I was interested to read Tom's question whether one can make an argument, consistent with Christian moral thought, that torture should be treated as a question of prudence rather than an intrinsic evil. It is the asking of the question that I find interesting.
I teach a first semester/first year Introduction to Law and the Legal Profession course, a couple of classes of which are devoted to an introduction to Legal Ethics. I have used different vehicles for teaching this part of the course. This year, I decided to use the DOJ's torture memo as a basis for discussion, thinking it would offer a good tool to think broadly about lawyers' obligations both to and beyond the client. It did not work as well as I had hoped it would.
The reason it did not is that for the discussion about the lawyer's behavior to work effectively, there needs to be a shared starting point understanding that torture is wrong. I went into the discussion (naive as I can sometimes be) assuming that such a shared understanding exists. I know that we live in a world where most things seem to be up for grabs, but really did not think torture is one of them. I thought we were all sitting in horror about the reports of Abu Ghraib etc.
Based on the responses of my students, I was wrong. Their responses suggest to me that there are a significant number of people (of varying religions; my class is quite mixed on that score) who accept the prudence over evil way of thinking about the issue. It is difficult for me to see how that view can be squared with Catholic moral thought and I share Tom's interest in hearing the thoughts of others on the question.
Yesterday Villanova Law School hosted the panel discussion Mark Sargent mentioned in an earlier posting, "Reflections on the Grand Jury's Report on the Archdiocese of Philadelphia." The event was a real credit to its organizer, the same Mark Sargent. James Post, Professor of Management and Public Policy at B.U. (and a Villanova Law alumnus), offered a general appraisal of the ongoing scandal and some specific insights into what went wrong in Philadelphia; his comments were nuanced and passionate both. Chuck Zech, Professor of Economics at Villanova and Director of the University's Center on Church Management, reported the results of his pollings on the effects of the scandal on the life of the Church in the U.S.; his evidence on the growing disengagement of American Catholics from their Church on account of the scandal was sobering. The still same Mark Sargent gave a masterful sketch of the civil law, criminal law, and bankruptcy issues facing (or not)the Church in Philadelphia today and in the coming years. More than a hundred people were in attendance: many members of Voice of the Faithful, parish priests from across the Archdiocese (many sans Roman collar), "Philadelphia lawyers," law students, law faculty, and, yes, a reporter from the Philadelphia Inquirer. The discussion was predictably lively and remarkably productive; a particular emphasis was the American hierarchy's decades-long failure to follow the governing canon law procedures. I moderated the event; my introductory comments follow below, for whatever their worth. I would just add that this sort of event seems to me to exemplify what Catholic law schools can do that is true to their charism and different from what other places can do. As the event unfolded, I was thinking, "Here is the Church thinking and reflecting; here are Catholic lawyers and scholars gathered together to work on behalf of their Church."
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I should like to begin by setting a broader than America-in-the-first-half-of-the-first-decade-of-the-new-millenium perspective that may be of assistance in approaching and focusing the questions of the day. On one view of the world, societies (such as churches and families) exist by right within a given state only by concession of the state; this is the view embodied, for example, in the following statute of the Third French Republic:“No religious congregation may be formed by without an authorization given by law that determines the conditions of its exercise. . . .The dissolution of a congregation or the closing of any religious establishment may be declared by a cabinet decree.”This statute, mind you, was in effect in first half of the twentieth century.On another view of the world, and it is the one we grope toward in the United States today, societies, still including religious societies, exist by right that precedes the state.Bound on the one hand to recognize the freedom of action and development of the legitimate societies that precede it, the state is also bound, on the other hand, to regulate all societies as the common good of the whole body politic may require.The balance between the primordial authorities of the societies that precede the state and the state’s mandate to care for the common good remains, if we are lucky, a work in progress.Totalitarianism is one premature resolution of the tension; the failure of plural societies to work together for the common good is the other.
In the current engagement between the Grand Jury that works for the common good of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the society that is the Catholic Church in the particular church that is the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, we confront a paradigm instance of the challenge and its temptations.It would be wrong to grab either horn to the exclusion of the other.The Church should govern herself with the legitimate authority that is uniquely hers, and she should seek to govern in a way that supplies no reason or pretext for outside forces to feel justified to enter in and run things “better;” the state, in any event, must never usurp the authority that is irreducibly the Church’s, must never insinuate itself into the Church’s internal life.The Commonwealth, however, must insist that the Church (and other such societies) be held to a uniform application of the law that is necessary and beneficial to the common good.The Church never asks, as Pope Benedict has been firm in saying, any special privileges for herself, though she does of course hope for and call for a state that will permit her the internal freedom that is necessary to the authority that is the hallmark of a distinct society.Clearly, the Church should be among the first to follow the legitimate laws of the state that, as a matter of concrete fact, makes her ministry possible.
