Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, March 31, 2011

Something New from New

The other day I took up Russell Shaw’s argument that, although most Americans now identify themselves as pro-life they do not vote that way.  (See here).  When they enter the ballot box they are not convinced that abortion is “the great moral issue of our times” and so cast their vote based on “something else.” 

I don’t deny that this is the case.  I argued, however, that the unwillingness of many to vote in a way that follows their pro-life convictions may in part be due to a belief that their efforts will be unavailing, that political action cannot make a difference in the frequency of abortion.  After all, Roe is still with us thirty-eight years on. 

I also argued that this belief in pro-life futility, while understandable, is profoundly mistaken, and that the efficacy of pro-life legislation can be demonstrated empirically.  Here I referred to the path-breaking work of Michael New. 

As it turns out, Prof. New has a new article in which he examines the effect that informed consent, parental notification, and restrictions on public funding laws passed at the state level following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Webster and Casey had on the incidnce of abortion.  In the paper he compares states where judges nullified anti-abortion laws with states where such laws went into effect. 

The results indicate that enforced laws result in significantly larger in-state abortion declines than nullified laws.  Other regression results indicated that various types of legislation had disparate but predictable effects on different subsets of the population.  For instance, parental involvement laws have a large effect on the abortion rate for minors and virtually no effect on the abortion rate for adults.  These results provide further evidence that anti-abortion legislation results in declines in the number of abortions that take place within the boundaries of a given state. 

Check out the entire study here.

Vince Rougeau to be dean of Boston College Law School

It has been announced by Fr. Leahy that my colleague, and former MOJ-blogger, Vince Rougeau will succeed John Garvey as the Dean of Boston College Law School.  Readers will certainly be familiar with Vince's writings, both popular and scholarly, regarding the intersection of Catholic Social Thought, law, and politics, including his recent book, Christians in the American Empire:  Faith and Citizenship in the New World Order.  Vince's departure is, of course, a loss for Notre Dame Law School, but all of us who care about the future of Boston College as an authentically and interestingly Catholic law school should see Fr. Leahy's choice as a promising sign, and wish Vince all the best.

School choice coming to Indiana

Indiana's House has passed what looks to be a meaningful, if small-scale, school-choice measure.  (A number of legislators, as readers might know, had left the state for Illinois, in an effort to prevent this -- and other -- developments.)  If the law passes, it will (of course) be challenged on constitutional (state and federal) grounds.  It's sad, I think, that I regard it as entirely possible that a judge will yield to partisan temptations and invalidate the law.  Still, no need for Puddleglummery, I suppose.  This is good news.   

Wednesday, March 30, 2011

Marriage and Procreation

Most people suppose that there is some connection between marriage, as a human institution, and procreation.  After all, if humans did not reproduce sexually, nothing resembling the institution of marriage would likely have emerged in human cultures.  Yet many people today are puzzled about the nature of the connection.  After all, both religious and civil law recognize the validity of marriages that do not, and even cannot, produce children.  So Is the link between marriage and procreation merely incidental?  Or is it intrinsic?  Is the value of marriage instrumental to the good of having and rearing children?  Or is marriage something good-in-itself?  Obviously, the answers, whatever they are, will bear in profoundly significant ways on contemporary debates about the meaning of marriage and how it should be defined for purposes of civil law and public policy.  Patrick Lee, Gerard V. Bradley, and I have posted on Public Discourse an essay on the subject.  Part One of the essay, entitled "Marriage and Procreation:  The Intrinsic Connection" appeared on Monday and is available here:

http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/03/2638

Part Two, entitled "Marriage and Procreation:  Avoiding Bad Arguments," appeared today and is available here:

http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/03/2637

This work builds upon work I've done with Sherif Girgis and Ryan Anderson in "What Is Marriage?," published in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy and available here:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1722155

Links to responses to this paper by critics (including Kenji Yoshino and Andrew Koppelman), and to our replies to those critics, have previously been posted on MoJ.  We're gratified that the paper has drawn a great deal of attention from critics and supporters alike.  It is now by a considerable margin the most frequently downloaded paper on SSRN for the past twelve months, and it is number thirteen for frequency of downloads in the history of SSRN.

Cash for Conviction Rates?

This story is a few days old, but I flag it because while I was initially very skeptical, I am now somewhat uncertain.  A DA in Colorado has instituted a system of bonuses for line ADAs: try at least 5 cases a year (that is not a large number, in my experience), reach a conviction rate of at least 70%, and receive a bonus in the range of about $1,000 to $3,000.

One important thing that will color any assessment of this plan is that we are talking about conviction rates and not total convictions (the title of the piece is potentially misleading).  One might think that to the extent that the bonus system conditions a prosecutor's discretion about whether to bring a case at all, it might be a good thing.  Also, and as a general matter, we want prosecutors to give better deals for weaker cases, and to try stronger cases, so perhaps the incentives in this kind of system may match up with the public interest.

