Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, May 4, 2010

Smith, "The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse"

I was delighted to receive in the mail the other day my copy of Steven Smith's latest book, "The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse."  Run (or, double-click), don't walk, to get yours.  As one of the back-cover blurb-ers (ahem, me) puts it, "[t]his book presses us to look harder at closely held beliefs and to question deeply rooted premises and commitments with which we are perhaps too comfortable."

In the Unlikely Event of an Emergency...

Jeremiah Wooten, a student in my seminar exploring Catholic Perspectives on American Law writes:

 If there is a change in cabin pressure, oxygen masks will release from the panels above your seat.  Pull the mask over your nose and mouth and breathe normally to start the flow of oxygen.  If assisting a child or other passenger, secure the mask to yourself before helping the other passenger. 

                Anyone who has ever flown commercially has heard this phrase or some variation of it, and if you are like me, you have felt uneasy about being instructed to save yourself before you save someone else.  How selfish is this?  If I was traveling with my children and the masks dropped, my first instinct would be to help them get set up before doing anything else, yet these are the instructions before every flight.  Perhaps it is reiterated before every take off because it is so counter intuitive.  But the idea is simple, if you can’t breathe, then you pass out and can’t help others in need, and then they pass out, and in the end everyone loses.  However, if you take care of yourself first, you will be able to assist others in need, and in the end, everyone benefits.

But does this scenario have deeper meaning?  Could these instructions provide insight into the human experience?  Catholic social thought instructs every person to live a life of solidarity, the selfless giving of oneself in order to help your neighbor.  But if you don’t take care of yourself first, how much do you have to offer?  Conversely, in our ultra-individualistic society, we often spend far too much time taking care of our own needs and desires.  Where is the line drawn?  How can there be a balance?  Perhaps the airlines have it right: before you help others, make sure you can “breathe” on your own. 

Counting the costs of early marriage

Jonathan Rauch has an interesting op-ed derived in part from the Cahn/Carbone book, Red Families v. Blue Families, which has prompted previous conversations on MoJ about policies toward contraception.  I'm more interested in the economic dimension of the red state / blue state divide on family life: forming families at a young age was much easier in the past, when the father could support the family with a high school education and a stable factory job.  In the postindustrial age, more education is needed, and so early procreation has a much more disruptive economic effect on the participants' lives.  (A related reality is that sexual abstinence until marriage looks different if marriage happens at 19 versus marriage happening at 26 or 27.)  This does not negate the truth of any particular moral or religious teaching on sexuality, marriage, and family life, of course, but it does change the set of background considerations, doesn't it?  If parenthood at a young age brings a different set of economic complications today than it did in past generations, should that change the way Catholics (and Christians more broadly) speak about these issues?  To be clear, I'm not proposing that the Church begin teaching that sex outside marriage is morally permissible -- I'm asking whether the conversation about the accompanying hardships needs to change in light of the changing economic reality.  Maybe it's changed already, and I'm just out of the loop.  Thoughts?

Arizona Immigration Law

I hope to find the time later to address the Arizona Immigration Law directly.  For now I want use a Chesterton quote to reflect briefly on a potential motivating factors behind the law.  To be clear, I think the new Arizona law is terrible and terribly mistaken at many levels.  But, I also don't want to fall into demonizing the common person who supported it.  In his essay, The Common Man, Chesterton opines:

To put it briefly; it is now the custom to say that most modern blunders have been due to the Common Man.  And, I should like to point out what appalling blunders have in fact been due to the Uncommon Man.  It is easy eonugh to argue that the mob makes mistakes; but as a fact it hever has a chance even to make mistakes until its superiors have used their superiority to make much worse mistakes.  It is easy to weary of democracy and cry out for an intellectual aristocracy.  But the trouble is that every intellectual aristocracy seems to have been utterly unintellectual.  Anybody might guess beforehand that there would be blunders of the ignorant.  What nobody could have guessed, what nobody could have dreamed of in a nightmare, what no morbid mortal imagination could ever have dared to imagine, was the mistakes of the well-formed....

After Jimmy Carter appointed him to head a blue ribbon commision on immigration reform in 1979, Notre Dame President Fr. Hesburgh concluded that the United States needed to close the back door (illegal immigration) in order to maintain a healthy front door (legal immigration).  Amnesty for four million or so undocumented aliens followed the passage of immigration reform in 1986 with the promise by our government that the back door was effectively shut.  But, of course it wasn't and now we face a situation where the number of undocumented persons in this country is as much as four times what it was in 1986.  While I vigorously oppose the Arizona law, could that law be a "common" reaction not so much to those illegally in the country but toward our federal government's inability or unwillingness to fulfill its promise made 24 years ago?  In short, could the "common" person's terrible mistake in Arizona be a reaction to worse mistakes made by their governing "superiors" in Washington?

Cross posted on the LRE blog.