It is the genuine blessing of this Catholic law school that we can come together to talk openly, passionately, and rigorously about what has happened and the way forward to mutual respect between Church and state, and full protection by both Church and state of the youth who are our collective charge.
There is no question but that many priests of the Church in Philadelphia acted very wrongly, and that high officials of the Church in Philadelphia, whatever their good intentions, mismanaged the life of the Church.Through acts of mismanagementat the top, and through violence and other abuse in city and suburbs, untold harm was visited upon dozens and dozens of young people, as well, it should be added, as upon innocent Catholics, lay and clergy both, in the Archdiocese and far beyond.
It is a fundamental truth of the Catholic moral tradition that what atonement must be for the sins we commit and harms we cause depends upon our culpability.The extensive report of the Grand Jury, the Response of the Archdiocese, and the Grand Jury’s Examination of that Response illuminate a serious discrepancy on the issue of culpability as it concerns various individuals and the Archdiocese itself. On these issues I find the three documents remarkably unhelpful; the Grand Jury’s Report obscures important points through its rhetorical excess and ultra vires opining; the contents of the Response of the Archdiocese are sometimes irrelevant, frequently conclusory, and often lawyerly (in the bad sense).Atonement that fits the true culpability is a necessary step in the way forward, and the letter that Cardinal Rigali sent recently from Rome indicates the Archdiocese’s movement in that direction.
Also necessary to going forward is a fair and workable plan for preventing harm to young people.The Grand Jury report recommends many expansions of the civil and criminal law.Law, whatever its greatness as a tool to human living, is also necessarily a crude tool, particularly in its operation and application in the criminal context.The Grand Jury Report’s repeated invocation of “criminal conduct” that is “not criminally indictable” fits uncomfortably within the Anglo-American criminal law that refuses to elide acts that are mala in se with crime, a creation of the positive law.As a student and teacher of the criminal law, I have long held reservations about expanding the scope of the criminal law; my general view has been that application of the criminal law should be our last resort, and I retain that view.The question then, fairly presented today, is whether we have reached the point at which expanded statutes and reduced statutes of limitations are called for.Something needs to be done.Some people respond only to the threat of punishment, and certainly, consistent with the moral teaching of the central tradition, the body politic deserves to impose retribution for harm caused to itself and its members.
In the first reading for last Sunday’s Mass, from the Prophet Malachi, the Lord flared up with anger toward his priests for their straying ways.The prophet then asked of the people: “Why do we break faith?”The question we are here to discuss today, as Catholics and other people of good will working in and around the law, is how faith can be restored in the life God’s people, the Church.In this important work, we have the assistance of three distinguished panelists, whom I shall introduce according to the order in which they will speak.All three are exceedingly prolific authors, so I have opted to omit even a sketch of their writings from my introductions. . . . .
The administration continues to push (see here and here) to weaken -- and threatens to veto -- the McCain Amendment that forbids the use of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" against anyone in U.S. government custody anywhere. Is there any argument that the administration's position can be squared with Catholic, or more generally Christian, moral thought? Can defenders of the administration make any argument -- as they did concerning the invasion of Iraq -- that this is a question of prudence rather than intrinsic evil?
Imagine if I had been Luther and Rick had been Pope Leo X (or the other way around). We would have ended up getting together for beers somewhere in Switzerland, and the whole Reformation would have had to be called off.
I appreciate Rick's comments about fairness and moderation, because he consistently displays those qualities too (even when he shows up on National Review Online!). I must admit, though, that then another voice keeps chiding me that it's only the wild, anti-moderate people -- of whom Luther surely was a prime specimen -- who change the world.
This article evaluates the extent to which newer, more carefully constructed studies can assist us in isolating theimpact on a child's well-being of living in a marital home. Part I describes the limitations of earlier studies of family structure. Part II examines a pair of studies published in 2003that compare children's outcomes and parental investments in children in families that contain biological, married parentswith those containing biological, unmarried parents. Thesestudies conclude that "marriage per se confers advantage interms of" how children thrive and to the extent to which parentsare willing to invest in children. Part III evaluates the degreeof reliance we should place on these newer studies. . . . [It] concludes that perceptions of enduringness may shape notonly relationships between the adults, but may also frame theadults' relationships to their children.
"Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the American Law Institute's Treatment of De Facto Parents."
In its PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, the American Law Institute (ALI) proposes sweeping changes in the legalconception of parenthood. One such change would confer custodyand visitation rights on a live-in partner of a legal parent whoshared caretaking responsibility for a child for two or moreyears. . . .
