Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, May 24, 2010

Is Pornography bad for Its Consumers

Catharine MacKinnon led a movement arguing that a class of sexually oriented material was harmful to women: it led to sexual assaults and sexual discrimination. Wendy Maltz persuasively argues in the Psychotherapy Networker (a respected professional journal) that porn is bad for its consumers as well. Maltz decades ago used to recommend pornography to her clients. She now, together with many other analysts, has concluded that pornography distorts human relationships in very serious ways. It is a major cause of divorce and relationship difficulties. Maltz describes it as a cousin to sexual abuse.

She says: "Added to my pile of concerns about porn, the realization that porn could be used as weapon against vulnerable children and women was the last straw. The clearer I became about conditions necessary for experiencing healthy sexuality—consent, equality, respect, trust, safety—the more doubt I had about advocating pornography as a sexual-enhancement product. How can I support something that portrays sex as a commodity, people as objects, and violence, humiliation, and recklessness as exciting? What am I doing encouraging people to condition their arousal to self-centered, sensually blunted, loveless sex? Do I really want to be advocating a product that's associated with causing sexual harm and relationship problems?

"My primary concern about porn wasn't that it was sexually graphic, explicit, or hot: it was that porn conveyed harmful ideas about sex and could lead to hurtful and ultimately unrewarding sexual behaviors." Porn leads to sexual addiction and unhealthy obsessions. According to Maltz, pornography has grown from a side issue to a central issue in sexual counselling. I suppose this is not surprising. Pornography, according to Malz, is a $13 billion dollar industry in the U.S. and $100 billion worldwide. It accounts for 1/3 of all downloads. It is not surprising that psychotherapists see a rise in sexual disfunction.

cross-posted at religiousleftlaw.com

Can one be a hillbilly *and* a Thomist? [Updated]

Of course one can.  I've seen it done.  And you can too, if your click here:  View this photo.

(HT:  My Emory colleague, Aquinas Professor Philip Reynolds.)

Updated:  A friend sent this: "Michael’s photograph illustrates that it’s entirely possible to fine-tune the distinction between synderesis and conscientia over a vessel of White Lightnin’ . . ."

Sunday, May 23, 2010

Um, those are deep waters, and generalizations are perilous ...

Rick writes:  "For me -- more than, I think, for Michael [Sean Winters] -- it is . . . a departure from justice, when our Supreme Court overreaches to invalidate even unjust immoral enactments of politically accountable representatives."

Rick, I don't have time to go into it now, but I can imagine situations--in my lifetime if not in yours--when it would not have been a departure from justice but a just act for SCOTUS to overreach.

Kent Greenawalt and I will be discussing just that issue at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference, in New Paltz, New York, on June 3.

Another view of the "Tea Party"

After reading Elizabeth Sanders's & Tom Friedman's description of the "Tea Party" -- which, to be clear, I think is easily and appropriately criticizable on more than a few fronts (as are the often unhinged folks who flocked to Cindy Sheehan events and Michael Moore films), including several of the ones that Friedman lists -- I was reminded of this book (which I have not read, but which has a catchy title):  "That's No Angry Mob, That's My Mom: Team Obama's Assault on Tea-Party, Talk-Radio Americans."

It is clear to me that there is certainly some inconsistency in the Tea Partiers' critique.  (It's hard to simultaneously defend Medicare but rail against government involvement in the health-care system; it's foolish to see cutting "foreign aid" as the answer to our country's financial woes; it is wrong to imagine that immigrants are the cause of our financial or cultural challenges, etc.)  It is also clear to me that neither this inconsistency, nor the snobbery and disdain that animates many of the Partiers' critics, insulates the new health-insurance-funding regime -- or our taxing-and-spending regime more generally -- from criticism. 

I think it is worth remembering the observation made by Ainsley Hayes, during the second season of "The West Wing", made in response to a typically self-important anti-gun speech by the Rob Lowe character, which concluded with his pronouncement that he didn't like guns.  She said no, "you don't like people who do like guns. You don't like the people."

More on the "sound"-ness of the Graham decision

As Robby has described (here), Michael Sean Winters recently wrote, with respect to the Graham decision (invalidating LWOP sentences for non-homicide crimes committed by juveniles), the following:

"If by this Professor George means that no one but a legal scholar is permitted to assess the basic justice of a court ruling, I will look forward to his making that point at next year’s annual March for Life. I deny the exclusive right to judgment by a priestly legal caste which alone can judge whether or not a given decision by the Court meets the standards of justice I think should be met. And every citizen has the same right to question the Court."

