Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, August 7, 2008

A Trend from the Land Down Under?

Jim Wallis reports from Australia that in their election of a Labor government last November, a "pivotal" cause was the swing in votes of some evangelicals and pentecostals (see here), based on "new" issues like climate change, global poverty, and the Iraq war and on the presence of an openly religious (Catholic) party leader.  Those factors are operating here, although we don't know how strongly and you'd want to compare  Obama's specific positions with how Kevin Rudd as PM has handled similar issues.

At any rate, the Australian headline "On a swing and a prayer" is clever.

Abortion and the Catholic Voter

Interesting post (including comments) over at dotCommonwealhere.

Wednesday, August 6, 2008

More on the AALS Boycott

I think that Susan and Greg have articulated well the reasons why the proposed boycott at AALS is a bad thing, and they help me put details on my not-fully-articulated question about whether the presence of "market power" makes this wrong.  (I think we agree that the boycott is legal -- an exercise of the boycotters' own speech and other freedoms -- except perhaps for Fr. Araujo; I'm not sure how to read his argument that the boycotters "are challenging [Mr. Manchester's] right to exercise his political voice").  I do think we have to be careful about saying that "it's not within [an organization's] nature or purpose" to engage in a given expression of conscience in the marketplace.  That's the argument that's used to say landlords shouldn't refuse to rent to unmarried couples, pharmacists shouldn't refuse to dispense Plan B, and federally funded soup-kitchen program shouldn't consider religion in hiring: their purpose, the argument goes, is simply to provide commercial and social services, not to express conscience.  But I agree that the presumption should be different when a scholarly organization with a wide membership, i.e. encompassing the whole legal academy in a given subject matter, takes an official stance based on someone's expression of views.  Such organizations should have a much stronger ethos of maintaning a neutral stance between people (including their own members) of fundamentally different political views.  I was pointing toward something like that with the "market power" question, but the others articulate it much better.

I think Greg is also right to recognize that SALT, which is an an ideologically grounded rather than an umbrella subject-matter organization, presents different questions.  In response to Greg's charge that SALT is contradicting its professed commitment to freedom of speech, I imagine SALT would say that if Mr. Manchester's giving his money to a cause based on his belief is speech, then so is their members' withholding their money based on their beliefs.

Now if Mr. Manchester repeatedly expressed racist views, or contributed $125,000 to a constitutional-amendment drive to reverse the right to interracial marriage, would Greg, Susan, et al. respond differently to a proposed boycott?  If so, that would bring us back again to the argument, which recurs in all of these disputes, that opposing same-sex marriage and seeking to reflect that opposition in the law, should not be treated the same as racism.  There is, at the least, enough room for good-faith debate about this issue that those with whom one disagrees ought not to be marginalized, not just in the academic sphere directly -- this is not a boycott against academic speakers who oppose same-sex marriage -- but in closely related spheres like where to hold a conference.  Thus Patrick's post on the same-sex marriage/racism comparison is highly relevant.

Tuesday, August 5, 2008

Ending the possibility of civil discourse

Tom Berg and Susan Stabile have raised some important questions about decisions by groups that are eager to boycott the hotel the AALS, long before the California Supreme Court decided that there is a right in law to same-sex marriage, chose to house the organization's January 2009 meeting.  The stated object of the boycott is the hotel owner's use of his personal resources to influence political judgments and law.  I'm sure reasonable minds can differ on many of these questions. 

A statement by my distinguished Villanova colleague Louis Sirico, who in his capacity as an AALS section chair speaks for many, raises a question of a different order of magnitude.  Here's what the National Law Journal Reports:

'Also on Monday, Louis Sirico, chairman of the AALS Section on Legal Writing, Research and Reasoning, said that if the AALS does not move the meeting, his group will not attend events at the hotel.  "It's a matter of principle," he said. "We just don't believe in this kind of discrimination." Sirico is director of the legal writing program at Villanova University School of Law.

"Discrimination?"  Does Professor Sirico -- and do those for whom he (apparently) speaks -- believe that those who adhere to the traditional view that marriage is the union of a man and a woman engage in "discrimination?"  It would seem so, if the NLJ and Professor Sirico are telling the truth. 