Although the ALI is engaged in an admirable undertaking - to provide children with enduring contact with, in some cases, theonly father [a] child ha[d] known - the drafters assume, withoutsubstantiation, that continuing contact between a child and theformer live-in partner of the child's parent is an unadulteratedgood. However, by designating more and more adults as parents towhom custodial responsibility may be given, the ALI glosses oversignificant differences in the protective capacities of legalparents and other caretakers, as well as their desires toexploit children. Although some children may be made better offby the continued presence of de facto parents, their gain comesat a cost. Other children are likely to experience punishingphysical abuse, sexual abuse or neglect, hastened in part by thefact that such contact occurs outside the protective presence ofthe child's legal parent.
Paper ID: Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-42
Contact: DALE CARPENTER Email: Mailto:[email protected] Postal: University of Minnesota Law School 229 19th Avenue South Minneapolis, MN 55455 UNITED STATES
ABSTRACT: This article claims that three common arguments against gay marriage - the definitional, procreation, and slippery-slope arguments - are quite bad, the worst of the lot. The definitional argument asserts that marriage just is the union of one man and one woman, and that the definition alone is a sufficient defense against claims for gay marriage. The procreation argument claims that marriage's central public purpose is to encourage procreation, and so the exclusion of same-sex couples is justified. The slippery-slope argument claims that the acceptance of same-sex marriage logically entails the acceptance of other public policy changes - notably the acceptance of polygamy - that would themselves be bad, independent of whether gay marriage is bad.
While each argument has some appeal, and each has adherents both inside and outside the legal academy, each is badly flawed as a matter of logic, experience, politics, or some combination of the three. The article suggests that in the interest of focusing on the most important concerns about gay marriage, commentators should move on to other arguments against it that seem stronger and thus better test the affirmative case for gay marriage.
I'm appreciate Tom's taking up my (good humored) "One Thesis", nailed to the door (sort of) of the Mirror of Justice. And, Tom is so scrupulously fair, reasonable, and moderate, that I don't think there is much room for strong disagreement, just differences in emphasis, or different judgments about how to strike the balance -- and remember, in my original post, I asked whether "on balance", the Reformation was "a bad thing for political freedom." I don't think my post could reasonably be taken by any reader (and I know Tom didn't take it this way) as Catholic "triumphalism," because nothing in my proposed thesis commits me to the view that all was (or is) well with the Church, or that the Reformation was without good effects. So, when Tom writes the following, I do not really disagree:
I think it would be way too easy to say that this was the determinative battle for institutional pluralism and freedom, and pass over the difficulties that the Church had over the next 700 years in acknowledging a similar freedom for any non-civil institution besides itself. We can contextualize the Syllabus of Errors, "error has no rights," and the defenses of monarchy as against democracy --and it's important to do that contextualization -- but even after that's done, I think there remains an undeniable, irreducible sense in which the Church was formally negative for a long time about freedom for institutions other than itself, and sought arrangements in which (to oversimplify) there were not multiple sources of authority, meaning, and power in society, but two sources, civil authorities and the Church.
In any event, thanks again Tom. Beers are on me next time.
As we discuss whether the body of Christ is well-suited to suburban or urban existences, here's an alternative to consider: the New Monasticism. A profile in The Christian Century gives an overview of the growing collection of commune-type Christian living environments that, in contrast to many recent installments of the long history of Christian communes, embrace technology and do not reflexively eschew Catholic or Orthodox traditions. One problem, though, is:
the challenge of transcending divisions along the lines of race and class. While those who do join are drawn to the scriptural norm of communities that transcend racial and financial barriers, they tend to be white, college-educated folks, despite great effort to reach out. For example, one of the Sojourners' original goals was to serve some of the tens of thousands of refugees displaced to San Francisco as a result of civil war in El Salvador. Three Salvadoran families joined the church and benefited from its legal clinic and job preparation aid. As soon as they acquired the resources, the families promptly bought minivans, left the church and moved to the suburbs. Perhaps those who have had less of a chance at pursuing the American dream are not yet ready to be disenchanted with it.
I think disenchantment is elusive even among those well-acquainted with the American dream. Perhaps the nuclear family model has become so engrained in my psyche that I resist what would actually bring me closer to the rich communal existence contemplated by Christ, but I have no desire to move in with a collection of other Christians or pool our resources. I'm pretty sure I'd welcome my mother-in-law with open arms, but expanding the circle much beyond that violates my comfort zone. I'm glad the New Monastics are out there, challenging me to take community more seriously and pursue it more intentionally, but for now I'd be content with a few more meaningful conversations after church. That doesn't mean I want to see parish friends sitting at my breakfast table every morning when I come downstairs, much less sharing my checkbook. Is the New Testament model of community outdated, or am I simply missing out on the potential richness of the Christian life?
