Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, September 12, 2005

Religious Freedom and Immigration

Like Rick, I'm troubled by the Fifth Circuit's ruling on religious "freedom" in China, but I'm wondering whether some of the fault lies in the vagueness of the governing statute, which provides simply that "the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's . . . religion."  We don't have to look to China for scenarios where an individual's freedom is threatened because of his religion.  Would or should the United States grant asylum to a pastor who wants to preach anti-gay sermons in Sweden?  Or to Christians who want to proselytize in Saudi Arabia?  For that matter, should other countries give asylum to Native Americans who lack the legislative clout to secure exemptions for their sacramental use of illegal drugs?  Or to David Koresh types?

In other words, can the statute mean what it seems to say, and if so, is that a workable standard?  And does the impractical quality of the standard drive the Fifth Circuit's strained distinctions between "political opinion" and religion?  Given the fact that states constantly pose threats to their citizens depending on the substance of the citizens' religion-driven practices (many more of which are palatable to the United States government than to the Chinese government), is it more accurate to fault the Fifth Circuit for failing to acknowledge that the limitations placed on religious exercise in China are not justified by state interests that we deem legitimate (much less compelling)?

Rob

Friday, September 9, 2005

Associations, Discrimination and the Academy

There's an interesting discussion over at the Volokh Conspiracy (and St. Maximos' Hut) regarding an academic association forging its identity through a non-discrimination norm and the impact such an identity has on the ability of schools (in this case, Wheaton College) to forge their own unique identities.  At some point, one side's associational identity has to give; my understanding of subsidiarity calls for the higher body (the association) to resist the temptation to elevate its own moral claims to non-negotiable status when such claims preclude the pursuit of divergent claims by the lower body (the school).  This does not mean that all academic associations must allow all moral claims to flourish among their members.  Where exclusion from an association does not threaten the viability of a school, there is no reason why the higher body must disregard its own identity to embrace all schools seeking membership.  (E.g., There is no reason why an Association of Christian Law Schools should have to admit UCLA.)  It's different, though, where exclusion from an association calls into question the very ability of a school to function.  (E.g., The American Association of Law Schools should not require that member schools agree not to consider religion in its decisions on faculty hiring.)

Rob

Salvation through Government

Joe Carter has another provocative post on Katrina addressing the rising belief in "Gnostic governance":

[O]ne of the most consistent, though often unstated, themes in the discussion about the disaster in New Orleans is that the government could have saved everyone. Some blame the local government, which had hundreds of unused buses at their disposal. Most others place the blame on the Federal government which is believed to have almost unlimited resources at its disposal.

Either one or both of these allegations could very well be true. But undergirding every claim is the foundational assumption that someone somewhere could have done enough to ensure almost universal salvation after the disaster. Nearly everyone could have been spared if only the government had responded in the right way. . . .

As becomes apparent, the Gnostic deification of governance resembles the Roman god Zeus more than it does Jehovah or Allah. The Gnostic government is omnipotent, but not omniscient; transcendent and also immanent; impersonal and yet represented in various human forms (i.e., President Bush). The god is also arbitrary and showers blessings on those it loves (the rich, welfare recipients, white men) and ignores those who it despises (the poor, minorities, white men); able to save all and yet arbitrarily chooses limited atonement. It is a fickle god that commands our succor but is unworthy of adoration.

Over the next few weeks, the primary question will be “Which part of the government is to blame?” and will be hashed over by the various Gnostic sects the way Lutherans and Presbyterians argue over baptism. A few heretics (like me) may step forward to claim that maybe -- just maybe -- the government really can’t save us all. After an audible gasp, we apostates will be shouted down and ushered to the door by a stern deacon. We’ll stand outside the gates of the public square, shrugging and casting bemused looks at one another. As we walk away, with the din of “Bush!”, “Class!”, “Race!”, and “FEMA!” echoing behind us, we’ll reflect on the nature of government and remember where our true salvation lies.

Carter once again raises some good points, but remembering where our true salvation lies should not be an obstacle to recognizing the impact human action can have on real-world suffering.  FEMA could not have stopped the hurricane, but it could have responded to the resulting disaster more quickly and effectively.  Demanding as much is not idolatrous; it is good citizenship.

Rob

Wednesday, September 7, 2005

Mission-driven law school courses

At St. Thomas, we are exploring the possibility of adding a course to familiarize first-year students with the basic tenets of Catholic social thought as applied to the lawyer's role.  To the extent that co-bloggers and readers have taught or taken similar mission-driven courses -- whether the course was explicitly grounded in Catholic social thought or not -- I'd love to hear about your experience.

Rob 

Tamanaha on Recusal in Abortion Cases

Over at Balkinization, Brian Tamanaha has weighed in on the debate over judges recusing themselves in abortion cases.  An excerpt:

If these judges were remaining true to their opposition to abortion--if they acted with the courage of their convictions--it would seem that [they should] hear the cases and deny all applications. This would directly prevent abortions (at least for those minors who do not thereafter go to their parents for permission). Of course, some truly desperate minors who cannot confide in their parents might seek high risk (dangerous) abortions from unlicensed practioners who will ignore the consent requirements. But by taking [this] option in many cases the judge will have effectively prevented abortions. Judges against abortion can be even more effective in preventing them if they delay purposefully in issuing their denials long enough to make it difficult for the minor to seek out other alternatives. This . . . option is underhanded and repulsive, to be sure, but it would prevent abortions--so the higher moral end justifies the means.

