Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Radical equality, mentally handicapped people, and organ transplants

Thanks to Rick for calling attention to the story of the mentally handicapped child who may be disfavored for a kidney transplant simply because of her handicap.  And bravo to Rick for identifying the principle that would be violated by discrimination against the child on the basis of that handicap:  the radical equality of human beings.  Bravo, too, to my friend Art Caplan, the distinguished bioethicist at the University of Pennsylvania, for his wise and precise moral analysis of the subject:  http://vitals.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/01/17/10175611-bioethicist-transplant-denial-for-mentally-disabled-child-raises-questions.  Art is not generally regarded as a friend of the pro-life cause, but pro-lifers will be cheering him on this one.  His bottom line:  "There are reasons why anyone with an intellectual or physical disability might not be considered a good candidate for a transplant.  But those reasons, to be ethical, have to be linked to the chance of making the transplant succeed. Otherwise they are not reasons, they are only biases."  Amen, brother.

If there is a principle that can truly be said to be at the heart of the Christian understanding morality, surely it is the radical equality of every member of the human family as a creature fashioned in the very image and likeness of God.  Each of us, regardless of race, sex, ethnicity, and the like, but also irrespective of age, size, stage of development, and intellectual or physical ability, is the bearer of profound, inherent, and equal dignity.  No one is inherently superior or inferior in fundamental worth to anyone else. One needn't be a Christian (or a religious believer of any stripe) to grasp that great and central truth about our human condition--think of the witness given to it by the great pro-life journalist and social critic Nat Hentoff, for example; but if one does happen to be a Christian, it should be impossible not to understand and affirm it.

Transplant denial for disabled child

The Anchoress has the story (and links).  And, USA Today reports that advocates for people with special needs have taken up the cause.

MOJ readers and bloggers are, I am confident, deeply committed to radical human equality, and so would reject any claim that the life of a disabled child is "worth" less than that of anyone else.  That said, we owe it to ourselves to ask (I'm thinking of my teacher Guido Calabresi's book, Tragic Choices), what considerations are we allowed to take into account, and what mechanisms are we permitted use -- given our commitment to human equality -- for allocating much-needed but (presumably) scarce goods like organ transplants?  We could say, of course, that there's a line, and people get in it and wait; when someone's turn comes up, that's it, and the needed organ is theirs.  But, we don't say that (at least, I don't think we do).  If not, why not, and should we? 

UPDATE:  Prof. Charles Camosy, whose work has been discussed several times here at MOJ, is quoted in this news story about the case.

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

Herbert W. Vaughan: A Tribute

On November 28, 2011, Herbert W. "Wiley" Vaughan, a truly eminent man of the law, died at the age of 91. This past Saturday, I had the honor of giving a eulogy at his memorial service:

Tribute to Herbert W. Vaughan

Robert P. George

St. Andrew’s Episcopal Church

Wellesley, Massachusetts

January 14, 2011

If I were to begin this tribute to our beloved friend, and my revered mentor in law and life, by listing Wiley’s important contributions and accomplishments as a lawyer, a philanthropist, a conservationist, and an engaged citizen, I would not even have completed the list when my five minutes elapsed.  So instead of doing that, I will focus my reflection on what mattered most to Wiley himself, and what made his numerous and remarkable achievements possible, namely, the excellence of his character.

Now I would be the last person to claim that worldly success is necessarily evidence of good character, or that the lack of worldly accomplishments reveals a want of integrity or other moral virtues.  You can take it on the authority of the Bible (though such weighty authority is scarcely needed for so evident a truth) that all-too-often the wicked prosper and the virtuous must rest content with virtue as its own reward.  But in Wiley’s case, a virtuous man prospered, and his prospering was the fruit not only of intelligence, determination, and a willingness to work hard to achieve goals, but also of honesty, steadfastness, integrity, public spiritedness, and other moral virtues.  The transparent excellence of Wiley’s character won him trust and admiration.  His purity of heart helped to ferment the raw must of intelligence into the precious wine of wisdom.  People turned to Wiley, in every field of his interest and endeavor, because they knew him to be a supremely honorable man as well as an impressively able one.  Not only was he was a person whose counsel was worth having and heeding, he was someone who could be completely trusted and relied upon.

