First of all, I wish to thank in great abundance my Mirror of Justice friends who have been contributing to the thread on Catholics and the upcoming election. I shall not speak about any party or any group’s efforts to capture the “Catholic vote.” But, it does appear that many Catholics in the United States find themselves in conflict over their faith and their role in public life. While some of us are trained in the law, we all have a role in its development. The principal objective of this posting is to identify and examine the relationship between Catholic faith and the duties of each Catholic in public life, as either office holder or citizen.
I contend here that there is nothing in the civil law and associated regulations to preclude the Catholic office holder or citizen from adhering to the teachings of the Church in the exercise of one’s respective public duties. Each Catholic retains the obligation to be faithful to the Church’s teachings if he or she is to be an effective, contributing Christian member of the commonwealth. This means that the Catholic who exercises a role in American democracy simultaneously participates in the exercise of discipleship by applying in this world the substance and content of communion with Jesus Christ and other disciples. I have addressed this subject matter in greater detail elsewhere. But I would like to offer a more concise presentation that could be of assistance to others as we approach the November election.
In the first place, we need to take stock of the fact that through our baptism and the exercise of the faith, we are disciples of Jesus Christ. This element of my discussion is rooted in the story of Cleopas and his friend—two disciples who, on their way to the village of Emmaus, encounter the resurrected Jesus. Something prevents them from recognizing Jesus until they dine together and Jesus, after having said the blessing, breaks bread with them and, in doing so, shares communion with them. When Jesus quickly disappears from their sight, they then recognize who he is, and they are energized with the breaking of the bread and communion with Jesus to continue his work mindful that the “repentance and forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed in his name to all the nations.” By being in communion with the Lord, they are restored to active and vibrant discipleship and respond to the call to serve in his name. Without the communion with Jesus, they seemed to have no direction in their lives but were “downcast.” They needed him to do the work they were called to do, and with him they were fortified to labor in his name. Through their communion with Jesus, they maintained right relation with God and with their neighbor. Being in communion with God, His Son, and the Church is essential to anyone’s discipleship regardless of whether one lived in the time of Jesus in Palestine or in the United States at the present time. We are fortified in the Lord calling us, “Come, follow me!” And, this is the challenge the Second Vatican Council placed to all faithful.
In a powerful voice, the Council challenged us to remember what Jesus taught: “As long as you did it for one of these least of my brethren, you did it for me.” The Church and its members have a duty to combat whatever is “opposed to life itself” by identifying murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia, willful self-destruction, or anything else which “violates the integrity of the human person.”
Catholics are citizens of two cities who are called to discharge civic responsibilities with the exercise of a Christian conscience inspired by the Gospel. Nevertheless, we are often reminded of the address given by Governor Mario Cuomo at Notre Dame University in September of 1984 entitled “Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor’s Perspective” in which he raised and addressed the question of the relationship of his Catholic faith and his politics—are they separate or related? For prudential and other reasons, the Governor counseled against imposing views based on Catholic teachings on others which these citizens find unacceptable. He spoke of the “American-Catholic tradition of political realism” in which the Church has avoided settling into a “moral fundamentalism” mandating “total acceptance of its views.” But that is not what the disciple is called to do. The disciple, as John Paul II judiciously explained, proposes to the community rather than imposes upon it. And one cannot propose unless one is willing to speak, even against the grain.
It is through reasoned discourse that the genuine contribution of the disciple can be made for the betterment and benefit of all rather than just some of humanity. It is the example of a way of life that is suitable for making the propositions consistent with God’s truth contained in the Church’s teachings. And, it is these teachings and the authority upon which they are based that serve as an antidote to the cynical and sinister in this world that God has given His disciples as one of our two cities.