. . . . [F]rom the standpoint of their opposition to abortion, judges who recuse themselves are not preventing any. What they are doing is keeping their hands clean while making someone else, a fellow judge, accept responsibility for deciding the case. After all, no judge wants to hear these cases, all of which have an unavoidably tragic element--these minors are the most vulnerable people in society in the most difficult situation imaginable. Adding to the burden they impose on other judges, the judges who recuse themselves expose their fellow judges to reprisal--to an increased risk of losing their judicial position in the next election--for stepping up to do the job the conscientious objector judge was unwilling to do.

The recusal option, when viewed in this way, seems neither consistent with their moral opposition to abortion nor with their institutional obligation to their colleagues, nor with their duty to apply the law. Moreover, if judges begin to recuse themselves partly out of opposition to abortion and partly out of fear of the possible reprisal at the next election (such mixed motives would be normal), the moral standing of recusal becomes shakier.

When you consider further that this practice opens a back door way to defeat the law--to eliminate the legal right of minors to obtain an abortion in situations where they do not want to seek parental consent--the recusal decision appears even more dubious.

Of course, these judges would (and should) recoil at the suggestion that they take the cases and uniformly deny requests. That course of action . . . would violate their oath to apply the law in an unbiased fashion, and would not be fair to the applicants. But, as Professor Koniak pointed out, by recusing themselves they have already taken a step down this path.

All things considered, a judge who cannot in good conscience apply the law fairly--who cannot do the job they have sworn to do--would seem to have only one option: resign.

Rob

Tuesday, September 6, 2005

Subsidiarity and Katrina

Over at Evangelical Outpost, Joe Carter views the Katrina tragedy through the lens of subsidiarity, asserting that the tools for an effective pre-hurricane evacuation were within the grasp of local officials, who instead simply pointed their fingers at the federal government.  But conservative advocates of subsidiarity do not escape blame, according to Carter, as they fail to live out the doctrine they espouse:

Principles such as subsidiarity, federalism, and limited government are often considered cornerstones of conservative political thought. But when it comes to their actual implementation they are merely given lip-service. While aspiring young politicos sing the praises of states-rights, they prefer to do so on Capital Hill or in D.C. think tanks rather than in the choirs of their state legislatures or local governments. The very idea that our most competent conservative statesmen should be working in their actual states rather than in Washington is considered ludicrous. After all, everyone knows that state and local governments are reserved for the also-rans and has-beens rather than for the able and ambitious. Any job in FEMA, for instance, is considered superior to working in the New Orleans’s Office of Emergency Preparedness.

But mayor’s offices, city councils, and state legislatures all join the “little platoons” that serve as our first line of defense when natural or man-made disasters strike. So why then are we not working to put our best and brightest into these offices? Why do push them to take jobs as Senatorial aides rather than as state senators? Why do we lead them to roles as assistants to assistant directors in the Department of Education rather than as leaders on county school boards? Why do we put our rhetoric behind the local and yet but our faith in the federal?

If we expect to be taken seriously, conservatives must start supporting the principles we claim we believe. One way that we could begin is by “subsidizing” subsidiarity, by using our resources to promote our intellectual and political leaders at the state and local levels of governance.

In the case of Katrina, I think there's plenty of blame to go around at both the local and federal levels.  I do agree with Carter, though, that conservatives often invoke subsidiarity without acknowledging its full import, an argument I've made elsewhere.  (This is not to excuse liberals, who tend to ignore subsidiarity completely.)

Rob

Thursday, September 1, 2005

Tragedy and Detachment

Usually when a natural disaster hits, I find myself effectively intellectualizing the tragedy, focusing on big-picture issues that call for problem-solving or logical analysis, rather than the person-by-person anguish that has unfolded.  So when the tsunami hit in December, I focused on the theological implications, which make for fantastic and important debate, but can sometimes distance us from the ground-level reality.  That changed a couple of weeks later when we learned that a close friend of my wife's from college had been swept away by the tsunami in Thailand.  The debate suddenly became less vital to me. 

There was no chance of intellectualizing Katrina.  As a graduate of the University of New Orleans, for four years I lived steps away from Lake Pontchartrain, and still have many good friends in the city.  So the impact of Katrina, for me, is not captured by the panoramic scenes of flooding, the gambling barges tossed onto buildings in Mississippi, the skyrocketing gas prices, or even the law students with their futures in limbo.  I think of my friends Chuck and Becky, of their beautiful but now uninhabitable home near the lake, and of the fear and confusion faced by their young kids.  I also think of their deep family roots in New Orleans, and of sunny February mornings during college standing in the front yard of Becky's childhood home as the Mardi Gras parades went by, a home that is now almost certainly underwater.

