Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, March 20, 2007

Anthropologies

Rob continues my question on God and anthropology.  He looks at the question from the perspective of one who rejects the claimed moral obligation. If there is a Creator and I reject his moral order, then, as Rob suggests, there are temporal consequences (failure to fully develop as a human being) and possibly eternal consequences (damnation).  And, this hold true whether I contest or reject the Creator's morality.  Whether or not there is a Creator, if I reject the moral order imposed by my society, there will be temporal consequences ranging from a cold stare to criminal sanction. 

I want to explore the other side of the equation.  On what basis does a society impose moral obligations on its denizens?  And, how does it arrive at that morality, especially on those issues backed by criminal sanction.   If a given society's public anthropology holds that human beings are all accidents (in other words the idea that our rights are self-evident, given to us by a Creator, finds no purchase in the halls of power), then what is that society's basis for saying that any individual is obligated by that society's moral norms, whether those norms are generated by a dictator or a majority?

Law and religion at St. John's

If you are in New York City, and are reading this blog, here is an event you don't want to miss:

On Friday, March 23, from 9:00-3:00, St. John's University School of Law is hosting a symposium (CLE available!) on "Law and Religion in the Public Square."  Noah Feldman is the keynote speaker, and presenters include Chris Eberle, Philip Hamburger, John McGreevy, Kent Greenawalt, Leslie Griffin, and Bernadette Myler.  (And me.)  Here is the blurb: 

OPEN QUESTIONS REMAIN concerning the constitutionality of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, the placement of the national motto “In God We Trust” on currency, the justification for exhibiting the Ten Commandments on state property, the placement of Christmas trees, crèches, nativities and menorahs in public places, the use of government funds for religious education and social services, the equal access of religious groups to public facilities and the ability of private groups to maintain religious autonomy while accessing public funds. How should these issues be resolved?

"My" panel is on "religion and group rights": 

Conventionally, the free exercise of religion is thought to protect individuals.  Recently, however, courts and commentators have asked anew whether our constitutional commitments also protect the rights of religious institutions or groups.  Courts have debated, for instance, the supervision of diocesan finances by a bankruptcy court or administrative agency, the requirement thatreligiously affiliated organizations pay for employees’ contraception and churches’ decisions about the hiring and firing of clergy. Arguing from history and doctrine, panel participants will consider the concept of church autonomy in American law.

God and the Anthropological Question

Michael S. asks whether a Christian anthropology provides a truer/richer account of our obligations to each other than does a secular dependency care theory founded on reciprocity.  If our objective is to articulate a moral framework, does it matter whether we are created for a purpose or whether we simply exist by happenstance and assign ourselves a purpose?  Either way, someone can defy that purpose and reject the claimed moral obligation.  The consequences will be more severe if I'm rejecting God's purpose -- whether because of eternal damnation or my failure to realize my own full flourishing -- but does it end the moral inquiry simply because God said it (through the act of creation) rather than John Rawls saying it?  God told Abraham to kill his son -- that command is begging for moral criticism, isn't it?  As H.L.A. Hart wrote:

The moral monster who thinks there is nothing morally wrong in torturing a child except that God has forbidden it, has a parallel in the moralist who will not treat the fact that the child will suffer agony as in itself a moral reason enough.

So does Christianity's advantage over secular theories of justice stem from its recognition of the anthropological implications of our status as created beings -- i.e., that the facts of our natural existence (gender difference, parent-child relationships, etc.) are not accidental, but reflect our creator's intentions?  If so, does the advantage disappear once someone decides to contest the morality of those intentions?

Accommodating Conscience

Notre Dame law prof Julian Velasco responds to my comments on conscience at the cash register:

Let me start by saying that I am a big believer in freedom of conscience.  However, to a large extent, one has to be willing to suffer the consequences of one's moral convictions.  The law should probably make reasonable accommodations, but private parties should not be required (or even expected) to do so.

