Dear Rick:
Because I've been dealing with a horrible family tragedy, I have not been reading or contributing to MoJ for the past ten days or so. During a visit to South Africa, my brother Edward's fiance, Helen Elaine Hill, was thrown from a horse and severely injured. After lingering in a coma for several days, this charming, beautiful, and brilliant young woman died. Her obituary appeared in last Sunday's New York Times. I returned to Princeton last night after attending her funeral in Lewisburg, West Virginia. As you can imagine, my brother is utterly grief-stricken and our entire family is devastated. It has been a rough period for us.
When I opened MoJ this morning to catch up, I found your report that Michael Winters, who seems to have some sort of obsession with me, has found a pretext for launching yet another vicious, flailing, personal attack at his blog. Thanks for defending me, but, honestly, the guy is plainly not interested in reasonable debate. You won't get anywhere with him. I have no idea whether what is driving him is ideological or psychological, but it is certainly not devotion to truth. He seems to have some sort of score to settle with me---what it is I can't say, since I don't know the man---and he's not going to let truth get in the way of settling it.
The last time you called attention to one of Winters' bizarre attacks, I posted a response on MoJ noting that "[w]e can go step by step to show how he willfully twists and misrepresents an interlocutor's words in order to create a false impression of what his opponent is saying." This, as it turns out, is his modus operandi. As his conduct consistently shows, he is a deeply intellectually dishonest person. This time he is trying to smear me by drawing preposterous inferences from the fact that I haven't yet published anything on the New York mosque controversy.
As a matter of fact, I'm writing an op ed with Jennifer Bryson, an outstanding scholar of contemporary Islam with whom I've worked closely in the cause of Muslim-Christian understanding, concerning controversies about mosques not only in New York City, but across the country. We are submitting our piece to the Wall Street Journal. Although we have not yet finalized the draft (precisely because I have been occupied with my family's bereavement), here are the opening sentences:
Across the country in recent months, from California, to Louisiana, to New York, anti-Muslim sentiment has become a prominent feature of opposition to new mosques. At risk in this is religious freedom itself. But not just religious freedom. Also threatened is the respectful civility that enables constructive public discourse in religiously pluralistic democratic societies. First, an attitude of "freedom for me but not for thee" rings the death knell for liberty itself. Freedom of religion is a right of all human beings, including Muslims. People who oppose the building of mosques in their communities out of anti-Islamic animus are guilty of intolerance and a lack or respect for religious freedom. Such hostility assaults the human dignity of both the hater annd the hated.
Now, Dr. Bryson and I recognize that many, many of our fellow citizens in New York, New Jersey, and elsewhere who oppose the location of the proposed Islamic center near Ground Zero, especially the families of 9/11 victims, are not bigots. They are not driven by animus against Muslims or the Islamic faith. That is why President Obama is correct to distinguish the question of a right to locate the Center at Ground Zero from the wisdom of exercising that right. And that is why many serious Muslims oppose building the mosque. (See, for example, the comments of Abdul Rahman Al-Rashid in Al-Sharq Al Aswat here: http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=21980. ) But there are other places in the country where opposition to the building of mosques is plainly not rooted in considerations of the sensitivies of families of victims of the 9/11 attacks. And that is something that Dr. Bryson and I believe all friends of tolerance and religious liberty should be deeply concerned about.
Since it is apt, I'll repeat here what I said the last time you called my attention to one of Michael Winters' vicious outbursts: "Mr. Winters' behavior is, alas, very much in line with his conduct in the only other case in which I had dealings with him. That was when he misrepresented what I had said in a public exchange with Douglas Kmiec at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. regarding the Obama administration's policies on abortion and embryo-destructive research. Since I don't know the man, I have no idea what's behind it or what he hopes to gain by conducting himself in this way. It doesn't advance the discussion of points of disagreement and it makes him look bad."
You will know better than I, since you know him, but his pattern of misconduct---the vitriolic personal attacks, the falsifications, the leaping to unwarranted conclusions in an effort to smear people he doesn't like or disagrees with---leads me to suspect that there's just something wrong with the guy. Now, I myself don't want to leap to any unwarranted conclusions, but the truth is that never in my nearly ten years of participation in efforts to promote Muslim-Christian understanding and cooperation have I heard anyone involved in the work mention Mr. Winters' name. Could it be that, though he is happy to throw stones at others, he himself has done nothing to advance the cause? Perhaps you know. Has Winters' troubled himself to do anything to actually further the understanding of Islam among Christians and to promote mutual respect? Or does the issue engage him only when he thinks he can seize on it as a pretext for smearing people he regards (for whatever reason) as his enemies?
Rob links, below, to Perry Dane's recent discussion of the analogy that some have proposed between the controversy over the convent at Auschwitz, on the one hand, and the Cordoba Project near Ground Zero, on the other. Walking in to work this morning (ed.: are we supposed to be impressed? You live less than a mile from work), another not-an-analogy-but-perhaps-in-some-ways-instructive-case came to my mind, the other big law-and-religion controversy this summer: The Christian Legal Society at Hastings.