I might be speaking for myself (but I doubt it) when I confess that lawyers, and especially law professors, are very adept at using our minds to detach ourselves from suffering.  Indeed, I catch myself unconsciously teaching my Torts students to do the same thing as I gloss over (or worse yet, make a joke of) the horrific suffering of plaintiffs that fills our casebook, recasting it without even skipping a beat as a problem to be solved through the application of legal reasoning.  I hope that I can teach myself, as well as my students, to make sure that I don't even think about solving someone's problems until I've come alongside and mourned their loss.

Rob

Tuesday, August 30, 2005

Public Schools, Private Schools, and Moral Capital

I've just finished reading Amy Gutmann's Democratic Education, and while I find myself resisting several of the book's assertions, I've had trouble articulating a response to one of the passages.  Here it is:

Many public schools in the mind-nineteenth century were, to say the least, disrespectful of Catholicism.  Catholic children who attended these schools were often humiliated, sometimes whipped for refusing to read the King James version of the Bible.  Imagine that instead of becoming more respectful, public schools had been abolished, and states had subsidized parents to send their children to the private school of their choice.  Protestant parents would have sent their children to Protestant schools, Catholic parents to Catholic schools.  The Protestant majority would have continued to educate their children to be disrespectful if not intolerant of Catholics.  The religious prejudices of Protestant parents would have been visited on their children, and the social, economic, and political effects of those prejudices would have persisted, probably with considerably less public protest, to this very day.  There may be little reason today for Catholic parents to worry that privatizing schools will reinstitutionalize bigotry against Catholics, at least in the short run.  But one reason that Catholics need not worry is that [a school system built on parental choice] today would be built on the moral capital created over almost a century by a public school system.

My questions for Rick, Tom, Patrick, Michael S., and others who have written or thought about the importance of Catholic schooling and/or school choice: Do you agree that, as public schools became more tolerant of minority views, they played an essential role in reducing tension and increasing understanding between Catholics and Protestants?  If so, would you still advocate for school choice if you were writing in the nineteenth century, or is your support for school choice premised, at least in part, on the availability of the "moral capital" created by public schooling?

Rob

Informal Groups and the Law

Even if you don't normally keep up on technology-and-law scholarship (and I don't), anyone interested in mediating structures, subsidiarity, civil society, etc. will want to check out Pittsburgh law prof Michael Madison's paper, "Social Software, Groups, and the Law."  Here is the abstract:

Formal groups play an important role in the law. Informal groups largely lie outside it. Should the law be more attentive to informal groups? The paper argues that this and related questions are appearing more frequently as a number of computer technologies, which I collect under the heading "social software," increase the salience of groups. In turn, that salience raises important questions about both the significance and the benefits of informal groups. The paper suggests that there may be important social benefits associated with informal groups, and that the law should move towards a framework for encouraging and recognizing them. Such a framework may be organized along three dimensions by which groups arise and sustain themselves: regulating places, of things, and of stories.

And here's an even more intriguing passage from the paper itself:

Law channels social organizations into prescribed forms, fictionalizing the entity for regulatory purposes.  Absent the prescribed form, law looks to the individual.  Informal social structures are messy and dynamic; formal legal structures are relatively neat, and static.  Part of my argument here is that something is lost in the translation.  There may be good which comes from informal groups, which may be lost when group activity is channeled into typical legal forms.

(HT: Solum)

Rob

Friday, August 26, 2005

Popular by Contract

Given our ongoing discussion of Pat Robertson's bizarre behavior this week, it bears noting that he appears to be even less of a spokesperson for evangelicals than we might think, as he is no longer dependent on attracting or keeping viewers with his espoused take on the world.  Christianity Today reports that:

Television and televangelism usually work through viewership. A show with few viewers won't stay on the air: On commercial television, no advertisers will buy space. In religious broadcasting, no donations will come in. But Robertson hasn't needed viewers for almost a decade. He has contractual obligations.

Many people have complained about the 700 Club to cable channel ABC Family, which airs it. But ABC Family has no choice. It is obligated under contract to air it. (The FCC may not be able to do anything, either)

In 1988, Robertson sold the Family Network to Fox for $1.9 billion.  Not bad, when you consider the channel was originally launched in 1977 through the donations of viewers who had been promised a Christian alternative to "secular" television, then taken public in 1992. CBN got $136 million from the sale. Robertson's Regent University got another $148 million. Robertson personally received $19 million, and the rest went to the Robertson Charitable Remainder Trust, which will fund CBN after Robertson and his wife die.

But the money wasn't the biggest part of the deal: Fox Family was required to air The 700 Club three times a day—and, if Fox sold the network, the obligation to air The 700 Club had to be part of that deal, too.

Cable World reported in 2001 that Robertson turned down hundreds of millions of dollars to renegotiate. Largely due to frustration that the 700 Club had disrupted its programming, Fox sold the network to the Walt Disney Company in 2001 for $3 billion and $2.3 billion in debt. Now ABC Family is obligated to air the program three times a day.

Hopefully reality will give folks pause before they attribute Robertson's "leadership" to the desires and inclinations of evangelicals (much less Christians more broadly).

Rob