Wednesday, May 12, 2010
The Marquette affair: A question for Russell
So, my outsider's impressions of the goings-on at Marquette, described by Russell in this post, lead me to agree with him that the process by which Prof. O'Brien was "offered the Deanship of Arts and Sciences at Marquette, only to have the University attempt to rescind the contract", was flawed. Russell writes:
The only justification so far for the University's change of position is that her work in gender and sexuality is inconsistent with the mission of the institution. This came as a shock to many of my colleagues here, who have considered her an important contributor to University mission, although her positions challenge some current Catholic teaching. Marquette's administration presumably reviewed her scholarship, so this should have been no surprise. Clearly, something happened after the selection process had been completed, most likely originating outside the University's administration. It has raised serious concerns about process and academic freedom at Marquette and has implications for Catholic universities in general.
I'd like to hear more from Russell about the ways in which the Marquette process failed. That is, where did the process break down? Russell notes that "Marquette's administration presumably reviewed her scholarship", before offering the position. Was the failure, then, in offering her the position notwithstanding the nature and content of her work? Or was it in rescinding an offer that, perhaps, should not have been made in the first place? The press is reporting that Marquette's decision was based not simply on "her work in gender and sexuality" but on the fact (according to these reports) that she is "openly gay." Was this, in fact, the reason? (I don't know.) If so, does / should that matter? And -- again, conceding that the process appears to have been bungled -- how, exactly, is "academic freedom" implicated by a decision by a Catholic university not to hire, as a leader of that university, someone whose is (that university believes) inconsistent with, or even hostile to, the Church's teachings?
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2010/05/the-marquette-affair-a-question-for-russell.html
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Here is a comment sent to me by David DeWolfe, who is on the faculty at Gonzaga's law school (like Seattle and Marquette, a Jesuit institution):
I simply don’t understand why the decision not to hire Ms. O’Brien at Marquette is controversial. What is noteworthy is the fact that she was even considered for the position.
Look at Canon Law, ¶ 810: “The authority competent according to the statutes has the duty to make provision so that teachers are appointed in Catholic universities who besides their scientific and pedagogical qualifications are outstanding in integrity of doctrine and probity of life and that they are removed from their function when they lack these requirements; the manner of proceeding defined in the statutes is to be observed.” If a candidate for a faculty position does not demonstrate that they are “outstanding in integrity of doctrine and probity of life,” they should not be hired. And if they are shown later to lack these qualities, they are to be removed.
Of course, it is well known that throughout Jesuit universities this canon is ignored. It is ignored both by the local authority (the administration of the university) and by the bishop whose obligation it is to insure the Catholicity of the university. We have become so accustomed to this disconnect that we find ourselves obliged to respond to claims of “academic freedom” when there is any faint recognition of the distinctive requirements of a Catholic university.
Here’s what *should* be the practice at Catholic universities – not just because it would make them better institutions, but because the following is *required* by canon law: it is contemplated that individuals who are not Catholic will be hired to teach at Catholic institutions. However, care should be taken that such individuals still have *probity of life* -- that is, they do not present an example to students of open rebellion against the moral law. This could occur through a violent temper, or alcoholism, or irresponsible sexual behavior. It is to be emphasized that occasional lapses from standards of right behavior are fatal to one’s serving as a faculty member at a Catholic university, but the emphasis is on “occasional” and that they are “lapses” that are followed by remorse and a firm purpose of amendment. If I interpret the “openly gay” description to mean someone who is engaged in a sexual relationship outside of marriage, and touts it as a good thing, then you cannot say that such a person has probity of life. It is not unreasonable to expect probity of life from the individuals who serve as important role models for young men and women in a formative period of their life. In addition to this expectation for *all faculty*, those who constitute the minimum of a majority of Catholic faculty must also demonstrate “integrity of doctrine.” Even at this, one would contemplate that individuals might from time to time harbor doubts about various claims of the faith. It is in the nature of the intellectual life that we are called to pursue the truth wherever it leads, and that from time to time that will lead us to question various aspects of the faith. Nonetheless, in our *teaching* capacity we are called to demonstrate “integrity of doctrine,” meaning that we will faithfully transmit that which the Church teaches regarding the various subjects that we are assigned. Those who are not Catholic, or who are not comfortable teaching some aspect of the faith as to which they harbor doubts, may ask to be assigned to teach subjects (like calculus) where the conflict between inner belief and outward expression is minimized.
But let us be clear about the role of a faculty member at a Catholic university. He or she is like an attorney who is representing a client in a civil or criminal case. If that attorney were to stand up in front of the jury and say, “Well, here is the evidence that points to my client’s innocence. . . . But before I conclude, I have to tell you: personally, I think my client is guilty. You still have to make up your own minds, but I couldn’t in good conscience leave you with the impression that my client is innocent. That would be dishonest.” No, it wouldn’t be dishonest. In fact, what is dishonest is taking the assignment and then betraying the trust that has been impressed upon you.
I should point out that many of our colleagues at Catholic universities are ignorant (perhaps invincibly ignorant) of these plain, basic facts, and so they express great sympathy with those who have been denied “academic freedom” or “discriminated” against. To the extent that they were hired and have devoted much of their professional lives to an institution based upon a series of misrepresentations about what they were getting into, that entitles them to a measure of sympathy and makes the institution responsible for some degree of reparation for mistakes made. But under no circumstances should it be the reason for ignoring the plain mandate of canon law.
What happened at Marquette (I suspect) is that the common (mis)understanding about the role and rights of faculty members at Catholic universities collided with the recognition that a person in a position of leadership (the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences!) who couldn’t meet the minimum expectations for a faculty member under canon law is, shall we say, not a good fit.
If, however, Ms. O’Brien were simply recruited to the faculty, she would have sailed through without anybody saying anything. Such is the sad state of affairs at Jesuit universities today.