Earlier this week, I mentioned that I'd been away last week, to give a paper at Yale for an interesting conference hosted by Thomas Pogge of Yale's Philosophy Department. I might have failed to mention how very inspiring this conference was. It brought together lawyers, economists, and philosophers not only from the academy, but also from such influential global institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and from such NGOs, 'civil society' organizations, and faith groups as Global Financial Integrity, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Soros Foundation, the National Council of Churches, Oxfam, Christian Aid, and many others.
What was perahps most profoundly encouraging about this conference was how so many morally committed and engertetic people, from so many varied backgrounds and affiliations, were able in a spirit of fraternal concern and committed collaboration to grapple with a very real, very urgent, yet very much 'off the radar' global problem: That is the role played by 'offshore' financial secrecy, money-laundering, tax-dodging 'transfer pricing' schemes, and like practices in hampering sustainable, equitably shared development in many still undeveloped nations, locking the global poor into enduring penury.
Also eye-opening at this conference were a multitude of shocking reports that emerged of the brutal, dehumanizing ways in which laborers, often imported into many of these havens under false pretenses, are treated. And this is not even to mention, though perhaps it is to presuppose, the regard in which these same folk -- many from such places as the Philippines and Bengladesh -- are held by the wealthier 'tax refugees' who reside in the penthouses of these Vegas-like 'outlaw jurisdictions.' For the imported laborers appear to be viewed and routinely described, as well as treated, as less than human by those who import them.
I accordingly think that all lawyers of good will with an interest in financial regulation and tax policy might find the subject of last week's Yale conference a very ripe field in which dramatic improvements in the lives of our innocent sisters and brothers worldwide might be made -- if only we will continue to notice.
In the spirit of such 'declarations' as the recent Manhattan Declaration, then, let me close this post with the 'New Haven Declaration' upon which we all agreed last week at the close of our conference, a declaration upon which we shall be following-up with more action:
New Haven Declaration on Human Rights and Financial Integrity
Human rights and international financial integrity are intimately linked. Where poverty is pervasive, civil, political, and economic rights often go unrealized. Today, large outflows of illicit money ? many times larger than all development assistance ? greatly aggravate poverty and oppression in many developing countries.
Illicit money leaves poorer countries through a global shadow financial system comprising tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions, disguised corporations, anonymous trust accounts, fake foundations, trade mispricing, and money-laundering techniques. Much of this money is permanently shifted into western economies.
Reducing these illicit outflows requires greater transparency and integrity in the global financial system. Achieving this is a prerequisite to creating an economic framework that is open, accountable, fair, and beneficial for all.
We call upon the United Nations, the G8, G20, WTO, IMF, World Bank, and other international fora, as well as on national governments, world leaders, faith groups and civil society organizations to recognize the linkage between human rights and financial transparency. We further call for decisive steps to ensure that developing countries can retain their resources for sustainable growth and poverty alleviation, which they must achieve if the human rights of all people are to be realized.
The undersigned individuals and organizations shall be working together in the coming months to pursue this agenda and look to add additional voices to this effort.
Sorry, Michael, but I don't see what your point is. Perhaps I'm being obtuse. We've got a country full of all types of people, and they have differing views on all sorts of morally-charged political issues, including the issue of what marriage is and what it isn't. They also have all sorts of different views about whether moral knowledge is possible, and if so what its sources are and how we have access to those sources. And obviously among people who believe in moral truth there are all sorts of differences about its content.
We have fideists, including many Evangelical Protestants of the Carl F.H. Henry school, who don't think too highly of the idea of natural law, and who believe that all moral knowledge is the fruit of Biblical revelation. We have Catholics who believe in natural law. We have secularists, some of whom believe in the possibility of objective moral knowledge, and many others of whom do not. We have Humeans, for example, who don't believe that moral truth is obtainable at all, whether by revelation or reason ("Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and may pretend to no office other than to serve and obey them.") We have Nietzscheans and nihilists of other descriptions. (Even nihilists have fierce disputes amongst themselves as to which form of nihilism is correct.) Among the intellectual classes, we have Foucaultians. Lord, do we ever have the Foucaultians. Then, of course, we have utilitarians of various descriptions. And that only scratches the surface in accounting for all the different types of people who are out there. Now, all of these people have political views. They are all prepared to fashion policy, grant legal recognitions of various sorts, and restrict liberty on the basis of beliefs they hold about how society ought to be shaped and run. Some are libertarians, some are egalitarians, most don't fit neatly into either of those categories. Are you saying that some of them may legitimately act in the political sphere to enact laws that they favor and others may not? If so, who is in, and who is out? And according to what criterion?