Clearly, no law should require anyone to handle pork.  However, employers should not be required to make an accommodation for scruples, either.  Of course, employers may choose to make accommodations on their own -- and that's wonderful.  (However, reassignment seems a better course than forcing customers to scan their own groceries.  Just as the employee's scruples should not be forced upon the employer, neither should it be forced upon the customers.)  Similarly, anyone can start their own business and refuse to trade in pork; customers who want pork can go elsewhere.  But one who does not want to handle pork probably should not expect to be able to be a cashier at a grocery store.

I *think* my principle is generalizable.  Thus, the law should not force a pharmacy to carry abortifacients (or other products).  The pharmacy (owner) should be able to decide whether or not it chooses to carry those products.  The employee should take that into consideration when considering employment at a given pharmacy.  A pharmacy that wishes to sell abortifacients should not be required to make an accommodation for pro-lifers any more than a pharmacy that decides not to sell abortifacients should allow a pro-choicer to circumvent the pharmacy's policy.  (Of course, in both cases, the pharmacy should be free to make accommodations if it wishes to.)  And, of course, anyone that is unsatisfied with the local pharmacies' policies has the right to start a new business.

I can see why the law should make accommodations for conscience, but I don't see why private parties should be required to do so.

I agree that we should be more concerned with the state's intrusion on a person's conscience than a private actor's, but much of the law's work in maintaining space for conscience in the public sphere will have to enlist private actors in the effort.  Private employers hold too much power over the lived reality of conscience if they are not constrained by law; I'm not willing to entrust conscience completely to market forces.

Year Five Has Begun: Some Food for Thought

Christianity Today, March (Web-only), 2007

From Protesting Abortion Clinics to Protesting the War:
Evangelical Christian couple who founded Believers Against the War have a son in Iraq.

Suzanne Brownlow shivers on the Oregon highway overpass as a cutting wind whips her sign: "Honk to End the War." Her weekly demonstration is the latest turn in a fractious journey that has taken the evangelical Christian mother from protesting abortion clinics to protesting the war in Iraq.

"I feel like at least we are doing something," Suzanne Brownlow says, waving with her husband, Dave, and two youngest children just outside Portland.

No polling data conclusively demonstrate that opinion has shifted among conservative evangelicals. But some prominent national evangelical leaders say that debate about — and, in some cases, outright opposition to — the war is breaking out among Christian conservatives.

For those evangelicals, they say, frustration with Republicans' failure to overturn abortion rights has fueled their skepticism. Others decry the war's human toll and financial cost, and they're concerned about any use of torture.

"This war has challenged their confidence in the party," says Tony Campolo, an evangelical Baptist minister who lectures across the country on social issues.

"Add to that that they feel the Republicans have betrayed them on the abortion issue," says the author and frequent talk-show guest, "and you are beginning to see signs of a rebellion."

The National Association of Evangelicals, which says it represents 45,000 evangelical churches, recently endorsed an anti-torture statement saying the United States has crossed "boundaries of what is legally and morally permissible" in its treatment of detainees and war prisoners in the fight against terror.

The Brownlows voted for Bush in 2000 because of his more conservative views. But a month before the 2003 invasion, the Damascus, Ore., couple began campaigning against his Iraq policies. Dave Brownlow ran for Congress three times, twice on an anti-war ticket for the Constitution Party. Since November, the couple have lobbied lawmakers to bring the troops home.

Last month, they founded Believers Against the War to influence other evangelical Christians.

On a recent Saturday, a motorcyclist, sleek in black leather, spotted the Brownlows' banners, raised his gloved fist and flipped an obscene gesture. The Brownlows smiled, because many others were honking their support. Then a woman driver slowed and screamed, "Get over it."

Suzanne Brownlow's serenity finally broke.

"How can I get over it?" she said. "My son is in Iraq."

To be sure, many mainline Christian churches and several dozen prominent evangelicals opposed the war from the beginning. Others were ambivalent.