As I see it, the Christian Legal Society was not recognized by the law school at Hastings because, at the end of the day, the Christian Legal Society's message of "exclusion" -- its practice of "discrimination" -- was offensive to the administration (and much of the community) at Hastings. To be sure, everyone admitted that Christians at Hastings are welcome, and that they are allowed to meet . . . but they should meet somewhere else, out of respect for Hastings' very different values, and because the recognition by Hastings of the CLS would interfere with the messages that Hastings wanted to express. Yes, all agreed, the Christian Legal Society has the "right" to discriminate -- to do something that many in the Hastings community find deeply offensive -- but Hastings wanted to avoid symbolically endorsing that discrimination, notwithstanding its affirmation of the right.
The cases are different, of course. But are they entirely different? I don't think, by the way, that it is enough to say, "well, in the Hastings case, it would, in fact, distort Hastings' message / vision to recognize officially a group that discriminates on the basis of religion, whereas in the New York case, it would not, in fact, detract from the meaning of Ground Zero if the Cordoba Project moved forward nearby", because the "in fact"-ness of these claims is, in each case, what is in dispute.
Thoughts?
I appreciate the title of Rob's last post, which speaks of a mosque "near" Ground Zero. People keep speaking of a mosque "at" Ground Zero or refer to it as a "Ground Zero Mosque." Whether or not one is generally a fan of Huffington Post,this piece nicely conveys the difference between "at" and "near."
I am not insensitive to the feelings of those who lost loved ones on 9/11. I lost an uncle only five years my senior, who was more like a brother to me growing up than an uncle, and I have seen the devastating effects of that day on other of my family members who were in the WTC or nearby when the planes hit. I still grieve for all of them. But talking about a mosque "at" Ground Zero is inaccurate and inflammatory. If anything, incorrectly talking about a mosque "at" the site adds to the pain and opposition of the familes who mourn those who died (many of whom, I'm guessing, have not focused on the fact that one is unlikely even to be able to see the mosque from Ground Zero given the size of surrounding buildings).
Here is Chris Eberle's response to Paul Horwitz's thoughts:
Just a quick response to Paul Horwitz. I take it that Professor Horwitz and I agree that there are serious questions to be raised about the moral propriety of the building of the mosque near Ground Zero. As I see it, the relevant moral question is as follows: various polls apparently show that many Americans are offended/insulted by the Cordoba Project's intention to build a mosque/community center near Ground Zero. Given that the Cordoba Project's announced intentions are to foster mutual understanding between Muslims and other religious groups, given that acting in ways that other people regard as insulting impedes the aim of fostering mutual understanding, and given that the Cordoba Project can build its mosque/community center in some location that their intended interlocutors will not regard as insulting without in any way diminishing its expressed aim of fostering mutual understanding, the Cordoba Project has excellent reason, given its aims, to relocate. So the Cordoba Project can achieve its religious aims far better by relocating than by erecting a building that will result in lots of Americans thinking far worse of the project than they otherwise would.
Does this grant anything like a heckler's veto to the opponents of the mosque? Hardly. The opponents have no veto at all. The decision is entirely up to the leaders of the Cordoba Project. But the leaders of the Cordoba Project have to realize that, if you want to communicate with others, you must refrain from engaging in actions that preclude communicating, even if you have a right to do so. We should take the announced aims of the project leaders at their word … and therefore implore them not to build as they intend. Should they insist on their rights, then objectors should acquiesce. Acquiescence is of the essence in a pluralistic liberal democracy.
Of course, the leaders of the Cordoba Project don't have to communicate with anyone; they needn't build a mosque/community center with the aim of fostering religious dialogue. They might conclude that the reactions of others are so bigoted that they cannot engage in meaningful dialogue. They could decide to pursue some other religious aim, one that requires them to build exactly in the currently intended location, such that their not building in the currently intended location would preclude them from achieving some important religious aim. Should they change their aims, then they might have reason to build as intended. But not given their current aims.
And, here is Paul:
I'm grateful to Professor Eberle, whose work I greatly admire, for his response. I should say at the outset that I'm not sure he and I do, in fact, agree that "there are serious questions to be raised about the moral propriety of the building of the mosque near Ground Zero." For me, the most powerful possible criticisms of the project have to do with the alleged views of its principal backer or backers (about which I offer no conclusions here). Similarly, I might find Reverend Phelps' views so objectionable that I wish he would not build a church anywhere, but just go away. But those kinds of moral questions, first, have little to do (for me, at least) with the location of such a church or mosque. Second, the kind of moral question they raise is a prior one: how should we feel about the presence of illiberal religious groups in our society? One's views on this may differ. For myself, I think these groups' presence may be disturbing, but I consider the rules of engagement for a pluralist society best served if they are not excluded in principle, not least because I think many illiberal groups have something to offer public discourse, however indirectly. In any event, that sort of question for me has little to do with where that illiberal group decides to set up shop. I agree that there may be moral questions involved in where the Cordoba Project chooses to build, along lines that have been characterized in public discourse in terms of "can they vs. should they," but I do not think they are "serious," by which I mean strong or grave, questions.
