Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Yoshino on SSM

Over at Slate, Kenji Yoshino continues the conversation with Robby George et al. regarding the nature of marriage.  I find the exchange to be healthy and productive, not because it's reaching consensus, but because it's clearing away much of the name-calling and easy assumptions and getting down to the core of the disagreement.  The core, not surprisingly, centers on the malleability of marriage.  Yoshino articulates his view:

[T]hose who have propounded trans-historical, much less eternal, definitions of marriage have often been time's fools. Fifty years from now, I expect new challenges will be made to the definition of marriage. Yes, such challenges could take the form of challenges to recognize polygamous marriages (in fact, such challenges would not be new, as they were made on grounds of the free exercise of religion in the 19th century). Currently, I would distinguish polygamous marriage primarily on the intuitive ground that one can give one's full self to only one other person—that is, that the "undivided commitment" the co-authors praise can be valuable even in the absence of common procreation. But I would prefer to test such intuitions if and when such debates become live national controversies. I do not purport to know where future challenges will arise, or how those challenges might require us to reassess the purposes of marriage. I refuse to answer the question "What is marriage?" by saying "Marriage is one thing, always and everywhere, for all people." I regard that refusal as a strength, rather than as a weakness, of my position, as I do not think we stand at the end of history today.

Friday, December 17, 2010

Slippery slopes

Reading the comments to my post on Will Saletan's distinction between SSM and incest made me wonder: are slippery slope arguments more powerful in legal reasoning than in moral reasoning?  Saletan was focused on moral arguments against (adult) incest, and there does not (in my view) seem to be much of an obstacle in making arguments distinguishing adult incest from SSM.  That doesn't mean you will find arguments in favor of SSM persuasive; it just means that there are readily apparent moral analyses of SSM and adult incest that are distinct from each other.  As long as those arguments are available, I don't see much ground for raising slippery slope concerns.  In law, though, there seems to be less and less moral analysis -- or perhaps more accurately, moral analysis has been foreclosed for certain categories of conduct under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution (Eisenstadt, Roe, Lawrence, et al.).  If law is pulling back from adjudicating contested moral claims regarding sex, the beginning of life, the meaning of marriage, etc. to the extent that these claims are perceived to implicate threaten overarching equality and privacy norms, then it seems that the slippery slope concern is apt.  Even then, though, it might not be a slippery slope per se, but an already flattened slope that is just gradually being articulated as particular disputes are adjudicated in the void that has been created by the law's departure. 

This is a long and rambling way of getting to the question: do slippery slope arguments have much traction in philosophy (or other circles outside constitutional interpretation)?  I'm guessing that this question has been taken up by others in the past, and if so, I'd appreciate being steered toward the appropriate sources.

What is Marriage?

Last week Robby George, Sherif Girgis, and Ryan Anderson posted a new paper, "What is Marriage?"  Kenji Yoshino responds here, calling it "the best argument against gay marriage," but ultimately rejecting it.  George et al. have now replied to Yoshino.

When is "anti-SSM" properly labeled "anti-gay?"

Here's an update on the controversy over Apple pulling a Manhattan Declaration app from its App Store.  I'm more interested in MSNBC's headline for the story.

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Incest is cancer

If concern for the traditional family unit is not enough to justify opposition to same-sex marriage, is it enough to justify opposition to adult incest?  Will Saletan makes the case for continuing the moral taboo against adult incest, even if our society has grown less comfortable condemning decisions between consenting adults pertaining to sex.

Waldron quote of the day

In the paper I linked to earlier today, Jeremy Waldron challenges secularist premises regarding the nature of religious argument on controversial political issues:

The secularist view seems to be that a person of faith engaged in a political debate will – if he is allowed – simply cite some verse of scripture which he finds dispositive of the issue and then stand pat, impervious to argument.

[However, w]hen I read the Catholic case against gay marriage, for example, I am not convinced by it; but I find there is very little Leviticus-quoting or invocation of papal authority. What I read are elaborate tissues of argument and reason, open to disputation and vulnerable in the usual way to quibble, rejoinder, and refutation. . . . [A]ctually what’s infuriating about people like Finnis is not any adamantine fundamentalism but their determination to actually argue on matters that many secular liberals think should be beyond argument, matters that we think should be determined by shared sentiment or conviction. My experience is that many who are convinced of the gay rights position are upset more by the fact that their argumentative religious opponents refuse to take the liberal position for granted than they are by the more peremptory tactics of the “bible-bashers.”

