Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, November 4, 2005

Upcoming Book: Self-Evident Truth?: Catholic Perspectives on American Law

In the spring of 2007, Catholic University of America Press will publish a book tentatively titled "Self-Evident Truth?:  Catholic Perspectives on American Law."  The book is co-edited by MOJ friend Teresa Collett and yours truly.  Contributers include MOJ bloggers Robert Araujo, Rick Garnett, Amy Uelmen, and Rob Vischer.  Other contributers include Lorenzo Albacete, Benedict Ashley, John Coughlin, Cardinal Dulles, Robert George, Mary Ann Glendon, Jim Gordley, Tom Kohler, Kevin Lee, Vince Rougeau, and Chris Wolfe.

A starting assumption of the book is that before we can discuss law we have to have some grasp of the nature of the human person.  Therefore, after a chapter on the foundations of Catholic Legal Theory, the book has two anthropological chapters, one theological and the other philosophical.  The next section of the book has three chapters covering foundational issues in Catholic thinking, covering the relationship of freedom to truth, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the common good.  This is followed by two chapters on Catholic dialogue with secular perspectives in political and legal theory.  The final section of the book contains eight chapters addressing Catholic Perspectives on particular substantive areas of the law, including all of the subjects (except Civil Procedure) traditionally taught in the first year of law school.

In the future I'll post the table of contents and blog more about the book and its potential audience and uses.  I will probably assign it (in pre-publication form) for my seminar in Religion and Democracy next fall and hope others at both the law school and undergraduate level will consider it for their students. 

For me, this has been a labor of love, which I hope finds a wide audience. Our Sunday Visitor Institute was instrumental in getting the project off the ground by providing funding to host a conference addressing these issues several years ago.  And, Bob Destro, then interim Dean at Catholic, was gracious enough to host us.  The book, which has changed significantly in the intervening years, is a direct result of that conference.

Michael

Federal Tax Policy and Judeo-Christian Ethics

[This piece should be of interest to many MOJ readers.  --mp]

"An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian
  Ethics"
       Virginia Tax Review, Vol. 25, Winter 2006

       BY:  SUSAN PACE HAMILL
               University of Alabama School of Law

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=824907

Paper ID:  U of Alabama Public Law Research Paper

  Contact:  SUSAN PACE HAMILL
    Email:  Mailto:[email protected]
   Postal:  University of Alabama School of Law
            P.O. Box 870382
            Tuscaloosa, AL 35487  UNITED STATES
    Phone:  205-348-5931
      Fax:  205-348-3917

ABSTRACT:
  This article severely criticizes the Bush Administration's tax
  policies under the moral principles of Judeo-Christian ethics. I
  first document that Judeo-Christian ethics is the most relevant
  moral analysis for tax policy because almost eighty percent of
  Americans and well over ninety percent of the Congress,
  including President Bush, claim to adhere to the Christian or
  Jewish faiths. I also show that evaluating federal tax policy
  under Judeo-Christian principles not only passes constitutional
  muster but is also appropriate under the norms of a democracy. I
  then provide a complete theological framework that can be
  applied to any tax policy structure. Using sources that include
  leading Evangelical and other Protestant scholars, Papal
  Encyclicals and Jewish scholars, I prove that tax policy
  structures meeting the moral principles of Judeo-Christian
  ethics must raise adequate revenues that not only cover the
  needs of the minimum state but also ensure that all citizens
  have a reasonable opportunity to reach their potential. Among
  other things, reasonable opportunity requires adequate
  education, healthcare, job training and housing. Using these
  theological sources, I also establish that flat and consumption
  tax regimes which shift a large part of the burden to the middle
  classes are immoral. Consequently, Judeo-Christian based tax
  policy requires the tax burden to be allocated under a
  moderately progressive regime. I discuss the difficulties of
  defining that precisely and also conclude that confiscatory tax
  policy approaching a socialistic framework is also immoral. I
  then apply this Judeo-Christian ethical analysis to the first
  term Bush Administration's tax cuts and find those policies to
  be morally problematic. Using a wealth of sources, I then
  establish that the moral values driving the Bush
  Administration's tax policy decisions reflect objectivist
  ethics, a form of atheism that exalts individual property rights
  over all other moral considerations. Given the overwhelming
  adherence to Christianity and Judaism, I conclude that President
  Bush, many members of Congress and many Americans are not
  meeting the moral obligations of their faiths, and, I argue that
  tax policy must start reflecting genuine Judeo-Christian values
  if the country is to survive in the long run.
            