Thus, we are reminded that while the harvest is plentiful, the laborers may be few. God needs laborers to follow His son, for the harvest is great, but the workers seem to be few in number. As Pope John Paul II kept reiterating in his post-Synodal apostolic exhortation, Christfideles Laici, “you go into my vineyard, too.” The rest is up to us: do we accept the challenging invitation or not? Instilled with the mission of discipleship, we are called to be God’s conscious instruments in a world often plagued with exaggerated autonomy that ignores both the neighbor and God and sees only the isolated self. By remaining in contact with the Church and her teachings, we become a light to the world illuminating the minds and spirit of those who might otherwise be overwhelmed by the darkness of evil. In this regard, we need to take account of what John Paul II stated in his last World Day of Peace message issued in 2005, by recalling the words of St. Paul, “do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good.” This is a noteworthy appeal to the disciple who labors in the fields of law and politics.
When considering particular challenging topics that today’s disciple must confront, we turn to St. Paul who reminds us about the duties of citizenship and how discipleship and citizenship are designed to be complementary rather than separate and independent of one another. But Paul also cautions that the civil authority also must be mindful of its duties and properly exercise its power for it is supposed to be an instrument of God as well. Citizens as disciples and the political, social, and economic structures in which they live and work are all responsible for being the keepers of our brothers and sisters whoever they may be.
Civic duty—be it of the office holder or citizen—is compatible with, not contrary to, discipleship. The two are not mutually exclusive but, for the Catholic, inextricably related. The disciple must be as wise as a serpent and as innocent as a dove and recognize that some will reject the role of the disciple-citizen. For when Church authorities and citizens speak out on issues from the Catholic persona, they might be challenged, albeit on dubious grounds, that this “preaching” is prohibited by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. But, do these same critics, especially when they have access to mass media outlets that welcome their strongly secularist or other views, exercise similar restraint? It often appears that the result is dependent on who is doing the preaching and whose Gospel is being preached. Whatsoever you do to the least of your brothers and sisters, that which you do unto me. It is a well-formed Christian conscience [see my earlier posting HERE] that richly contributes to the public debate by adding alternatives that reflect genuine pluralism and diversity and is not subjugated by the monolithic view of a culture that is antagonistic to the religious viewpoint—not by “imposing” but by “proposing.”
If one assumes the title of disciple, does not one also assume certain risks that go along with the vocation? In answering this question, we need only recall the names of all those disciples in the Roman canon who were martyred for their beliefs and the exercise of their conscience. There are indeed risks of proclaiming the truth, the Good News that some treat as unwelcome, but there is the moral obligation not to give into bullying or pressure, subtle or otherwise. Sound prudential judgment may dictate when this obligation is exercised in a public fashion, but it does not mandate avoidance of the obligation in perpetuity.
Disciples of today, be they the electors or the holders of office, shoulder duties in the name of God and His Son. There are occasions when these disciples need not fear the decisions they take in the public square so long as those decisions sufficiently coincide with the views of the secular components of society; however, there may be occasions when the situation is otherwise. It is clear that if the disciple, be that person office holder or exerciser of the franchise, may not be able to eliminate that which is evil entirely. That is understandable, but the disciple has the continuing obligation to ensure that the evil in this world that is of human manufacture at least be reduced if it cannot be eliminated at present.
Those who consider themselves good citizens and good disciples seem to be neither when it comes to some of today’s difficult issues such as euthanasia, abortion, same-sex marriage, or certain kinds of stem cell research requiring the creation and inevitable destruction of human embryos. They may assert: “I cannot legislate morality” or “I cannot impose my religious views on others who do not share my faith” as Governor Cuomo opined. It may seem odd that when the matter under debate involves some aspects of civil rights or criminal legislation addressing, for example, sexual assault or welfare reform or increasing medical benefits for the underinsured or uninsured or the protection of civil rights, the reservations toward the religious perspective tend to be silent. But why do they surface when the matter involves the conscious destruction of human life—the most precious right of all, for without it, all others wither? When these events take place and chill the words of deeds of the disciple in contemporary life, we find ourselves on the decline and must ask: why we did not do something to stop the spread of evil.
Being silent with regard to the vital issues confronting the human family is not always golden. The exercise of silence can be prudent and sometimes offers a useful delay to consider the best manner of addressing a grave problem. But, when all is said and done, silence is rarely a solution to difficult problems that must ultimately be addressed. It can be, in some of today’s political debate, a form of weakness and fearfulness or cooperation (material or formal) in perpetrating and continuing evil. That is why the disciple of today must be willing to embrace the exhortation of John Paul II—“Be not afraid!”
