Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, October 6, 2009

A Nun’s Story (2009)

 

 

Thanks, Michael P., for directing our attention to the lengthy essay authored by Sister X which appears in the October 9 issue of Commonweal. Since I have discussed a lot of what Sister X has to say in my last posting [HERE] in the context of communio and concilium, I won’t go into any of her contentions that Sr. Ilia Delio has raised and to which I have already responded.

At the outset of today’s posting, I acknowledge that Sister X, Sr. Delio, O.F.S., Sr. Sandra Schneiders, I.H.M, and Sr. Joan Chittister, O.S.B. have registered their concerns about the two apostolic visitations of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious [LCWR] (one by the Congregation for Institutes of Consecrated Life and Societies of Apostolic Life and the another investigation by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith). What is not in question is the good work that the religious orders (both women’s and men’s) have provided in the Church in the United States for several centuries. What is in question, though, is the quality of the response to religious life (hence the visitation by the Congregation for Institutes of Consecrated Life) and questions stemming from a 2001 meeting of officials from both the LCWR and the CDF regarding a variety of issues (including women’s ordination; the Declaration Dominus Jesu; human sexuality; and abortion).

Let me begin with a narrative: last September there was convened at Stonehill College a symposium entitled “Apostolic Religious Life since Vatican II...Reclaiming the Treasure: Bishops, Theologians, and Religious in Conversation.” I attended this important day-long event. During that time, I spoke with a good number of religious, both men and women, but more women than men. We were all from apostolic orders. I have an answer for Sister X who eloquently poses the question: “Is the Vatican visitation truly being done out of concern for American nuns?”

The answer is unequivocally: yes. And not only yes, but yes because it is American women religious who have asked for, petitioned for, and begged for this visitation. The women with whom I spoke saw no need to conceal their identity to me in raising their concerns about two important issues: the first, the quality of life in their respective communities; the second, the fidelity of some of their community to the Church and her teachings. They did, however, respect anonymity not from Rome, not from the Vatican, but from their own sisters who have decided, it seems unilaterally, to take the congregations into new and questionable directions. This symposium was an eye-opener. These were women who entered their congregations with zeal for the apostolates of teaching, of nursing, and of other works so vital to the Church. What they have seen and experienced is that their orders have undergone dangerous radical transformation—or, as some said, an abandonment—of their raison d’être and the charism of their founder or foundress.

After hearing their narratives, I, like Sr. X, also want to believe in the good will of the “institutional church” better known as the Church. But I would also like to believe in the good will of the women religious who have been making it increasingly difficult for these good women religious who publicly appeared at this symposium to live out their vocation to Christ and the Church. This is something that Sr. X does not address. Looking at many of the statements contained on the LCWR website of past annual conferences of this organization, I can see why these good and holy women whom I met at Stonehill are worried. They are not worried about Rome or the “Vatican.” They are worried about their own community members who have chartered a course that dramatically departs from the Church and her teachings.

Sr. X asserts that the visitations, especially from the CDF, constitute an “implicit accusation” that the leaders of the LCWR “are not Catholic.” Well, that concern comes not from Rome and the “institutional church.” It comes from members of the women’s congregations themselves—from members who have gone to receive advanced degrees, who have great love for the Church, who have labored valiantly in the vineyard of the Lord. Sr. X states further that the allegation that the LCWR leadership is “not Catholic” is “both insulting and absurd.” From what I gathered at the Stonehill conference, she should talk with some of her fellow congregation members who have a different take. When Sr. X claims that “since the 1980s the Vatican has not seemed interested in hearing what women religious themselves think about the quality of life in their own communities” it has. And her expressed disappointment should not be with “the Vatican” but with the women’s religious orders themselves who have neglected the concerns of their own members who have asked for the investigations.

I find it curious that Sr. X, and those sisters who have identified themselves publicly and criticized the visitation, have not focused on the fact that it is a fellow woman religious who is in charge of the visitation. It is not a bishop or cardinal. It is not a priest. It is not a man. It is one of their own who happens to be the superior general of her order, and, yes, she is an American.

