Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, October 25, 2006

Catholics and Civil Unions for Gays and Lesbians

Why should we think that Catholics can't support civil unions for gays and lesbians, as distinct from civil marriages?  Consider the following piece by John Allen:

'Theo-dem', top Vatican hawk on family have meeting of minds

By JOHN L. ALLEN JR.
New York

An intriguing meeting took place in the Vatican today between a leading exponent of a political current known as the “theo-dems,” meaning center-left politicians inspired by Catholic values, and the Vatican’s leading hawk on issues of sexuality and the family. The encounter symbolizes two different visions of the church’s engagement in the Western “culture wars” – one moderate and dialogic, the other clear and uncompromising.

Indirectly, the session raises a crucial question, with implications far beyond Italy: To what extent can the more moderate tendency find a “right of citizenship” in a church that in many ways stresses a harder line?

Italy’s Minister of the Family, a 56-year-old devout Catholic politician named Rosy Bindi, met Cardinal Alfonso Lopez Trujillo, 70, President of the Pontifical Council for the Family, in Lopez Trujillo’s Vatican office.

Though no statement was issued after the session, the two almost certainly discussed Bindi’s willingness to entertain proposals for the civil registration of unmarried, “de facto” couples, including same-sex couples, a proposal Lopez and other church officials have strongly opposed.

On most other cultural issues, Bindi and Lopez are in near-perfect harmony. Bindi opposes gay marriage and adoption rights for homosexuals, and has made clear that the government of Romano Prodi has no intention of introducing legislation that would equate same-sex unions with marriage.

“The word ‘pacs’ does not appear in our agenda,” Bindi has said, referring to the French acronym which has become a shorthand reference for civil equivalents of marriage in European discourse. "We speak of civil unions, of guaranteeing rights."

“One can’t think of putting the family founded on marriage and other forms of living together on the same level,” Bindi said, “and not just because the pope says so.”

Yet the fracture between Bindi and Lopez Trujillo on civil unions reflects a wider divergence in Catholic opinion – between those who believe that the state has to make some concession to new social realities in order to protect individual rights, and those who insist that any concession to the dissolution of the traditional family unit invites a slippery slope.

More broadly, some Italian Catholics see figures such as Bindi as a God-send, a way of keeping Catholic values alive in political and cultural circles often hostile to the church. Others, however, see her attempt to reconcile Catholicism with the post-modern political left as an effort to merge matter and anti-matter which the church should reject.

It’s a quandry with which Catholic politicians elsewhere, including Democrats in the United States, can easily identify.

Few politicians anywhere in the world, of any ideological stripe, can stake a better personal claim to Catholic credentials than Bindi.

Born in 1951 in Sinalunga, Bindi attended the University of Siena and quickly became enrolled in Catholic Action, by far the largest and most influential lay organization in Italy. Catholic Action has long been seen as the moderate and “mainstream” lay group in Italian Catholicism, while Communion and Liberation, founded by Fr. Luigi Giussani, is the more conservative alternative.

Bindi says that her life changed on Feb. 19, 1980, when she witnessed the assassination of her mentor, Vittorio Bachelet, by a commander of the Red Brigade terrorist group. Bachelet was a former president of Catholic Action as well as a former vice-president of the Pontifical Council for the Family. Afterwards, Bindi dedicated herself to Bachelet’s project of bringing Catholic values to political life.

As a member of the opposition party under former conservative Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Bindi was a strong opponent of the war in Iraq. After elections last May brought the center-left under Prime Minister Romano Prodi to power, Bindi was selected as Italy’s first-ever “Minister of the Family,” a position which has put her on the front lines of the culture wars.

Bindi has said that she sees the center-left as a “grand common home” for secularists and Catholics alike.

“Look, I appear sometimes as a Catholic of the center-left, which can take positions that are a little critical with regard to the church,” she said. “Now, my being a believer will be put to the test: I’ll have to find a synthesis between my values, and my respect for pluralism and the evolution of society, for different ideas and inclinations.”

Today's meeting suggests the search for that synthesis continues.

The Drinan Chair in Human Rights

To read the announcement about the new Drinan Chair in Human Rights, click here.

