Friend of MOJ Mark Stricherz recently provided a very thoughtful post on Senator Bob Casey's lack of courage with respect to federal funding of abortion in the Senate version of the health care bill. You can find Mark's post here at True/Slant where he blogs.
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
Mighty Casey's Son Strikes Out?
Religiously grounded morality in our politics and law
In his most recent response to Chip Lupu, Robby George wrote:
"The final paragraph of Chip's most recent comment presents liberalism's "old time religion" on the role of religion and religiously informed moral judgment in public life and the formation of public policy. It rehearses various implausible liberal dogmas, including the one that claims that deviations from liberal beliefs about sexual morality and marriage represent sectarian views that cannot be rationally defended apart from appeals to revelation and religious authority. The truth is that there is a serious rational debate among intelligent and intellectually sophisticated people of goodwill about the morality of various forms of sexual conduct and the nature of marriage. Religions have something to say on the subject; and religious people have every right to enter the public square and make their arguments in the languages of their traditions--just as they have done on everything from gladiatorial contests, to feuding, to slavery and civil rights. Not just conservatives, but also liberals who recognize the flaws of their tradition's "old time religion"--I have in mind scholars such as Michael Sandel and Bill Galston--recognize that liberal views about sex and marriage have no right to prevail in the domain of policy or anywhere else by the dubious expedient of ruling competing views out of bounds. Liberals, no less than conservatives, have an obligation to make their arguments about sex and marriage and answer the counterarguments advanced against them."
There are several issues that need disaggregating:
3. Does the best
understanding of our constitutional commitment to the right to religious
freedom rule out coercive and/or discriminatory laws and policies that are
based on a religiously grounded moral argument?
The right to religious freedom subsumes not just the right to practice
one’s own religion, but also the right not to be coerced into practicing, and not to be penalized for not practicing, someone else’s religion.
4. Are laws banning
abortion typically based on a religiously grounded moral argument? They are not, in my judgment: There is a plausible secular moral argument fully
adequate to support such laws—that is, a plausible secular argument that we can
realistically imagine the lawmakers accepting in enacting laws banning
abortion.
5. Is government’s
refusal to extend the benefit of law to same-sex unions based on a religiously grounded
moral argument? In the United States, many who oppose extending the benefit of law to same-sex unions undeniably invoke
religiously grounded—indeed, biblically grounded—moral arguments. Still, the question remains: Is government’s refusal to extend the benefit
of law to same-sex unions based on a religiously grounded moral argument? In order to answer that question, we need to answer
this question: Is there a plausible
secular argument for not extending the benefit of law to same-sex unions—that is,
a plausible secular argument that we can realistically imagine the lawmakers
accepting in opposing efforts to extend the benefit of law to same-sex unions? The magisterial argument about the immorality
of “inherently nonprocreative” sexual conduct (intentional, deliberate conduct)
is a secular moral argument. Let’s
assume for the sake of discussion what some would deny: that it is also a plausible secular argument. But is it a plausible secular argument that
we can realistically imagine the lawmakers accepting in opposing efforts to
extend the benefit of law to same-sex unions?
Certainly not in my home state of Georgia, where most citizens do not entertain
any doubts about the morality, say, of using condoms, etc., as a contraceptive. In my home state of Georgia, and in many
other places I assume, the determinative argument for refusing to extend the
benefit of law to same-sex unions is religiously—in Georgia, biblically—grounded.
A final comment. In his post Robby mentioned the names and invoked the positions of Michael Sandel and William Galston. So it bears mention that both Sandel and Galston were criticizing, in the passages I suspect Robby had in mind, mainly the misguided conception of “liberalism-as-neutrality” (moral neutrality), a conception defended over the years by Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, and others—a conception attacked by me in the 1980s, in my book, Morality, Politics, and Law (Oxford University Press, 1988). In a blurb he kindly wrote for that book, John Noonan said that my critique of (what I then called) “the liberal political-philosophical project” was compelling.
Hockett to Capretta
Hello All,
Many warm thanks to Robby for the kind thoughts on my earlier post, and for posting Mr. Capretta's reactions thereto. I don't think that Mr. Capretta has managed to respond to the questions I directed to Dr. K, however -- doubtless owing to lack of clarity on my own part. So I shall here attempt briefly to sharpen the points I attempted to make earlier, by addressing the observations offered by Mr. Capretta.
