Universities and Moral Neutrality revisited

I thank Rick and Richard and, indirectly, Cathy for their respective contributions on the issues that are emerging from the York University student government’s plan to ban pro-life, specifically the critique-of-abortion, speech.

I would like to respond to several of the ideas presented so far.

First of all, many of us who contribute to the Mirror of Justice have taught courses in which the legal issues surrounding abortion are addressed. I suspect the discourse has been robust. Moreover, many of these discussions and debates have occurred in university law schools where the host institution holds itself out to be Catholic. As one who has thought about and embraced freely the Church’s teachings on this particular subject, I do not see the problem of discussing and debating the matter with those who hold different views in the context of the pursuit of truth. This brings me to my second point.

A distinction needs to be made between the situation in which the academic institution allows free and vigorous debate in the pursuit of truth and where the institution is asked to support, financially and otherwise, a voice that conflicts with the first principles of its founding. To cut to the chase, should a Catholic institution be asked to permit an honest debate on issues that raise questions about the Church’s teachings? Yes. Then, should a Catholic institution be required to support a perspective that conflicts with the Church’s teachings? I answer no. And I do so in the context of reflecting on the following situation: should a traditionally Black college or university be expected to have fora in which the institution of slavery, views about race, and events that were the catalyst of the civil rights movement be discussed? Of course. Then, should such an institution be required to support organizations whose views sympathize with racial supremacists and conflict with the foundation of these institutions? No. This brings me to a third point that is raised by Cathy’s important commentary.

Assuming as she does that we are talking about a private but secular institution, are we further to assume that every person on this campus believes in the view that he or she cannot discuss what is constitutive of human autonomy so that questions about physical autonomy, contraception, abortion, fetal life, human embryology, etc. cannot be discussed and debated fully? While the student government at York has decided to ban student organizations that are opposed to abortion, I must ask what is there in the foundation of York University and the first principles that established its foundation that would necessitate this quarantine of views that do not endorse abortion? Was York founded on so-called “pro-choice” first principles? I don’t think so. It is the view of Ms. Gilary Massa, vice-president external of the York Federation of Students, who has unilaterally asserted that student clubs will be free to discuss abortion in student space, as long as they do it “within a pro-choice realm,” and that all clubs will be investigated to ensure compliance. For those interested in free speech and debate, her approach has more than a chilling effect on the exchange of some ideas and perspectives that are found in all free societies. I think her policy constitutes a classic prior restraint that is impossible to justify. This brings me to the fourth point I wish to raise.

York University has a law faculty in which I am certain the current cases of the day are explored in depth and from the perspectives of all the litigants. Is it presumed by the vice-president external of the York Federation of Students that the examination of cases dealing with abortion, be they from Canadian or other jurisdictions, may proceed only if they do so “within a pro-choice realm”? If her presumption provides the normative framework for teaching, it seems to me that many aspects of these cases cannot be addressed because they would run afoul of her mandate. I note, by the way, that York’s mission statement asserts that the institution exists to preserve, pursue, and disseminate knowledge; it exists to test the boundaries and structures of knowledge; it exists to cultivate the critical intellect; it is open to the world; it explores global concerns; and, it is committed to academic freedom and social justice. Knowing that these are noble but ambiguous elements of a university mission statement, it still appears to me that Ms. Massa’s policy will stop the discussion and debate that is crucial to the raison d’être of York University as defined by this general mission statement. And this brings me to a fifth point.

That a liberal institution must sacrifice objective debate and examination of issues in order to preserve the autonomy of women, or for that matter, anyone else would be a counterintuitive and a contradiction. In order to preserve the identity secular-humanist, would an institution have to silence views that offer a critique of abortion? If so, they would not be capable of providing an environment that stimulates critical thinking or, for that matter, any kind of thinking. This brings me to my sixth point raised by Rick’s discussion of his representation of the Orthodox Jewish students at Yale who did not have a choice to live in alternative residences.

It is clear that Yale had only one model of student life: it did not offer, contrary to its assertion, diversity and multi-cultural habitats. Those who did not accept the one life-style student residence did not have a choice and were, like Ms. Massa’s policy, required to live in a realm where their life-style and alternative culture were forbidden. The reality of the Yale policy pays lip service to diversity and multi-culturalism while, in fact, eradicates them. The life-style and culture of the Ortodox Jews were not only not tolerated, they were expunged from the campus as long as the “one-model-fits-all” was the implementation of diversity, etc. And this brings me to my seventh point.

There are occasions where “liberal neutrality” is practiced so that it is not only not conducive to “wide-ranging tolerance,” it is not tolerant of anything that departs from its mandate for uniformity of practice and belief. To assume without question that “liberal neutrality” is, in fact, both liberal and neutral is not a prudent course to pursue. Taking into consideration my first point, I just wonder if the freedom to discuss abortion that existed in my classroom would be tolerated in Ms. Massa’s classroom should she one day be a university professor? Would my views be tolerated, or would they be silenced? Judging from what the student government at York University has concluded, I believe I have my answer.

RJA sj