Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, May 12, 2010

On the proper standards for evaluating judicial nominees

I am grateful to Paul Horwitz for his kind words regarding my comment on the Kagan nomination.  I agree with him, as he thought I would, that senators are bound by their constitutional oaths to limit their questions for judicial nominees to those which they believe it is appropriate for a nominee to answer.  I'm glad to know that Senator Charles Schumer agrees with me that questions about issues such as abortion, marriage, and the role of religion in American public life are appropriate; I'm disappointed to learn that Senator John Cornyn believes that they are not.  At least, this is what I gather from what Professor Horwitz reports.  After reading his comment, I composed a letter to Senator Cornyn stating my reasons for believing his position is incorrect from a constitutional point of view and urging him to abandon it in favor of the view held by Senator Schumer.  As I'm sure Professor Horwitz agrees, if he finds the reasons for changing his position persuasive, he is bound by his constitutional oath to revise his view and cannot be excused from doing so by the fact, if it is a fact, that some might accuse him of a conversion of convenience.

I do have one question, however, about Professor Horwitz's account of Senator Cornyn's view.  He reports that "Cornyn has made quite clear that he believes that a nominee's personal views about abortion and other issues are irrelevant to her fitness for the bench" (emphasis added).  Stated just that way, I would not necessarily disagree with Cornyn.  It depends on what one means by "personal" views.  I don't think the American public necessarily needs to know whether Elena Kagan or any other nominee believes that abortion is right or wrong, just or unjust; nor do we need to know whether she believes that this or that sexual practice or form of sexual partnership is morally good or bad; nor do we need to know what her religious convictions are.  In that sense, her personal views may indeed by irrelevant.  What we need to know in order properly to evaluate a nominee's suitability is whether he or she believes that some provision of the Constitution, or the Constitution somehow taken as a whole, may legitimately be interpreted as settling the question of abortion and removing it from the domain of democratic deliberation.  Ditto for marriage; ditto for, e.g., including "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance.  (For that matter, ditto for the private possession of handguns, burning the American flag, and issues such as those at stake in the Citizens United decision.)  By answering questions about these issues---candidly and fully---a nominee will let us know where he or she stands on the central matters at stake:  namely the sources of constitutional meaning and the role of the courts in our system of constitutional government.  It is on the basis of the nominee's stands on these matters, considered together with intellectual attainment, integrity, and temperament, that Senators should, in my opinion, cast there votes for or against confirmation.

Does a Bishop stand as an outsider to a Catholic University within his diocese?

The Marquette Affair raises a question that Notre Dame's President Jenkins largely ducted in responding to a similar question at the recent symposium on Alasdair's MacIntyre's "God, Philosohy, and Universities," to wit: What is the relationship between a Bishop and a Catholic university within his diocese?

In his recent post, Russ speculates "that some outside party (perhaps a donor or Church official) expressed dissapproval" leading Marquette to withdraw its offer to Prof. O'Brien.  Since we don't know the details with respect to Marquette and O'Brien, let me offer a hypothetical.  Suppose that a hypothetical Catholic University is hiring a dean for one of its college's.  After supposedly careful vetting, the university decides to offer the job to a professor whose primary scholarly focus could reasonably be viewed as sophisticated and rigorous pro-choice advocacy.  Should the university have offered that person the job in the first place?  If not, does the local bishop have the right (duty?) to step in and encourage (pressure?) the university to rescind the offer?

What do you think?

Response to Rick on Marquette Affair

I cannot speak with knowledge regarding the details of Marquette's process failure. However, if we assume that the search committee members, the provost, the president, and the trustees all met their duty of due care in the selection process, they were certainly aware of Professor O'Brien's work. Even so, they made her an offer to be the new dean. Presumably, these parties had to have found her acceptable for mission purposes in order to make the offer. Those who have problems with this substantive determination (including some MOJ contributors), noted objections after a only brief review of her CV. So, unless the decision-making parties were grossly negligent by failing to review O'Brien's work, it is most likely that some outside party (perhaps a donor or Church official) expressed disapproval and exerted pressure to rescind the contract.

My understanding is that this has had a chilling effect on Marquette's faculty, some of whom wonder when outside parties will next attempt to control the content of scholarship.

If this decision was based on Professor O'Brien's status as a lesbian, it would be a violation of Marquette's own non discrimination policy. In my opinion, it would also be unjustifiable on the basis of Catholic teaching.