Professor Eberle's basic point is this: if the Cordoba Project's stated aim is to foster mutual understanding, and if there are strong objections to its building in the proposed location, then it can better serve this purpose by building elsewhere. He says this does not present a true heckler's veto, but is merely part of the usual exchange and compromise involved in attempting to communicate with others. I have some practical and theoretical problems with this line of argument, although I don't consider it unreasonable. First, practically speaking, the project may have more than one aim. A church may want to serve its own community *and* reach out to others; if so, it will want to build where there is both a relevant community of co-religionists who need a place to congregate and where there are many non-co-religionists. The proposed location seems to serve both needs. Second, relocating can be a burdensome proposition, even if the basic costs are paid for; and a religious group might well not want to accept such funding, given the loss of autonomy that might be or seem to be attached to such an offer. Third, although I think there is room for public debate about whether the project's aims might best be served by moving elsewhere, just as we can argue about whether a church that wants to serve the homeless ought to relocate out of a residential neighborhood, in both cases I would want to defer substantially to the church or mosque's own assessment of that question. On this last point, I don't think Eberle disagrees: he says, quite wisely, that if the mosque insists on its rights, "objectors should acquiesce." This is an important point, and we may be at the point in the public debate where responsible individuals who have argued that the mosque can but shouldn't build in the proposed location are under some obligation to raise it quite vocally and chasten those who refuse to let go of the point.
Most important, I think Professor Eberle is too sanguine on the heckler's veto issue. I agree that coping with opposition is very much a part of any public dialogue, on both sides. The mosque ought to consider the possibility of objections, and for all we know it did so before fixing on this site. But a heckler's veto doesn't depend simply on direct legal force; it depends on the state's (un)willingness to protect the speaker or church against the pressure of the hecklers. As I said in my earlier intervention, although there are certainly widespread objections to the proposed location -- some of them quite genuine and others, I think it's fair to say, largely opportunistic -- there are also many who either support the location, or are indifferent to it, or who would otherwise have been indifferent but now think a larger principle is involved. These individuals, and not just the ones who vocally object, are also possible subjects of the bridge-building effort by the mosque, and their desires must also be factored in to the debate. The presence of objectors is important; but the simple fact that some people object cannot be enough to demonstrate that the bridge-building project will necessarily or even probably fail if the mosque proceeds in its current location. We must also consider the possibility that if the mosque builds in the proposed location, although some people will continue to object, others -- both the supportive or indifferent and those who are currently opposed to it -- may find that the mosque is not, in fact, dangerous or objectionable, and may arrive at a different and much more supportive or tolerant perspective.
The bridge-building metaphor is actually pretty powerful here. We build bridges over chasms, not where there is no need for them. Similarly, most churches send their leaders among strangers and not only among friends. Sometimes those efforts engender initial opposition, but that opposition doesn't always last; and we may well hope that the initial objectors will become more supportive once they realize the "threat" is less great than they initially assumed. For these reasons, I think there is actually an argument -- not a dispositive one but an important one -- that building in *this* location as opposed to another one can be considered an important part of the bridge-building goal. Indeed, and perhaps with some irony, the bridge-building project may, in the long run, be strengthened rather than weakened by opposition to this particular location.
Over at Law Religion Ethics blog, Rutgers law prof Perry Dane compares the proposed mosque near Ground Zero to the controversy over crosses at Auschwitz. (I'm not opening comments here because comments are open there.)
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
I continue to be fascinated by the fallout from Target's decision to donate $150,000 to an organization supporting Tom Emmer, the GOP candidate for Minnesota governor. Emmer, besides being a conservative who favors lower taxes, opposes same-sex marriage (though he is trying to avoid that issue as much as possible in the campaign). After petition drives and much boycott talk, Target's CEO
apologized. Now Target, apparently after intensive negotiations, has
rejected the Human Rights Campaign's demand that the company donate $150,000 to a pro-gay rights candidate. (I would predict, though, that Target will soon take other steps to remedy this perceived lapse in its support for gay rights.) A few years ago, I wrote an
article arguing in favor of the corporation as a venue for conscience, suggesting that it is a good and healthy thing for our society when corporations take morally distinct stances. The Supreme Court, in
Citizens United, has made it easier under the law for corporations (and labor unions) to do so in the political arena (and of course, it is possible for a corporation to take many morally distinct stances outside the political arena!). The Target case, though, illustrates how tricky it can be. To the extent that a greater corporate role in politics is thought to be a benefit primarily for conservative, pro-business candidates, I wonder if we need to amend the conventional wisdom to clarify that the benefit may accrue primarily to pro-business candidates who avoid controversial stances on "culture war" issues. Perhaps
Citizens United is good news for the GOP's libertarian wing more than anyone else? Thoughts?
