Boonin's Argument

I have already said that I disagree with Boonin's argument--and that I explain why I disagree with it in my new book.  Michael S. has asked me to explain why I do not go further and conclude that Boonin's argument is unreasonable.  Let me suggest that anyone who wants to evaluate the reasonableness vel non of Boonin's argument should read chapter 3 (pp. 91-132) of Boonin's book, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge, 2003).  I disagree with Boonin's argument because unlike Boonin, I believe that we give other human beings the respect that is their due when we respect their true welfare--their authentic well-being.  Boonin believes that we give others the respect that is their due when we respect their ideal (v. actual), dispositional (v. occurrent) desires.  (A human being does not have any ideal, dispositional desires, Boonin explains, until after the emergence of organized cortical brain acvtivity.)  I do not conclude that Boonin's argument is unreasonable, even though I disagree with it, because I do not believe that it is unreasonable to believe, as Boonin does, that we give other human beings the respect that is their due when we respect their ideal, dispositional desires.  MOJ-readers who want to think about Boonin's argument should read chapter 3 of Boonin's books for themselves.  MOJ-readers who want to think about my position can read the relevant chapter of my book--chapter 5--when my book is published in a month or so.  Though I expect only libraries to buy the book.  For reasons best known to the Cambridge University Press, and to my regret, the book is being published only in hardback at $70 a copy.