Thursday, November 3, 2005

Susan Stabile on John Courtney Murray and Abortion

"John Courtney Murray and the Abortion Debate"

      BY:  SUSAN J. STABILE
              St. John's University
              School of Law

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=825164

Paper ID:  St. John's Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-0028

Contact:  SUSAN J. STABILE
   Email:  Mailto:[email protected]
  Postal:  St. John's University
           School of Law
           8000 Utopia Parkway
           Jamaica, NY 11439  UNITED STATES
   Phone:  718-990-1579

ABSTRACT:
This paper explores the contribution of the foremost Catholic
theologian in the church in the United States - John Courtney
Murray - to the issue of abortion. Although Murray never
directly spoke on the question of abortion, his distinctions
between morality and civil law and between matters of public and
private morality contribute to our thinking about that question.
Indeed, Murray's views on how the Church should respond to
legislative efforts to decriminalize contraception, as well as
his statements generally about religious freedom, the separation
of law and morality and the distinction between public and
private morality have been influential in forming arguments
concerning the abortion controversy.

In the mid-1960s, Murray wrote a memorandum containing
recommendations regarding how Catholics should respond to a
proposal to amend Massachusetts law to decriminalize
contraception. In response, Murray wrote a memo arguing against
Catholic opposition to the law, despite his view that artificial
contraception was immoral. Because that memorandum has been used
by others in an attempt to use Murray to justify a pro-choice
position, I use it as a framework for exploring Murray's
thought. This paper considers to what extent Murray's statements
about how the Church should respond to contraception carry over
into the development of a workable position regarding abortion
and evaluates arguments that have been made based on his
writings. I argue that Murray has something to say to both
public policymakers and the Catholic Church about their approach
to abortion. More specifically, I argue that abortion is a
matter of public morality, making it a matter that the state is
justified in regulating, but also that prudential considerations
must be taken into account in deciding whether and how the law
should intervene. Separating the questions of whether abortion
is a proper subject for the law to address and what constitutes
a good law with respect to abortion is a necessary step in
moving from confusion to productive debate.
          

"Catholic" Law Schools

My thanks to Michael for posting the most interesting article by Patricia Lefevere on Catholic Law Schools.

Catholic Law Schools? Do they exist? This is a suitable topic for MOJ exploration, since CLT is well suited to address the topic and the issue. Father Hesburgh once said that the Catholic university is the place where the Church does its thinking. Can the same be said of the Catholic law school? Ms. Lefevere is quick to bring this question into focus when she raises her own inquiry about whether it is “even desirable to have such an identity?” Her rhetorical point brings up the further question: if an institution were accused of being a Catholic law school, would there be sufficient evidence to convict?

Initially, I was reluctant to write this post, but two immediate points in the article necessitated a response. The first was our introduction to the new dean of Villanova Law School, Mark Sarget. I immediately wondered what happened to our dear friend, Mark Sargent. But my initial concern about Mark Sargent’s fate was quickly relieved when I realized that the spelling of his surname was a typographical error! Following his point about Catholic mission, I would hasten to add that I cannot find any law school that asserts missions for social injustice and academic laziness when Catholic schools are said by some to be distinctive in their demands for social justice and academic rigor. And when it comes to symbols, why is the symbol of the cross deemed offensive by some? Yet, at the same time displays of other symbols which have no connection with Catholicism, e.g. rainbow colored banners, do not seem to raise any questions at all?

The second point was the statement that “Villanova tied with the University of San Diego, a Jesuit law school, for 63rd spot…” The University of San Diego is not a Jesuit institution, so I was perplexed to learn that it has a Jesuit law school. But this would raise another question best left for another time knowing that John Breen and others have looked at the issue: is there such a thing as a Jesuit law school today? Do any exist? Ms. Lefevere states that there are thirteen in the US, but there are fourteen schools which claim to be in this group. In 1994, the University of Puget Sound’s law school was acquired by Seattle University, and it became “Jesuit” law school number fourteen. Once I decided to comment briefly on these two points, I succumbed to the lure of writing more.

I begin with my thanks to Mark, Greg, and Susan for their observations. At the outset, I will let MOJ readers know that I am inclined to agree with Mark’s assessment about the problems and challenges that face Catholic identity in legal education today. I applaud Greg’s and Susan’s work. I know Russ Pearce at Fordham and congratulate him, too, knowing that Amy Uelmen is also responsible for much of the good work that takes place at Fordham Law in the name of Catholic identity and mission.

I also agree with Tom Shaffer that one might expect a uniquely Catholic perspective on the law that could be available in addressing not only property, contracts, securities regulation, or criminal procedure, but Constitutional Law and everything else as well. Admittedly, the task is not always quite the same for each substantive area of law, but if Feminist Theory, Critical Race Theory, and GLBTQ Legal Theory, etc. are acceptable lenses for examining substantive legal disciplines across the board, why not Catholic Legal Theory? The MOJ discussion group was established to pursue this point and to examine the role of the Catholic intellectual tradition’s contribution to the underpinnings of legal theory. I believe that Tom is onto something when he states that Catholicism “has always copied too much in trying to come to terms with the secular university…” I wonder if this is behind Russ saying “Jesuit universities are saying, ‘Catholics can learn from non-Catholics…’” But is the reverse true today: can non-Catholics also learn from Catholics? I should hope so, and I should further hope that this is what the Catholic universities, including Jesuit ones, are all about. Tom indicated in his interview that he scratched his head about one school that has not been able to turn the corner, but I wonder if that is the only one over which one can scratch heads? Some schools have yet to approach the intersection where they can turn a corner; for others, the corner is pretty big, and I wonder if they will come out of the turn if they have ventured into the intersection?