But there's discrimination (I discriminate between ripe and overripe tomatoes), and there's discrimination.  The latter is of the sort condemned in Loving v. Virginia (1967), in which the Court declared Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute a violation of our Constitution.  Is the suggestion, allegation of Sirico et al.  that those who oppose legal recognition of same-sex marriage engage in the invidious sort of discrimation that Loving outlawed?

Cannot reasonable minds differ on the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized in law?  The crazy-quilt of national discourse would indicate a positive answer.  The reactionary hurling of epithets only tends to preempt the possibility of civil discourse on a question that is vigorously and vibrantly disputed in our society. 

But perhaps it's more than the hurling of epithets.  Perhaps Sirico et al. are sitting in solemn moral judgment on all those people who conscientiously conclude that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage is not a morally tenable option.  Perhaps they're sure that the rest of us are surely wrong.

The allegation of "discrimination," when it's not varieties of tomatoes that we're talking about, is a debate stopper.  Should we admire -- or should we not question -- the moral certainty that leads people to rule out the voices of those who are not convinced that same-sex marriage is a morally tenable option?  Has the question tackled by Sirico et al. in fact been decided with the finality and certainty that leave all the others in the realm of moral opprobrium?

John C. Murray was right that civil disagreement is a monumental achievement.  The anti-reasoning sloganism of "discrimination," in advance of deep and certain judgment, prefers intimidation to civic discourse. 

The AALS and Boycotts—revisited and thought through

I begin by thanking Tom and Susan for their contributions regarding the AALS annual meeting and the desire of certain groups of law teachers to boycott the early-New Year conference because the owner of the hotel, Mr. Manchester—who, by the way is a practicing Catholic according to news sources—contributed to the political campaign geared for the fall electoral season to address the California Supreme Court’s 4-3 decision in In Re Marriage Cases. It seems that Mr. Manchester disagrees with the majority opinion in that case, and he, along with other citizens of California, are using the means of democracy to express their disagreement.

According to the article about this matter appearing in the National Law Journal to which Tom kindly gave us the link, Mr. Manchester, the hotel owner, employs men and women who, in some fashion, identify themselves as homosexual. So, it appears that there is no employment or other discrimination prohibited by the law such that may offer protections that address this inclination.

But the boycott is focused on something else that the law also addresses, and that is Mr. Manchester’s Constitutional, and I would say God-given, right to participate in the political process. The problem with that, according to the law faculty who have expressed their decision to boycott his hotel, and perhaps the conference, is based on Mr. Manchester’s political contribution to a side in a referendum endorsed by the California Supreme Court. In short, these law faculty are challenging his right to exercise his political voice.

This is a tragedy, but it is also a violation of the law. How ironic that those who teach law would object to a person’s right to exercise his political voice in a democratic exercise. This is not the sort of thing one would expect in a democracy, but it may be the sort of thing to which one could expect in a totalitarian state.

Many years ago, in the 1930s, Christopher Dawson, the first holder of the Charles Chauncey Stillman Chair of Roman Catholic Theological Studies at Harvard University, had these words to say about the totalitarian mind in the academy and in society:

The totalitarian state—and perhaps the modern state in general—is not satisfied with passive obedience; it demands full co-operation from the cradle to the grave… [I]f Christians cannot assert their right to exist in the sphere of higher education, they will eventually be pushed not only out of modern culture but out of physical existence. That is already the issue in Communist countries, and it will also become the issue in England (Mr. Dawson’s country of birth) and America if we do not use our opportunities while we still have them.

I find Mr. Dawson’s counsel wise and timely. I hope that it benefits those who may be attending or may be considering attending the AALS conference early next year. If you join the boycott, you have certainly expressed your political decision. In that case, let Mr. Manchester and those who agree with him be able to exercise, without intimidation or any other pressure, their political decision, too. That is what democracy is about. But when it no longer is, then democracy has mutated into the totalitarian regime to which it is supposed to stand in clear counterpoint—and this would make our national motto, e pluribus unum, rather ironic indeed.

RJA sj

The Proposed AALS Boycott: The Sad Politicization of a Scholarly Association

In reporting the plan of several law professor organizations to boycott the Association of American Law Schools annual meeting if held in the San Diego hotel owned by a contributor to the California campaign against same-sex marriage, Tom Berg says that we ought to regard the protest/boycott as "legitimate."