I agree with Michael that it is not the case -- I do not believe it is the case, nor does Robby -- that there is an "exclusive right to judgment by a priestly legal caste which alone can judge whether or not a given decision by the Court meets the standards of justice [one] think[s] should be met."  And, I definitely agree -- Robby does, too -- that "every citizen has the same right to question the Court."

As Michael W. and I have discussed, I fear that I was unclear in some of my earlier comments.  Responding to my expressed concerns about the decision, Michael wrote:

Professor Garnett disagrees with the policy at issue, but thinks it is not the place of the Court to decide if a policy is just or not, that such tasks are relegated to the legislature. It is a perfectly respectable argument, but not a definitive one. This commitment to judicial restraint is undoubtedly true about some policies, but the policy in question is about punishment, and the Constitution, which the Court interprets, guarantees you and me the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. I do not see why the legislature in Florida should receive carte blanche to decide what is and is not cruel anymore than I think they can decide what is, and is not, protected speech under the First Amendment. The Florida legislature, after all, did not do such a great job interpreting the requirements of the equal protection clause for many years.

I emphatically do not want the Supreme Court to yield its authority to interpret the guarantees in the Bill of Rights to any legislature. Is it really that hard to believe that a legislature could adopt a statute the plays well politically but which violates the constitutional rights of citizens? Or, that 37 state legislatures may have over-stepped into cruel, and therefore unconstitutional, territory? The judicial branch is the least responsive to popular opinion for a reason, because sometimes the mob seeks injustice, and the political branches cave. I think the Founders knew what they were doing in creating one branch that was removed far from the popular will.

To be clear (this time, unlike last time!), it is not my view that the Court has no role to play in interpreting and enforcing the Eighth Amendment.  Nor is it my view that the judicially enforceable content of that Amendment was fixed in 1791 or 1868.  It is my view, though, that unelected federal judges should exercise great care when identifying the line between "unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishments" and "punishments that, in the view of the judges in question, are unwise, excessive, or even unjust."  And, in my view, a penalty that is authorized (even if not often imposed) by the political authorities of thirty-something states is almost certainly not unconstitutional.

When Michael praised the Court's decision, he meant to communicate, I think, that "the policy in question is unjust, and therefore the Court was correct in concluding that it ought to be, and is, prohibited by the Constitution."  For me, though (I think, for Robby) there is a difference -- a difference that, given the limited authority and role in our constitutional democracy for the Court, really matters -- between saying that "the state of affairs brought about by the Court's decision represents an improvement in the justice of our criminal-justice system" and "the Court's decision is 'sound.'"  For me -- more than, I think, for Michael -- it is a "cost", a departure from justice, when our Supreme Court overreaches to invalidate even unjust immoral enactments of politically accountable representatives.  (Sometimes, of course, the Court appropriately invalidates legislative enactments; the key is to identify the "overreaches" and distinguish them from the appropriate invalidations.)

Saturday, May 22, 2010

What is the Tea Party anyway?

Back on May 13, I posted something by Mark Lilla on the Tea Party.  Today, Elizabeth Sanders, a professor in the Department of Government at Cornell and a ReligionLeftLaw blogger, posted a comment, at RLL, in response to that post.  Elizabeth's comment is not to be missed ... so here it is:

I'm not sure it's accurate to see the Tea Party as libertarian, in view of its flamboyant nationalism, apparent militarism, and unyielding defense of Medicare and Social Security. We may be over-intellectualizing an assortment of malcontents. I attended a TP rally in Alabama in April. It celebrated soldiers and the Bible (Judge Roy Moore of Ten Commandments fame is running for governor and was the most rabble-rousing politician to address the rather small crowd).

From my informal survey of my high school class (which appears to celebrate the TP), I tend to agree with NYT columnist Tom Friedman, who wrote in a recent Op-Ed,

“Our parents were “The Greatest Generation,” and they earned that title by making enormous sacrifices and investments to build us a world of abundance. My generation, ‘The Baby Boomers,’ turned out to be what the writer Kurt Andersen called ‘The Grasshopper Generation.’ We’ve eaten through all that abundance like hungry locusts.”