The fact that a source of the citizen’s truth may be the teachings of the Church does not disqualify the Church from teaching that which may be used by the citizen nor the citizen from using that which the Church teaches regarding the moral issues affecting law and politics. The Church does not interfere with the State’s proper function, but it does retain and must exercise its proper role to provide instruction on moral truth that can be appropriated and used by the citizen in his or her participation in the exercise of self-determination of the democratic process.
It would be problematic to insist that the citizen must observe an unnatural dichotomy in his or her life insulating the spiritual and moral from the public and the political. In this context the Johannine text of Jesus farewell: “I am the vine, you are the branches. Those who abide in me and I in them bear much fruit...” Those who would insist on defeating this participation by the disciple-citizen would deny legitimate and authentic pluralism and would impose a regime of intolerant secularism.
As I suggested earlier, we are citizens of two cities. Each of us is one person who holds and exercises various duties through this dual citizenship—we are the branches who remain tied to Christ, but we also exist and act in the temporal world. This fact should not deter us from embracing what Thomas More said when he declared his allegiance to both sovereigns, but to God first. Let us not be afraid to declare our allegiance likewise regardless of what the Sirens of the present age beckon us to do.
RJA sj
Wednesday, June 25, 2008
Today, I should like to bring together two recent threads of discussion that have been appearing over the last few days, i.e., Senator Obama’s Catholic Advisory Group and today’s Supreme Court decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana. I shall begin with the second first.
In his dissent, Justice Alito in the Kennedy case begins his dissent by stating:
The Court today holds that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of raping a child. This is so, according to the Court, no matter how young the child, no matter how many times the child is raped, no matter how many children the perpetrator rapes, no matter how sadistic the crime, no matter how much physical or psychological trauma is inflicted, and no matter how heinous the perpetrator’s prior criminal record may be. The Court provides two reasons for this sweeping conclusion: First, the Court claims to have identified “a national consensus” that the death penalty is never acceptable for the rape of a child; second, the Court concludes, based on its “independent judgment,” that imposing the death penalty for child rape is inconsistent with “‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” (reference omitted). Because neither of these justifications is sound, I respectfully dissent.
I have taken the small liberty of altering slightly Justice Alito’s opening paragraph of his dissenting opinion and substituted references to “rape” and “child rape” or “the raping of a child” with “abortion” or a word or phrase that addresses abortion. The text now reads:
The Court today holds that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of abortion. This is so, according to the Court, no matter how young the child, no matter how many times to abort the child are attempted, no matter how many children the perpetrator aborts, no matter how sadistic the crime, no matter how much physical or psychological trauma is inflicted, and no matter how heinous the perpetrator’s prior criminal record may be. The Court provides two reasons for this sweeping conclusion: First, the Court claims to have identified “a national consensus” that the death penalty is never acceptable for abortion; second, the Court concludes, based on its “independent judgment,” that imposing the death penalty for abortion is inconsistent with “‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” (reference omitted). Because neither of these justifications is sound, I respectfully dissent.
I do not know if Justice Alito would approve of my taking some small liberty with the opening paragraph of his dissent. But as law teachers, I think we often exercise the license of professorial prerogative to make some point relevant to the law, the teaching of it, and the learning of it. As I read Kennedy v. Louisiana, the five-justice majority strives to make the distinction between the taking of life, i.e., murder, and the raping of a child which, in spite of the enormous damage, does not conclude with the taking of the physical life. The other takings of aspects of life, while acknowledged by the majority, just don’t seem to count for the imposition of the death penalty. All right, the majority of the Court has spoken.
But let us consider Justice Alito’s remarks more carefully. By my substituting abortion for rape, do we not come to the same thing—the taking of a physical life of another that may be protected by the law, regardless of the penalty? I think so. Justice Alito is making an important point regarding the gravity of child rape. But, with his language, we can see that any taking of innocent human life is the most grievous of offenses. So, why might murder be a crime that could deserve the death penalty but abortion is a constitutional “right”? Something doesn’t add up here, and that is why I think Justice Alito and three other members of the Court are on to something.