Paul Horwitz responds to Robby

MOJ-friend Paul Horwitz sent in some thoughts, responding to Robby's recent post about the Kagan nomination:

In his discussion of the Kagan nomination, Robert George writes: "[A]s Kagan herself noted in relation to previous Supreme Court nominees, it is imperative that she answer questions about particular issues, including abortion, marriage, and the role of religious faith in American public life. For her to decline to answer such questions would be not only to contradict herself but to undermine the valuable opportunity for a serious discussion of the role of courts that her nomination presents."  He adds: "Because I know Solicitor General Kagan to be a person of integrity, I do not expect her to attempt to evade questions whose legitimacy she affirmed when the nominees of previous presidents were under consideration."

I find Professor George's comments fair-minded and eloquent.  Assuming he shares Kagan's views that a nominee can be asked and must answer questions of the kind he has listed, there is nothing wrong with his stating those views.  I just want to add one note, which I think Professor George should agree with.  The important question is not what Kagan herself has said about appropriate or inappropriate questions for nominees, but what the Senators themselves, who after all are bound by their constitutional oaths, believe to be appropriate or inappropriate questions.  For example, Senator Charles Schumer has stated a view similar to George's own apparent views, and it would be inappropriate for him to object to substantive questions from his colleagues about Kagan's views on abortion and other issues.  On the other hand, Senator John Cornyn has made quite clear that he believes that a nominee's personal views about abortion and other issues are irrelevant to her fitness for the bench, and that senators are not permitted to demand that a nominee ask questions that constitute a commitment to rule a particular way on cases that may come before the Supreme Court.  He has made equally clear that these views are based on his understanding of the Constitution, and thus his oath, and thus that they are indefeasible.  He should thus consider himself barred from asking Kagan the kinds of questions George wants him to ask -- notwithstanding anything Kagan herself may have said about what kinds of questions nominees may be asked or answer.  That does not mean he can ask nothing: he has made clear that he thinks broad questions about a nominee's views of the Court and the rule of law are appropriate.  But on his own principled view, he is more constrained than George's own remarks suggest he would prefer.  And because those views are grounded in the Constitution and the oath itself, he is not entitled to change them just because any Democratic senators have taken a different view then or now, or even because Kagan herself has suggested that some such questions might be appropriate.

Again, I respect Professor George's views.  Many people believe that nominees can or must be asked substantive questions about their positions on various sensitive issues.  But the touchstone for any sitting senator must be their own view of what the Constitution requires, allows -- or prohibits -- in asking questions of judicial nominees or expecting answers.  These views are non-delegable.  If some Republican (or Democratic) senators believe as a constitutional matter that they cannot ask Kagan her personal views on abortion, or consider those views in voting for or against her, or ask her to commit to a particular view on abortion cases that might come before the Court, or (as Cornyn does) that she is entitled to an up-or-down vote, they cannot use Kagan's own views as a justification for changing their sense of what is constitutionally required or prohibited.  There may be much room to accuse various persons -- most certainly including Kagan herself -- of inconsistency depending on how they behave during the confirmation process.  But our first and last question must be, not what the nominee herself thinks about the process, but what we, or the senators charged with constitutional responsibility in this area, believe is required or prohibited by the law.  If that means some Democratic senators, such as Senator Schumer, are not entitled to complain about Kagan being asked substantive questions, so be it.  Conversely, if that means some Republican senators, such as Senator Cornyn, are not entitled to ask such questions or to deny Kagan a vote if she fails to answer them, then, again, so be it.

More on Marquette Process Failure

The Chronicle of Higher Education yesterday published an interview with Professor O'Brien that provides some details regarding her understanding of how her work fit within Marquette's stated mission. The attempt to rescind her contract in any event represents gross negligence in the University review process and/or after-the-fact external interference, which should give us pause as scholars at Catholic universities regardless of how we might disagree regarding the substantive question of mission fit.

The Marquette affair: A question for Russell

So, my outsider's impressions of the goings-on at Marquette, described by Russell in this post, lead me to agree with him that the process by which Prof. O'Brien was "offered the Deanship of Arts and Sciences at Marquette, only to have the University attempt to rescind the contract", was flawed.  Russell writes:

The only justification so far for the University's change of position is that her work in gender and sexuality is inconsistent with the mission of the institution.  This came as a shock to many of my colleagues here, who have considered her an important contributor to University mission, although her positions challenge some current Catholic teaching.  Marquette's administration presumably reviewed her scholarship, so this should have been no surprise.  Clearly, something happened after the selection process had been completed, most likely originating outside the University's administration.  It has raised serious concerns about process and academic freedom at Marquette and has implications for Catholic universities in general.