Monday, October 23, 2006

Mark Sargent in Chicago

[Cut/pasted from dotCommonweal:]

Chicagoweal

Are you in Chicago or in the Chicagoland area? Free tomorrow night around, say, 7? Yes, I realize game three of the World Series is on. But unless you're a displaced Tigers fan, or encamped in some secret Redbird-fan enclave, you don't really have a dog in that fight. So, what do you say? Come on out to Loyola University to hear Mark Sargent's talk, "A Catholic Critique of Law and Economics" (warning, PDF). Great. We'll expect you then.

Congratulations to Eduardo Peñalver!

I heard from an Emory colleague who's at Cornell Law for a couple of weeks that Eduardo and his wife just had a baby.  In response to my e-mail inquiry this afternoon, Eduardo writes:

Baby (Sidhartha Ovidio Peñalver) was born on Friday at 9pm, weighing in at 8lbs., 4 oz.. He and mom are doing fine. I'm still recovering, though.

Emory as a (Partly) Catholic University

COMMONWEAL
 

October 20, 2006 / Volume  CXXXIII, Number 18

THE LAST WORD

The Catholic Presence

Luke Timothy Johnson


Is there such a thing as “thinking Catholic”? Looking back, I see that my earliest awareness of something called intellectual life came from reading the fierce journalistic battles fought out among Belloc, Chesterton, Wells, and Shaw. They made me aware that the world of science and literature, economics, and politics was a place where ideas mattered deeply and were vigorously contested.

In college I began to appreciate that these polemicists stood within a much larger-often quieter and subtler-intellectual tradition that, while rarely ecclesiastical in character, was unmistakably Catholic. Like Chesterton, Dorothy Sayers wrote detective stories, but also translated Dante. Graham Greene and François Mauriac fashioned fictional universes marked by sin and grace, as did Flannery O’Connor and Walker Percy. Teilhard de Chardin leaped from science to theology in his vision of creation evolving toward God. Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson, and Yves Simon addressed contemporary philosophical issues through their study of Thomas Aquinas, while Gabriel Marcel and Dietrich Von Hildebrand did the same through existentialism and phenomenology. Thomas Merton, and later Henri Nouwen, spoke to the spiritual conditions of their day from a distinctly Catholic perspective, in a manner accessible to a broad readership.

My list is partial and idiosyncratic, and could be extended almost indefinitely. The point is that all these remarkable writers and thinkers had something important to say even to those who did not necessarily know them as Catholic. By the end of the twentieth century, Catholics could boast an intellectual tradition that-far from being parochial or backward-looking-played an important part in the century’s critical conversation.

The same tradition thrives at the start of the twenty-first century. One thinks of pundits of the public square like Garry Wills, E. J. Dionne, and Andrew Sullivan; of Catholic publishing houses and journals such as Commonweal and America; and of all the scholarly endeavors in monasteries and religious houses, in Catholic colleges and universities across the country. But Catholic intellectual life also thrives in less obvious places, including private and state universities. I don’t know how typical Emory University is, but I am impressed by the extent to which my own work as a Catholic scholar here does not stand isolated, even in a school with a distinctly Methodist heritage. The Catholic presence at Emory is considerable. Indeed, more Roman Catholics than Methodists are undergraduates at Emory College, and a minor in Roman Catholic Studies has recently been approved. For some twenty years, the Aquinas Center has cultivated a Catholic presence by sponsoring lectures, visiting professors, and events, many of which draw considerable audiences from the university at large and the population of Atlanta.

Emory’s professors include many self-identifying Catholics who continue to engage the same important issues as their intellectual predecessors, like Thomas Flynn, a diocesan priest and past president of the American Catholic Philosophical Society, who writes about Sartre, Foucault, and other continental philosophers; or the recently retired Eugene Bianchi, for decades an acute commentator on the politics and culture of the church, more recently the author of books on the spirituality of aging. Brian Mahan’s courses in religious education link spirituality to social activism, while he and his wife Kim (author of a book on Zen Buddhism) also minister at an Atlanta retreat center. Lewis Ayres leads students into an appreciation for patristic theology, helping a generation that has little sense of history and less taste for creed to appreciate how the classic theological doctrines arise from a passionately scriptural imagination. Award-winning teacher Jack Zupko reveals to undergraduates the workings of medieval philosophy. Philip Reynolds studies Aquinas, but has also written a monograph on the subject of food and the body in the medieval period, as well as the best available account of marriage in the Christian tradition. Mark Jordan has moved from the study of medieval philosophy to the difficult arena of sexual politics, with a series of challenging books on the history of sodomy and the ethics of sexuality. Michael Perry, at the law school, writes on questions of church and state.

