More on "licensing parents"

A few days ago, I posted this, about a new-ish book by Michael T. McFall called "Licensing Families":

In Licensing Parents, Michael McFall argues that political structures, economics, education, racism, and sexism are secondary in importance to the inequality caused by families, and that the family plays the primary role in a child's acquisition of a sense of justice. He demonstrates that examination of the family is necessary in political philosophy and that informal structures (families) and considerations (character formation) must be taken seriously. McFall advocates a threshold that should be accepted by all political philosophers: children should not be severely abused or neglected because child maltreatment often causes deep and irreparable individual and societal harm. The implications of this threshold are revolutionary, but this is not recognized fully because no philosophical book has systematically considered the ethical or political ramifications of child maltreatment. By exposing a tension between the rights of children and adults, McFall reveals pervasive ageism; parental rights usually trump children's rights, and this is often justified because children are not fully autonomous. Yet parental rights should not always trump children's rights. Ethics and political philosophy are not only about rights, but also about duties - especially when considering potential parents who are unable or unwilling to provide minimally decent nurturance. While contemporary political philosophy focuses on adult rights, McFall examines systems whereby the interests and rights of children and parents are better balanced. This entails exploring when parental rights are defeasible and defending the ethics of licensing parents, whereby some people are precluded from rearing children. He argues that, if a sense of justice is largely developed in childhood, parents directly influence the character of future generations of adults in political society. A completely stable and well-ordered society needs stable and psychologically healthy citizens in addition to just laws, and McFall demonstrates how parental love and healthy families can help achieve this.

This sounds like a book that moves from some premises that are clearly correct -- e.g., "parents influence the character of future generations of adults" -- and moves to some conclusions and proposals that might be less attractive.  But, of course, I have not read it.  Others?

For my own thoughts on some of the matters that (apparently) this book covers, check out this paper.

The book's author wrote to me, and gave me permission to post what he wrote:

Thank you for posting this, Rick. If I may, as the author of the text in question, I would like to address a few things. First, you are correct. Most people accept the premises. And most also accept the reasoning. Yet many reject the conclusions and proposals (some of which are indeed not attractive). I enjoy problems where people accept the premises and logic but not the conclusions that follow, and this is one of those messy problems. Several of the posts touch nicely upon major moorings of the argument. Dave nicely sets up the argument by analogy to adoption, an analogy I believe is given insufficient attention by society. There is something enticing about ensuring that children will likely be raised in a minimally decent environment. And I think Andrew is appropriately concerned about categorical rights to rear children *simply* from sexual intercourse. Here I follow Locke, “So little power does the bare act of begetting give a Man over his Issue, if all his Care ends there, and this be all the Title he hath to the Name and Authority if a Father.” Likewise, I agree and put forth, like Locke, a theory of conditional or defeasible parental rights. I suppose this isn’t too radical, as most people accept the conditionality of parenting insofar as they accept that children may be removed from parents when severely maltreated. This links with Dave’s first point, which seeks, I believe, something more robust than rights unattached to anything else. I agree. The thing that rights should be attached to is something that our society has largely lost track of – duties. Again, Locke stresses this link nicely, and James Kent perhaps says it best: “The rights of parents result from their duties.” I’m enjoying the debate between Rick and Andrew about the role of the state in this matter, and it is tricky how to balance family/state in this issue. Perhaps one way to approach the matter, which you might both agree to, is that so long as basic duties to children are met by parents, then parents can fulfill their duties in a multitude of different ways, especially in a pluralistic society. However, if parents do not meet their basic duties, then the state can ensure that such duties are met and direct things accordingly. It’s refreshing to see the rights and welfare of (1) children, (2) adults, and (3) the state [and society] addressed in this conversation. Far too often only one or two of these is seriously considered. I might add, though not discussed in the book for several reasons, it is also important to consider a fourth party – God. I note this because Locke, for example, believes that the duty that parents have to ensure children are raised well is a duty to God, not a direct duty to children. While I believe that parents do have a duty to God in this matter, it seems that parents also have direct duties to children themselves. Lastly, I understand Joel’s concern about the book not taking sin seriously. But, for what it’s worth, I believe that the book does; it doesn’t pretend to remove sin – it doesn’t even pretend that it is possible to entirely eliminate child maltreatment, even if all the policies proposed are adopted. To address this concern, I dedicated the last chapter to worries as such, especially concerns that the proposed licensing parents proposal is utopian/dystopian. Thank you.

A few quick thoughts:  First, Mr. McCall and I would disagree, I suspect, about whether certain conclusions (including some that, I gather, he proposes) in fact "follow" from the premises we both embrace.  Next, if McCall's argument is that parents have not only (non-absolute) rights (against the state) to direct the formation of their children, but also duties to exercise well, in the best interests (richly understood) of their children, those rights, then I suspect we don't really disagree.  But, it seems to me, that a book called "licensing families" (and, again, I have not yet read the book) is probably making a stronger, more state-centered claim.