Greg also makes some solid points when he stated that many contemporary academics “shy” away from discussing religion. I think that would be more difficult at secular, state-sponsored institutions, but even many of them have religious studies departments. Why should this be difficult at an educational institution that claims to be Catholic? He perceptively makes two additional points: the first is that by raising discussions about the religion, would some consider themselves excluded when a particular religious view, let’s say Catholicism, predominates? But when measures are taken to make the institution welcoming of others who are not members of this religious community, his second astute observation comes into play: the religious perspective, over time, becomes marginalized. And with that occurrence, is there not the threat of this perspective becoming lost? Greg’s next statement about offending those of other or no religious traditions then comes into play. Several years ago, I visited a “Jesuit” law school, and I was asked in a public forum by one of the faculty members if I always wore “that” as this teacher pointed to my clerical shirt. I was surprised by the individual’s question which generated embarrassment and offense to me. Whether either was intended, I do not know. I wonder how this individual would have reacted if I had raised the same question about the soiled T-shirt this person was wearing. Would such a question have been off limits, and would asking it generate offense? This brings me to another observation about Greg’s statement about those schools which “seek” to be “authentically Jesuit.” Are they not “authentically Jesuit” now? If not, why? What has happened? Why must the Catholic/Jesuit school seek to be Catholic/Jesuit? It is not simply building trust and avoiding suspicion and anxiety about the faith dimension of the school’s social justice dimension as he states; it is about the ability to define the soul of the institution as Catholic or not. If the Catholic soul is no longer present, what has happened to it? I gather that is why there must be seeking today.

Bill Treanor of Fordham is quoted on points about diversity and dialog as virtues. Yes, indeed, his perspective has merit, and it is “something to be cherished.” But do law schools in general, and those which claim to be Catholic in particular, practice “inclusion and dialogue” and avoid “imposition or indoctrination”? I wonder. What would happen in a law school Constitutional law school discussion where someone, be it teacher or student, questioned, from the perspective of the Church’s teachings, the underpinnings of Justice Blackmun’s Roe opinion or Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion, for example? Would such a person “feel” included? Would such a person be welcomed into “dialogue”? Maybe, but then again, perhaps not. It becomes problematic when a religious perspective quickly becomes suspect of “imposition or indoctrination” but other views escape or are immune from such labeling. The problem intensifies when it is the Catholic perspective at the Catholic law school that is the object of suspicion. This raises one side of the coin presented by Susan’s helpful discussion about proselytizing and enabling students and faculty to disagree with particular views they find objectionable. Somehow the Catholic perspective seems to be the one that gets labeled “proselytizing” whereas vigorous advocacy for relativism or the exaggerated autonomy identified and addressed by Mary Ann Glendon in her “Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse” again is immune. But if some have a problem with what appears to be proselytizing, I hope we can agree that a Catholic institution, including a Catholic law school, is called to evangelize. If that is still a problem for some, then the institution's Catholic identity is not simply diluted, it is expunged.

This brings me to one last point I would like to offer about Ms. Lefevere’s article. She raises a discussion about the important questions surrounding who gets to teach at the Catholic law school, and she addresses issues surrounding hiring for mission. Hiring for mission discussions once prompted a colleague of mine to raise the issue if there could be such a practice as “firing for mission,” but I will put that aside for the time being. It appears that faculty members who have been hired, regardless of their views, have little to fear; moreover, tenure brings additional security. But a dimension of this important discussion about faculty hiring was not addressed, and this concerns those who share in the Catholic mission of the institution but face hidden obstacles to being hired. If a person cannot he hired, how can he or she contribute to the school’s Catholic mission? If the faculty candidate who is interested in contributing to the Catholic identity of the school and publicizes this aspiration has his or her application sidelined, this is a further problem. I am aware of hiring practices where some Catholic law school hiring committees have said: we must replace a woman who leaves with a woman; we must replace a racial minority who leaves with a racial minority; we must replace a sexual minority who leaves with a sexual minority. Is the same true about replacing a Catholic who leaves with a Catholic? A Jesuit with a Jesuit? Does simply asking the candidate whether he or she will “respect” the Catholic mission and identity of the school suffice? This makes Mark’s comment about “hiring toward mission” all the more important to the vitality of Catholic legal education.