I am a Baby Boomer too. Most of the audience at the TP rally I attended were baby boomers; most, I dare say, already on Medicare (or if not, probably some of the lucky few who are still working, and, like me, have generous employer-provided health and retirement programs).

What I hear the Tea Party baby boomers and their upper-income allies saying is this:

“I’ve got mine. My government-provided health care is the most generous available. I can fall and bruise my foot and get taken to the hospital in an ambulance for days of “observation,” and pay almost nothing. I can make innumerable visits to the doctor for every health worry…and they are abundant in my over-fed, under-exercised generation. Instead of telling me to shape up, cut the fat and salt from my diet and walk for an hour a day, the doctor will give me prescriptions for drugs for my blood pressure and cholesterol and the indigestion that attends overeating, all paid for by the government. I may live forever (granted, without large chunks of my mind); but my doctor and hospital and the hugely profitable pharmaceutical industry have every financial incentive to keep my body alive.

“I ignored the Bush policy of conducting two big wars—one based on stories about Saddam Hussein being ready to launch a ‘mushroom cloud’ at us. I thought it was fine to have two big wars while cutting taxes on upper-income people like me. I agreed with Alan Greenspan when he told Congress to ignore the growing deficits and not try (like Clinton and the Democrats in the ‘90s) to cut the deficit and restore a balanced budget. I also backed the big Republican expenditures for new weapons systems, highways, agricultural subsidies, and more Medicare drug benefits (with no controls on drug pricing, and importation of cheaper drugs forbidden). After all, I benefitted from these policies.

“I also supported deregulation of the finance industry. I believed Bush and Greenspan when they said this would unleash great free-market energies with no possible downside. I watched as the EPA, SEC, and other regulatory agencies were virtually dismantled. Good riddance!

“Now economists say that all those chickens have come home to roost. The economy tanked because of deregulation and the rising burden of debt-financed wars and generous baby-boomer health care and retirement pensions.

“Now, suddenly, I NOTICE the debt, and I am outraged, OUTRAGED that the Democrats propose extending health care to young and low-income people. Granted, even my son, a small businessman, has no health insurance while paying a big chunk of his income in Medicare and Social Security taxes, but luckily he’s still pretty healthy.

“I want all entitlements and programs for people under 65 cut. I want the new health care bill repealed. I do NOT want ANY change in Medicare or Social Security. I refuse a higher co-pay, any limit on drugs or office visits, and I certainly refuse to work a month beyond my 66th-year retirement eligibility. I’m ready for golf, bridge, and seeing my friends in the doctor’s office waiting room. I’m happy for the high levels of unemployment that came with the economic crash of 2008, because now I can have a housekeeper, home health aide, and a yard man without paying an arm and a leg.

“I do NOT want to cut the military budget, which rivals entitlements for a huge chunk of the budget. We need to remain the world’s only superpower, with a military budget as big as all other countries put together. The way to fight terrorism is not with wimpy international police work and pressing Israel and India to end their occupations of the West Bank and Kashmir. Let people over there go crazy with rage. We’ll just use our predator drones and missiles to wipe out their villages.

“So the only way to pay down the huge deficit and cumulative debt that suddenly worries me is to repeal the health care reform and cut things I don’t care about. I hear foreign aid is less than one percent of the budget, but I’m fine with it going to nothing if that will help to protect my Medicare drug benefit. I also think we spend too much on education and research. Let the private market provide those services.

“They can also cut out the EPA, as far as I’m concerned. I don’t go to Gulf Shores much anymore, since my walker doesn’t roll well in sand. And besides, Rush Limbaugh says the ocean will gradually absorb that oil without any remediation or regulation. Drill Baby Drill!

I also agree with him when he says we shouldn’t spend a taxpayer dime to protect silly Louisiana wetlands, if that would mean cutting any medical benefits for granny. After all, I am granny!

“Hear me roar!”

Friday, May 21, 2010

So, what's with this?

Thanks, Rick, for calling attention to Michael Winters's post responding to yours and mine.  He seems to be a friend of yours, so I'm sure he has some worthy qualities.  I therefore don't know what to make of the way he conducts himself in intellectual exchanges.  Let's examine his behavior in this one.  We can go step by step to show how he willfully twists and misrepresents an interlocutor's words in order to create a false impression of what his opponent is saying. 