I am confused by Sr. X attributing to Sr. Sandra Schneiders a dichotomy between “two theological visions of church and religious life.” Sr. X asserts that Schneiders poses two lenses of the renewal of religious life: one from the dogmatic constitution and one from the pastoral constitution of the Second Vatican Council. I was intrigued by Sr. X’s claim about Sr. Schneiders. But, I am sorry to say, one or both are mistaken. While it is true that Lumen Gentium does speak of the church “as institution,” it also speaks of the Church as “the people of God” and “as a pilgrim Church.” The pastoral constitution also speaks of the “people of God” but it does not address the pilgrim church as Sr. X attributes to Sr. Schneiders. It is, however, the dogamtic constitution that talks about a great length the “pilgrim church.” Moreover, the dogmatic constitution does not speak of the “fortress” or the “witness to a godless world” as Sr. X implies to Sr. Schneiders. So the implication that Sr. X makes that “Rome seems partial to the worldview of Lumen Gentium” simply is not supported by the texts upon which reliance is made. Frankly, from my humble experience, the Roman curia is vitally concerned about both simultaneously.

There are other problematic assertions made by Sr. X that are indefensible. But one other that I must comment on today is her suggestion that the priest shortage is not subject to an investigation. Well, maybe on its surface, that is true. But to think that the Vatican only investigates the LCWR is unwise. The seminaries, and therefore aspects of the priesthood and male religious life and the deficit of priestly vocations, were the subject of a recent investigation. Sr. X does not take account of this. And as I speak, the Legionnaires of Christ are also undergoing an investigation by Roman curial authorities. Sr. X fails to mention this as well. So any implication that only women are “targets of Vatican investigations” is simply not true.

As I said the other day in the context of a thread that Michael initiated regarding Sr. Theresa Kane, prayers are in order for the Church, the people of God, and the Body of Christ. I shall also pray for Sr. X, her gifts, and her zeal to serve the Church that she and I were called to assist as vowed religious. And so I conclude with another prayer: Maria, Speculum Justitiae, ora pro nobis.

 

RJA sj

Where does adoption fit when marriage is defined by procreation?

Greg Popcak offers this response to my questions about the place of adoption in the procreative institution of marriage:

Adoption has been a wonderful blessing to me and my family, and I couldn’t imagine life without my youngest daughter or my sister. Further, adoption is certainly entirely in keeping with the generative nature of the marital relationship. Social science data shows that even the adopted child fairs best in a home in which they are being raised by a mother and a father in an exclusive, traditional, marital union (as opposed to being raised a single parent or cohabiting parents).  As such, I don’t see an issue focusing on the nature of the procreative act.  Interpersonal neurobiological studies (c.f., The Neuroscience of Human Relationships—Louis Cozolino for a great summary) show the sexual act between a man and woman (in general, but especially in marriage) leads to a series of biochemical and neurological changes in the structures of the brains of the man and woman causing them to be bonded to each other in a way that does not exist in same sex relationships (it also tends to not be as present in co-habiting couples for reasons that are not yet well-understood. Although some bonding does occur here as well, the bond tends not be as deep or stable either socially or biochemically leading to “defensive” or even “reactive” attachment problems in adulthood). Therefore the nature of the procreative act in a committed marriage serves both as the glue that holds together a stable home life AND leads to the rearing of children. And so, the child who is adopted by a married man and woman in a committed, traditional marriage enjoys at least most of the benefits of the nature of the procreative act because of the increased intimacy and stability in the home where mom and dad are intimate partners. Adoption is not so much an “exception to the procreative boundaries of marriage” as it is a logical extension of the procreative boundaries of marriage.

Continue reading

The venerable Daniel Callahan, on Catholics and health care reform ...