1.
Mr. Capretta first nicely characterizes my response to Dr. K's first criticism. That response was to the effect that a complaint such as Dr. K's, directed as it was at the sprawling nature of the health care reform legislation now under debate, is effectively a complaint every piece of complex legislation drafted by our Congress since early in the 20th century. For this Congress has long been riven by faction and, relatedly, beholden to an immense assortment of sectional interests. That fact in turn is the product in part of our large, sprawling democracy and economy (have another look at Federalist 10), and in part of our perverse, plutocratic system of political campaign finance.
Mr. Capretta does not appear to disagree with these observations -- at least he does not in his reply purport to do that -- but instead suggests that I have 'miss[ed] Krauthammer’s larger point.' That larger point, Mr. Capretta goes on, is that 'the bills are much more unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic because the authors start from the premise that the federal government has the capacity to centrally plan one-sixth of the American economy from Washington D.C.'
If this was indeed Dr. K's point, then I must confess to having missed it. It was better for Dr. K, however, that I did. For this putative point, resting as it does upon a falsehood, is not really a point at all. The reason is two-fold.
The first reason is that, while the health care industry as a whole constitutes a large sector of the full economy, the health insurance industry does not constitute anywhere near so large a portion of the economy; and what we are talking about here is not 'health care reform' so much as it is health insurance reform. To make that point plain, and to draw consequences of the fact, is part of the object of the forthcoming article to which I linked in the earlier post. Congress is dealing with a classic social insurance problem right now, a problem that all of our peer nations did systematically and effectively literally decades ago. One cannot begin to understand the nature of the problem until one first grasps that fact, and then, ideally, second, takes a hard look at how our peers have managed it -- that we might learn from both their failures and their successes.
The second reason that the point attributed by Mr. Capretta to Dr. K is no point at all is that there is no question of 'central planning' here, at least in the pejorative, 'Soviet'-reminiscent sense in which those who now employ this familiar 1920-1990 term of art appear to be traficking, at all. The only sense in which something like 'planning' that is 'central' is at work here is the sense that Dr. K and Mr. Capretta would presumably applaud: Congress is attempting to understand the likely systemic consequences of the sundry components of the legislation it is contemplating, debating, and amending even now. Not to do that would be to proceed in reckless disregard of precisely such 'unintended consequences' as those about which Mr. Capretta in a later paragraph expresses concern. The way to avoid unintended consequences is to work systematically and responsibly to foresee them, assign reasonable probabilities to them, amend to avoid them, and allow flexibility going forward to respond to them if and when they emerge. Call that 'central' planning' if you like. I call it 'responsible legislating.'
2.
Mr. Capretta next cites a paper from the conservative Heritage Foundation, and a presentation made at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, that purport to show that certain disparities and inequities in treatment are apt to result from the legislation then under discussion in the Senate. He cites these as examples of the kind of unintended consequence that he credits Dr. K with fearing. I've only four brief reactions to these citations.
The first is that I have no idea whether this is the sort of thing Dr. K had in mind, as the Op Ed to which I directed my earlier questions afforded no guidance on this score.
The second is that I am thus far incompetent to judge whether these consequences are really apt to follow on the legislation now under consideration, or whether, if so, they are justifiable. Perhaps Mr. Capretta can say something about why the Senators themselves have not seen these alleged inequities and acted to rectify them. I for my part will have to take time of my own to look into them.
The third is that if in fact these two particular consequences are apt to follow, and if in fact they are unjustified, then it seems to me that the correct course of action is to bring this to the attention of legislators and call for amendment, rather than to throw hands in the air and say let's wait another 15 years before trying yet again to bring down health insurance costs and get health insurance to the now uninsured. Please recall here my earlier point to the effect that Dr. K's proposed remedy -- burning the whole bill and scattering its ashes over a swimming pool -- simply is too much like lancing a blister with a chainsaw.
Finally, my fourth reaction is to say thanks to Mr. C for helping to make a larger point that many besides me (including, I think, Dr. K in part) have tried to make elsewhere. That is that we could simplify things considerably and avoid Baroque complexities (no disrespect intended to the Baroque, a wonderful period of cultural achievement) such as those deplored by Mr. C and Dr. K were we to revisit the curious decision not to allow single payer (per Canada) or single provider (per the UK) onto the agenda at all.