1.  He posts a comment on a pair of Supreme Court cases in which he says: "I am no constitutional scholar, and so I will pass on any analysis of the legal arguments."  Got that?  He expressly excuses himself from analyzing the legal arguments put forward in legal opinions whose soundness and validity he is about to pass judgment on.  He does that on the ground that "I am no constitutional scholar."  (Has he even read the opinions?  He can tell us, but my bet is that he had not read them.  He certainly gave no indication that he had done so.)

2. He declares the rulings to be "sound" and the dissents to be wrong.  Of the first ruling, he delcares, "the Court got it right."  The second ruling, he says, "is just as sound."

3. So here we have a fellow who by his own account---not mine, mind you, but his own---does not analyze the legal arguments, yet declares one side right as a matter of constitutional interpretation and the other side wrong.  Why does he not bother to analyze the legal arguments?  Because, to quote him again, "I am no constitutional scholar."  Note again, these are his words, not mine.

4. I point out on MoJ that despite evidently not having read the opinions, and despite declaring himself unqualified to judge the legal arguments (yet again: it was he, not I, who made that declaration, and he did so in the context of excusing himself from the responsibility to offer an anlysis of the legal arguments on the competing sides of the case), he declared with utter confidence which side was right and which was wrong.

5. I then drew the inference that seems plainly to follow.  What inference is that?  Notice that it is not that non-lawyers are unfit to analyze legal arguments or offer opinions on constitutional questions.  Rather, it was that "he seems to think that the Supreme Court has plenary authority to invalidate laws the justices regard as unjust and uphold laws they deem to be just." I then observed that "it's a common mistake about the role of courts and the scope and limits of their authority under the Constitution, but a mistake nonetheless."

6. At this point Winters responds with this:  "If by this Professor George means that no one but a legal scholar is permitted to assess the basic justice of a court ruling, I will look forward to his making that point at next year’s annual March for Life. I deny the exclusive right to judgment by a priestly legal caste which alone can judge whether or not a given decision by the Court meets the standards of justice I think should be met. And every citizen has the same right to question the Court."  Here the manipulation and dishonesty begins.  He attempts to cover himself against having it exposed by the expedient of prefacing his characterization of my views with the words "[i]f by this Professor George means."  But no one will be fooled by that.  What Winters suggests to readers I meant is manifestly not what I meant and is manifestly not what I said.  To evade my criticism, he is here attributing to me a silly and condescending view that I do not hold and, indeed, firmly reject, namely, the view that only "a legal scholar is permitted to assess the basic justice of a court ruling," and that members of "a priestly legal caste" alone are fit to "judge whether or not a given decision by the Court meets the standards of justice . . . ."

7. So, instead of answering my criticism and engaging in fairminded and honest debate about points on which we (I assume) disagree, he lowers himself still further, stooping to a purely ad hominem argument underwritten by his blatant misrepresentation of what I had said:  "As for Professor George’s condescending tone, what to say? If he were unable to write condescendingly, he evidently could not write at all. It is his only key."

Mr. Winters' behavior here is, alas, very much in line with his conduct in the only other case in which I had dealings with him.  That was when he misrepresented what I had said in a public exchange with Douglas Kmiec at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. regarding the Obama administration's policies on abortion and embryo-destructive research.  Since I don't know the man, I have no idea what's behind it or what he hopes to gain by conducting himself in this way.  It doesn't advance the discussion of points of disagreement and it makes him look bad.  If he wants to criticize my views and arguments, it would be far more constructive---and honorable---to engage what I actually believe and say and offer readers his reasons for believing that I am in error.

What would *you* do if you were in this judge's shoes, er, I mean robes?

Dayton Daily News
May 20, 2010

Editorial: Can Judge Wagner sit out death-penalty cases?

Montgomery County Common Pleas Judge A. J. Wagner has asked to be excused from the case of Cody Henderson, 20, indicted on three counts of aggravated murder, including murder for hire. It’s a death penalty case, and Judge Wagner opposes the death penalty. His desire not to serve clearly applies to all death penalty cases.

This is unusual. Several law school professors around the state who follow these matters were contacted by the Dayton Daily News. None could think of a case of a judge making such a request.

Presiding Judge Barbara Gorman approved the request, saying she has approved all requests for recusal.