... in this week's Commonweal:

America’s Blind Spot

Health Care & the Common Good

Daniel Callahan

The concept of the common good, ancient in origin, would seem on the face of it an ideal foundation for health-care reform. We all get sick and depend on others to care for us, and many of us will need expensive treatments that are beyond the means of all but the most affluent. At the core of the idea of a common good is the Aristotelian understanding of man as a social being—as well as the understanding that, in the words of Pope John XXIII’s Mater et magistra, “individual human beings are the foundation, the cause, and the end of every social institution.”

Except for Catholics and a few others, however, the common good as a moral value has little purchase in American culture and politics. The closest some come is to speak of the “public interest,” but that notion seems more political than moral, useful perhaps but not quite the same. European health-care systems are based on the idea of solidarity, which is closely related to the common good, but the term “solidarity” has even less resonance here than the term “common good” does. For Europeans, it is a matter of solidarity that everyone have access to health care because it is a necessity for human welfare; and government, they believe, is the appropriate institution to guarantee this access. For Europeans, the 46 million uninsured Americans, together with the excessively high cost of care for those Americans who have insurance, is a source of astonishment. How can an affluent, civilized country tolerate treating millions of its citizens this way? Since every other developed nation provides universal care, it is worth exploring why we are different and whether anything can be done about it

[Read the rest, here.]




Honoring Joe Vining: The fun never stops at Villanova

The long awaited 4th Annual Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and Culture is approaching.  This year's conference is a "celebration and exploration of the path-breaking work of Joseph Vining."  Speakers include Jeff Powell, Steve Smith, Judge John Noonan, and many others.  Congrats to our own Patrick Brennan for (another) great contribution to the Conversation.  Go here for more info.

Speaking of the nature of "marriage", ...

... this looks interesting:

"Marriage Equality? First, Justify Marriage (If You Can)"

Drexel Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2009
Widener Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-27

JOHN G. CULHANE, Widener University - Delaware Campus
Email:

With recent positive developments in Connecticut, Vermont, Iowa, and New York, mixed success in California, and setbacks in Arizona and Florida, the marriage equality movement remains in the center of political, legal, and social debate in the United States. Proponents have argued that granting the right to marry to same-sex couples is compelled as a matter of simple fairness and equality, while opponents have continued to make a host of related - but unconvincing - arguments about the intrinsic meaning of marriage and how this will be lost or compromised if marriage equality takes hold. But below this turbulent surface, courts called upon to solve real problems confronting same-sex couples have expressly or impliedly recognized that a much deeper problem exists: the vast and often unexamined privileging of marriage over other forms of family and other kinds of relationships. Legal scholars, too, have questioned marriage - sometimes by focusing on the privileges that attach to it, but sometimes more broadly, by questioning the status itself. These unavoidable questions reveal that the controversy over same-sex marriage is but the most visible part of a much larger set of issues about equality and social justice.

What public health and policy goals are we trying to further with laws recognizing and subsidizing marriage? How do the signals sent by privileging marriage advance or compromise those goals? Is there a continued justification for marriage, and, if so, ought we consider changing its prerogatives in ways that will further the public good? What might those ways be, and how will (or could) we know whether we have succeeded? This brief Article raises and explores these questions, and asks whether and to what extent the current privileging of marriage is (or is not) justified.

[Downloadable here.]

Marriage's procreative boundaries: who's left out?

I can join Robby in agreeing with Gerry Bradley's point about there being no morally neutral definition of marriage.  But to the extent that Prof. Bradley seeks to establish that marriage should be defined in law as a procreative institution, I still have questions.  Put simply, why must we define marriage as a procreative institution, rather than as a child-rearing institution?  The examples he uses to buttress his claim of how the law protects the biological relationships within the family -- bans on polygamy, incest, adultery, fornication -- are noticeable for what is omitted: there is no mention of adoption.  Should adoption be viewed as a concession to a fallen world, an exception to the procreative boundaries of marriage?  Or should adoption be viewed as fully in keeping with the nature of the marital relationship, to be stabilized, protected, and even celebrated by our public understanding of why marriage is such a vital social institution?  One concern I have is that, by defining marriage in a way that can logically exclude same-sex couples, we also marginalize family relationships that are not biological. 