I have gone on at some length, and I am grateful to MOJ readers for their patience. I would like to conclude on this note. For those who may view my remarks as expressions of dissatisfaction, I must add this counsel form St. Paul, whose wisdom I labor to follow. In his letter to the Romans, he reminds the faithful not to be overcome by evil; rather, the charge is to overcome evil and that which is wrong with good. That is often easier said than done, but when this exhortation becomes the course directing one’s life, that person’s discipleship has a greater claim to authenticity. It is also the direction that the Catholic law school and all associated with such an institution are called to pursue. Any thoughts anyone?    RJA sj

Wednesday, November 2, 2005

CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOLS

[The following article is from the October 28th issue of the National Catholic Reporter.  I've reprinted the whole article below, because a link to the article won't do a nonsubscriber any good.  Among those quoted in the article:  MOJers Greg Kalscheur, Mark Sargent, and Susan Stabile.]

Catholicism and teaching law:
Catholic law schools grapple with faith's influence

By PATRICIA LEFEVERE

Increasingly law schools that call themselves Catholic are raising questions about the nature of their Catholic identity. Is it even desirable to have such an identity? Does the linking of Catholic and lawyer feel uncomfortable -- except when uttered by the local bishop from the cathedral pulpit at the annual Red Mass? And in what way -- if at all -- are graduates of Catholic law schools different from those who earned their degree from a state or public university?

Talk about what does and what should distinguish a Catholic law school from a secular institution fill law professors’ blogs and are the stuff of law reviews, conferences and classroom discussions at many of the 27 law schools that call themselves Catholic.

These institutions, located in 17 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, are currently educating some 22,000 future lawyers -- the majority of them Catholic. Eight of the schools have been around over a century. The 27 schools employ more than 1,100 full-time faculty and some 1,500 adjuncts.

From such an infrastructure, one might expect a uniquely Catholic perspective on the law, a Catholic contribution to legal theory or an overriding Catholic moral voice on issues involving property, contracts, securities regulation or criminal procedure.

“Yes, it should be there,” said Thomas Shaffer, professor emeritus and former dean of Notre Dame Law School. “Catholicism has always copied too much in trying to come to terms with the secular university,” he said. “Some law schools may be still doing that.”

A legal ethicist, Shaffer has been looking at Catholic legal education and the making of the Christian lawyer for some 30 years. The question of Catholicism in Catholic law schools is undergoing a kind of revival, he said. The humanistic approach, dominant for four decades, now faces a challenge from religiously affiliated law schools, be they Catholic, Protestant or Jewish, he said.

Shaffer said he thinks the movement has less to do with the Vatican’s 1990 Ex Corde Ecclesiae -- requiring theologians in Catholic institutions to be in conformity with the church’s magisterium -- than it does with the keen interest Catholic law schools have always had in ethics. These schools are now expressing this concern through exploring Catholic social teaching, he said.

The shift toward distinctly Catholic law schools has “turned the corner” at Notre Dame in South Bend, Ind., Boston College and New York’s Fordham University, said Shaffer. “I scratch my head about Georgetown. It’s so urban and so large.”

Last semester Jesuit Fr. Gregory Kalscheur coordinated three evening conversations on the Jesuit, Catholic identity and mission of Boston College Law School, where Kalscheur, a lawyer, is assistant professor. About 30 faculty attended one or more of the series, which continued this past summer.

In addition, Kalscheur has conducted three retreats for 45 law students, introducing them to discernment skills, based on a model of St. Ignatius Loyola, founder of the Jesuits. A dozen faculty members took part in the retreats.

Many contemporary academics shy away from any admission of religion into the conversation, afraid it will make the religious voice “the predominant, privileged or the excluding voice,” he said. “My own fear is that prolonged failure to confront that fear explicitly and directly has helped to marginalize and exclude the religious voice.”

To make sure the voice of the Catholic tradition itself is not devalued, ignored or made invisible out of concern for offending those of other religious traditions or no religious tradition remains a challenge for law schools that seek to be “authentically Jesuit,” the priest said. “We have to be more explicit about the faith dimensions of our social justice mission. We have to move forward in ways that will generate increased trust, not anxiety or suspicion.”

Interfaith law

At Fordham Law School, hundreds of the 1,546 students are Jewish, Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu and of no faith at all. The same diversity applies to the nearly 300 full-time and adjunct faculty. -- Patricia Lefevere Russell Pearce Russell Pearce, an observant Jew, teaches at Fordham and codirects its Stein Center for Law and Ethics. He said he supports the school’s Catholic identity and its mission of educating the whole person “in the service of others.”

Fordham’s identity is “inclusive, respectful and supportive of all,” Pearce said. The fact that “a Catholic law school has placed a Jew in a position of leadership sends a signal that it’s living up to its mission.

“Jesuit universities are saying, ‘Catholics can learn from non-Catholics,’ ” said Pearce.

Throughout its 100-year history, Fordham Law School has been concerned with “access,” said Dean William Treanor. At first it was access to the bar for Irish Catholics, then it was access to a legal education for Jews.