About Goldman Sachs

Hello All,

Have been a bit busy of late with finance-regulatory developments, and so have not been posting on more fundamental matters.  But there will presumably be more time for that soon.  In the meanwhile, for any MoJ readers who might be interested in the recent hullabaloo over Goldman Sachs and related concerns, there's some analysis of what is at stake, provided by a local entertainer, here: http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/05/meanings-of-goldman-sachs.html .  I'd be especially interested in folks' reactions to the last couple of paragraphs, which project ahead to forthcoming work on how we might render the financial economy more helpful to those sectors of our and the global polity with much less disposable income and financial sophistication than Wall Street's currently dominant clientele.  There's a bit more on that here: http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/ .  Here's to bringing a 'preferential option for the poor' to the options (and other derivatives) markets themselves.

All best,

Bob

Monday, May 3, 2010

Arizona Immigration Law, ctd.

No matter what you think of the question of illegal immigration, there's no denying that the Arizona immigration law will have a huge impact on legal resident Latino immigrants, naturalized citizens and even U.S. born Latino citizens (and, although the focus has been on Latinos, the same would go for Asian-Americans as well).  In fact, U.S. born citizens and naturalized citizens are likely to feel the brunt of it most directly, because of two interlocking factors:  (1) they possess the phenotype and accents that police will inevitably rely on in identifying illegal immigrants and (2) since they are actually citizens, and therefore secure in their presence here, they are not in the habit of carrying around papers that would prove their citizenship. 

This is what defenders of the Arizona law, who say that it is just an attempt to deal with illegal immigration by enforcing the law do not seem to understand.  The burden of this enforcement is not just going to fall on illegal immigrants.  Besides the actual illegal immigrants whose apprehension it will facilitate, the design of the law means that the burden it creates will fall exclusively on Latinos who are lawfully present in the United States.  This is exactly how the law differs from a law that, say, would require everyone to prove his or her lawful immigration status in certain contexts (e.g., as when we are required to show our SS card when we begin new employment).

And a recent episode confirms the fear that the law is designed specifically to maximize the zone in which these intrusive police interactions will occur.  An email from Kris Korbach, a UMKC law professor who has been instrumental in shaping and defending the language of the Arizona law, confirms this.   When lawmakers recently tinkered with the statute's language, ostensibly to limit the circumstances under which law enforcement would be required to demand papers, he sent an email to Russell Pearce, an Arizona State Senator involved in drafting the new language, asking him to be sure to do it in ways that would continue to  give police officers the ability to selectively target certain groups (e.g., those who have cars on blocks in the their front yards and those living with lots of people in a single apartment) for immigration inquiries by making violation of local ordinances one of the contexts in which police would be obligated to ask for proof of immigration status when they developed a reasonable suspicion that someone was here illegally: 

When we drop out "lawful contact" and replace it with "a stop, detention, or rest, in the enforcement a violation of any title or section of the Arizona code" we need to add "or any county or municipal ordinance." This will allow police to use violations of property codes (ie, cars on blocks in the yard) or rental codes (too many occupants of a rental accommodation) to initiate queries as well.

Korbach's email suggests that the point of the law is not just to empower the police to question the immigration status of people they happen to encounter in the course of their normal law-enforcement duties.  That would be intrusive enough from the perspective of lawfully resident Latinos who find themselves in a situation of always being on the hook to prove their status.  As Korbach's email makes clear, however, the goal is much more ambitious:  to give local law enforcement the mandate -- and then use the other provisions of the law to pressure them to make use of it -- to affirmatively target certain populations for intrusive immigration inquiries.

Interestingly, the very same group of people promoting the Arizona immigration law are generally (1) eager to avoid government intrusions on their "liberty" (e.g., the Real ID Act) and (2), as Frank Rich pointed out in his column this past Sunday, not satisfied by President Obama's own proof of his U.S. birth, notwithstanding his Hawaiian birth certificate.  Why is that?  Given the racially tinged rhetoric of the current immigration discussion in some quarters, you could forgive Latinos for thinking that this law might have to do with a bit more than just enforcing immigration laws and might, in fact, be tied up with larger racial and cultural anxieties animating certain segments of the American Right.  (And, it should go without saying that if Obama's birth certificate is not evidence for these people that he is a natural born US citizen, heaven help the rest of us.)

In light of all of this, this WSJ article, discussing the growing dissatisfaction with the GOP among conservative Latinos should come as no surprise.  Here's the essence of it (but go read the whole thing):

Conservative Hispanic voters, in particular, say they feel betrayed by Republican Party leaders who have supported the law. ....  "When the Arizona law was passed, it quickly became the single most important issue to all Latinos in Arizona and nationwide," said Matt Barreto, a political science professor at the University of Washington who studies Latino voting patterns. "Either party that pushes the issue too hard risks moving centrist voters in the other direction," said Dan Schnur, a former Republican strategist and director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California.  Massey Villarreal, a Houston businessman and past national chairman of the Republican National Hispanic Assembly, an independent group with chapters nationwide, said, "It's insulting to have Republican leaders across the country applauding this racist law. I'm sure this is going to hurt the Republican Party."

This law is quickly becoming a litmus test for Latinos of all political stripes.  So far, the GOP is failing it.