I should also note that I don't see Robby's arguments against same-sex marriage as exhibiting the same tendency, for he, at least in my reading, focuses more on the nature of the procreative act, rather than on the procreative origins of the parent-child relationship.  I have no reason to believe that Prof. Bradley disagrees with those arguments, but he's emphasizing another aspect in this post, and that emphasis sends some significant, if unintended, messages about some relationships counting more than others.  For Robby, my question has been whether the nature of the act can carry the normative/policy weight he places on it, and this in turn gets back to the question of whether I'm a hopeless instrumentalist . . .

"All in the Family"

The MoJ congregation will no doubt be divided in its reaction, but some might join me in shouting "Amen" to Gerry Bradley's piece, posted today at Public Discourse, entitled "All in the Family."  On one of Gerry's central claims we may even have unanimity (though I can't say for sure, since I don't know whether there are any orthodox Rawlsians among us), namely, law and the state cannot be (not only should not be, but cannot be, so will not be) morally neutral with respect to the now controversial question of what marriage really is. In other words, if the law recognizes and honors marriages or sexual partnerships of any type, it will be favoring one substantive moral view of the meaning and value of marriage over competing conceptions. The key thing is for lawmakers to do their best to make sure that their handiwork embodies the soundest view.  As to which view is the soundest, well. that's where disagreement breaks out in full flower.  But if we're arguing about that, and not about moral neutrality, then at least we're having the right argument.  Here's the link to Gerry's piece:  http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2009/10/938

Monday, October 5, 2009

Somebody give me an "Amen"!

Dear Michael:

I certainly don't say "Amen" to Martin Marty's essay.  I have no problem with your posting it, though.  I'm not crying "foul."  You made the judgment that it was something valuable and quite worth sharing with us, and that's fine with me.  But I'm afraid it didn't provide me with an opportunity to say, "Amen!  Attaboy, Michael!  Great post!"  That's because I think Dr. Marty's piece was weak.  (On this point, of course, we have a friendly disagreement.)  To some posts--even those that merely consist of calling attention to the work of someone else (perhaps adding, as you did in this case, an "Amen!")--some of us might be moved to say "Amen!  That was really an insightful piece you called to our attention!"  To others, we'll find ourselves unable to say "Amen!"  Now, the folks sitting quietly in the pews (and they will be different ones of us at different times) won't be saying or implying that the post was offensive, or that the person responsible for the post was out of line.  They won't be crying "foul!"  But between "Amen!" and "foul!" there is a lot of room. In that vast space, one can acknowledge as perfectly legitimate all sorts of posts--including posts of whose content one is quite critical.  So you were right to assume that, though I have a problem with Martin Marty's essay, I don't have a problem with your posting it.  But having not been able to shout "Amen" this time, I do very much look forward to my next opportunity to say of something you post (perhaps something of your own) "Amen!  Attaboy, Brother Michael!  Preach it!"

Please, please, please read this essay ...

... which is the cover story in the current issue of COMMONWEAL  The subtitle of the essay:  "Why Is Rome Investigating U.S. Nuns?"  The essay is, in my judgment, brilliant, moving, and devastating.  What do *you* think?

Click here to read the essay.


Dear Robby, I assume you didn't mean what you said ...

Here's what you said:  "I wish I could reciprocate it by shouting 'Amen' to [Michael's] post of Martin Marty's essay entitled 'Evangelicaldom.'"  I assume you don't have a problem with my posting Marty's essay.  I assume you have a problem with Marty's essay.  I assume you meant to say:  "I wish I could reciprocate it by shouting 'Amen' to Martin Marty's essay entitled 'Evangelicaldom.'"  Or do I misunderstand?  Do you really want to take issue with my posting Marty's essay?