The lovely tribute to Wiley that was posted on the Wilmer Hale website after his death recalls the days of the great commercial real estate boom that transformed the Boston skyline, and notes Wiley’s central role in it.  “During that time,” the author writes, “Herbert W. Vaughan was the go-to lawyer for developers and lenders involved in Boston’s most complex and prominent projects because of his reputation for wisdom and sound judgment, meticulous drafting, tenacious negotiating and consummate deal-making skills.”  Of course, that is 100% true.  But let’s pause for a second over that reference to Wiley’s “consummate deal making skills.”  Someone reading those words who didn’t know Wiley personally might conjure up an image of a wheeler-dealer type, a Steve Wynn or a Donald Trump.  Of course, Wiley’s personality and manner was nothing like that.  He was, indeed, tenacious in protecting and advancing the interests of his clients, but what made him a great negotiator was that everybody around the table knew that he was impeccably fair-minded and honest.  This is not to suggest that the wheeler-dealer types are necessarily dishonest; I’m sure many are not.  It is only to say that Wiley’s self-evident integrity—a feature of his personality that no one who was with him for more than an hour could miss—made it clear to those with whom, as well as those for whom, he was negotiating that he was not a manipulator or a deception artist. He was a straight shooter.  If he made a representation or commitment, you could take it to the bank.  He was as good as his word and his word was always his bond.  And in this case the virtue of honesty, though, to be sure, its own reward, brought other rewards as well—massive professional and financial success, redounding to him and to the firm he loved and served so devotedly—and, ultimately, to the benefit of the educational, conservationist, medical, and other charitable enterprises he supported.

Anyone who knew Wiley, whether though his work at Hale & Dorr or his leadership in education, conservation, and the like, knew that he deeply, and passionately believed in high standards.  He held himself to the highest standards in his personal as well as his professional life, and he demanded high standards from those with whom he worked and of the enterprises he supported.  He did not hold financial success and worldly recognition in disdain; but, in the true spirit of professionalism, he regarded them as secondary in importance to excellence.  For Wiley, excellence is what mattered above all.  And he encouraged, promoted, supported, and honored it wherever he could find it—whether it was at Wilmer Hale, at Harvard Law School or Princeton University, at the Roxbury Latin School, the Trustees of Reservations, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, the Abstract Club, the American Enterprise Institute, the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy, the American Council of Trustees and Alumni, the Johnson and Chesterton Club.

No one here today is unaware that Wiley was disappointed by, and deeply concerned about, the erosion of ethical, professional, and intellectual standards in so many sectors of our culture today.  But he was never a scold.  To be sure, he would not hesitate to express an opinion where appropriate, even if the opinion were a critical or negative one; he was not shy about stating his views; but Wiley’s principal method of promoting excellence and high standards of thought and conduct was by exemplifying them in his own life.  In this respect, though in his humility he would scoff at the comparison, he resembled no one so much as the father of our country, George Washington.  And like President Washington, the excellence of character and his devotion to high standards caused others, even among the great, to treat him as the bearer of a special dignity and as someone who commanded an unusually high degree of respect.  It took a long time, even after Wiley and I had become close friends, for me to bring myself finally to address him as “Wiley,” rather than “Mr. Vaughan.”  I suspect I am not alone among us gathered here in having had that experience.