I'll have to blog very quickly and briefly, continuing the Catholic-Protestant mix-up that Rick and I have started.
On my point that, apart from whether Protestantism was a good development, the mere fact of the Reformation ushered in fundamental disagreement: Rick is right that there was dissent before then, but surely the Reformation level of disagreement -- the size, power, and determination of both sides -- marked a fundamental break in Western Europe. The continent had to deal with pluralism of a nature and degree it never had before. Many things stemmed from that, including tyranny in some places (including in England directed at Catholics). But the effects also included a proto-federalism (as in the "whose the rule, his the religion" solution of 1555) and eventually, as it became clear that dissenters were still around in each place, rights of individual conscience. To treat England under Elizabeth and James as the epitome of Protestant arrangements is to pick out the worst case -- the most Erastian (state ruling church) variation -- and overlook what developed later out of Protestantism in England, America, and elsewhere. And by Murray's own account, the degree of religious diversity in (Reformation-influenced) America was at a new level and called for a further limiting of state power.
Second, I acknowledge the important contribution made by the medieval fight for the "freedom of the church" that Murray and others have described. But I think it would be way too easy to say that this was the determinative battle for institutional pluralism and freedom, and pass over the difficulties that the Church had over the next 700 years in acknowledging a similar freedom for any non-civil institution besides itself. We can contextualize the Syllabus of Errors, "error has no rights," and the defenses of monarchy as against democracy --and it's important to do that contextualization -- but even after that's done, I think there remains an undeniable, irreducible sense in which the Church was formally negative for a long time about freedom for institutions other than itself, and sought arrangements in which (to oversimplify) there were not multiple sources of authority, meaning, and power in society, but two sources, civil authorities and the Church. America was quite different, but largely because the American Catholic Church contextualized the Syllabus and those other things practically out of existence.
And for all of America's plank in its own eye with respect to Catholic freedom, it was in early America -- with a largely Protestant rather than Catholic influence at that point -- that the model of a full array of non-state social institutions, with varying religious and non-religious bases, really took shape. Protestantism was not, and is not, incompatible with a thick civil society, as various writers such as the Dutch "sphere sovereignty" Calvinists show. (My comment that Protestantism led directly to all the problems of "unmitigated individualism" was meant as partly tongue in cheek.)
Let me emphasize that I think (and have written) that there's been loads of Protestant triumphalism over the centuries, claiming that Catholicism stood for nothing but ignorance and persecution, and that Protestantism's emphasis on the individual is the key to freedom of all kinds. These claims have been both wrong and dangerous. But recognizing that fact should make one all the less inclined to substitute a Catholic triumphalism, under which the Church's fight for its freedom solved the basic problem, and after that the Protestants messed everything up by enthroning the individual. (I'm not at all saying that Rick goes there; I'm just saying let's be wary about moving in that direction.)
A few thoughts to add on why the Catholics on the Court now make up a majority and why they're the conservative wing. (Note that one of them is a bit of an accident: Thomas, who converted back to Catholicism after he joined the Court.)
The current position of Catholics in America really begins with Vatican II and the "mainstreaming" of Catholics beginning in the mid to late 1960s. Since then, Democratic presidents have had relatively little chance to appoint justices -- Carter had no opportunity -- and Clinton in his opportunities appointed justices who weren't Catholic (who were Jewish). It's not surprising that conservative presidents would have many more chances to appoint Catholics, because they've had many more chances overall.
Republicans recently have used their opportunities to appoint a lot of Catholics (a disproportionate number), for a couple of reasons. There may be some element of political calculation in it: for example, W Bush using SCT appointments among other things to try to cement conservative Catholics' ties to the Republican party. I don't think that's been a big factor, but it could have played a role. In addition, however, I have a sense that the other component of the conservative religious coalition -- evangelical Protestants -- hasn't yet developed a pool of lawyers/judges with elite educational and professional credentials that's as large as the conservative Catholic pool. Evangelicals are attending Ivy League schools, but they're perhaps a decade behind the Catholics in doing so. (Watch for an incerasing number of evangelicals in the future.) And the clumsy interventions of people such as James Dobson in the Miers nomination may show that some evangelical activist leaders aren't quite ready for prime time yet. Judge Michael McConnell would have been the sterling nominee who happens to be a conservative Protestant (I confess to bias on that matter, as his co-author, former student, and friend).