The 'Medicare for All' proposal recently made by academic doctors in the Lancet and New England Journal of Medicine, or cognate proposals to extend to all who wish it the health plan enjoyed by Congress members themselves, would be a lovely place to start.
3.
Mr. Capretta next takes up Dr. K's 'out of a hat' charges, essentially repeating them under the heading of a new colorful simile: Now Congress is said simply to have 'picked an arbitrary number and crossed their fingers.' I'll accordingly repeat here what I said in reply to Dr. K: If this is true -- and I ask again how the leveler of the charge purports to know it -- the remedy is that suggested above in my third reaction to point 2: Don't burn the whole bill and scatter it over a swimming pool; tell Congress to do the modelling whose absence you are deploring.
4.
Mr. Capretta next defends Dr. K's trotting out of the familiar tort reform canard. He does so by citing a CBO study to said to estimate that 'serious' tort reform could save up to $54 billion per annum. There are several reaons why this is not responsive to my objection to Dr. K.
The first is that my point was not that the existence of a tort system does not result in costs faced by healthcare providers. Any system of accountability brings costs. (Imagine how much less expensive it would be to start and operate a gasoline station if you didn't have to pay all that money to avoid exposing those pesky neighbors to benzine contamination.) The point I made, rather, was that all the empirical work out there -- notably that of Greg's, Eduardo's, Steve's and my colleage Ted Eisenberg, who is hardly a molotov cocktail throwing 'liberal' -- shows that the putative 'liability crisis' decried periodically since the early 1980s by lawyer-baiting conservatives simply does not exist, nor has it every existed. Adjusted for inflation, tort damage awards have been constant in the aggregate for decades.
The second is that, even ignoring the injustice that would result to wrongfully harmed people, and the incentives to carelessness in respect of the lives and limbs of ourselves and our fellows that we would lock into place, were we arbitrarily to eviscerate our system of tort remedies -- a system we and our Roman and English legal forebears have had literally for centuries, since long before becoming Americans -- saving $54 billion over ten years would amount to saving quite literally a tiny fraction of the costs currently wrought by our system of health care insurance. Since Mr. Capretta has seen fit to cite the CBO, I wonder what he has to say about the far greater savings that the selfsame CBO has attributed to the bills currently before Congress.
Finally, the third point is that there is a structural similarity between the familiar 'tort reform' canard and the 'unnecessary tests' canard I addressed in my earlier post responding to Dr. K: It is easy to opine in the abstract that 'tests' in the aggregate are overprescribed, or that 'damages' in the aggregate are overawarded. A funny thing happens, however, when it is you who the doctor says ought to undergo tests, or when it is you whose colon now contains a scalphel inadvertently left by a surgeon. And just as the same people who complain of too much testing or too many unnecessarty procedures are those who complain about 'rationing' (either by govt or by HMOs) when somebody suggests actually limiting these things, my bet is that any lawyer-hater who actually knows or has been the victim of a reckless or neglegent medical practice (I do) will complain about govt's 'getting between you and your lawyer' the moment that Congress attempts to eliminate accountability from medical practice.
5.
Mr. Capretta closes by reiterating Dr. K's endorsement of Senator McCain's campaign proposal that we establish something more uniform in the way of health insurance provision for all. To that I say, as I did in my earlier post, hear hear. Please note also that this would be quite in keeping with what I suggest above under heading 2. One warning, however: In proposing something as radical (in the best, 'roots'-y sense) as this, Mr. Capretta risks being accused of attributing to Congress competence to engage in ... yep, 'central planning.' See last paragraph under heading 1, above.
6.
Let me close by observing, once more, something I observed in my response to Dr. K's Op Ed, something with which I have yet to see those who object to the current efforts underway in Congress engage:
We regularly hear innuendos to the effect that Congress is attempting to meddle in a 'free market' and is in so doing apt to lower the quality of our health care, as well as introduce inequities and, perversely, raise costs. But these people have yet, to my knowledge, to grapple with the fact that we do not presently enjoy a free market in health insurance, and indeed never will enjoy such a thing in light not only of the antitrust and additional federal regulatory exemption currently extended the health insurance companies under McCarran-Ferguson, but more intractably still of the 'natural monopoly' characteristics of health insurance. Nor have these people ever yet, to my knowledge, addressed the embarrassing fact that, of the full list of 30 OECD countries -- our peers -- to which the US belongs, the US ranks 26th in the quality of its health outcomes, while ranking first in the costs that it shoulders. It is no accident that these facts are both found together. Nor is it an accident that these peer countries I reference also are precisely those that treat health insurance as what I have been asserting it to be -- a classic social insurance problem. (For goodness sake, even Bismark, hardly a leftist, saw this!) It is high time we did so as well, in order that we be no more than a century late in so doing. And until we begin saying explicitly that it is not 'health care,' but health insurance that Congress is aiming to reform, we are not apt so much as to begin barking up the right tree.