If by "legitimate," Tom means legally protected, then by all means, definitely yes. The government should not interfere with the choice by consumers singly or organized (and I would argue many service providers as well) not to patronize (or serve) those whose actions or positions they find offensive. But if by "legitimate," Tom means that this is a laudatory development or one arguably in keeping with the nature of all of the entities that are behind the boycott plan, then I think we should say, definitely no.

Most of the law professor organizations that are involved in this boycott campaign—the Legal Writing Institute, the AALS Section on Legal Writing Research and Reasoning, and the AALS Section on Teaching—are scholarly and academic organizations, not political lobbies. These entities should have no political platform by which to guide their actions. Since when has the Legal Writing Institute or the AALS or any of its subunits been permitted to adopt political resolutions? Does this now mean that a member of the Legal Writing Institute or these AALS sections who is opposed to same-sex marriage is no longer a member in good standing? Does this mean that a member of these entities who dissents from the new official position in favor of same-sex marriage would be well-advised to remain silent or even resign? Should a scholarly organization committed to legal writing or teaching excellence be identified as a political lobbying entity and one that takes a particular stand on a disputed issue? Again, the answer should be definitely no.

When the American Political Science Association (APSA) was recently considering whether to move a future annual meeting from New Orleans, the advocates of relocation were careful to frame their argument in terms of the alleged concrete harms that gay and lesbian political scientists might experience when visiting a state that not only rejected same-sex marriage but also prohibited any legal recognition of same-sex couples comparable to marriage. The debate focused on whether there was a real risk that the legal regime in Louisiana would prevent a gay person's partner from participating in health decisions should that gay person be hospitalized during the annual meeting. Ultimately, the executive board of the APSA concluded that the risk was not substantial enough to justify moving the meeting, to which gay rights groups and others within the APSA have responded with a boycott.

However, during the APSA debate, it was always common ground that political viewpoints alone were not a "legitimate" basis for the APSA as a scholarly organization to make decisions about siting a meeting. No one contended that the APSA should take a stand for or against same-sex marriage. To contend otherwise would have been to corrupt the nature of a scholarly organization, which should be committed to the open exchange of ideas, into that of a political pressure group with a distinct political viewpoint. Not only would such a step have contradicted the very nature of a general scholarly organization and compromised academic freedom, it also would have created inappropriate political conflict among the members.

The boycott of AALS meeting events now proposed by these law professor entities has taken the very step that the APSA wisely understood was never a "legitimate" option for any entity that calls itself a scholarly association and claims to represent an entire field of scholarly study. As I understand it, no one is suggesting that gay and lesbian law professors will be endangered, denied service, or mistreated in any way at this San Diego hotel. The boycott is crudely political, nothing less. It is based solely on the illegitimate and non-scholarly endorsement of one side of an election referendum, which then is advanced by an attempt to preclude any association with those who take the other side of that election contest. Such an openly political gambit, on an election matter no less, is unworthy of a scholarly association. By so corrupting a scholarly association, academic freedom for all law professors is diminished. This is a sad day indeed for the AALS.

(By contrast, the Society of American Law Teachers (SALT) is an openly political organization, not a general scholarly association, and thus its threat of a boycott poses less of a contradiction to its nature. Nonetheless, by taking the unwise step of urging the AALS to become politicized and act in conformity with a particular political stance on a controverted election, SALT improperly seeks to enmesh a scholarly association in a political controversy. As Susan Stabile inquires in her post, SALT's action arguably also undermines freedom of expression for controversial viewpoints, which from time to time SALT has suggested is part of its mission. We apparently may expect SALT in the future to adopt political litmus tests for hotel owners, vendors, etc., which it then will demand be honored by the AALS at the risk of a political boycott.)

Greg Sisk

Government Spending and Poverty Programs Revisited

Susan Stabile kindly responds to my post documenting the massive size of current government programs and the enormous expenditures on social programs already in place. She challenges the significance or meaning of some of the data that I provided and concludes that they fail to demonstrate a "serious commitment to the human flourishing of the poorest."