Now, about that friendship:  It began as inauspiciously as possible.  I was a summer associate, working for the guy, who was working for the guy, who was working for Wiley.  I had a graduate school application in to Oxford, and was at the same time angling for an offer of full-time employment at Hale & Dorr.  Since the fate of my Oxford application was uncertain, getting the law firm offer was pretty important to me—especially since I really enjoyed working there and palling around with young superstar lawyers like Bill Lee, Jim Quarles, and John Burgess.  Well, in connection with a Back Bay real estate development matter we were handling, I was instructed to prepare a memo on riparian rights to be directed to Mr. Vaughan.  (As it happens, the law of riparian rights was one of Wiley’s own areas of interest and expertise.)  I knew I had to hit this one out of the park, so I worked diligently and produced an analysis that I was rather pleased with.  I sent it upstairs, and in due course had a phone call from Wiley’s secretary asking me to come to his office to discuss the issues in the memo with Mr. Vaughan.  Now I had not at that point met him.  But I had viewed him from afar, as it were, and observed the awe in which he was held, even by the senior partners in the firm.  I was eager to make a good impression—I wanted that job offer.  So up to Olympus I went.  I will never forget the first words spoken to me by this great and formidable figure who would become my dear friend.  Those words, seared into my memory, were, verbatim, “Mr. George, please note the spelling of my last name.”  To his evident consternation, I had deprived Wiley of the second “a” in “Vaughan.”  I was horrified and traumatized. I don’t think I really heard another word he said, at least I don’t recall another word.  When I got back to my apartment that evening, I called across town to the girl who a couple of years later would become my bride, and said, “I had better get in to Oxford, because there is no way I’m getting an offer at Hale and Dorr.”

But despite my faux pas, an offer came; and when I declined it to pursue a doctorate at Oxford and an academic career, Wiley called me to his office again—this time to say that he was sorry that I had declined the firm’s offer, but that he was glad to know I was going to Oxford.  It was a place that he and his beloved wife Ann had visited, and for which he had great respect.  He knew it to be a place that retained high standards of academic excellence.  A couple of years later, Wiley called me in Oxford to say that he was taking a sabbatical from the firm and wondered whether he could obtain some sort of special student status at Oxford.  When I approached Harvey McGregor, the Warden of New College, about it, and when he learned who Wiley was, he invited him to become a Visiting Senior Fellow of the College.  He and dear Ann joined us in Oxford for a wonderful term, and from that point forward—for twenty-seven years—a week did not pass without the two of us being in touch with each other.

Although we were both conservative by conviction, he was conservative by temperament as well, and I am not.  He tended to an almost Calvinistic pessimism about human nature and human affairs; I am an inveterate optimist (though I prefer to characterize myself as filled with hope).  He was reserved in his manner—in a becomingly old Bostonian way.  I am, um, how shall I put it?  A bit outgoing.  These differences of personality, coupled with the great distance in years between us, made us rather an odd pair of friends, but we grew ever closer.  He advised, guided, and supported me at every stage of my career, and my friends and family became his friends and family.  He and Ann became like a third set of grandparents to my children.  In 2000, he helped me to found the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton, and it gratified me immensely that he took so much pride and pleasure in its success.  As centers and institutes devoted to constitutional law and political thought modeled on the Madison Program sprang up around the country he was delighted.  True to form, he would, however, express a concern:  These programs must never, he said, be permitted to degenerate into partisanship and what he called pamphleteering.  They must be centers of true scholarship—dedicated to the very highest intellectual standards.

Wiley remains, and will remain, with us in spirit and memory.  We who were privileged to be his friends will, I have no doubt, continue to be inspired, as we were inspired when he dwelt among us, by the example of his life.  Let us lead our own lives with the integrity of which his life was a model, and devote ourselves and our institutions to intellectual, professional, and moral excellence.  In that way, we will honor, in the way he would have wished, the great man whose life we gather today to celebrate.

"Justice Without Foundations"

Robert Kraynak, in The New Atlantis, makes a point (HT:  First Things) with which I'm sympathetic that I have tried to make myself, in (too) many MOJ posts:

What is so strange about our age is that demands for respecting human rights and human dignity are increasing even as the foundations for those demands are disappearing. In particular, beliefs in man as a creature made in the image of God, or an animal with a rational soul, are being replaced by a scientific materialism that undermines what is noble and special about man, and by doctrines of relativism that deny the objective morality required to undergird human dignity. How do we account for the widening gap between metaphysics and morals today? How do we explain “justice without foundations” — a virtue that seems to exist like a table without legs, suspended in mid-air? What is holding up the central moral beliefs of our times?

