[A rehearsal, that is, of the parts of my response that Robby, in his post just below, ignored. I'll let the to-and-fro accusations about who's insulting whom speak for themselves. Again, Robby’s words are in non-bold
type; my response, in bold type.]
Liberal Catholics frequently lecture
us "Rambo Catholics" about the need for respectful discourse, the
importance of engaging "the other" with civility and openness to
competing arguments and points of view, etc., etc. Indeed, Brother
Michael himself pleads with us to have "open, truly open
minds." Yet like so many liberal Catholics Michael seems to have
trouble imagining that people could have "open, truly open" minds yet
actually dissent from liberal ideology on matters of sexual morality. . .
. How can it be that there are people
who disagree with sophisticated, open-minded, liberal people like
Michael?
“Liberal ideology”? “Liberal people”? Robby overlooks, in his rhetorical slap at
liberals, that many of those who agree with me on the issue at hand—and disagree
with Robby—are not at all liberals:
Jonathan Rauch, Dale Carpenter, Dick Cheney, etc. Government’s role in regulating the economy
is a right/left, liberal/conservative issue.
But the issue at hand is not such an issue—and should not be so
characterized, however useful in may be to do so in polemical
statements and
fundraising letters.
Michael's post caricatures and
ridicules those who don't share his views. Evidently he regards us
as unsophisticated schlubs whose idea of a moral argument is to exclaim
"Yuk!" In that most predictable of liberal tropes, he insinuates that
we are like racists -- "Black bonding sexually with white?
Yuk!" Gentle Michael is understanding of our schlubbiness, though,
and even offers an exculpatory diagnosis. After calling for moral
theology to take on board the "yield of modern and contemporary
experience," he says: "Think, here, human sexuality. I fully
understand that for many of us [that would be us poor unsophisticated
schlubs--RG] this is hard to do---for some of us impossibly hard: those
whose socialization and psychology have bequeathed to them a profound
aversion---I am inclined to say, an aesthetic aversion (though, of course, they
do not experience it that way)---to unfamiliar modes of human sexuality."
My
point was and is that the “Yuk”—my shorthand for an emotional disposition of
disgust—is what animates, in many, the search for and construction of a
rational vindication of the disposition.
The “Yuk”—the disgust—is not the argument but an important factor animating
the search for and construction of the argument. Now, I know that this is not true for
everyone who is in the grip of the conviction that homosexual sexual conduct is
necessarily immoral, but it is certainly true for many. See Martha Nussbaum, Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law: From Disgust to Humanity (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010); Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton Univ. Press, 2006).
In
any event: Am I not correct that moral theology should be informed by the yield of modern and contemporary
experience—and that it loses credibility if it is not so informed? Am I not correct that today, there is good
reason to reevaluate traditional attitudes toward, and judgments about, the
morality of homosexual sexual conduct?
Even good reason to think differently about the morality of homosexual sexual
conduct than our parents and grandparents did when they were young?
Don't worry, it can be explained. They
are victims of forms of "socialization" and "psychology"
that have bequeathed to them an "aversion" to "unfamiliar modes
of human sexuality."
Isn’t
it clear that in the world’s most established liberal democracies, there is
ongoing a generational shift in attitudes toward, and judgments about, the
morality of homosexual sexual conduct? What
are the principal determinants of this generational shift? Are we to believe that shifts in
socialization and psychology, due to a contemporary experience of homosexuality
that is rather different from that of our parents and grandparents, do not play
a significant role?
In the course of his remarks,
Michael mentions my mentors, John Finnis and Germain Grisez, together with two
liberal scholars he admires, Cathleen Kaveny and Jean Porter. Michael
claims that the liberals are the ones more faithful to the great tradition that
runs from Aristotle through Aquinas. This strikes me as preposterous, but
MoJ readers needn't rely on my judgment of the matter or Michael's.
Readers can (and I hope they will) have a look at some work by Finnis and
Grisez and some work by Kaveny and Porter and judge for themselves which
writers are superior to the others in analytical rigor, logical precision,
interpretative soundness, and depth of insight.
Preposterous? Wrong, maybe, but preposterous? That’s a unduly harsh judgment, given that,
as Robby well knows, there are very many highly regarded Catholic theologians
(and other Christian theologians) who judge Jean Porter’s important, ongoing
work on natural law to be much more insightful and persuasive than that of John
Finnis and Germain Grisez, whose natural-law defenses of traditional Catholic teaching about
such matters as contraception, masturbation, and non-marital sex, for example (“always and everywhere gravely immoral”),
they regard as unpersuasive.
Preposterous?