But since 2003, polls have shown that a higher rate of conservative Christians than other Americans favored military action. The National Association of Evangelicals, the same group that condemned torture tactics, even linked evangelical "prayer warriors" to the successful killing of Saddam Hussein's sons.

Daniel Heimbach, professor of Christian ethics at Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary in Wake Forest, N.C., supported the war and Bush's recent troop surge. Heimbach said that while pacifists believe war is never moral, and crusaders believe it is the ultimate means to bring about God's kingdom on Earth, the dominant view among some Christians for centuries has been that war can be justified under certain conditions.

Now the debate has shifted to whether the United States should stay. Heimbach says he is not convinced the situation is hopeless or that the cost of remaining is too high.

Daniel R. Lockwood, president of Multnomah Bible College and Biblical Seminary in Portland, Ore., says he has seen a "sea change" among his students, who are looking beyond traditional conservative issues such as abortion and homosexuality to the environment, children with HIV/AIDS and the poor.

"More and more, students are very interested in social justice and issues often associated with the middle and the left," Lockwood says, "and the war is a piece of that."

Before the war in Iraq, the Brownlows shared the concerns of the religious right.

Suzanne and Dave Brownlow met at a church singles group in Houston 26 years ago. As born-again Christians, they vowed their marriage, like their faith, would be politically active. He picketed Planned Parenthood clinics; she organized for the Concerned Women for America, eventually becoming the director of the organization's state chapter.

They had Jared, now 20; Desi, 19; Jace, 15; and Sierra, 12, and moved to Oregon in 1990 for Dave's job. They home-schooled their children, were foster parents for three medically fragile youths for Heal the Children and housed eight foreign-exchange students. They say those experiences "made the world smaller for them."

They campaigned on behalf of Republican candidates. In 2001, Suzanne Brownlow won the Concerned Women for America's National "Diligence" award.

But by 2002, troubled by the lack of progress on the anti-abortion front and the legality of the president's war powers, they joined the Constitution Party. Soon after the invasion, Dave Brownlow began writing articles opposing the war.

Meanwhile, Jared Brownlow — long fascinated by military histories, movies and photos of his grandfather, a World War II tail gunner — joined the Army.

The Brownlows say their eldest son has not objected to their anti-war efforts. He's serving in the Army near Baghdad.

Suzanne Brownlow says she had no choice. Increasingly overcome with worry, she has trouble eating and dreams of helicopters landing in her yard. Her husband starts every day clicking onto casualty Web sites. The couple keep two clocks in their living room, one for Oregon and one for Iraq.

Although many churchgoers are active against the war, the Brownlows say they still feel self-conscious sharing their views with their Christian friends, or even praying at their church for their son's platoon. People have told them that freedom isn't free or that they must support the troops.

"As if to say that by allowing our sons and daughters to languish in a vast Iraqi shooting gallery," Dave Brownlow says, "we are somehow supporting them."

"We really don't fit anywhere," Suzanne Brownlow says. "All our friends are pro-war and think we are heretics for talking against the president."

Parent-Friendly Campus Legislation

Feminists for Life College Outreach Program Inspires Legislation

Washington, D.C., March 19, 2007 __ Senators Elizabeth Dole, R-North Carolina, and Ben Nelson, D-Nebraska, introduced the Elizabeth Cady Stanton Pregnant and Parenting Student Services Act of 2007 today to help pregnant and parenting college students continue their education.

The bill is named for the famous suffragist, mother of the women’s movement and advocate for women’s education, and is modeled on a program Feminists for Life initiated on college campuses in 1997.

“This legislation supports women who wish to be both students and mothers,” said Sen. Nelson. “By fostering a parent-friendly environment in our nation’s universities, we can help these students who have made the decision to balance parenthood and education.”