I'd like to hear more from Russell about the ways in which the Marquette process failed.  That is, where did the process break down?  Russell notes that "Marquette's administration presumably reviewed her scholarship", before offering the position.  Was the failure, then, in offering her the position notwithstanding the nature and content of her work?  Or was it in rescinding an offer that, perhaps, should not have been made in the first place?  The press is reporting that Marquette's decision was based not simply on "her work in gender and sexuality" but on the fact (according to these reports) that she is "openly gay."  Was this, in fact, the reason?  (I don't know.)  If so, does / should that matter?  And -- again, conceding that the process appears to have been bungled -- how, exactly, is "academic freedom" implicated by a decision by a Catholic university not to hire, as a leader of that university, someone whose is (that university believes) inconsistent with, or even hostile to, the Church's teachings?

Conservatives and the Kagan nomination

How should conservatives react to President Obama's nomination of Elena Kagan?

First, let me say how conservatives should not react.  They should not claim that Kagan is the Democrats Harriet Miers.  She is not.  I myself opposed the President Bush's nomination of Miers, as did most conservatives, on the ground that her record, though perfectly respectable, was not distinguished.  Kagan's record, by contrast, is distinguished.  If she were a committed constitutionalist, as conservatives understand that idea, we would, rightly, be celebrating the nomination of a person of her ability and distinction.

Furthermore, conservatives should not speculate or entertain speculation regarding Kagan's romantic interests, feelings, or "sexual orientation."  Some of this has gone on in the media (and not just among conservatives), and it is despicable.  (Indeed, I find it so loathesome that I am reluctant to bring the subject up, even for the purpose of condemning it.)  Kagan has done nothing to bring her personal life or private feelings into public view and no one can point to anything in her record as a professor, dean, or White House official that raises questions to which facts about her romantic interests or inward feelings are relevant.  It is true that Kagan fiercely opposed the Solomon Amendment and argued that it is unconstitutional (an argument that not even John Paul Stevens or Ruth Ginsburg was willing to swallow); but her position was scarcely idiosyncratic among liberals and there is no reason to suppose that it was the product of personal interests or bias.

What is relevant is Kagan's understanding of the proper role of courts in our system of government under the Constitution.  And that should be the focus of conservatives' concerns.  If, indeed, Kagan believes it is legitimate for judges to read into the Constitution liberal (or, for that matter, conservative) views about abortion, sexuality and marriage, religion, speech, or anything else, then she should be opposed for that reason.  In my judgment, a constitutionalist is someone who believes that the legitimate sources of constitutional meaning are the text of the Constitution, the logical presuppositions and implications of its provisions, its structure, and its publicly understood historical (or "original") meaning.  A jurist who is willing to look beyond these sources of meaning in order to reach outcomes in line with his or her moral and political preferences undermines the Constitution by usurping authority it allocates to other actors in the system.

Conservatives pride themselves on their commitment to constitutionalism, even if conservative jurists themselves do not always live up to its ideals.  The President's nomination of Elena Kagan provides conservatives with an opportunity to defend these ideals, educate the public regarding their importance, and, most importantly, test the nominee by reference to them.  If Kagan is to be opposed, it should be because, under questioning about abortion, marriage, and other issues, she fails the test.  Kagan herself is on the public record as validating the legitimacy of such questioning.  So the stage is set for a long overdue national discussion of the scope and limits of judicial power under the Constitution.

For the sake of the country, I pray that Republicans will not squander this opportunity by making dubious or unworthy claims about Elena Kagan, and that Kagan will remain as good as her word by responding candidly to questions that will reveal to the public her understanding of the role of the judiciary in our constitutional system. 