Judge Wagner made his request not by filling out the usual form, but by putting together a 135-page submission. It includes material from a respected group of lawyers that has studied how the death penalty is applied.

Despite the length, his argument comes down to a simple matter: He cannot justify the death penalty on moral, constitutional or religious grounds. So is he right in recusing himself?

Well, if he is not going to impose the death penalty no matter what, then, of course he should not be sitting on a death penalty case. The law obliges him to proceed on a case-by-case basis. A judge has to follow the law.

The larger question here is whether somebody who can’t follow the law should run for a position as a common pleas judge. Capital cases are part of the territory, after all. Could he have done something short of recusing himself?

Lori Shaw, assistant dean for student affairs and professor of lawyering skills in the University of Dayton School of Law, suggested one option might have been hearing the case but then ruling that the death penalty is unconstitutional. That ruling wouldn’t prevail, but it would fight the fight, at least more than simply passing the case on to somebody else.

Judge Wagner wonders, however, whether it would be appropriate to preside all the way through a capital case in the full knowledge that he wouldn’t apply the ultimate sanction.

Judge Wagner isn’t slated to face voters until 2014. Whether pro-death penalty voters should be upset with him is not so clear. After all, if he refuses to hear a case, the case might go to a judge they might like better.

Still, some voters are likely to have an opinion on this matter.

Even before that, though, the question arises: Should a judge stay in a job in which he refuses to do the biggest, toughest tasks?

Judge Wagner says the question isn’t compelling because death penalty cases are rare. This is his first, except for one in which a plea bargain had been arranged, he said.

Recusing oneself from a case is a respected mechanism. It’s used when a judge knows a person involved in the case or has some other potential conflict of interest. But it’s typically used one case at a time, not for a category of cases.

And not for such a tough category. After all, many judges dread death penalty cases. Some oppose the death penalty as law, but feel they must enforce the law. When a judge declines to take up the burden, that means somebody else ends up with it, in this case Judge Mary Wiseman.

Judge Wagner says that when he first ran for judge at the beginning of the last decade, he thought he could handle a death penalty case. His thinking gradually changed. But he was last elected in 2008 (unopposed).

He has now thrown the court and the public a curve ball, and some people have a right to be upset.

The first man for whom I worked, after finishing law school, and, still, the best man for whom I have worked since finishing law school thirty-seven years ago this month: Judge Jack B. Weinstein

Judge Weinstein is still trying to make the law "less cruel".  Read about it, in the New York Times, here.

More from Michael Sean Winters on the Graham decision, et al.

Michael Sean Winters responds here to recent posts by Robby and me, in which we expressed some disagreement with the Court's recent Graham decision, in which the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to sentence someone to life-without-parole for a non-homicide crime committed as a juvenile.

Also very worth reading on this matter is this piece, by Benjamin Wittes, which Winters also engages. 

Winters writes:

This commitment to judicial restraint is undoubtedly true about some policies, but the policy in question is about punishment, and the Constitution, which the Court interprets, guarantees you and me the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. I do not see why the legislature in Florida should receive carte blanche to decide what is and is not cruel anymore than I think they can decide what is, and is not, protected speech under the First Amendment. The Florida legislature, after all, did not do such a great job interpreting the requirements of the equal protection clause for many years.

I emphatically do not want the Supreme Court to yield its authority to interpret the guarantees in the Bill of Rights to any legislature. Is it really that hard to believe that a legislature could adopt a statute the plays well politically but which violates the constitutional rights of citizens? Or, that 37 state legislatures may have over-stepped into cruel, and therefore unconstitutional, territory? The judicial branch is the least responsive to popular opinion for a reason, because sometimes the mob seeks injustice, and the political branches cave. I think the Founders knew what they were doing in creating one branch that was removed far from the popular will.

This excerpt makes me worry that my own post, to which Winters was responding, was not sufficiently clear.  My point is not that the Court lacks authority to interpret and enforce the Eighth Amendment.  Rather, it is that the judicially enforceable content of the Amendment needs to be very carefully identified, in a way that is sensitive to the danger that judges can confuse their policy preferences with the Constitution's requirements.  It's not a question of giving "carte blanche" to the Florida legislature, or even of denying the claim that the 8th Amendment's meaning "evolves."  Rather, it's a question of according appropriate skepticism to a claim that the Constitution prohibits, as "cruel and unusual", a penalty that 37 (I think) states authorize.