Thanks again for listening,
Bob
conference on rights of conscience in health care
With all the discussion about conscience, I thought I'd mention an upcoming conference entitled "The Future of Rights of Conscience in Health Care: Legal and Ethical Perspectives." The conference, which is co-sponsored by University Faculty for Life, Ave Maria School of Law, and BYU Law School, will be held on February 26, 2010 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah.
The speakers will be Armand Antommaria, Tom Cavanaugh, Rebecca Dresser, Cole Durham, Clarke Forsythe, Jill Morrison, Richard Myers, Edmund Pellegrino, Rob Vischer, Lynn Wardle, and Robin Fretwell Wilson. The papers will be published in the Ave Maria Law Review. More information about the conference is available at this link. Here.
Richard M.
Bart Stupak, pro-life Democrat, defends his amendment ...
... in an op-ed in today's New York Times, here.
In the Senate: "Besides Mr. [Ben] Nelson, the Democrats who voted for the ban on abortion coverage [which was defeated] were Senators Evan Bayh of Indiana, Bob Casey of Pennsylvania, Kent Conrad and Byron L. Dorgan of North Dakota, Ted Kaufman of Delaware and Mark Pryor of Arkansas."
Is this really what government ought to be meddling in?
From ESPN's website:
Federal legislation that could lead to a college football playoff tournament will move a step closer to reality on Wednesday in a hearing before a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives.
The Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection will consider a bill that would allow the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prohibit any bowl game from calling itself a "national championship" unless the game is "the final game of a single elimination post-season playoff system." The subcommittee is expected to vote on the proposal on Wednesday after a line-by-line consideration of the bill.
Written and sponsored by Rep. Joe Barton (R-Tex.), the bill is a direct attack on the BCS and, if enacted, would bring the long simmering controversy over the BCS to an end. In a legislative process that is long and can be tortuous, the hearing is a significant step. This is the furthest any bill on the BCS controversy has ever progressed on Capitol Hill.
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
Paul Horwitz and reporters' errors
Cardinal Pell on Religion, Human Rights, and Policy
Here's Australia's Cardinal George Pell, speaking at a recent conference in Sydney. Cardinal Pell is concerned (with good reason, it appears) about an ongoing investigation by that country's Human Rights Commission into the freedom of religion and, more specifically, "the compatibility of religious freedom with human rights[.]" Cardinal Pell writes:
. . . The tone was set when the inquiry was announced in September 2008. The ABC reported the Commission’s Race Discrimination Commissioner, Tom Calma, expressing concern (in the ABC’s words) “at evidence of a growing fundamentalist religious lobby, in areas such as same-sex relationships, stem-cell research and abortion”.[1] I am not a fundamentalist religiously, politically or morally. But I was not aware that being a fundamentalist was against any Australian law; nor am I aware why this should be of any concern to a Race Discrimination Commissioner. This alleged fundamentalism is apparently one of the main reasons for the inquiry, and this attitude — that religious opinion and religious people in the public square are somehow a problem, perhaps even a danger — runs through the discussion paper the Commission issued to commence the inquiry.
In case there was any doubt about the matter, in August Mr Calma and Conrad Gershevitch delivered a conference paper on the inquiry which opened with these words:
"The compatibility of religious freedom with human rights is the subject of the most comprehensive study ever undertaken in Australia in this area. ..." [2] (emphasis added).
Let us spell this out: the clear meaning of these words is that religious freedom is not a human right and may not be compatible with human rights. This is an astonishing claim from a senior officer of the body responsible for the protection and advancement of human rights in Australia. Mr Calma announced the inquiry in a similar vein, comparing religion and human rights to oil and water – substances that do not mix.[3] . . .