This brings me to my first point which is treated in the second place, Senator Obama’s Catholic Advisory Group. I wonder if the distinguished members of this panel, some who hold important public office and some who hold prestigious positions in the community that include academic posts of distinction, will advocate that the Senator reconsider his magnanimous support of abortion “rights”? Surely, as faithful Catholics, they, the members of this advisory group, will recognize that the most fundamental of human rights is the right to live so that in turn one has the ability to take advantage of all that rest that life has to offer. In spite of the complexity of issues and the difficulties of dealing with them, as Amy implies, if the members of the Catholic Advisory Group do not understand this fundamental point, then I fear their ability to help the common good, let alone CST or CLT, will be lost. Perhaps, like Justice Alito, they, too, should consider dissenting not from the candidate but from the views he holds so dearly but so wrongly on this critical issue not only of this election but of this age.
RJA sj
Tuesday, June 24, 2008
Thanks to Amy and Rob for beginning an exchange on “discrimination.”
Catholic Legal Theory could begin to address the question of discrimination that there is a certain understanding of equality about the human person and the incumbent dignity of the human person that emerges from the fact that everyone possesses the divine image of God—each person, each human being, each member of the human family has an equality before God and for humans to alter this or to attempt to alter this is wrong (it is unlawful discrimination).
But in the human world, things are a bit different due to some other considerations as St. Paul reminds us when he points out that we receive different spiritual gifts (1 Corinthians 12:1-11): “there are a variety of gifts, but the same Spirit; and, there are varieties of service, but the same Lord…”
When we use the gift of right reason, we can see how this plays out in our lives. By way of illustrating my point, we may all enjoy sports to some degree, but we are not all the equal of great athletes. We may all enjoy music, but we are not all the equal of great composers and performers. We may all appreciate great literature, but we are not all great authors, novelists, or poets. And so it goes. Here we see discrimination that is part of our lives and that is inseparable from our human condition and existence. This discrimination is not wrong. It helps to distinguish our individualities as St. Paul suggests.
I do not find the criterion of “demeaning” as has been described to be determinative in assessing whether human actions in the treatment of others constitute discrimination that is antithetical to the dignity of each member of the human family and, therefore, wrong. This criterion may be useful in some circumstances of thinking about discrimination, but its helpfulness diminishes and disappears when a subjective standard is employed to assess whether the “demeaning” that takes place is inappropriate discrimination. If Michael Jordan and I are playing a game of pickup basketball, I think I will be trounced. I may experience humiliation and sense that I have been demeaned, but I have not been the subject of improper discrimination. By objective standards, I have not been demeaned; I have not been the target of inappropriate discrimination. In the realm of the law, the famous Casey “mystery of life” passage that I have critiqued on several occasions in the past illustrates the fundamental flaw of the subjective determination when the isolated, autonomous individual becomes the standard by which human conduct is judged.
When it comes to CLT developing some standards or criteria for assessing what is constitutive of discrimination, both lawful and unlawful, I submit that it is the tool of objectivity that enables those involved with the enterprise to transcend individual caprice which is vital for the success of the assessment. What is most helpful to begin the process of developing standards and criteria is a proper, i.e., objective, understanding of human nature that takes stock of the physical and metaphysical dimensions of the human person and the dignity that is the due of each.
RJA sj
I response to Amy’s question raised by Greg’s posting, the NARAL website provides a menu [HERE] where you find their explanation of how they rate public officials and the ranking each has “earned” by the NARAL organization. In a nutshell, the more you reflect NARAL views, the higher the rating; the less you reflect NARAL views, the lower the rating. Let us not forget that NARAL is an aggressive partisan in the abortion debate and battles surrounding “choice.”
RJA sj
Monday, June 16, 2008
I thank the two Michaels (Perry and Scaperlanda) once again for bringing us to an urgent discussion on same-sex issues that continue to embroil our nation and our world. I also thank Rob and Tom for their contributions on this critical matter.