“Pregnancy and child rearing can be overwhelming, particularly when coupled with the pressures of being a student,” said Sen. Dole. “Whether they are married or single, mothers or fathers, we need to do our part to support these students and provide them with options that allow them to be a parent and still graduate from college.”

The bipartisan Senate bill, if passed into law, would establish a pilot program to provide up to $50 million in grants to encourage institutions of higher education to establish and operate a pregnant and parenting student services office. The on-campus office would serve parenting students, prospective student parents who are pregnant or imminently anticipating an adoption, and students who are placing or have placed a child for adoption.

Legislation with the same name was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives by Representatives Marcy Kaptur, D-Ohio, and Sue Myrick, R-North Carolina, in February.

Dr. Kittay and the Anthropological Question

Again, thanks Lisa for an enriching conference.  The following account of Dr. Kittay's talk is taken from what I heard and remember.  Since both my hearing (and listening) and memory are notably fallible, it is possible that I have misunderstood or mischaracterized Dr. Kittay's positions and statements.  If so, I look forward to correction.  In her presentation, Dr. Eva Feder Kittay criticized Susan Stabile and Marie Failinger for suggesting that Christian feminism provided a richer account of woman than its secular counterpart.  She thought this statement divisive and suggested that sisters in a common cause should look to what unites, not what divides.  Substantively, Dr. Kittay argued that all dependent human beings (at least all born human beings - she didn't address abortion) were due care under a reciprocity theory of justice because all human beings are dependent at some point in their lives, particularly when they are young and old.  During the question and answer period, I asked Dr. Kittay upon what foundation was she building her argument that human beings have a dignity worthy of respect by others.  Specifically, I asked on what grounds is a perpetually dependent human being (a severely retarded individual, for example) due care as a matter of justice.  She answered by saying that the standard philosophical foundation for concluding that human beings are owed justice is the capacity to reason.  As I understood her, she rejects this as too narrow, concluding that it is our dependency (not our rationality) that binds us and creates certain obligations.  The perpetually dependent human is owed care because even though he or she may not be able to reciprocate, he or she is part of a great cycle of reciprocal care giving and care receiving by human beings generation after generation. 

Four comments.  First, I agree with Dr. Kittay that when we are working toward a specific goal (working for family leave legislation for instance), we should build as broad a coalition as possible, setting aside our differences.  Second, except for the narrow case just described, a much richer pluralism is born, IMHO, of each participant in the discussion bringing their whole self into the discussion.  Third, it seems to me that the anthropological question (and our responses to it) is vital to the conversation.  A key question is why?  Why is slavery wrong?  Why is abortion wrong?  Why was Hitler's project wrong?Why is it wrong to discard the perpetually dependent?  Some anthropoligical foundations from which these questions can be answered are sturdier than others.  Finally, it seems to me that Marie and Susan's Christian anthropology (I look forward to Marie and Susan teasing out the differences between a Lutheran and a Catholic anthropology) provides a richer and sturdier foundation for feminism than Dr. Kittay's secular dependency care theory.  No matter how reasonable it might seem, Dr. Kittay is building her dependency care feminist project from her own preference for how the world ought to be ordered.  She is not making a Truth claim about human persons and the world in which they live.  There is no grand "sez who" to use Leff's words, judging that her view of the perpetually dependent individuals is Right and that a position that perpetually dependent individuals, by reason of their lack of reasoning capacity, are not subjects of justice (see Ackerman, Social Justice in a Liberal State) is Wrong.  Susan and Marie, on the other hand, are making Truth claims about the human person.  These claims, which can be known to some extent through reason without the mediation of revelation, may or may not be true.  But, if they are true, they do, it seems to me, provide a richer account of dependency care theory.  In the end, I don't think it is a question of whether Susan and Marie have a richer account but whether they have a true account.  Because if it is true, then it is richer, isn't it? 

I hope Dr. Kittay will respond. And, to all of you, readers and contributors, am I correct that the exploration of the anthropological foundations here (as in other areas) is vitally important, especially in this time when our public anthropology is unstable and much contested?