Tuesday, May 11, 2010

The political demise of a pro-life Democrat in West Virginia

Allan Mollohan is a pro-life Democrat who has for twenty-eight years represented the congressional district in West Virginia in which I grew up.  Today he was trounced (56%-44%) in the primary by a pro-life challenger, Michael Oliverio.  Mollohan's vote in favor of a health care bill that failed to secure Hyde Amendment protection to unborn children and pro-life taxpayers probably cost him his seat.  I suspect that the Obama administration and the Democratic leadership in Congress will tell a different story.  They will say that ethics problems sank the veteran congressman.  But that claim is dubious.  Mollohan has been under an ethics cloud for several years, but (like the late John Murtha, a pro-life Democrat in the Pennsylvania district just north of Mollohan's West Virginia district, who was also under an ethics cloud) he was returned to office in 2008 despite the cloud.  Members of my family and friends in the district tell me that Mollohan would have prevailed today had it not been for what pro-life West Virginians perceived as a betrayal.  It will be interesting to see now what happens to other pro-life Democrats who supported the Senate version of the health care bill, such as Brad Ellsworth in Indiana, Steve Driehaus in Ohio, and Kathy Dalhkemper in Pennsylvania.  They have been targeted by, among other pro-life groups, Susan B. Anthony's List, the pro-life political organization whose television and radio ads and robo calling were instrumental in bringing down Mollohan---a congressman the organization had supported in previous elections.

A comment on the Kagan nomination

I gave the following statement to the American Principles Project on President Obama's nomination of Elena Kagan.

In Elena Kagan, President Obama has nominated a person of great intellectual attainment, and unquestioned personal integrity. In these important respects, she is a nominee much in the mode of both nominees of the President's predecessor, George W. Bush, namely: John Roberts and Samuel Alito. There are some who argue that intellectual ability and personal probity are sufficient qualifications for someone to serve on the Supreme Court of the United States. President Obama disagrees with that position, and I believe he is right to reject it. In explaining his decisions to vote against the confirmation of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, then-Senator Obama explained that a suitable justice must have a sound view of the role of the courts in our Constitutional system. Again, I agree.

Where I believe President Obama errs is in his view of the proper role of the courts. In envisaging courts as agents of social change unconstrained by the text, logic, structure, and original understanding of the Constitution, he misunderstands the important but limited role of judges in our constitutional system. The judicial office is not a license for jurists to usurp the authority of legislators, or impose on the nation their preferred ideas about social justice or personal rights. When judges do that, in the name of a right to abortion, for example, or to redefine marriage or drive religion from public life, they betray the Constitution in whose name they purport to act.

So, Solicitor General Kagan's nomination to the Supreme Court provides an important opportunity for a national conversation on the proper role of the judiciary in our system of democratic republican government. Senators should follow the President's lead and advice in questioning the nominee closely about her view of the role of judges, and oppose confirmation if they find that she espouses a view contrary to the one they believe to be proper under the Constitution. To this end, as Kagan herself noted in relation to previous Supreme Court nominees, it is imperative that she answer questions about particular issues, including abortion, marriage, and the role of religious faith in American public life. For her to decline to answer such questions would be not only to contradict herself but to undermine the valuable opportunity for a serious discussion of the role of courts that her nomination presents.

Because I know Solicitor General Kagan to be a person of integrity, I do not expect her to attempt to evade questions whose legitimacy she affirmed when the nominees of previous presidents were under consideration. Moreover, with an overwhelming Democratic majority in the United States Senate at the moment, her candor would be unlikely to place her confirmation in jeopardy.

As Dean of Harvard Law School, Kagan's openness toward the serious engagement of competing points of view led to discussions that enriched the intellectual life of the community she served. By making possible a serious discussion of the vital question of the role of courts in our constitutional system, she is in a position to confer an equally valuable gift on the nation.

This is no time for her to go silent.

MOJ Friend Gerry Whyte reports from Ireland

Here is what Gerry (Trinity College Dublin, Law) has to say:

MOJers may be interested in a speech delivered by Dublin Archbishop Diarmuid Martin last night in which he said, inter alia, that he was 'disheartened and discouraged about the [low] level of willingness [within the Church] to really begin what is going to be a painful path of renewal and of what is involved in that renewal'.

He also said,"There are still strong forces which would prefer that the truth did not emerge.  The truth will make us free, even when that truth is uncomfortable.  There are signs of subconscious denial on the part of many about the extent of the abuse which occurred within the Church of Jesus Christ in Ireland and how it was covered up.  There are other signs of rejection of a sense of responsibility for what had happened.  There are worrying signs that despite solid regulations and norms these are not being followed with the rigour required....

.....There are those who claim that the media strategy of the Church in the Archdiocese of Dublin following the publication of the Murphy Report was “catastrophic”.  My answer is that what the Murphy report narrated was catastrophic and that the only honest reaction of the Church was to publicly admit that the manner in which that catastrophe was addressed was spectacularly wrong; spectacularly wrong  “full stop”; not spectacularly wrong, “but…”   You cannot sound-byte your way out of a catastrophe."

The full text is available here.