Monthly dialogues on what it might mean to be a Catholic law school have drawn a third of the faculty in recent years -- the majority of them non-Catholic. Many have traveled to Fordham’s main campus in the Bronx to visit with Jesuits in their residence.

“This school was founded by those who saw diversity and dialogue as virtues -- as something to be cherished,” said Treanor. In the classroom that translates as “inclusion and dialogue,” not “imposition or indoctrination,” he said.

Fordham boasts the largest pro bono and community service program among the dozen New York City-area law schools. Last year 500 students volunteered more than 75,000 hours, serving the poor and those of limited means in such areas as domestic violence, unemployment, housing, family court mediation, immigration, police misconduct, environment and death penalty advocacy, and community service.

At Villanova Law School in Philadelphia, Dean Mark Sarget doubted that law schools have turned the corner in the direction of their Catholic identity. In the latest U.S. News & World Report ranking of the 100 best law schools, Villanova tied with the University of San Diego, a Jesuit law school, for 63rd spot, up from 76th in 2004. The 13 Jesuit schools account for 57 percent of students in U.S. Catholic law schools.

These ratings are “the life and death of law schools,” said Sarget. Of schools outranking Villanova in the current tally, Georgetown was at 14th, Notre Dame 24th, Boston College and Fordham among five schools rated 27th and Loyola in Los Angeles at 58th, “only Notre Dame has a Catholic identity,” he said. The others he found had “little or very little Catholic identity.”

“Every law school will say, ‘We’re Catholic, because we teach jurisprudence and ethics and we do clinic,’ ” Sarget told NCR. But all law schools require ethics courses and “they all have clinics,” he said.

Clinics allow student lawyers the chance to practice law with attorneys and professors and work with judges. Many involve outreach to the poor, immigrants and victims of discrimination. Villanova’s clinical law practice “is organized expressly for mission,” Sarget said. It is modeled after the school’s namesake, St. Thomas of Villanova, who said: “Anticipate the needs of those who are ashamed to beg, for to make them ask for help is to make them buy it.”

Sarget pointed to “a movement among Catholic law professors who are very self-consciously asking how our church tradition and teaching can influence Catholic legal theory.” The movement is most alive on the blog mirrorofjustice.com, where 25 or so academics at Catholic law schools meet to address issues that grew out of a conference on Catholic social teaching and the law, organized by Sarget at Villanova in 2003. Mass is held in St. Thomas More Chapel at the University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis.

Sarget said that a genuinely Catholic law school would have no qualms about the use of Catholic symbols in its buildings or publications. It would include prayer at law school functions, the observance of Christian holidays and a liturgical life.

The dean was quick to stress that Villanova’s law faculty is “very cooperative” even though many find the identity issue difficult. Traditionally law schools have had a much more secular faculty than other schools or departments of a Catholic university.

Indeed a chief reason why many Catholic law schools differ little from their secular counterparts is because committed Catholics are a minority on their staff. Many full-time faculty members are only nominally Catholic, of different faiths, or irreligious, Sarget said. “Some are even hostile to Catholicism, either as a matter of principle or of prejudice.”

Non-Catholic teachers at schools like Villanova, Notre Dame and the 13 Jesuit law faculties need not fear losing their jobs. These institutions will still employ the best constitutional law candidate who applies, regardless of his or her faith background, and will want to retain a diverse faculty, noted four deans interviewed by NCR. However, these schools are making candidates for jobs well aware of the school’s Catholic identity and asking new hires to respect their mission and to try to see how they can contribute to it.

Still, there is no shortcut to Catholic identity without a law school retaining “a critical mass of Catholics” both among its scholars and students, Sarget argued. This does not mean “affirmative action for Catholics,” but rather “hiring toward mission,” he said.

New law schools

The two newest Catholic law schools -- the University of St. Thomas in Minneapolis and Ave Marie in Ann Arbor, Mich. -- say that their students, even non-Catholic ones, enroll because of the faith-based identity that both schools seek to nurture.

The first thing one notices upon entering the spacious four-story atrium of the St. Thomas School of Law in downtown Minneapolis is a statue of Thomas More and a chapel where Mass is said daily. Close by is a meditation room.

Not an ordinary office block or learning center, the $36 million edifice, which opened in 2003, announces its mission: “Integrating faith and reason in the search for truth through a focus on morality and social justice.”

“You may think this is dean puffery, but there are lots of Catholic law schools in the U.S. Yet none of them is doing the variety of things to establish their Catholic identity that our law school is doing,” said St. Thomas’ law dean, Tom Mengler.

The model is that of servant-leadership, he said. “We’re integrating faith and reason throughout the curriculum. The school is committed to social justice and to service.”

According to Mengler, of the 200 lawyers graduated in 2004 and 2005, 14 to 15 percent of them are engaged in some form of public interest law. The national average is about 3 percent, he said.

Many of them found their vocation to public service law by fulfilling the 50-hour requirement for community service over their three years in law school. Others may have discovered it in jurisprudence courses where students get exposed to the Catholic intellectual tradition or at numerous colloquia where faculty staff and students learn about Catholic social teaching and its implications for law.