On the other hand, it is certainly possible that the bonus system might make a prosecutor push to try a case that ought really to settle, thereby misallocating resources in an already resource-strapped system.  On the third hand, it might be thought a good thing to provide incentives for more cases to be tried, since the risk aversion of prosecutors to trials, and the deleterious effects on the development of criminal law, is problematic (thanks to Mike Simons for this thought).  On the fourth hand, suppose the year is coming to a close, and a line ADA has not met his quota.  Wouldn't that ADA have incentives to go for broke and try a whole string of cases, because a few more losses would not affect his salary, but a few more wins might vault him "into the bonus"?  Finally (5th hand), who makes the decision about when to try?  The DA herself, or the line ADA?  I can see problems here if the discretion about whether to push for trial is solely (or even mostly) in the DA's hands.

There are also potential difficulties under the ethics rules (Rule 3.8 and maybe even Rule 1.5's proscription against contingent fees in criminal cases) that are implicated.  Thoughts about the justifiability of this scheme? 

6th Annual Conference on Catholic Legal Thought

See the attached schedule.  To request registration form please email Michael Scaperlanda at [email protected]

Download Schedule 2011

Ave Maria Law Review symposium on Rights of Conscience

The Ave Maria Law Review (Vol. 9; Issue 1)(2010) has just published a symposium on "The Future of Rights of Conscience in Health Care." The symposium grew out of a conference that Lynn Wardle (BYU) and I organized. The conference was generously supported by University Faculty for Life and was also sponsored by the J. Reuben Clark Law School at BYU and Ave Maria School of Law. The conference was held at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at BYU last February. The symposium issue of the Ave Maria Law Review contains papers by (I'll list them in order of appearance) Lynn Wardle, Kent Greenawalt, Rob Vischer, Armand Antommaria, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Richard Myers, Jill Morrison and Micole Allekotte, and T.A. Cavanaugh.

Richard M.

New Law Prof blog rankings

Paul Caron has them.  MOJ continues to grow in traffic.  So . . . thanks!  And, tell your friends . . .   I really want to catch the good folks at the "Wills, Trusts, and Estates" blog.

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

Regretting President Obama's lack of support for choice and opportunity in DC

The White House -- despite the occasional encouraging sign of openness to education reform -- continues to oppose even D.C.'s small experiment in school-choice for low-income kids in D.C.  Sad.

UPDATE:  The Washington Post gets it right.

We understand the argument against using public funds for private, and especially parochial, schools. But it is parents, not government, choosing where to spend the vouchers. Given that this program takes no money away from public or public charter schools; that the administration does not object to parents directing Pell grants to Notre Dame or Georgetown; and that members of the administration would never accept having to send their own children to failing schools, we don’t think the argument is very persuasive. Maybe that’s why an administration that promised never to let ideology trump evidence is making an exception in this case.

Connick v. Thompson

Villanova Law grad Gordon Cooney and his Morgan Lewis partner Michael Banks have long represented a Louisiana man, John Thompson, who spent 18 years in prison but was acquitted on retrial after a crime lab report that the prosecution had failed to disclose was discovered a month before his scheduled execution (Philadelphia Lawyer story here). The Morgan Lewis lawyers (including my friend and former White House colleague Allyson Ho) subsequently represented Thompson in a §1983 case against the Orleans Parish DA's office for the Brady violation, arguing that the Brady violation was caused by the DA's office’s "deliberate indifference" (the §1983 standard under Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378 (1989)) to the requirement to train its prosecutors properly. The jury awarded Thompson $14 million, but today the Supreme Court ruled that the DA’s office cannot be held liable under §1983 for the Brady violation.

On the merits of the decision, I defer to those such as my colleague Teri Ravenell who know more about §1983 litigation. As a mere torts teacher, I thought one interesting aspect of the case was the view advanced by the Alliance Defense Fund and the Cato Institute in an amicus brief for the plaintiff (Thompson) that government entities’ liability under §1983 should follow common law respondeat superior principles and arguing that Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), should be overturned, though there were a host of state and local government interests lined up as amici on the other side (understandably) resisiting such an expansion of § 1983 liability. A sentence in footnote 12 of Justice Thomas's majority opinion settles that particular question: "We stand by the longstanding rule—reaffirmed by a unanimous Court earlier this Term—that to prove a violation of §1983, a plaintiff must prove that 'the municipality’s own wrongful conduct' caused his injury, not that the municipality is ultimately responsible for the torts of its employees."

Regardless of the outcome in the §1983 case, congratulations to Gordon, Allyson, Michael Banks, Ted Cruz, and the lawyers at Morgan Lewis for their persistent and courageous representation of Mr. Thompson over many years.