Now this really is rich. Michael P. posts Christmas eve comments disparaging and insulting those who disagree with him about sexual morality, ignoring their arguments, insinuating that they are, or are like racists, and "diagnosing" them as victims of "socialization" or "psychology" that has produced in them an "aversion" to "unfamiliar modes of human sexuality." When called on this unseemly conduct, he casts himself as the victim of insults. But it doesn't end there. He conscripts none other than Cathleen Kaveny into the dispute, who opines that Michael is indeed a victim of my throwing around "labels, accusations, and insults." She's wrong about that, but more interesting is the irony of her saying it. This is the same Cathleen Kaveny who insults her intellectual adversaries by labeling them "Rambo Catholics" (gee, there is sophsticated philosophical analysis) and accusing them of being "ecclesiastical bullies." Wouldn't it be, um, better to engage their arguments rather than questioning their motives and calling them names?
As for Professor Kaveny's ex cathedra pronouncements on Germain Grisez's thought, I repeat the hope I expressed in response to Michael P.'s claim that Professor Kaveny's work and Jean Porter's are more faithful to the tradition running from Aristotle through Aquinas than the work of Professor Grisez and John Finnis. Readers of MoJ needn't rely on my judgment or Michael's or Professor Kaveny's. Just have a look at writings by Kaveny and Porter and have a look at writings by Grisez and Finnis. Reader's will have no trouble judging for themselves which writers are superior to the others in analytical rigor, logical precision, interpretative soundness, and depth of insight.
I appreciated Michael P.'s nominating me for the deanship at Villanova. I told him that were I to be appointed, three-quarters of the faculty would immediately resign. We would need to rebuild the faculty quickly. Therefore, I would accept the position only on the condition that Michael himself join the faculty. Bob Hockett and Rick Garnett would have to join us, too. I like Michael and enjoy arguing with him. But I and his other friends would do him no good service by letting him get away with what he tried to get away with in that Christmas eve post. If he is going to plead for people to have "open, truly open minds," then he needs to exemplify that virtue in making the plea. He needs to be open-minded. Concretely, that means taking other people's arguments seriously and giving them credit for thinking, even if one disagrees with their conclusions. That means addressing their arguments, and not claiming or insinuating that their beliefs are rooted in "aversions" to the "unfamiliar" that they somehow got saddled with as a result of their "socialization" or as a consequence of their psychological make-up.
I hope that Michael will go back and re-read what he wrote. I hope he will be open-minded enough to see why those against whom he made his allegations would perceive them as insulting, offensive, and hypocritcal. This is an occasion for resolving to actually engage their arguments, not impugn their intellects or suggest that the poor schlubs, unlike sophisticated people, can't help being like racists since they are psychologically in the grip of "aversions" to the "unfamiliar." ("Black bonding sexually with white? Yuk!")
I do not
know if the New York Times magazine accurately reported an aspect of his
method, but, if it did, I find it disturbing. According to the Times, as I read
it, George makes a sharp distinction between moral conclusions based in Reason
(which I take to be Opinion supported by reason - right or wrong) and moral
conclusions that do not follow deductively from moral principles (thus, as I
understand it, favoring particular practical steps in favor of the poor is
always lower in his hierarchy than say opposing homosexuality).
It seems to
me that compassion is a major theme in the gospel and that this method does not
leave adequate room for compassion.
I should
say that I have never met Robert George and am not talking at all about his
personal compassion for others. But I have a general view that deduction as an
exclusive method of moral reason risks taking on bloodless conclusions unless
the operator of the method smuggles his or her desires into the premises.
... about which I've written at length elsewhere. You've asked about my position. Here's a sketch:
1. Why is it the case--if indeed it is the case--that each and every human being has inherent dignity and is inviolable? In my judgment, secular (non-theological) thought lacks the resources to give an adequate answer to that question.
2. Given that every human being has inherent dignity and is inviolable, we should value what's good for any human being--good for him or her in the sense of conducive to or constitutive of his or her flourishing as human beings, his or her eudaimonia--and we should disvalue what's bad for any human being--bad for him or her in the sense of conducive to or constitutive of his or her withering. (Serious problems obviously arise--not least, political-moral problems--when what's good for one or more human beings is bad, directly or indirectly, for one or more other human beings.) So, what *is* good for (some or all) human beings--and what *is* bad for them? In my judgment, theology qua theology--qua theo-logos--cannot answer that question. What can answer it? That's where the natural-law approach kicks in, an approach that, properly understood, relies on and brings to bear all of the relevant parts of human knowledge. And the relevant parts of human knowledge, of course, are not static.
Now, I've got to start grading some exams!
