I agree, I think, with Eduardo that we ought to care about -- that, as Catholics, we ought to care about -- more than how individuals are doing, in absolute terms, and that inequalities -- even in a context where few people are, in absolute terms, deprived -- can signal problems in the life and well being of the community. That said, I think Eduardo might be coming down a bit too hard on Tyler Cowen, to whom he responds in his post. Cowen does not contend that we should not care about inequality, does he? True, he asks "why we should care [about inequality] at all," and I think Eduardo provides some powerful reasons. In the end, though, Cowen's claim is this: "What matters most is how well people are doing in absolute terms. We should continue to improve opportunities for lower-income people, but inequality as a major and chronic American problem has been overstated."
I guess I'm willing to regard this last, less extreme claim as a useful and valuable corrective to those who regard the existence of inequalities as conclusive proof of social injustice or of exploitation by some of others.
There are, we know, costs to equality; ham-handed (or heavy-handed) to guarantee it through regulation can easily conflict with freedoms that one does not have to be a knee-jerk libertarian to value. And, we know -- the American Bishops acknowledged -- that inequalities are a necessary result of an economy that is productive enough to provide decent opportunities and widespread well being. There are going to be tricky balances to strike. I agree with Eduardo that "solidarity" is a theme that should guide us in striking that balance, but I wouldn't think keeping our eye on the "absolute well being" -- at the median or at the low end -- is a bad idea.
MOJ-friend Bradley Lewis (CUA) passes on this item:
This past Sunday a meeting took place in Guadalajara, Mexico, at the Panamerican University campus there, aimed at launching a Panamerican network of scholars who work in the natural law tradition in law, philosophy, and other related disciplines. Among those present at the meeting were Rodolfo Vigo and Carlos Massini, two of the most respected legal philosophers in Latin America. The aim of the network would be to encourage increased international collaboration between scholars in the Anglo-American world and those in Latin America who seek to develop the natural law tradition and to engage with other traditions of philosophical jurisprudence. Those present agreed on two immediate projects: first, the construction of a website with a listing of scholars who wish to be affiliated with the network, including information on their published writings; and second, the translation into Spanish of the most important recent English-language works on natural law theory. There have already been some preliminary discussions of this latter project with the Mexican branch of Oxford University Press. There was also a discussion of some possible projects for the future, including the organization of international conferences and the publication of a journal. The construction of the website will be undertaken at the Aguascalientes campus of the Panamerican University and led by Aaron Castillo, who is a professor in the Law School there. I would be happy to pass along the names and email addresses of anyone who would like to be affiliated with this important project. For the moment, all that is involved is a listing on the network site, which will also eventually serve as a clearing house for information on natural law jurisprudence in the Americas.
You can contact Professor Lewis at [email protected]
I would like to compile a list of fellow travelers (those interested in Catholic Legal Theory) outside the United States. And, while I would like to develop a comprehensive list, at this moment I am particularly interested those who are engaged in this enterprise in and around London. Email replies would be great. Thanks.
Here is an abstract to an article that will be of interest to some of us:
"The Embarrassing Preamble? Understanding the Supremacy of God and the Charter"
University of British Columbia Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2,
p. 287, 2006
Contact: JONATHON W. PENNEY
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law, Dalhousie
University
Auth-Page:
http://ssrn.com/author=574775
Co-Author: ROBERT JACOB DANAY
Department of Justice - Government of Canada
Email: [email protected]
Auth-Page:
http://ssrn.com/author=548572
Full Text:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=941221
ABSTRACT: The reference to the supremacy of God (the clause) found in the preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has been either marginalized or completely ignored by Courts and legal scholars. This leaves the impression that most are either embarrassed by the clause, or just wish to ignore it.
Given the importance the Supreme Court of Canada has ascribed to constitutional preambles, it is time to acknowledge the supremacy of God clause and make a good faith attempt to determine its meaning and role in Canadian constitutionalism. This paper constitutes just such an attempt. Our thesis is straightforward.
The clause recognizes a fundamental principle upon which the theory of the Charter is based: people possess universal and inalienable rights derived from sources beyond the state, and the Charter purports to enumerate positivist protections for these pre-existing human rights. This understanding of the clause is rooted in the historical development of human rights theory out of the natural law tradition and finds support both in the dicta of the Supreme Court of Canada as well as the thinking of the Charter's framers. This analysis restores meaning and dignity to the clause and, as we will argue, has important normative and practical implications for our understanding of the Charter itself, including the limitation of people's rights under Section 1.