Undocumented Immigrants and Families

As immigration raids rise, human toll decried

Arrests across US break up families

When Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents raided a meatpacking plant in Marshalltown, Iowa, on Dec. 16, arresting 99 workers who could not prove they were in the country legally, then-governor Tom Vilsack was livid.

Immigration officials "chose to pursue a solitary path that limited the operation's effectiveness, created undue hardship for many not at fault, and led to resentment and further mistrust of government," Vilsack wrote in a letter to Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff.

The ICE raid was part of the agency's largest-ever enforcement operation, hitting Swift & Co. slaughterhouses in six states and resulting in the arrests of 1,297 workers. As of March 1, 649 of those workers had been deported.

Like the March 6 raid on the Michael Bianco Inc. leather goods factory in New Bedford, in which more than 300 workers were arrested, the Swift operation left some children stranded for hours, and many others in the care of friends and relatives. ICE flew many detainees to an out-of-state federal detention facility before immigrants' advocates had a chance to speak with them about their children. Some detainees were not initially honest with ICE investigators about whether they had children, fearing they, too, would be taken into custody even though some of those children were US citizens.

And like the New Bedford raid, the Swift raids drew harsh criticism from the governor, who criticized ICE's limited cooperation with state officials, including its refusal to release information in a timely fashion on who was detained and where.

Immigration raids nationwide have increased in recent months. Scenes similar to those in New Bedford and Marshalltown have played out in cities like Worthington, Minn., and Stillmore, Ga., where a poultry plant was raided last Labor Day. In Santa Fe, 30 undocumented workers were arrested in a raid in February, and Mayor David Coss said he was outraged that "families are being torn apart, literally."

For the rest of the article.  Lisa, the conference was great!  Thank you!

Monday, March 19, 2007

More on Conscience at the Cash Register

Last week I noted the controversy over the Muslim cashiers at Target who refused to handle customers' pork purchases.  (They have since been reassigned by the company.)  I asserted that "it would be hard to discern an institutional mission that rises or falls on the requirement that cashiers handle all products."

Antonio Manetti responds:

It's actually not that hard. The act of refusing to touch pork products thus forcing the customer to scan the item herself or call another clerk to do so can be taken by the customer as annoying at best and offensive at worst implication being that contact with 'unclean' food makes one unclean). I wonder how a customer might feel when the checkout clerk effectively proclaims that repugnance to everyone within earshot.

Also, when I go to the store, I don't expect to be subjected to gratuitous moral judgments from checkout clerks. In my opinion, the desire to avoid needlessly annoying or offending customers is a legitimate part of the stores' 'institutional mission'.

I agree that a store could reasonably conclude that customer sentiment weighs in favor of not permitting the objecting Muslims to remain as cashiers.  But in my view, something more than that is required if we're serious about honoring conscience.  (Let's assume for the moment that there aren't other available positions in the company, so the choice is between accommodating the cashiers as cashiers or terminating them.)  When I argue that employers should be empowered to maintain their own moral identities, I contemplate particular moral claims being made by the employer.  I do not mean that an employer should be able to overcome the employee's own moral claims by constructing a moral identity defined only by the negation of the employee's claims.  In other words, if Target wants to define itself as the anti-vegetarianism store (just as some pharmacies have defined themselves in pro-life terms), then talking about institutional mission -- in the way I mean it -- seems appropriate when dealing with these objecting cashiers.  But if the employer's institutional identity consists only of a requirement that cashiers handle all products, that seems akin to identity-by-negation, rather than one grounded in any affirmative claim of moral truth.  There is, of course, a moral dimension to the claim "we value our customer's ability to make their own purchase decisions," but it is so sweeping as to preclude any product-related request for accommodation by the cashier.  I want a person's conscience to be taken seriously in the marketplace; I just want to make sure that institutions still have the ability to function as venues for the common articulation and pursuit of conscience.  I am skeptical that customer autonomy should be sufficient to serve as a categorical trump of contrary moral claims.

