Over the past several months, a good deal of public discussion has appeared in various media sources, including web logs, about the perceived surplus of lawyers, the present cost of legal education, and the declining applicant pools of would-be law students who are reassessing the economics of investing large sums of money on legal education. I would think that most of the contributors to the Mirror of Justice have heard and participated in discussions about these topics formally and informally at our respective institutions.
I, for one, do not view any form of higher education as a market-driven economy. I often respond negatively when education is passed off as the equivalent of some product or merchandise in which the purveyor, i.e., the educational institution, needs to find its “market” in order to be successful. I realize that there are important economic elements of education in general and of higher education, including legal education, in particular. But I think it unwise to make important decisions about education as if it were a market only seeking to survive, especially in difficult economic times.
I also realize that many educational institutions, including law schools, like to portray themselves a filling some kind of niche in the world of higher education. As a member of a religious order that founded over several dozen institutions of higher learning in the United States, over half of them with law schools, I often hear my confreres in the order and my lay colleagues assert that “our” schools have the niche of meeting the needs of “social justice,” and it is “social justice” that is the raison d’être of and for these law schools. If this line of reasoning and justification is to be followed, then it is “social justice” which enables these institutions to attract students and faculty to join their ranks. I find a similar justification offered by other institutions that were founded by other religious orders or dioceses and choose to use the moniker “Catholic”.
But is “social justice” really the element that makes Catholic legal education distinctive and attractive to future students and faculty? What is “social justice”—what constitutes it? While I am at it, are there law schools which are for “social injustice”? Frankly, I find the term “social justice” being susceptible to many different, often conflicting definitions and thus realize it difficult to justify the distinctiveness of a law school that identifies itself as Catholic by relying on this nebulous term. Moreover, I have seen definitions of “social justice” that would include practices or beliefs which are antithetical to the Church’s teachings, e.g., abortion, same-sex marriage, euthanasia, some kinds of bio-medical experimentation. No, I don’t think “social justice” is the real element that makes a law school one that can call itself distinctively Catholic.
If there is, in fact, a declining interest in attending law school these days, is there something that can make a law school Catholic in fact knowing that it must also prepare students to become good practitioners of what is supposed to be a noble profession?
Indeed there is. Of course it would be found in an institution that is not ashamed of Catholic teachings, many of which have a direct or indirect bearing on the law. As laws and legal education deal with many of the same issues—e.g., labor-management issues, regulation of economic markets, the use of force, the role of sovereignty in the international order, just compensation in wages and in reparations (damages), criminal matters, health care regulation, etc.—why should a law school that relies on the modifier “Catholic” not be motivated to allow these great teachings to inspire the direction in which its curriculum is formed and taught?
Or is the temptation really to be just like everyone else? If this is the case, then there really is nothing that makes a Catholic law school really distinctive. And if there is nothing distinctive about it in regards to the substantive content of its curriculum and its outlook, then is there any reason to think it will fare better than other law schools given the current climate of the decreasing interest in obtaining a legal education?
RJA sj
Joe Knippenberg notes evangelicals' support for (MoJer) Rober George's conclusions regarding marriage, but their discomfort with how he gets there. Albert Mohler writes:
[A]t the end of the day, I am not very hopeful that a society hell bent on moral revolution is going to be held in check by our arguments by the moral law, the natural law. I’m thankful, however, that Robert P. George is making those arguments. I’m thankful that he’s making them better than just about anyone else is making them. And as an evangelical, we have every reason to use natural law arguments, we just don’t believe that in the end they’re going to be enough. That’s where we have to come back with the final issue always being the gospel.
Knippenberg asks, "how much of a difference is there in the end between the natural law of someone like Robert George and the reliance on Gospel and grace of someone like Albert Mohler?" I don't want to speak for Robby, and I'm leery of venturing into theological waters that are over my head, but I'm pretty sure that he would not reject "reliance on Gospel and grace," though he might be more optimistic about reason's capacity to function as a sign of God's grace, even among those who have not embraced the Gospel.
The Journal of Catholic Legal Studies has just published the proceedings of a conference, Laïcité in Comparative Perspective, organized by our Center for Law and Religion (under the able directorship of Mark Movsesian) and held in Paris last year. Our keynote speaker was Doug Laycock, who gave an artful comparative talk. The conference was very useful in no small measure because of the presence of French and Spanish contributors.
Those who are interested can find the proceedings here.
Thanks to Rick for flagging Michael Walzer's criticism of the West's military intervention in Libya. I agree with Walzer's concerns, but I wonder if there is a way to ground the case against the intervention in terms sounding directly in the Church's just war doctrine. For me at least, it was relatively easy to explain my opposition to the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq: there was no showing that a preemptive war was necessitated by "imminent" grave harm to the U.S., and the war's rationale (at least as stated by President Bush) seemed to place a much greater value on American lives than on Iraqi lives. I also oppose the Obama administration's actions in Libya, but I have a hard time placing "incoherence" within just war doctrine. Here's para. 2309 of the Catechism:
The strict conditions for legitimate defense by military force require rigorous consideration. The gravity of such a decision makes it subject to rigorous conditions of moral legitimacy. At one and the same time:
- the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;
- all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;
- there must be serious prospects of success;
- the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power of modem means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition.
These are the traditional elements enumerated in what is called the "just war" doctrine.
The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good.
If the aim of the intervention is humanitarian, doesn't it fail the "serious prospects for success" prong by merely extending the conflict? Does just war doctrine speak to this conflict in other ways, or are these factors largely superfluous to a serious moral evaluation of the intervention?
A heavy topic, no doubt, and Cardinal Burke discusses it, here. A taste:
In my presentation tonight, I want to reflect with you on the crisis of Christian culture in the West and our call to build anew a strong Catholic culture, in fidelity to our vocation to give witness to Christ and, therefore, to be martyrs for the faith. First, I will set the context of the living of our Christian vocation in the present time, as presented to us by Pope Benedict XVI who urges us to study again, in particular, the moral teaching of His saintly predecessor, the Venerable, soon to be Blessed, Pope John Paul II. I will, then, present briefly the teaching of Pope John Paul II on holiness of life as the program of the new evangelization. Drawing upon the teaching of both Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI, I will give particular attention to the witness to the truth regarding human sexuality, as fundamental to holiness of life, and to the question of conscience as the irreplaceable and secure guide in the pursuit of holiness of life. The final part of my presentation is a reflection on witness as martyrdom and the various forms which it takes. . . .
I came across that, to me, strange sounding and discomfiting statement, from Meyer v. Grant, a 1988 decision, while reading the Ninth Circuit's various opinions denying rehearing en banc in United States v. Alvarez, a case in which the panel ruled that the Stolen Valor Act, which criminalizes knowing lies about whether one has received military honors, violates the freedom of speech. The opinions are here. (Thanks to George Wright for kindly calling the case to my attention).
I have more knowledge about the Religion Clauses than the Free Speech Clause, but I am slowly trying to learn. Still, I cannot imagine that anyone would say that the Religion Clauses are "value-free provisions," and I can't recall that sort of statement ever being made by any court (can you, good readers?). Questions for speech mavens: is it really true that the Speech Clause is value-free? If so, in what way? As a matter of the substance of the speech only, or more than just that?
UPDATE: I chased down Meyer v. Grant, and it looks like the Court cited with approval the "value-free" language, but the phrase itself was drawn from the 10th Circuit opinion. Thanks again to Prof. Wright.
