity of contrary evidence presented by proponents' attorneys, perhaps this suggests that a courtroom trial is not the ideal setting in which to chart a course for the future of foundational social institutions. When we're trying a case to see whether defective brakes or driver error caused the car accident in question, plaintiffs and defendants fail or prevail based on the evidence they can put before the court. Adopting a definition of marriage because it was the only one put forward by a qualified expert seems a bit more dicey.
Fourth, a quick thought experiment: suppose that Judge Walker's ruling was issued forty years from now, and that California at that time is the only state not to have adopted SSM through the political process. Suppose further that empirical studies support conclusively all of Judge Walker's factual findings about the quality of parenting, the stability of relationships, etc. in comparing same-sex and opposite-sex couples. In other words, the consequentialist arguments are off the table. Assuming that Lawrence v. Texas is still good law at that time, would Judge Walker be wrong to rule that Prop 8 is unconstitutional? If so, why? What would the legitimate state interest be at that point in prohibiting SSM?
Thursday, July 29, 2010
Finally! We solved the religious liberty problem!
In the New York Times, Feisal Mohamed offers a "third way" between Varro and Augustine in matters of religious liberty. Varro distinguished "natural theology" from "civil theology" -- the latter referring to the theology acceptable in public observance -- while Augustine wondered why, if natural theology is truly natural, it should be excluded from the city. Mohamed explains:
Political and religious positions must be measured against the purity of truths, rightly conceived as those principles enabling the richest possible lives for our fellow human beings.
I'm all in favor of pure truths and rich lives, so maybe Mohamed is on to something. Wait a second, though -- how would this work in practice?
The kind of women’s fashion favored by the Taliban might legitimately be outlawed as an instrument of gender apartheid — though one must have strong reservations about the enforcement of such a law, which could create more divisiveness than it cures. The standard of human harmony provides strong resistance to anti-gay prejudice, stripping it of its wonted mask of righteousness. It objects in disgust to Pope Benedict XVI when he complains about Belgian authorities seizing church records in the course of investigating sexual abuse; it also praises the Catholic Church for the humanitarian and spiritual services it provides on this country’s southern border, which set the needs of the human family above arbitrary distinctions of citizenship. The last example shows that some belief provides a deeply humane resistance to state power run amok. To belief of this kind there is no legitimate barrier.
What a solution! I'm not sure how this "third way" is different than Varro's "civil theology," except that the definitional content built into the "civil" requirement amounts to the World As Your Humble Author Thinks It Should Be.
Quote of the day
Check out Joe Carter's short essay at First Things. Great quote:
It is often said that for national security conservatives, it is always 1938. A corollary is that for us religiously-oriented conservatives, it’s always 1968. Our society is always having to be retaught the laws of moral hygiene.