While the Hodge chart that I included in my prior post does include government pensions in the description of skyrocketing social spending (as compared with defense spending) over the past 60 years, I carefully separated out government pensions when noting that the categories of welfare, health care, and education spending by government constitute 40 percent of overall government spending and some 15 percent of our entire national economy. Now even if we were to assume that only half of health care spending by government and only one quarter of education spending by the government provides benefits to the poor, with all spending on welfare obviously being directed to poverty programs, government spending on programs for the poor in 2007 exceeded $1 trillion. If a trillion dollars of government spending on poverty programs, not even accounting for the many more tens of billions contributed by Americans each year to charities that serve the disadvantaged, does not demonstrate a "serious commitment to the human flourishing of the poorest," then apparently the sky really is the only limit.

I also offer this further defense of the reliability of the data that I provided: As evidence that the figures supposedly are hard to pin down, Susan says that Census Bureau statistics indicate that defense spending in 2007 was 20 percent of government outlays rather than the 13 percent figure that I used. In fact, the figures on government spending are readily available in some detail in Census Bureau statistics. The 20 percent figure that Susan identified is the share of defense spending as a part of the federal government budget viewed in isolation. As I'd noted in my post, and as the heading in the pertinent chart confirms, I was presenting the figures for government spending at all levels: federal, state, and local. The federal government is not the centerpoint for all governmental activity and programs in this country. State and local spending on poverty programs and education is considerable and should not be neglected. Defense spending indeed is only 13.4 percent of overall government spending and less than 5 percent of GDP, a level of defense spending that is lower today than before the Clinton Administration and much lower than it has been at many periods during the past half-century. And while defense spending as a share of GDP has been stable or declining, social spending as a share of GDP has nearly doubled in the past 40 years.

I stand by my earlier observation that those who advocate more government spending, new government poverty programs, and higher taxes to pay for it all have a great burden in proving that government consumption of more than a third of economic production in this country and government exaction of the product of nearly a third of our work lives to pay the taxes is negligible and insufficient.

Greg Sisk

AALS and Boycotts

Tom's post suggests that a boycott  of a hotel owned by someone who donated funds to oppose same-sex marriage by groups who are part of the AALS is legitimate, but wonders at some point a market power counterargument kicks in.  I'm still sorting out what I think about this but what I wonder is whether this isn't more of a speech issue than a market one.  That is, it is one thing to organize a boycott against the hotel if there is something about the business itself that is objectionable (e.g., there is evidence of discrimination against homosexuals in the actual operations of the hotel).  I assume no one would find such a boycott objectionable.  But isn't it another thing for a legal academic group (which presumably thinks freedom of speech and expression is a good thing) to organize a boycott based on the owner's speech (in this case evidenced by a donation), even if we disagree with that speech?  I'd be interested in hearing the thoughts of others on this.

Same-Sex Marriage, Boycotts, and the AALS Conference

From the National Law Journal (thanks to Mark Scarberry at Pepperdine Law for the pointer):

Organizations representing thousands of legal educators say they will boycott the Association of American Law Schools annual meeting in January if it is held at a San Diego hotel owned by a foe of same-sex marriage. . . .

The groups are the Society of American Law Teachers; the Legal Writing Institute; the AALS Section on Legal Writing Research and Reasoning; and the AALS Section on Teaching Methods. The groups represent as many as 2,500 members.

Several of us here, in varying degrees, emphasize the importance of, prima facie, letting people express their conscience in marketplace actions (landlords renting a few apartments, pharmacies refusing to dispense Plan B) without government interference.  We also emphasize the value and inevitability of people acting in groups, not just as isolated individuals.  So a boycott like this is legitimate, yes? -- but at what point should a "market power" counterargument kick in?

Social Spending vs. Concern for the Poorest Americans

Greg's post does little to ally the concerns some of us have that (as expressed by Eduardo) there has been lacking “a serious governmental commitment to human development among the poorest Americans.”   "Social spending," even as Greg narrows it to include only "welfare, health care and education," does not give us an indication of funds spent to help those living in poverty.  For example, the Hodges chart figures for social programs includes, e.g., pensions for government employees.   Or how much of the funds included for health care reach the poorest among us?  It is hard to even tell from the first link Greg gives us what some of the categories of expenditures mean. These concerns are apart from the fact that even the total figures are hard to pin down.  The Census bureau stats suggest that National Defense is about 20% of government outlays rather than 13%.  So more is necessary to persuade that there is the serious commitment to the human flourishing of the poorest among us.