Religious Freedom and Immigration

Like Rick, I'm troubled by the Fifth Circuit's ruling on religious "freedom" in China, but I'm wondering whether some of the fault lies in the vagueness of the governing statute, which provides simply that "the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's . . . religion."  We don't have to look to China for scenarios where an individual's freedom is threatened because of his religion.  Would or should the United States grant asylum to a pastor who wants to preach anti-gay sermons in Sweden?  Or to Christians who want to proselytize in Saudi Arabia?  For that matter, should other countries give asylum to Native Americans who lack the legislative clout to secure exemptions for their sacramental use of illegal drugs?  Or to David Koresh types?

In other words, can the statute mean what it seems to say, and if so, is that a workable standard?  And does the impractical quality of the standard drive the Fifth Circuit's strained distinctions between "political opinion" and religion?  Given the fact that states constantly pose threats to their citizens depending on the substance of the citizens' religion-driven practices (many more of which are palatable to the United States government than to the Chinese government), is it more accurate to fault the Fifth Circuit for failing to acknowledge that the limitations placed on religious exercise in China are not justified by state interests that we deem legitimate (much less compelling)?

Rob