Nothing that I've said suggests that employers are helpless to take action if the number of cashiers objecting to certain products becomes so high that accommodation would cause an undue hardship to the employer.  Target is dealing with a relatively small number of objecting cashiers, a single product, and a large pool of non-objecting cashiers who could scan the product without significant disruption to the business.  If this becomes a bigger problem, the analysis could change.

I'm still thinking my way through all this, so I welcome other perspectives on these questions.

Restructuring the Workplace Symposium

I'm still trying to track down some of the speakers at last Friday's symposium here at UST School of Law on "Restructuring the Workplace to Accommodate Family Life" to make sure they finally got home through the mess of Friday's snow and ice storm out East.  (Especially surreal for me to be worrying about that from the Twin Cities this weekend, as I basked in the bright sunlight of an absolutely beautiful Saturday, watching my (Croation, Polish, German, Slovenian, Luxembourger) daughter dancing with her Irish dance troop in the St. Paul St. Patrick's Day Parade!)

But I did want to report briefly on the symposium itself which, if I do say so myself, turned out to be an extraordinary day, bringing together diverse and fresh perspectives on the topic from a collection of gifted scholars.  All I can offer in a post are some impressionist highlights.  The volume of published papers is going to be an incredible resource for anyone looking at this area.

The day began with a Keynote Address by philosopher Sr. Prudence Allen, St. John Vianney Theological Seminary in Denver, who drew on her background in Existential Personalism to offer reflections on laws affecting family life and workplace structures from three different perspectives -- the application of analogy & complementarity to order positive law to better reflect the reality of workplace and family lives, how the philosophy of the person and conscience might help heal ruptures between conscience and truth in the practice of law, and the application of the common good to the accommodation of the family in workplace structures.

This tour de force was followed by a panel on "Feminist Legal Theory:  Dialogue Across Faith and Philosophical Perspectives."  First, Marie Failinger of Hamline Law School suggested that Lutheran theology supports traditional feminism's turn toward contextual approaches to analyzing facts and applying laws, citing Luther's insight about the finite as the bearer of the infinite, filtered by the humility that ought to accompany our realization that our perceptions of reality are clouded by our sinful and limited powers of reason and will.  Marie also laid out some powerful arguments about how the Lutheran notion of work as participation with God in the co-creation of the world and of work as always relational can help explain distortions in the workplace that subordinate women, remind women of their responsibilities in public life and their responsibilities to other workers they themselves hire for domestic work, and serve as the basis for valuation of even the most mundane aspects of care work.  MOJ-er Susan Stabile then presented a  primer on Catholic feminist legal theory, beginning with a discussion of its theoretical underpinings in (1) an understanding of the human person as relational in two dimensions -- towards God and towards each other; (2) the centrality of the traditional family; (3) acceptance of sex complementarity; and (4) the Catholic concept of work as vocation.  She then applied these concepts to a Catholic legal theory analysis of issues relating to women in the workplace, contrasting them to traditional, secular feminist analyses, covering issues such as how different conceptions of "equality" play out in structuring pregancy benefits and mandatory contraception benefits, and ways in which Catholic theory offers stronger arguments for family-freindly workplace policies than traditional feminist theories.  Following these two presentations, philospher Eva Feder Kittay from SUNY at Stoneybrook commented from the perspective of a secular feminist philosopher.  She sketched out her secular philosophical justification for many of the same propositions laid out by Susan and Marie, based on a theory of justice that is grounded not in each human's equal capacity for independent reason, but rather in each human's shared experience of dependency at some stage(s) of life.  She also offered some critiques of the faith-based arguments, including a sharp critique of what she considered a overly narrow conception of a 'family'.  (Maybe Susan will have something more to say about that panel?)