The school boasts of its Mentor Externship -- a program that requires every student to be paired with a working attorney or judge in the community. Some 450 lawyers take part, including 48 judges. Not only do would-be lawyers accompany a professional to a deposition, an appellate argument or client meeting, they also combine experiential learning with a focus on ethics and professionalism, said Lisa Montpetit Brabbit, who directs the mentor program.

The idea of legal training at a Catholic law school is not to get rich, but to serve God and the neediest among us, said St. Thomas law professor Patrick Shiltz, who believes that lesson has yet to be taught in most law schools that call themselves Catholic.

At St. Thomas the bulk of students and faculty have come because of the mission, said Virgil Wiebe, associate professor of law. “We’re highly mission-focused. If you want to pick a fight here, it’s about ‘You’re not living up to the mission.’ ”

Wiebe, a Mennonite, said, “I knew when I came to St. Thomas I’d not have to change my faith, hide it or apologize about it.” The faculty, while racially, ethnically and religiously diverse, supports the mission, he said.

Wiebe codirects the Interprofessional Center for Counseling and Legal Services, a clinical education program in which law students work in tandem with students from St. Thomas’ School of Social Work and Graduate School of Professional Psychology. Working with those from other disciplines helps law students to consider not only the legal obstacles of their clients, but also the emotional, spiritual and economic challenges they face, Wiebe said.

The standard St. Thomas has set for itself at times “gets thrown back in our face,” he said. “We get it coming and going. We’re not doctrinaire enough or we’re too religious.”

Mengler objected to being “pigeonholed” as a conservative law school. “We’ve a faculty of 25 -- conservatives and liberals, people of all perspectives. All of us are dedicated to the mission of formation, social justice and servant leadership.”

Comfortable conservative

Bernard Dobranski At Ave Maria School of Law, dean and president Bernard Dobranski is not uncomfortable being labeled “conservative.” He makes no apologies for the perspective of his institution, which was founded by Domino’s Pizza mogul Tom Monaghan in 1999: “We’re Roman Catholic and very insistent about what we’re doing here. You don’t come to Ave Maria unless you want to see the whole range of how Catholic moral and intellectual tradition affects the law.”

Critics who speak of Ave Maria’s “narrowness” and say that “all we do is defend the magisterium and talk about natural law haven’t been here,” Dobranski said. “We try to bring in something from our Catholic intellectual tradition, where it’s appropriate and relevant.”

In ethics, jurisprudence, even in commercial law classes, professors have been able to integrate the teachings of John Paul II, Aquinas and Augustine, he said. “We thought it would be impossible in procedure courses.” Then along came an Australian visitor, who was able to elicit Catholic teaching on subsidiarity when looking at the exercise of jurisdiction in federal and state courts.

Dobranski cited “a wealth of Jewish and Protestant scholarship” that has been summoned when professors look at the nature of individual and communal property rights.

Discussions about the use of law to enforce moral standards are ongoing -- particularly after the recent Supreme Court ruling striking down Texas’ sodomy laws. Dobranski held that the legal debates of the late 1950s and early 1960s that led to the decriminalization of prostitution and homosexuality were not guided by morality.

Dobranski said the school’s graduates pass the bar at the rate of 92 percent -- the highest among six law schools in Michigan. In each of the first two graduating classes, 20 percent of students got jobs as clerks in trial and appellate courts.

While Dobranski has yet to survey students, he said, “Lots leave here thinking they can overturn Roe v. Wade.”

The student body is more than 75 percent Catholic, with most of the others representing evangelical and mainline Protestant denominations. Last year eight Mormans chose Ave Maria, as did four Muslims, at least one Buddhist and “one self-proclaimed pagan hedonist,” Dobranski said. Racial minorities make up 16 percent of the 222 students including several Koreans and Mexicans, but few African-Americans. The dean said efforts were underway to attract more African-Americans.

Urgent moral issues confront society, said Susan Stabile, law professor at St. John’s School of Law in Jamaica, Queens, N.Y., and emerging lawyers would do well to view them enlightened by two millennia of church teaching. She cited Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical, Rerum Novarum, which called for the outlawing of child labor. “Still it exists,” she said.

In her first year course, “Introduction to Law and the Legal Profession,” Stabile has looked at the church’s just war theory and at the ethical dimensions of the “torture memo” that defined treatment of prisoners of war being held by the U.S. military at Guantánamo Bay.

Religious, racial and ethnic diversity thrive at St. John’s, she said, recalling that it was poor Jewish students from Brooklyn who came to the Vincentian Fathers asking them to build a law school so they might attend. Working-class Catholics, Jews and persons of other beliefs still predominate at the law school.

In the last several years, 15 to 20 percent of graduates took jobs in government or public interest law while 55 to 60 percent of them have gone into private practice.