Let's say Agatha is an Evangelical Christian. She believes that marriage is the union of one man and one woman and that polyamorous partnerships ought not to be legally recognized as marriages. She also believes that hotel owners and restaurateurs should be punished by law if they discriminate against African-Americans. Her reasons? The Bible tells her so. Is she out? Are laws that were enacted with crucial support from people like her illegitimate? Should some body that excludes people with her convictions be established to invalidate those laws? Benny is a Catholic. He believes that marriage is the union of one man and one woman and that polyamorous partnerships ought not to be legally recognized as marriages. He also believes that hotel owners and restaurateurs should be punished by law if they discriminate against African-Americans. His reasons? Well, he believes that the Bible and sacred tradition support these ideas, but he also believes that they can be grasped even by unaided reason as matters of natural law and natural rights. Is he in?
Then there is Carson. He is a disciple of Hume who teaches in the Philosophy Department in those green pastures of Princeton. He shares Agatha's belief that reason cannot identify objective moral norms, whether about marriage or about racial justice. But he doesn't believe in revelation. As far as he is concerned, there is no true moral reason to prefer one view of marriage over another, or to oppose racial discrimination. But, as a matter of feeling, he happens to dislike polyamory and racial discrimination. So he opposes the legal recognition of polyamorous unions as marriages and he favors laws punishing racial discrimination. Is he in or out?
And what about Cynthia? She's over in the even greener pastures of Rutgers. She shares Carson's Humeanism, but not his feelings. Her feelings have led her to a rather thoroughgoing libertarianism in politics. She has no aversion to poyamory and would like to see polyamorous partnerships recognized as marriages, if the state recognizes any marriages at all. She feels (to speak precisely) that no one should be forced to associate with anyone he doesn't wish to, so she is opposed to laws criminalizing people's choices to exlude patrons from hotels and restaurants on any grounds, including race. Is she in or out?
Now, we could keep going with this, considering the views of Debbie, the nihilist, Edgar the Foucaultian (who is in favor of legally recognizing polyamorous unions as marriages), Frances, the Kantian . . . all the way to Xavier, the utilitarian, and Zeke the guy who thinks that moral knowledge comes from drug experiences, and who decides questions like whether to favor or oppose the legal recognition of polyamory or the criminalization of racial discrimination in public accomodation on the basis of what comes to him when he is in drug-induced trances.
Now, as you know, I'm with Benny all the way. I believe we have, and can be aware of, reasons for moral judgments and we ought to form our moral opinions (including those that shape our political opinions) by reference to those reasons and in line with their integral directiveness. I think that traditions of faith are often bearers of wisdom--indluding wisdom that is revealed--so I think that its perfectly legitimate, and, indeed, desirable to view faith and reason as complementary sources of moral knowledge. But I don't want to disenfranchise (or question the legitimacy of political participation on the part of) my fellow citizens who see things differently. I certainly don't see any ground for treating Agatha as acting on politically illegitimate motives while supposing that Carson, Debbie, Edward, and Zeke aren't. Sure, I'd be happy to try to talk them out of their fideism, Humeanism, nihilism, etc. (and to give them a chance to persuade me that my belief in natural law is misguided). But that's a different issue.