Has the First Amendment functioned pedagogically

London's Daily Telegraph is reporting a case of someone's having been arrested for expressing the view that homosexual conduct is morally wrong and sinful. Here is the link: 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/religion/7668448/Christian-preacher-arrested-for-saying-homosexuality-is-a-sin.html

I understand that there have been similar cases in other jurisdictions, including Sweden and Canada.  For such things to happen, there must (I assume) be significant support in these jurisdictions for the belief that those Christians, Jews, and others who cling to traditional or conservative beliefs about sexual morality are just like racists and should be treated in just the way that racists are treated.  My impression is that many American gay rights supporters, though not all, hold the same view.  Of course, racists are treated differently in different jurisdictions.  In the U.S. we don't send them to jail, though there are both informal and formal (including legal) disabilities of various types that we impose under certain circumstances.  I suspect that many gay rights activists would enthusiastically support the imposition of these disabilities (especially in areas such as licensing and accreditation) on people and institutions who express the belief that homosexual conduct is immoral.  Am I wrong about that?  Our MoJ resident religious liberty experts probably know the answer on the basis of cases that have already arisen around the country.  Assuming I'm not wrong, is there a significant number of gay rights supporters who would go further and authorize the criminal prohibition of the expression of negative judgments about homosexual conduct as "hate speech"?  I don't think anything like that has happened in the United States, even in San Francisco or Burlington.  Is that because, though there are people who would like to criminalize expression that they regard as bigoted, they believe the courts would strike down the criminalization of speech?  Or is it that Americans (perhaps unlike Canadians, Swedes, or Brits) recoil at the idea of prohibiting the expression of opinions---even opinions they regard as bigoted?  If the latter, is that because the explicit protection of freedom of speech in the text of the Constitution has shaped our civic consciousness and our views about the nature of civil liberty in a certain way?  Is this an area where (for better or worse---our European and Canadian friends might say it's for worse) legal norms have performed a pedagogical function?  Or is there a better explanation?

A note from MOJ friend Pasquale Annicchino

The Italian law review Church and State, edited by Prof. Casuscelli at the University of Milan, has just published three essays on the "Italian crucifix case".  Two of them are in Italian, one (mine) is in English. MOJ readers might be interested:  here (mine), here, and here.
Dott. Pasquale Annicchino, LLM
Junior Fellow Law and Religion Programme
www.unisi.it/lawrel

Friday, April 30, 2010

Bradley on anti-proselytism laws

My colleague, Gerard Bradley, has a very thoughtful paper up at The Immanent Frame about anti-proselytism laws, and the dangers they can pose to religious freedom, properly understood.  In the paper, he engages those who "frame[s] the question in terms of a 'right to win adherents by persuasion' balanced against a 'right of communities to defend their respective traditions.'”  He concludes:

The duty of any political community to respect religious liberty as it is defined in countless constitutional, legal, and, yes, religious documents, and the extension of this duty, even to people whose beliefs and practices are largely false or misguided, is rooted in the basic moral (not legal or social) duty of everyone to seek the truth about reality, including reality’s furthest reaches—which reaches transcend the concerns of the political community itself. The political community’s duty is further rooted in everyone’s moral duty to shape his or her life according to what one judges to be the truth about reality. From here—this foundational ground—one can see straightaway that anti-conversion and anti-proselytizing laws strike at the heart of religious liberty.

From here, you can see, too, that if one thinks that religious liberty attaches to an established social order in which religion plays an important role, and if one credits reports that even peaceful encounters with articulated alternate conceptions of reality are “experiences” of attempted “destruction,” then one might well affirm some putative right to “non-interference.” But then one will have drifted very far from a sound understanding of religious freedom—the understanding on offer in so many authoritative documents—and one will have abandoned its foundations altogether.

I also tried, a few years ago, to say something worthwhile about persuasion, evangelization, and proselytism in this paper, "Changing Minds:  Proselytism, Religious Freedom, and the First Amendment."

Infanticide

Recently, in Italy, a 22-weeks-old infant who had survived an attempted abortion -- the reason for the abortion, apparently, was the child's cleft-palate -- was found hidden but alive by a hospital chaplain, 20 hours after birth.  The child died the next day.  The full story is here.

. . . Eugenia Roccella, the under-secretary of state in the health department, on Wednesday night promised a government inquiry into the incident.

“The minister of health will send inspectors to the hospital in Rossano Calabro to investigate what actually happened, and to see if the Law 194, which prohibits abortion when there is a possibility of the foetus living separately from the mother, and permits it only when the continuation of the pregnancy would result in life-threatening danger to the mother.”

She said that if initial information is correct, “this would be a case of deliberate abandonment of a seriously premature neonate, possibly also with some form of disability, an act contrary to any sense of human compassion but also of any accepted professional medical practice".

She added: “We must remember that a baby, once born, is an Italian citizen equal to all the others, and is entitled to all fundamental rights, including the right to health and therefore to be given full support.” . . .

My sense of the abortion debate in this country is that many would disagree with the claims that a child who is born alive, despite (or in the course of) an abortion attempt, is -- without regard to the mother's wishes -- "entitled to all fundamental rights", including a right to life-sustaining medical care.  Am I wrong?