Susan, picking up on your exchange with Sr. Margaret John on self-interest, folks might find food for thought on this in Dan Finn’s recent book, The Moral Ecology of Markets. I think it’s a terrific resource for all of us who are working with the economic implications of CST.
On page 56, Finn describes the distinction between psychological egoism (“all human action is inevitably egoistic, oriented toward the benefit of the actor . . . ‘Each of us is always seeking his own greatest good, whether this is conceived as pleasure, happiness, knowledge, power, self-realization…’”); and ethical egoism (the moral argument that “an individual’s one and only basic obligation is to promote for himself the greatest possible balance of good over evil.”). He then outlines a number of problems with psychological egoism, including the underlying tautology— “If every conceivable human action can be explained by self-interest, then self-interest explains nothing.” (57); the distortions entailed in a description of the world “that cannot distinguish saint from sinner, martyr from murderer, altruism from selfishness” (57); and the challenges that it poses for common understanding—most people have trouble absorbing that “technical economic notion of self-interest can include concerns for others.” (57). Finn concludes: “Leading a moral life is difficult and at various times requires the subordination of one’s interest to those of others.” (57)
Later he discusses two examples: first, presented with the choice of whether to buy dented cans of beans, leaving the good cans for other customers, he notes: “the self-interested thing to do is to buy undented cans, while the neighborly thing to do is to buy the dented cans.” (109). But in a context where customer complaints may generate systematic improvement in production or delivery, refusing to buy the dented might actually be a service to the common good (or at least efficiency): “Self interest need not result in harmful effects for others. It can … actually lead to a more careful husbandry of the goods of the Earth.” (111). In contrast, faced with the dilemma of whether to buy a cheaper rug made by child slave-labor, one may not have the same hope for systematic change. The difference between the two examples “is in the institutional framework within which these two chains of events occur.” (112). Thus it is futile to look for “a simple rule based on the intention of the actor to determine whether narrowly self-interested action is good or bad.” (113).
By way of probing the insights of Sr. Margaret John, here’s my question for Finn: Could this tangle all boil down to a natural law argument about teleological nature of human beings? Is the reason that most people have trouble absorbing a notion of self-interest that includes others because of a widespread philosophical foundation of individualism? If that is the case, is that a reason not to push the boundaries on this argument? If a more relational vision of the self is at the foundation of the analysis, might that shift a sense of when one’s interests are “subordinated”? Could a relational understanding of the self run parallel to how interest over time (long range interest) adds complexity to the analysis? Might it actually be more neighborly to refuse to buy dented cans, communicate one’s concern, and push for a systematic change in packing procedures? Is the bean example in tension with the list of concerns about psychological and ethics egoism? Might a more robust image of the relational self (eg, the self not essentially in tension with others) make the moral life less “difficult”?
Amy