Raising the Catholic identity issue at faculty forums has its critics. “The concern that gets expressed is that we not proselytize students and that students be free to disagree with what’s presented,” she said.

Next May Stabile and other academics from Catholic law schools will gather at Fordham for a conference on Catholic social teaching and the law. The event will be interdisciplinary and is designed to support those who want to see Catholic social thought have a bigger part in Catholic law curriculums.

“My bet is no one besides St. Thomas and Ave Maria is doing this across the board,” Stabile said.

Some Thoughts on Catholic Thought and Precedent

In response to my post asking what Catholic social thought has to say about the issue of following judicial precedent, reader (and former student of mine) Pat Shrake writes:

I tend to be in the Michael Paulsen camp on the very limited use of stare decisis in determining constitutional matters. Although I'm sure he has articulated it far better than I can, my main reason for this is my understanding that the court's role in interpreting the constitution is limited to the particular case (or controversy) before the court. . . .

What I was surprised to learn is that this appears to be the approach that the Catholic Church takes in canon law matters. That is, the decision of a particular canon law case does not decide the interpretation of the canon for future cases. Which leads me to an unresearched hypothesis of why this is so.

I hypothesize that the reason for both approaches is that the law in both cases is NOT the interpretation given it by the judge. Rather, in both cases, the law is written down (either as a Constitution or a canon) and then applied by the judge to the particular facts. The judge does not have the role of law giver in either circumstance. Or, more precisely, the judge only gives the law of the case.

In contrast, in the common law, the judge is either accepted as the law giver or, at the very least, the law "revealer"-when he or she writes down and/or pronounces what the law is. As many of the issues decided upon by the common law are an attempt to balance one interest against another, this method of determining "the law" fits within the broad variations of ordering society acceptable under Catholic social thinking.

So, in summary, I'm suggesting that one of the key insights that Catholic thinking and practice can give is that defining WHO the law giver is becomes vitally important. If the law giver has spoken (via the canon or Constitution) then the law interpreter (the judge) has a very limited role and only decides a particular case-with that decision having only a persuasive impact on the next judge. If the law giver IS the judge, then the judge's view of the law obviously becomes very important.

This is a very interesting and insightful point, and probably has a lot of truth in it.  But a couple of quick thoughts in response:

1.  It doesn't seem to me that respect for precedent is irreconcilable with respect for a written Constitution or code whose force derives from an act of the people.  Even though Henry Monaghan argued that we essentially have a "constitutional common law," I don't think that one needs to turn constitutional law into common law in order to affirm the relevance of precedent.  Stare decisis is, of course, a presumption that can be overcome.  It could rest on the idea -- compatible with a written Constitution, especially one whose phrasing (like ours) is often broad -- that often the written words do not clearly dictate the result, and that in such cases a backup principle of following what previous courts have done can be useful in guiding current courts, even though at some point a precedent will be so inconsistent with the true meaning of the provision (revealed by text, original understanding, etc.) that it must be overturned.  Hamilton's Federalist 78 certainly assumes a written Constitution as the subject of judicial review, but it also says that the judges engaging in such review will be bound by "strict precedents" that will constrain their imposition of their own will.  It seems to me it's unlikely that the framing generation thought a defeasible principle of stare decisis was inconsistent with a written Constitution reflecting a supermajority decision of the people.

     As for the Court's authority being limited to the particular case before it, that likewise is consistent with respect for precedent.  Stare decisis is not res judicata; the prima facie duty to follow precedent is not a matter of the binding, authoritative force of a previous decision.  Rather it follows from other sources, such as a duty to be consistent in rulings (not deciding cases under the same provision under entirely different principles, without a good reason for doing so) and a concern for stability in the law.

2.  I'm very interested in the canon-law point Pat makes, and I'd love to hear from canon lawyers about it.  Again, however, even if it is the practice that decisions on canon law (like those on other codes) advert directly back to the Code rather than to precedent, I'm not sure that this is logically compelled by the nature of a written text (i.e. a non-common-law situation).   Again, the U.S. practice under the Constitution has combined the two: a written Constitution together with substantial (though defeasible) respect for judicial interpretations of it.  And if we're going to look at written texts in the Catholic tradition, what about the Bible?  That's a statement of a lawgiver, for sure (at least the orthodox view would say) -- which the Church is not modifying but merely interpreting -- and yet in the Catholic tradition interpretation of it is substantially committed to an ongoing community reflected in the magisterium's teachings.  I know that, as I said before, the Church understands itself to have the Holy Spirit -- but doesn't the principle of giving respect to tradition in interpreting a text cut more broadly than that?  Isn't part of the Church's approach to the Bible that it is a complicated text (as we could also say of the Constitution), and therefore its interpretation over time by those with a special vocation to interpret ought to be quite relevant.  Remember that Mike Paulsen is, in the words of Sandy Levinson in Constitutional Faith, a "constitutional Protestant" (as well as a real one!) rather than a "constitutional Catholic."