Inside Higher Ed.: "Battle over Birth Control"

A story about the HHS mandate, the religious-freedom objections that have been raised, and the two pending lawsuits about it, is here.

The President's Religious Freedom Day proclamation . . .

. . . is here.  In his proclamation, the President "call[s] on all Americans to commemorate this day with events and activities that teach us about this critical foundation of our Nation's liberty, and show us how we can protect it for future generations at home and around the world."  I like to imagine that he hand delivered a special copy to those responsible for the government's brief in Hosanna-Tabor.  (I kid, I kid!  Well done, Mr. President.)

Great news out of Indiana

A trial court has rejected the predictable-and-expected constitutional challenge to Indiana's groundbreaking new school-choice law:

. . . Marion Superior Court Judge Michael Keele said the School Choice Scholarship program doesn’t violate the state constitution because the state isn’t directly funding parochial schools. Instead, it gives scholarship vouchers to parents, who can choose where to use them. That was essentially the argument made by the program’s supporters. . . .

Monday, January 16, 2012

Martin Luther King Jr.'s theology of action

My current project looks to draw insights from Martin Luther King Jr.'s theological claims by which to better critique the presumptions underlying the predominant narrative of the modern legal profession.  The core of that insight flows from King's belief in the inescapably social nature of the human person. 

The accessibility of King’s anthropological claim is magnified by the fact that King did not require agreement “all the way down” in order to join in the struggle to see the moral implications of the anthropological claim lived out.  King worked out those implications within a particular worldview, and the theological and philosophical sources of King’s worldview are not as widely accessible as the resulting claims themselves.  This does not make the sources marginal to King, for his moral claims could not have been formed in a vacuum, apart from those sources.  But King did not ask his listeners to embrace all of his sources (though many did); he asked listeners to embrace the moral claims themselves.  Whether or not someone in the 1960s would have shared King’s admiration for Walter Rauschenbusch’s interpretation of the Old Testament prophets, for example, they could have understood, appreciated, and (in most cases) affirmed King’s resulting exhortation to resist Sheriff Bull Connor’s violent suppression of peaceful protests in Birmingham.  In this regard, King’s moral claims were embodied in action. 

To illustrate Christians’ tendency to pay only lip service to justice, he told a story about visiting an imaginary city where no one wore shoes even though it was cold and snowy.  He asks a local resident why no one wore them:

“But what is the matter?  Don’t you believe in shoes?”

“Believe in shoes, my friend!  I should say we do.  That is the first article of our creed, shoes.  They are indispensable to the well-being of humanity.”

“Well, then, why don’t you wear them?” said I, bewildered.

“Ah,” said he, “that is just it.  Why don’t we?”

After I checked in the hotel I met a gentleman who wanted to show me around the city . . . [and pointed to a huge brick structure]  “You see that?” said he.  “That is one of our outstanding shoe manufacturing establishments!”

“A what?” I asked in amazement.  “You mean you make shoes there?”

“Well, not exactly,” said he, “we talk about making shoes there, and believe me, we have got one of the most brilliant young fellows you have ever heard.  He talks more thrillingly and convincingly every week on the subject of shoes. . . . Just yesterday he moved the people profoundly with his exposition of the necessity of shoe wearing.  Many broke down and wept.  It was really wonderful!”

“But why don’t you wear them?” said I, insistently.

 “Ah,” said he, “that is just it.  Why don’t we?”

In tracing King’s intellectual legacy, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that his was a theology of action.  He was not interested primarily in theology as a theoretical inquiry or systematic explication.  King’s passion was a rigorous exploration of theology as applied.  History’s narrative did not call for his cognitive assent; it called for his active participation.  In most situations, King’s moral worldview was discernible primarily through the courses of conduct he embarked on directly or recommended to his audience; he did not spend much time in his ministry debating the fine points of philosophical or theological theory.  King cared less about how a person arrived at her commitment to justice as long as they arrived at it somehow.  Because action follows from commitment, the path of commitment matters greatly to the actor herself, but King never espoused a particular path as a litmus test for participating in the struggle for justice.  The protest march photos of King locked arm in arm with leaders from various religious and political traditions bear witness to this fact. 