The list goes on and on, with more names and accomplishments than I can mention. I celebrate my colleagues not because they are unique, but because, like generations of scholars and writers before them, they are continuing a richly varied intellectual tradition-one that is Catholic precisely to the extent that it engages all of God’s creation. The exciting research and inspired teaching conducted at Emory and other universities reveals how, in subtle and notably broad-ranging ways, the Catholic tradition continues to shape our contemporary intellectual life.


ABOUT THE WRITER

Luke Timothy Johnson

Luke Timothy Johnson, a frequent contributor, is the Robert R. Woodruff Professor of New Testament at the Candler School of Theology, Emory University.

Please, Please, Please: Read the Whole Piece

The London Review of Books
October 19, 2006

Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching
Terry Eagleton

[Review of Richard Dawkins's new book, The God Delusion.]

[As Larry Solum says, here's a taste:]

Imagine someone holding forth on biology whose only knowledge of the subject is the Book of British Birds, and you have a rough idea of what it feels like to read Richard Dawkins on theology. Card-carrying rationalists like Dawkins, who is the nearest thing to a professional atheist we have had since Bertrand Russell, are in one sense the least well-equipped to understand what they castigate, since they don’t believe there is anything there to be understood, or at least anything worth understanding. This is why they invariably come up with vulgar caricatures of religious faith that would make a first-year theology student wince. The more they detest religion, the more ill-informed their criticisms of it tend to be. If they were asked to pass judgment on phenomenology or the geopolitics of South Asia, they would no doubt bone up on the question as assiduously as they could. When it comes to theology, however, any shoddy old travesty will pass muster. These days, theology is the queen of the sciences in a rather less august sense of the word than in its medieval heyday.

Dawkins on God is rather like those right-wing Cambridge dons who filed eagerly into the Senate House some years ago to non-placet Jacques Derrida for an honorary degree. Very few of them, one suspects, had read more than a few pages of his work, and even that judgment might be excessively charitable. Yet they would doubtless have been horrified to receive an essay on Hume from a student who had not read his Treatise of Human Nature. There are always topics on which otherwise scrupulous minds will cave in with scarcely a struggle to the grossest prejudice. For a lot of academic psychologists, it is Jacques Lacan; for Oxbridge philosophers it is Heidegger; for former citizens of the Soviet bloc it is the writings of Marx; for militant rationalists it is religion.

What, one wonders, are Dawkins’s views on the epistemological differences between Aquinas and Duns Scotus? Has he read Eriugena on subjectivity, Rahner on grace or Moltmann on hope? Has he even heard of them? Or does he imagine like a bumptious young barrister that you can defeat the opposition while being complacently ignorant of its toughest case? Dawkins, it appears, has sometimes been told by theologians that he sets up straw men only to bowl them over, a charge he rebuts in this book; but if The God Delusion is anything to go by, they are absolutely right. As far as theology goes, Dawkins has an enormous amount in common with Ian Paisley and American TV evangelists. Both parties agree pretty much on what religion is; it’s just that Dawkins rejects it while Oral Roberts and his unctuous tribe grow fat on it.

[To read the rest, click here.]

Saturday, October 21, 2006

Dear Richard,

Thanks for your response.

You say that "those who deny human dignity are evil."

Let's put aside--at least for now--the question of who in this election are the deniers of human dignity.  (The deniers of *whose* human dignity?  Do you really want to say that, e.g., those who deny that human life at its earliest stage of development has the same moral status as human life at later stages of development are not only mistaken but evil?)

Let me offer two statements and ask whether you agree with either or both:

1.  Some who affirm the dignity of all human life but do not live their lives in accord with this affirmation are weak; some are perhaps even evil.

2.  Some who deny the dignity of some, or even all, human life--because for one or another reason they do not find dignity-talk plausible--are not evil but good, and perhaps even saintly:  for example, those who, for reasons of their own, devote their lives to protecting human life.

I suspect you agree that what one affirms or denies is not the true measure of their good-ness or evil-ness.

But then, perhaps you meant this: "those who deny human dignity--that is, who deny it not intellectually but existentially--are evil."  If that is what you meant, I wonder whether you really want to say that those who support embryonic stem cell research are not merely misguided but evil.