For what it's worth, I think that most Americans throughout our history have understood themselves as drawing their moral convictions (including those that bear upon moral issues such as slavery, suffrage, abortion, and marriage) from their religious faith, and most have not fully understood the relationship of reason to faith, even as presented in their own religious traditions. This is true even of a great many Evangelcial Protestants. Far from all Evangelicals (now or in earlier periods of our history) belong to traditions that embrace the strict fideism insisted upon by the late Professor Henry. I think that it is also true that many people who speak in religious language about morality and politics, could and would, if pressed in argument, reveal that they do not believe that God's will (whether about murder, slavery, marriage, or anything else) is arbitrary. They might begin by saying "the Bible tells me so." But, if pressed, they would find themselves developing an account of why God commanded X and not its opposite. In many cases, the well-being and dignity of the human being (as a creature made in the image and likeness of God) would find its way into the argument, together with the belief that a good and loving God (the sort who would send His son as a man like us to suffer and die for our sins) would will (only) what is good for man, and would command (only) what is in line with the integral well-being and fulfillment of human beings. In other words, they would turn out to be believers in natural law after all. (Of course, that does not mean that their moral and political judgments would necessarily be correct.)
I take your point that these are contested questions requiring detailed treatment that can scarcely be given in a blog posting. Given their importance, I don't mind spending $80 to get the answers.
I mentioned my home state of Georgia in my post yesterday. But one may fairly wonder whether even in New Jersey, wherein are located the green pastures of Princeton University (apologies to Robert Zimmerman), the determinative argument for refusing to extend the
benefit of law to same-sex unions isn't religiously—indeed, biblically—grounded. Consider this passage from an article about the controversy in New Jersey over whether civil unions for same-sex couples, which already exist in New Jersey, should be called "marriage":
Carrying signs declaring, “God says no, [Senator] Baroni votes yes” and “Phony
Baloney Baroni,” a half-dozen demonstrators called out to passing
motorists and party guests, warning the senator that constituents would
hold him accountable for his vote.
“The Bible is very clear
that marriage is between a man and a woman, and homosexuality is a
sin,” said Bob Pawson, who said he is a longtime friend of Mr. Baroni’s
and has volunteered on his campaigns. “So to promote this lifestyle —
it’s actually a death style — is sending the wrong message.”
Mr.
Baroni, a Roman Catholic, said he respected the demonstrators’ right to
air their views, but nonetheless intended to vote for the marriage bill
because he considered it a matter of civil rights.
“I have never voted for discrimination, and I’m not about to start now,” he said.
Senator Baroni's friend and critic--Bob Pawson--is not alone. We are often instructed that same-sex sexual conduct is (and therefore same-sex unions are) "in direct opposition to God's
truth as He has revealed it in the Scriptures." So said the Rev. Ron Johnson, Jr., on Sept.
28, 2008, to cite but one example. See Peter Slevin, "33
Pastors Flout Tax Law With Political Sermons," Washington Post, Sept. 29,
2008.
Sorry, friends, I do not seem to be able to get myself as exercised about the meaning of the word 'attack' as John Breen does, but I nevertheless stand by my characterization of the blog post targeting Senator Casey as an attack upon the Senator that I hope Mr. Stricherz will reconsider.
John asks me to cite where the attack on Casey occurs. I ask that John look again at the second paragraph of my post, wherein I quote the language of attack. Want the locations of occurrences of that language? Here they are:
Mr. Stricherz accuses Senator Casey of 'lacking courage' (see title of post, and paragraph six). He accuses Senator Casey of not making his decision in re the pending legislation 'on principle' (see paragraphs four, five, and seven). And finally, he at the same time suggests that Senator Casey is making the decision he does on the basis, not of principle, but of mere electoral politics (see paragraph five: 'He's likely worried about pro-choice suburban voters in the Phildelphia suburbs...'). Moreover, and indeed ironically in the present context, that last attribution of motive is precisely what Mr. Stricherz offers by way of follow-up to what John curiously labels his 'acknowledgment' that '[c]oming up with Casey's possible objections to making a bold stand on behalf of the unborn is not difficult.'
I am sure John will appreciate that, to any person of principle, for whom it is always a cardinal imperative to act courageously in behalf of her or his principles even at the possible expense of unpopularity among suburbanites, the impugning of her or his motives, and the accusation that s/he is uncourageously disregarding her or his principles, all in order to curry favor with suburban voters, is apt to qualify as an 'attack.' Leveled at, say, Aaron Burr, such accusations might have qualified as high praise. But levelled at a courageous and principled public servant such as Senator Casey, they constitute an attack. And this attack was, for reasons adduced in my previous post, anything but 'thoughtful.'