Tuesday, December 14, 2010

Secularism and the Limits of Community

Jeremy Waldron keeps churning out papers brimming with meaningful implications for the MoJ conversation.  His latest, Secularism and the Limits of Community, looks like a must-read.  The abstract:

This paper addresses two issues: (1) the use of religious considerations in social and political argument; and (2) the validation of the claims of community against markets and other aspects of globalization. It argues that we should be very wary of the association of (1) with (2), and the use of (1) to reinforce (2). The claims of community in the modern world are often exclusionary (the word commonly associated with community is "gated") and hostile to the rights of the poor, the homeless, the outcast, and so on. The logic of community in the modern world is a logic that reinforces market exclusion and the disparagement of the claims of the poor. If religious considerations are to be used to uphold those claims and to mitigate exclusion, they need to be oriented directly to that task, and to be pursued in ways that by-pass the antithetical claims of community. Religious considerations are at their most powerful in politics -- and are most usefully disconcerting -- when they challenge the logic of community.

Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Marriage and the Middle Class

Brad Wilcox and Chuck Donovan report that marriage's decline is expanding from the lower socioeconomic classes into the middle class.  An excerpt:

The breakdown of marriage and family has afflicted the poorest Americans for more than a generation. What is happening today is a widening gulf between the middle class, where a sharp decline in marriage is at work, and the most educated and affluent Americans, where marriage indicators are either stable or improving. . . .

Among moderately educated Americans, the out-of-wedlock birth rate hit 44 percent, up from 13 percent as recently as 1982.  Again, Middle America moved closer in behavioral norms to the poorest Americans, even as more educated and wealthier Americans are embracing a marriage mindset.

Monday, December 6, 2010

Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital

I missed this opinion from a couple of weeks ago (but thankfully John Breen didn't!): the Second Circuit has ruled, not surprisingly, that the Church Amendment does not create a private right of action by which a nurse who was forced to participate in a late-term abortion may sue to vindicate her right of conscience.  As Robin Wilson has argued, if the Dep't of Health and Human Services declines to enforce the Church Amendment, a private right of action may be needed.

Friday, December 3, 2010

Waldron on the Image of God and Human Rights

Jeremy Waldron has been pitching it right in the MoJ wheelhouse recently.  He just posted a new paper, The Image of God: Rights, Reason, and Order.  The abstract:

The idea that humans are created in the image of God is often cited as a foundation for human rights theory. In this paper, this use of imago dei is surveyed, and while the paper is basically favorable to this foundation, it draws attention to some difficulties (both theological and practical) that using imago dei as a foundation for human rights may involve. Also it explores the suggestion that the image of God idea may be more apt as a foundation for some rights rather than others. Its use in relation to political rights is specifically explored. The moral of the discussion is that foundations do make a difference. We should not expect that, if we simply nail this idea onto the underside of a body of human rights theory as a foundation, everything in the theory will remain as it is.

And from the paper:

The foundational work that imago Dei does for dignity is, in my opinion,indispensable for generating the sort of strong moral constraint associated with rights – and for overriding the temptation to demonize or bestialize “the worst of the worst.” This temptation is so natural that it can only be answered by something that goes beyond our attitudes, even beyond “our” morality, something commanded from the depths of the pre-political and pre-social foundation of the being of those we are tempted to treat in this way Imago Dei presents the respect that humans as such are entitled to as something grounded, not in what we happen to care about or in what we happen to have committed ourselves to, but in facts about what humans are actually like, or, more accurately, what they have been made by the Creator to be like – like unto Himself and by virtue of that likeness sacred and inviolable. We are not just clever animals, and the evil-doers among us are not just good animals gone bad: our dignity is associated with a specifically high rank in creation accorded to us by our creator and refl ecting our likeness to the creator. Our status even as wrong-doers is to be understood in relation to this.

He also points out some difficulties with the Imago Dei as a basis for rights, both from theological and political vantage points.  Well worth reading.