In his response to Michael S., Michael P. relies on the works of Dr. and Sister Margaret Farley, RSM to reinforce his position—in particular her most recent book “Just Love”. As some MOJ readers and contributors may recall, I have offered a few thoughts on Dr. Farley’s work in the past. [HERE and HERE] Since December of last year when I last commented on Dr. Farley, I have read additional works she has authored that predate “Just Love” including her work “Personal Commitments.” After reading these additional works she has penned, I submit that her writings reflect more the views of the Metropolitan Community Church and the Unitarian Universalist Society on matters dealing with same-sex issues than they do the teachings of the Catholic Church. In fairness to her, I acknowledge her own self-disclosures about her disagreements with the Church’s teachings. But it is also clear that she departs from many other Church teachings when she addresses questions that include abortion, contraception, and bio-technology issues.
I am in no position to do anything but to pray for her and those whom she has influenced over the years. I also pray that her misleading sway will not be accepted as Catholic teachings by the faithful as the debates on same-sex marriage/unions and on other questions on which she has written intensify.
RJA sj
Tuesday, June 10, 2008
I am grateful for the thoughts other contributors have made regarding marriage, relationships, and benefits. Today I shall respond to Rob’s post made earlier today [HERE]. I am grateful to him for presenting his interesting views.
So, let me begin with his reference to a “real-world” example of social reformation proposed by the organization BeyondMarriage. I have read their statement; moreover, I have studied the list of endorsers of the statement to which Rob gave us the link. I think it vital to our discussion that we take stock of the underlying current that has motivated the BeyondMarriage organization to craft the statement advocating the end of marriage. As they state in their own words,
In April 2006 a diverse group of nearly twenty LGBT and queer activists—some organizers, some scholars and educators, some funders, some writers and cultural workers—came together to discuss marriage and family politics as they exist in the United States today. We met over the course of two days for lively conversations in which there was often spirited disagreement. However, we do all stand in agreement with the statement entitled “Beyond Same Sex Marriage”. We offer this statement as a way to challenge ourselves and our allies working across race, class, gender and issue lines to frame and broaden community dialogues, to shape alternative policy solutions and to inform organizing strategies around marriage politics to include the broadest definitions of relationship and family.
The members of the BeyondMarriage organization assuredly have a stake in the outcome of the debate on same-sex marriage. By doing away with marriage, or by recognizing relationships as substitutes for marriage, the hurdles that stand in the way of the “equality” argument for SSM will be eliminated. The membership in this organization identifies with “LGBT” activism and their reasons for proposing an alternative to marriage likely emerge from the realization that same-sex relationships cannot be marriages. I do not see among its ranks representatives or activists for those relationships comprised of elderly siblings who care for one another in their old age, or of single or widowed children who care for elderly parents or grandparents or other elderly blood relatives who have no one to care for them. Before I recommend endorsement of some group advocating a political cause that will dramatically alter civil society in a fashion that contravenes Catholic principles, I believe that it is vital to understand what this group is about, and they have given me a good understanding of what they want, and implicit in this is why they want to go BeyondMarriage. Marriage is an institution that cannot be duplicated in the relationships they value most.
This brings me to a second point raised by Rob in his opposition to state-registered “friendships.” (I wonder, by the way, if the state would have some role in the dissolution of these friendships that the state would register, but I digress.) In his disagreement with the proposals for blunting advocacy for SSM with the state-registered friendship substitute, Rob states that, “Marriage should be privileged because of its channeling function: it calls us to a commitment… that is greater than our own cost-benefit maximizing episodic calculation.” I agree that marriage should be privileged but not for the reasons Rob tenders. Marriage as the world has known it (and surely as the United States has known it) is the foundation of the basic unit of society. It is the coming together in a special relationship between a man and a woman that ensures the posterity of our human race. It is a commitment, indeed, but a very particular commitment that is identified and fortified by the inexorable complementarity of man and woman. In this context, “marriage” between same-sex couples is impossible. The relationship of same-sex couples can be fueled by a sense of commitment, but it is a commitment of a very different sort that can never be the equal of marriage, which out of necessity requires the complementarity of the sexes.