Be well.

Michael P.

Embryonic Stem Cell Research: A Cautionary Note

A perhaps needless reminder to MOJ-readers ...

Even among those who agree that human life at its earliest stage of development has the same moral status as human life at later stages of develeopment, there is disagreement about the morality--the moral permissibility--of (some) embryonic stem cell research.  I highlighted this disagreement in an earlier post.

Michael P.

Response to Michael S.'s Query

The details of what I'm about to say, Michael, are in my new book.  (And I hope your library will buy *two* copies.)

The morality of human rights, as I glean it from the international law of human rights, holds that every born human being has inherent dignity and is inviolable.  (Nota bene:  I am being descriptive in saying this, not prescriptive.)  No argument according to which infanticide is morally permissible is consistent with the morality of human rights.  Is it reasonable to reject the morality of human rights?  Because I accept the morality of human rights on theistic grounds and doubt that there are adequate secular grounds for the morality of human rights (see my recent Commonweal essay), the question whether it is reasonable to reject the morality of human rights is, for me, the question whether it is reasonable to reject my theistic grounds and all other possible religious grounds for the morality of human rights.   My answer:  Of course it is.  It is not unreasonable to be an atheist.  Singer, I take it, is an atheist--and rejects the morality of human rights.

This still doesn't quite answer your question about Singer's position on infanticide.  Let me address a friendly-amended version of your question:  Is it reasonable for Singer to hold that toddlers have moral status (i.e., the moral status that, say, adult human beings have) but that infants do not--in the way it would be unreasonable for one to hold that whites have moral status but nonwhites do not, or that men have a greater moral status than women, or that Catholics have moral status but Jews do not?  I am inclined to think that it is unreasonable to hold that toddlers have moral status but infants do not, because I am inclined to think that there is no difference between being a toddler and being an infant that one can reasonably believe warrants the conclusion that toddlers but not infants have moral status.

Now, Boonin's argument about the moral status of human fetuses before the emergence of organized cortical brain activity, unlike Singer's argument for the permissibility of infanticide, does not constitute a rejection of the morality of human rights.  Boonin accepts that infants, newborns, and even unborn children beyond a certain stage of development (namely, the emergence of organized cortical brain activity), have moral status.  Nonetheless, in my book I argue that we who affirm the morality of human rights have good reason to go further than Boonin does and affirm that every human being, born and unborn, no matter what his/her stage of development, has inherent dignity and is inviolable.  Boonin and I disagree, for the reason I sketched in my previous post.

Thanks to this give-and-take with you, Michael, I can now state more clearly what I have been trying to say.  For me, the morality of human rights is bedrock.  One can affirm the morality of human rights and yet reasonably disagree with Robby's position on the moral status of human beings at the earliest stage of their development.   One cannot affirm the morality of human rights and reasonably hold that infanticide is morally permissible.  Indeed, in my judgment one cannot affirm the morality of human rights and reasonably hold that, say, post-viability abortions are morally permissible.

Boonin's Argument

I have already said that I disagree with Boonin's argument--and that I explain why I disagree with it in my new book.  Michael S. has asked me to explain why I do not go further and conclude that Boonin's argument is unreasonable.  Let me suggest that anyone who wants to evaluate the reasonableness vel non of Boonin's argument should read chapter 3 (pp. 91-132) of Boonin's book, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge, 2003).  I disagree with Boonin's argument because unlike Boonin, I believe that we give other human beings the respect that is their due when we respect their true welfare--their authentic well-being.  Boonin believes that we give others the respect that is their due when we respect their ideal (v. actual), dispositional (v. occurrent) desires.  (A human being does not have any ideal, dispositional desires, Boonin explains, until after the emergence of organized cortical brain acvtivity.)  I do not conclude that Boonin's argument is unreasonable, even though I disagree with it, because I do not believe that it is unreasonable to believe, as Boonin does, that we give other human beings the respect that is their due when we respect their ideal, dispositional desires.  MOJ-readers who want to think about Boonin's argument should read chapter 3 of Boonin's books for themselves.  MOJ-readers who want to think about my position can read the relevant chapter of my book--chapter 5--when my book is published in a month or so.  Though I expect only libraries to buy the book.  For reasons best known to the Cambridge University Press, and to my regret, the book is being published only in hardback at $70 a copy.