[UPDATE:  Professor Kittay offers the following suggestion for a fuller explanation of her objection to Catholic feminist notion of family:

I make the critique in a more detailed way directed at the "new communitarians" in "A Feminist Public Ethic of Care Meets the New Communitarian Family Policy", Ethics, vol. 111, no. 3, April 2001 pp. 523-547. The article can just as well be directed at Catholic feminists who spoke at the conference.]   

Our second keynote address by Joan Williams, U.C. Hastings, then plunged us out of the theoretical into reality.  Focusing mostly on the current legal workplace, she first painted a rather bleak picture of the burgeoning hourly demands at most law firms, the decreasing numbers of women with children who are able (or willing) to keep pace with those hours, and the continued reluctance of the legal workplace to offer more flexible arrangements.  Then, she got slightly more encouraging by presenting the strong economic case for more flexible work arrangements (though, in questions after her talk, she admitted to pessimism about whether legal employers were willing to accept the economic arguments in the way some other industries were beginning to do).

The next panel considered policy prescriptions.  First, Gregory Acs, Economist from the Urban Institute, summarized recent empirical research on the situation of the working poor in the United States and the impact on children of workplace structures affecting their parents.  He also offered policy prescriptions, stressing the importance of parental leave during the first year of a child's life and some minimum flexibility to deal with family emergencies without loss of job.  (This is going to be a great resource once it's in print.)  Next, MOJ-er Michael Scaperlanda  spoke about current and proposed immigration policies, focusing primarily on their impact on families of undocumented workers.  He gave powerful examples of unrealistic waiting lists for family reunifications under current visa regimes, families torn apart in immigration raids, and the dilemmas facing undocumented immigrants wanting to get married in the United States.  Kirsten Davis of Arizona State U then spoke about the importance of the rhetoric of arguments for workplace restructuring.  She argued against using the term "accommodation" in describing desired reforms, demonstrating how interpretations of this term in other legal contexts, such as the ADA, might suggest limitations to what can be accomplished or what needs to be provided by employers.  She suggested use of "negotiation" or "facilitation of family life" as less loaded, and perhaps more empowered, terminology.

The last panel considered perspectives across generations and genders.  First, Allan Carlson of the Howard Center for Family, Religion and Society presented a fascinating historical survey of the rise and fall of the family wage in the United States.  He described the strong support of family wage by trade unions in the early 20th Century, leading to the widespread adoption of family wage structures by most Americans by the 50's and 60's, and then its ultimate demise in the 70s.  Some of his most fascinating data dealt with inverse correlations between widespread family wage structures and overall income inequality in the United States. (Again, this is a paper I'm most anxious to see in final printed form.)  Next, Michael Selmi of George Washington (currently visiting at Boston University) and Kathy Baker of Chicago-Kent Law School took fascinatingly different cuts at the sorts of data and trends that Joan Williams laid out in her keynote address.  Michael argued, among other things, that there was still significant amounts of discrimination against women going on the workplace, and that employers were unlikely to ever accept the "business case" for flexible work arrangements;  however, he argued, employers might be forced to change if they got enough demand from such change from employees, and argued for parents to keep up the pressure to do so.  Kathy ended the day with fascinating data about trends in unpaid domestic labor in familes.  On a positive note, data shows that all parents (including fathers) are spending more time with their children than they used to.   On the other hand, the imbalance between the total amount of time spent by mothers than fathers on total unpaid domestic work seems to persist.  Kathy struggled with the implications of this fact, as well as with the implications of data showing increasing numbers of mothers relatively wealthy, privileged families (the only ones who can afford to, given our country's relatively stingy child support policies) leaving the paid job market.

As usual in these conferences, the discussions in the question and answer sessions, the breaks between panels, during the receptions and dinners and drinks preceeding and after the sessions, were as insightful as the presentations.  But at least the presentations will be memorialized soon in what is sure to be an invaluable resource for those interested in these difficult issues.