This brings me to a third point that anticipates Rob’s potential objection to what I have just said. He mentions, “For those who oppose SSM, the challenge will be to articulate (in secularly accessible terms) a distinction between opposition to SSM and opposition to interracial marriage. The categorically procreative/biologically unitive argument is unlikely to do the trick.” I must disagree. First of all, reliance on Loving v. Virginia and analogizing opposition to SSM to the past opposition to interracial marriage does not withstand rational—secular or otherwise—scrutiny. The prohibition on interracial marriage was based on a superficial characteristic—skin pigmentation that had no bearing on the complementarity of the male and female. This prohibition paralleled the Nuremberg laws that prevented Jews from marrying Aryans because of another superficial feature. The anti-miscegenation statute in Loving and the racial purity laws of National Socialism could not deny the nature of the biology of the human person. The opposition to SSM is not the same as the opposition to interracial marriage. Advocates for SSM rely on the parallel but they astutely avoid making the critical distinction because it will not serve their objectives. The prohibition in Loving and the Nuremberg laws ignored human biology and the purposes for which man and woman were made; the prohibition to SSM does not.
I must respectfully disagree with Rob on the next point. The procreative/biological argument does do the “trick.” Moreover, it is not for the opponents to SSM to articulate the distinction because they have. The burden, in fact, is on the advocates for SSM. They shy from the scientific explanation that, “in secularly accessible terms”, provides the justification for opposition based on scientific fact. That is why the argument based on “commitment” becomes an attractive substitute, but it must and will fail. Its failure is inextricably linked to the reality that there are many relationships that have commitments—but commitments can be ignored. And when they are, what happens to the commitment so vital to the advocacy for SSM?
This brings me to a final point for today which relates to Rob’s contention that “The status quo will not hold.” He then offers a robust explanation why he thinks this is the case. But I must test his justification by presenting it word for word and merely delete the specific references to “gay,” “lesbian,” “homosexual,” and “homosexuality” and replace them with substitutes. When I do, the reason for maintaining the status quo in opposition to SSM should be all the more clear:
“_____ and _____ are visible, and they (and their relationships) are rapidly gaining acceptance as more Americans encounter them in their everyday circles. The shift in attitudes on _______ from my parents’ generation to mine has been remarkable, but I would predict it will be nothing compared to the shift in attitudes from my generation to the next. From what I have seen thus far, moral opposition to ______ relationships is just not conceivable to 98% of the law students I’ve taught.”
Allow me to make a Loving substitution that preserves Rob’s language but not his point:
“Blacks and whites are visible, and they (and their relationships) are rapidly gaining acceptance as more Americans encounter them in their everyday circles. The shift in attitudes on interracial relationships from my parents’ generation to mine has been remarkable, but I would predict it will be nothing compared to the shift in attitudes from my generation to the next. From what I have seen thus far, moral opposition to interracial relationships is just not conceivable to 98% of the law students I’ve taught.”
Same-sex marriage is not an option, but that does not mean the path our nation and our world should take is not evident. It is, and it is to stay the course. It may be that the status quo will not hold, but its failure to do so will not be because of any flaw in its justifying rationale that is based on objective reason. It will be due to the imposition of pure positivism and its recurrent ally, totalitarianism.
RJA sj
Thursday, June 5, 2008
I thank Rick and Richard and, indirectly, Cathy for their respective contributions on the issues that are emerging from the York University student government’s plan to ban pro-life, specifically the critique-of-abortion, speech.
I would like to respond to several of the ideas presented so far.
First of all, many of us who contribute to the Mirror of Justice have taught courses in which the legal issues surrounding abortion are addressed. I suspect the discourse has been robust. Moreover, many of these discussions and debates have occurred in university law schools where the host institution holds itself out to be Catholic. As one who has thought about and embraced freely the Church’s teachings on this particular subject, I do not see the problem of discussing and debating the matter with those who hold different views in the context of the pursuit of truth. This brings me to my second point.