I might note also, while at it here, that there is no inconsistency what ever between making the conciliatory remarks cited by John in his third paragraph, and going on to attack the person about whom one has made those remarks. John is accordingly correct that the kind words he cites in his third paragraph are 'hardly the stuff of an "attack,"' but the point is quite free of relevance. If I say, 'I have a soft spot for you because you used to be principled, courageous, and free of opportunistic concern with currying the favor of pro-choice suburbanites, but now you are unpricipled, lacking in courage, and chasing after the votes of pro-choice suburbanites,' I shall simultaneously have made conciliatory remarks about your past and attacked your present behavior -- particularly in impugning your motives as Mr. Stricherz's accusations do Senator Casey's. I think that's a shame.
Attributing the motives that he does to Senator Casey, instead of the more plausible -- and principled -- motives that I attribute to Senator Casey in my post, then, Mr. Stricherz attacks Senator Casey even while flattering him. I think that requires either reconsideration or fuller substantiation. I hope that one or the other or both will be forthcoming.
This holiday season, if you've been tossing and turning all night, wondering what to buy for that friend or relative who has a strange fascination with the liberty of conscience, wonder no more.
Thanks to Bob Hockett for responding to my post linking to Mark Stricherz's commentary on Bob Casey's apparent lack of courage with respect to resisting the federal funding of abortions in the proposed health care reform bill.
Mark is more than capable of responding to Bob's comments (i.e. as to whether Casey is or is not principled or courageous) in detail -- something that I hope he will do in in the near future. So I will limit my remarks here to a single point.
Bob urges Mark to "reconsider his attack" on Senator Casey. Whatever else one may think of Mark's post, it can hardly be characterized as an "attack." Mark notes that Casey has made "unpopular votes on the prolife side" and that Casey "wants to overturn Roe v. Wade." Mark says that he "has a soft spot" for the Senator and recounts a lengthy interview he once had with him. Clearly Mark criticizes Senator Casey for saying that he "will vote for health-care reform even if the legislation allows private insurers who cover abortion to get federal dollars" but then acknowledges that "[c]oming up with Casey's possible objections to making a bold stand on behalf of the unborn is not difficult."
This is hardly the stuff of an "attack." It is reasoned, considered and measured. Indeed, I suspect that Mark's post would strike most readers as the work of a journalist who is attempting to present a balanced view of Senator Casey's situation while also criticizing the Senator for not acting with the same courage that his father demonstrated. Most people would, I think, agree that it is possible to criticize a person for a failure or shortcoming that one explains, without "attacking" them.
Bob's mischaracterization of Mark's post as an "attack" highlights, I think, a larger problem with respect to political discourse in this country.
The liberality with which the word "attack" is thrown around is simply astounding. Like plastic beer cups at a Friday night fraternity kegger or colored beads thrown to women lifting their tops on Bourbon Street at Mardi Gras, the frequency with which the word "attack" is invoked to describe a point of view with which one simply disagrees is in no short supply.
This hyperbole, this misuse of the term "attack" to describe anything the reader disagrees with is simply irresponsible. Mark's comments are not severe and aggressive, let alone spiteful. They are instead respectful yet pointed expression of criticism. If Bob Hockett wishes to stand by his characterization of Mark Stricherz's post as an "attack" on Bob Casey, then he should point out where such an attack occurs in the post-- something he simply failed to do in his MOJ response. If not, I wish that he would amend his remarks. Which is not to say that he can't -- in a reasoned an measured way -- take issue with what Stricherz says. But let's keep the attacks to a minimum.
Irish abortion ban up before European human-rights
court Lawyers
and activists argue an abortion ban in Ireland challenged by three women in the
European court of human rights violates several articles of the Council of
Europe's convention on human rights. In a case being closely watched by
traditionally Catholic European nations, the three women told the Strasbourg,
France, court that they traveled to Britain to seek abortions because of the
Irish ban, which they say has caused them humiliation, hardship and trauma. The Guardian (London) (12/9)
I'd like to thank John Breen for linking to Mark Stricherz's recent post on Senator Casey. I must disagree, however, with the characterization of this post as 'thoughtful.' With all respect to Mr. Stricherz, I think his post unfair to Senator Casey, and so I urge him either to reconsider his attack upon the Senator or to elaborate more fully his reasons for characterizing Senator Casey in the way that he does.