I threw a lot of themes quickly into those three paragraphs, which may need disentangling (and in some cases correcting).  I'd be interested in hearing from others.

Tom 

Hello, Catholics. Goodbye, Catholics

A few days ago, Eduardo and I had a conversation about, among other things, changes in Catholics' voting patterns and practices.  In a related vein, check out these two essays -- "Hello, Catholics" and "Goodbye, Catholics" -- in the latest issue of Commonweal.  I have some thoughts about the essays, and will blog about them later.  With respect to Daniel Finn's "Hello, Catholics", though, my immediate impression is that he (like many other Catholics who think and write about the current political situation) works from a premise that it is only on abortion where the Republicans' stated position and actions are obviously preferable -- to conscientious, reasonable Catholics -- to the Democrats'.  I do not accept this premise.  But . . .more later. 

Oral Argument on Ritual Tea and Religious Freedom

As I've blogged before (here and here), the Uniao do Vegetal case -- on the application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to the sacramental use of tea with a small amount of hallucionogenic substance in it -- raises vital issues across the board about the scope of religious freedom in America, and what kind and quantum of evidence the government must provide to justify serious restrictions on religious freedom.

The case was argued in the Supreme Court yesterday, and the argument appeared to go very well for the religious group and badly for the federal government (HT: SCOTUS Blog):

Perhaps the most telling development of the argument was that Justice Antonin Scalia displayed almost no sympathy for the government’s position. Noting that Congress has created an exception to drug policy for Indian tribes’ ritual use of peyote, Scalia told [Deputy SG Edwin] Kneedler: “This demonstrates you can make an exception without the sky falling.” Kneedler did not do well in trying to explain away the peyote exception as limited to Congress' special concern for Indian tribes. Scalia, of course, was the author of the Court’s 1990 decision (Employment Division v. Smith) allowing states to ban the tribal use of peyote – a decision that Congress essentially overturned in passing RFRA, and enacting a separate exception for Indians’ use of peyote.

If indeed the justices are overhwlemingly in favor of protecting the group under RFRA, then the view of Justice O'Connor versus Judge Alito won't matter, and the case won't need to be held over until a new justice is seated.

I have an article on the case in the November 1 issue of The Christian Century.  It's at your local newsstand, but despite the date, it's not posted online yet; I'll provide a link when I can.  My article describes the background of the case and the importance of RFRA to religious freedom in America.  It also takes on some of the arguments against religious accommodation made by Marci Hamilton, whose position was discussed here at MOJ a while back.

Tom

The Catholic Second Amendment

Here's some ammunition for Rick's effort to put the Reformation in its place: Over at the Volokh Conspiracy, David Kopel has posted his new article, "The Catholic Second Amendment."  Here is an excerpt from the conclusion:

One of the values of understanding the debt that the Declaration of Independence and the Second Amendment owe to the Summa Theologica, to Policraticus, and to other great works of Catholic resistance theory is that we can better understand that the American principles of revolution and the right to arms are not novelties that spontaneously arose in 18th-century America or in 17th-century Great Britain.  Rather, they are the natural results of an intellectual tradition that was in many ways far older and broader -- and much more Catholic -- than the American Founders may have realized.

Rob

Questions on Abortion

MOJ reader and prominent law professor Steve Shiffrin sends along these questions, prompted by my recent post about abortion law in Portugal:

Your MOJ post on Portugal got me thinking. Because Europe does not have Roe v. Wade, abortion politics have taken a less strident tone there (as they tended to before Roe in the U.S.). The result of the democratic processes is that second trimester abortions are regulated far more strictly in Europe than here, and, of course, restrictions in some (many?) European countries exist in the first trimester.  Portugal is one of the most restrictive. Support for those restrictions has declined for at least two reasons. First, there is substantial evidence that the restrictive laws in the first trimester are ineffective: Portuguese women still have abortions either in other countries or illegally. Second,  the government made the mistake of prosecuting some women who secured illegal abortions (in addition to the doctors). . . .
What I am wondering is this: 
A. If Roe were overturned (I am not sure this will happen in the next decade), what would be the range of views of the posters on MOJ on what the post-Roe policies should be?
(1) Should abortion be outlawed in all circumstances? Life of the mother? Physical health of the mother? Rape? Etc.
(2) What should the penalties be? Should they be different from murder?
(3) Should abortion patients be prosecuted?
(4) Should the failure to pass restrictive abortion legislation be considered a violation of the  equal protection clause?
(5) Should a constitutional amendment be passed enacting restrictive policies on abortion nationwide?
B. As a separate, but related  matter, one might discern from some statements of the American and European bishops that pragmatic considerations should play no role in determining whether the criminal law should be employed to deal with moral evils. Yet, my understanding is that there is a longstanding counter tradition in the Church. If there is, how does that tradition relate to abortion politics?
Steve has asked for our views.  What do people think?