A distinction needs to be made between the situation in which the academic institution allows free and vigorous debate in the pursuit of truth and where the institution is asked to support, financially and otherwise, a voice that conflicts with the first principles of its founding. To cut to the chase, should a Catholic institution be asked to permit an honest debate on issues that raise questions about the Church’s teachings? Yes. Then, should a Catholic institution be required to support a perspective that conflicts with the Church’s teachings? I answer no. And I do so in the context of reflecting on the following situation: should a traditionally Black college or university be expected to have fora in which the institution of slavery, views about race, and events that were the catalyst of the civil rights movement be discussed? Of course. Then, should such an institution be required to support organizations whose views sympathize with racial supremacists and conflict with the foundation of these institutions? No. This brings me to a third point that is raised by Cathy’s important commentary.
Assuming as she does that we are talking about a private but secular institution, are we further to assume that every person on this campus believes in the view that he or she cannot discuss what is constitutive of human autonomy so that questions about physical autonomy, contraception, abortion, fetal life, human embryology, etc. cannot be discussed and debated fully? While the student government at York has decided to ban student organizations that are opposed to abortion, I must ask what is there in the foundation of York University and the first principles that established its foundation that would necessitate this quarantine of views that do not endorse abortion? Was York founded on so-called “pro-choice” first principles? I don’t think so. It is the view of Ms. Gilary Massa, vice-president external of the York Federation of Students, who has unilaterally asserted that student clubs will be free to discuss abortion in student space, as long as they do it “within a pro-choice realm,” and that all clubs will be investigated to ensure compliance. For those interested in free speech and debate, her approach has more than a chilling effect on the exchange of some ideas and perspectives that are found in all free societies. I think her policy constitutes a classic prior restraint that is impossible to justify. This brings me to the fourth point I wish to raise.
York University has a law faculty in which I am certain the current cases of the day are explored in depth and from the perspectives of all the litigants. Is it presumed by the vice-president external of the York Federation of Students that the examination of cases dealing with abortion, be they from Canadian or other jurisdictions, may proceed only if they do so “within a pro-choice realm”? If her presumption provides the normative framework for teaching, it seems to me that many aspects of these cases cannot be addressed because they would run afoul of her mandate. I note, by the way, that York’s mission statement asserts that the institution exists to preserve, pursue, and disseminate knowledge; it exists to test the boundaries and structures of knowledge; it exists to cultivate the critical intellect; it is open to the world; it explores global concerns; and, it is committed to academic freedom and social justice. Knowing that these are noble but ambiguous elements of a university mission statement, it still appears to me that Ms. Massa’s policy will stop the discussion and debate that is crucial to the raison d’être of York University as defined by this general mission statement. And this brings me to a fifth point.
That a liberal institution must sacrifice objective debate and examination of issues in order to preserve the autonomy of women, or for that matter, anyone else would be a counterintuitive and a contradiction. In order to preserve the identity secular-humanist, would an institution have to silence views that offer a critique of abortion? If so, they would not be capable of providing an environment that stimulates critical thinking or, for that matter, any kind of thinking. This brings me to my sixth point raised by Rick’s discussion of his representation of the Orthodox Jewish students at Yale who did not have a choice to live in alternative residences.
It is clear that Yale had only one model of student life: it did not offer, contrary to its assertion, diversity and multi-cultural habitats. Those who did not accept the one life-style student residence did not have a choice and were, like Ms. Massa’s policy, required to live in a realm where their life-style and alternative culture were forbidden. The reality of the Yale policy pays lip service to diversity and multi-culturalism while, in fact, eradicates them. The life-style and culture of the Ortodox Jews were not only not tolerated, they were expunged from the campus as long as the “one-model-fits-all” was the implementation of diversity, etc. And this brings me to my seventh point.
There are occasions where “liberal neutrality” is practiced so that it is not only not conducive to “wide-ranging tolerance,” it is not tolerant of anything that departs from its mandate for uniformity of practice and belief. To assume without question that “liberal neutrality” is, in fact, both liberal and neutral is not a prudent course to pursue. Taking into consideration my first point, I just wonder if the freedom to discuss abortion that existed in my classroom would be tolerated in Ms. Massa’s classroom should she one day be a university professor? Would my views be tolerated, or would they be silenced? Judging from what the student government at York University has concluded, I believe I have my answer.
RJA sj