Healthcare reform and undocumented immigrants: Cardinal Mahony speaks
NYT, 12/8/09
Op-Ed Contributor
Coverage Without Borders
By ROGER MAHONY
LOS ANGELES
AS the leaders of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops noted last month, the current health care reform bills in Congress are fundamentally flawed because they fall short in three critical areas: the prohibition of federal financing for abortions and the protection of current conscience laws; the inclusion of meaningful provisions to ensure affordability; and the defense of immigrants’ rights to health care.
Although all three areas are critical for this proposed legislation to be acceptable to the Catholic Church in our country, I would like to focus on the lack of adequate health care for immigrants who live in our midst but who do not yet have legal standing.
The two bills are quite different. The Senate bill bars undocumented immigrants from using even their own money to buy health insurance in the government-sponsored marketplace, or exchange, being proposed. The House bill allows undocumented immigrants to purchase health insurance from the exchange, if they use their own money and receive no federal subsidy.
Most studies estimate that more than 10 million undocumented immigrants live in our country. Many have been here for decades. The majority of these immigrants live in “mixed families” — some members of the family were born here, while other relatives are here without documents. It is unrealistic to think that these millions of people with roots deep in their communities are somehow going to pack up and move back to their country of origin — whether that is Korea, the Philippines, Russia, England, France or Mexico. Most have their children in local schools, the vast majority of them have jobs here, and all are contributing to the betterment of our nation.
It makes no sense to deny this large population necessary health care services. It certainly does not help Americans as a whole to remain healthy when millions of people, including schoolchildren, cannot get basic preventive care like immunizations and medications.
When undocumented immigrants are intentionally excluded from health care coverage, they are forced to go to the only place where they will be accepted for care: trauma centers and emergency rooms — the most expensive health care delivery systems in the country. What a foolish waste of money, particularly in a time of economic stress for everyone.
Using their own money, undocumented immigrants could receive basic health services through less expensive community clinics and doctors’ offices. Studies have shown that immigrants are generally younger and healthier than citizens, and use health care facilities and resources less frequently. Giving them access to less costly preventive care would help keep them that way. And by paying into the system, immigrants would make health care less pricey for all by spreading the risks and costs among a larger pool of participants.
At least the House bill allows undocumented immigrants to purchase health insurance from the proposed exchange. It’s difficult to understand anti-immigrant groups’ objections to this provision. No one would be rewarded for lacking proper documentation, since undocumented immigrants wouldn’t be eligible for subsidies.
The Senate bill takes us in the opposite direction and needs to be changed. How is the health of the entire country helped when the Senate will not even allow immigrants to use their own money to purchase their health insurance?
In many conversations with people around the country, I have found that the dreadful anti-immigrant rhetoric that dominates talk shows does not represent the views of a majority of Americans, who do not reject immigrants out of hand as a burden. Instead, they want to find a way for these people to emerge from the shadows and to begin down a path to legal status.
To deny our immigrant brothers and sisters basic health care coverage is immoral. To allow people’s basic health needs to be trumped by divisive politics violates American standards of decency and compassion. We should pass health care reform that provides access to all, in the interests of the common good. We must also enact comprehensive immigration reform that better balances our country’s need for a stable work force with the orderly flow of immigrants to help bring greater prosperity to all Americans.
Otherwise, in our country there will remain a permanent underclass left standing in the waiting room, asking for a doctor’s visit that will never come.
Personal Autonomy and Religious Law
Another paper of possible interest, this one by Farrah Ahmed:
The ‘millet’ and 'personal law' systems, found in countries such as India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Malaysia and Israel, are long-standing models of state accommodation of religious norms in family law. This paper, a work of applied normative legal theory, uses the Indian system of personal laws as a test-case to consider the extent to which these modes of accommodation undermine personal autonomy.
In particular, it studies the claim, made both in the context of the Indian personal law system and in debates in other jurisdictions on the use of religious norms in family law, that if people had a choice between religious law and generally-applicable secular law, this would remove any objection to such systems on the grounds of personal autonomy. It also studies the further claim that such a power to choose would actually make the personal law system better for personal autonomy than a system of general secular laws.
Liberal states, including the United Kingdom and Canada, increasingly face calls from religious groups to reform family law in order to accommodate religious norms. The conclusions of this paper contribute to the broader question of whether these states should do so, as well as the question of what form any accommodation should take.