By the same token, lawyers are not hired to opine on prevailing currents in academic thought; if their worldview is going to matter, it has to matter in the world of concrete action items.  For example, the mammoth (and now defunct) energy futures trading company, Enron, focused relentlessly on share price – to the exclusion of any more fulsome measure of corporate well-being and accountability.  This narrow conception of self-interest stands in tension with a variety of moral truth claims and traditions.  From whatever perspective Enron’s lawyers would have approached the problem, though, it was important for them to flag for management the concern that the company was neglecting its broader responsibility to constituents.  The lawyer’s moral framework is both more efficacious and more accessible to the extent that it expresses itself in the world of action.  King is a powerful model on that front. 

Friday, January 13, 2012

Marc's question about the judge

The discussion sparked by Marc's question about a judge who on moral grounds declines to perform same-sex "marriages" is interesting and instructive. I gather from it that those who support redefining marriage to include same-sex partnerships are now prepared to state publicly that, once marriage is redefined, those Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, Eastern Orthodox Christians, Latter-Day Saints, Orthodox Jews, Muslims, and others who cannot, in conscience, participate in ceremonies to unite partners in homosexual relationships should be excluded from certain offices and opportunities, including judgeships.  They no longer claim, if they ever did, that redefining marriage will not affect the lives, liberties, and opportunities of those of their fellow citizens who reject, on religious and moral grounds, their understanding of marriage and sexual morality.

I further gather, then, that everyone would consider it fair game for this fact to be shared with the citizens of North Carolina, Minnesota, and other states that are considering whether to enshrine in their state constitutions, as many states already have done, the conjugal conception of marriage as the union of husband and wife.  So, for example, an ad would be regarded as completely truthful if it said:

Do not believe anyone who tells you that the redefinition of marriage is purely a libertarian issue that will have no impact on those who hold traditional beliefs about marriage and sexual morality.  Many supporters of same-sex marriage themselves now admit that redefining marriage as they propose would in some cases affect the lives and limit the liberties and opportunities of those Christians, Jews, Muslims and others who reject same-sex sexual partnerships on moral and religious grounds. For example, they say that a Christian, Jew, or Muslim (or anyone else) who cannot in conscience perform a same-sex marriage should not be eligible to serve as a judge, or, if such a person does serve as a judge, he or she should not be permitted to officiate at marriages at all if he or she will not officiate at same-sex ceremonies.  In fact, if you believe what the Catholic Church, Evangelical Christianity, Eastern Orthodoxy, the Mormon faith, Orthodox Judaism, and Islam all teach about same-sex sexual relations, those who want to redefine marriage regard you as a bigot.  They think that your belief in marriage as uniquely the union of husband and wife is equivalent to opposing interracial marriages. If they have their way, and marriage is redefined, you and those who share your views will be treated the way we treat racists. We don't put such people in jail for holding or expressing their opinions, but there are certain offices from which we exclude them and certain opportunities we deny them.  Are you a devout Catholic, for example, who would like to be a judge?  Sorry. Your belief in your Church's teaching makes you unfit to serve. "No Catholics need apply."  That's something worth keeping in mind when you go to the polls on November 6th.

An Augustinian Cardinal

An important, but, I think, sometimes neglected aspect of the mission at many Catholic universities is fostering an appreciation for the wider accomplishments of Catholic intellectual life and of the sponsoring religious order. There is special reason for those of us at Augustinian institutions such as Villanova to celebrate because among the new cardinals announced by Pope Benedict XVI last week is Father Prosper Grech, OSA, the noted Maltese biblical scholar, co-founder of the Augustinianum in Rome, and the first Augustinian friar in over a century to be made a cardinal. (And the Jesuits can celebrate the elevation of Father Karl Josef Becker, SJ.)