How does Mr. Stricherz characterize Senator Casey? He suggests repeatedly that the Senator's decision to refrain thus far from threatening to filibuster the health insurance reform legislation now before the Senate, unless certain demands that he might make are met, is 'unprincipled.' He relatedly attributes merely 'political' motives to the Senator in thus refraining till now. And he repeatedly accuses the Senator of 'lacking courage' in light of thise decision.
Mr. Stricherz also cites, apparently with intended approval, sundry hold-up threats raised by other Senators. In particular, he instances Senators Landrieu, Lieberman, and Nelson, who have threatened to prevent independently compelling health insurance reform legislation's going through unless the full Senate capitulates to certain individual demands that these Senators make. One such demand noted by Mr. Stricherz is Senator Landrieu's demand that the final Senate bill funnel $300 million in federal subsidies to her state. To be principled, it seems, and to be courageous, is to hold urgently needed health insurance reform, willed by a majority, hostage to one's individual will to see certain pet demands -- including demands for subsidies -- met by the US Senate.
Now it of course bears noting that the issue that most exercises Mr. Stricherz -- as well, of course, as Senators Casey and Nelson, though not Landrieu or Lieberman -- is much more than a mere 'pet demand.' It is a matter of foundational moral concern, about which scores of millions of morally sincere -- might one say 'principled'? -- even if often confused, people have long disagreed and continue to disagree. But the critical point here is that there is nothing in Senator Casey's refusal thus far to threaten a filibuster on behalf of the Nelson amendment, in the manner that people like Landrieu and Lieberman have done on behalf of their own demands, that warrants the attribution of unprincipled opportunism or cowardice to him, much less the accusation that he is 'lukewarm' or 'tepid' in his opposition to abortion. Quite the contrary; I think it is at least as likely -- and indeed much more likely -- that Senator Casey is activated by high principle and admirable courage.
I'll quickly substantiate that suggestion with two examples, both of which figure at least obliquely in Mr. Stricherz's post.
First, as Mr. Stricherz notes, Senator Casey voted in favor of Senator Nelson's proffered amendment to the Senate bill, which would have introduced a counterpart, to this bill, of the hotly contested Stupak amendment made to the House bill. That itself constitutes a principled stance, as even opponents of the Nelson amendment would likely admit. It might be a stance on behalf of the wrong principle, in opponents' eyes, but it is not for that unprincipled. Moreover takes something an awful lot like courage to take such a stand as that, when s/he who takes it is a member of a political party in the eyes of most of whose members Stupak itself was, justifiably or not, an outrage. An opportunistic Senate Democrat would have declined to offer any support at all for the Nelson amendment.
Second, as Mr. Stricherz and I suspect all MoJ readers now surely appreciate, the Stupak amendment -- and a fortiori, presumably, the Nelson amendment -- quite possibly (if not likely) fail the test of abortion-neutrality. And the latter is the acknowledged desideratum of all people of good will -- abortion opponents and 'choice' proponents alike -- who wish realistically to see a more just and less costly system of health insurance put into place now, while leaving the much more fraught and presently unresolvable matter of abortion to continue contested in the same fora as it has been to the present. Hence one can have very good, principled reasons, even as an ardent opponent of abortion, of Roe v. Wade, and of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, not only for refraining from filibustering a health insurance reform bill on behalf of the Nelson amendment, but even for opposing the Nelson amendment.
In short, then, if health insurance reform is independently compelling from a Catholic social justice point of view, and if it can only be had by severing it from the equally or more compelling question of abortion, then there are perfectly good grounds, sounding in principles cognate to those that often go under the name of 'subsidiarity,' upon which either to reject, or to support only with misgivings, something like a Nelson amendment, while adamently refraining from threatening to obstruct the good will of the majority in favor of health insurance reform unless that majority signs onto that non-neutral amendment.
Senator Casey, then, might very well have very good principled reasons, which he harbors and acts upon with great moral courage, for not joining such hostage-takers as Landrieu and Lieberman. And I think that familiar canons of charitable interpretation militate in favor of our attributing motives underwritten by precisely such reasons to Senator Casey. I for my part have no doubt about his earnestness.
