... this one--Cathy Kaveny--well known to many MOJers, has just published something of interest to MOJers, namely, the following op-ed. (Cathy was a student in a course I co-taught with Robin Lovin at the University of Chicago Divinity School back in my Chicago days. Cathy then headed off to Yale, where she received her JD and PhD, and then to a clerkship with John Noonan, who, despite his critique of the magisterial position on contraception, Robby probably wouldn't want to trade.) Cathy is the John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law and Professor of Theology at the
University of Notre Dame, where she studies the relationship of law, religion, and
morality.
The Washington Post
December 1, 2009
Clashes
of conscience
Should American lawmakers refuse to give government funding to those who
object to the current moral consensus on controversial issues, or should they be
generous in making allowances for conscience?
In recent weeks the U.S. Catholic bishops have been on both sides of this
question, as they have dealt with the thorny issues of abortion, on the one
hand, and gay rights on the other. Nationally, they don't want health care
reform dollars to subsidize abortion, and in the District of Columbia, they
don't want to lose public funding for Catholic Charities because they
conscientiously object to providing equal benefits to gay couples.
Ironically, abortion and discrimination against gays with respect to
employment benefits have roughly the same moral status in American life. Both
practices are legal, but widely disapproved. Many people, nationally or locally,
don't want tax dollars to go to organizations that practice or promote them. At
the same time, significant - although often different - minorities think they
have a moral right to seek or provide an abortion, or to treat heterosexual
couples more favorably than homosexual couples.
The Catholic bishops have opposed any health reform package which would allow
tax dollars to be used to support a policy a health plan that covers abortion.
It does not matter how small the government subsidy is compared to the personal
contribution, or how low a percent of the premium cost actually goes to abortion
coverage. It is not merely the money, it is the principle at stake. In response
to the claims of Planned Parenthood and NOW that the conscience of the
policyholder ought to be respected, the bishops reply, "we are not prohibiting
people from getting abortions entirely with their own money. But we, the
majority of Americans, do not want our tax dollars used to support practices or
organizations that contravene our basic values." If push comes to shove, some
bishops would let health care reform go and leave millions without necessary
medical treatment, rather than subsidize abortion, however tenuously.
But in the enforcement of anti-discrimination law in Washington, D.C gay
rights activists are in exactly the same position as the bishops are with
respect to abortion--and the Catholic bishops are making the pro-choice
argument, so to speak. Gay rights activists maintain that no public funds
whatsoever ought to go to an organization that practices or promotes
discrimination against gay people. In response to the claim of Catholic
Charities that the conscience of the service provider ought to be respected, the
activists argue, "we are not prohibiting people from establishing programs that
discriminate against gay people using only their own money. But we, the majority
of citizens in Washington, D.C., do not want our tax dollars used to support
practices or organizations that contravene our basic values." If push comes to
shove, some gay rights activists would let Catholic Charities go and leave
thousands in Washington, D.C. homeless and hungry, rather than subsidize
discrimination against same sex couples, however indirectly.
Very different groups in our pluralist democracy try to "enforce morality" --
or at least to encourage it -- by using public funds as an incentive. In this
respect, the bishops on abortion are no different from the gay rights activists
on employment discrimination. But when they are in the minority, these groups
all want space to act according to their consciences without sacrificing
participation in public programs. Pro-choice activists don't want some benefit
plans to be excluded from all public support because they cover abortion, and
bishops don't want Catholic Charities to be excluded from all public support
because they practice discrimination against gay couples in granting employment
benefits.
There is no easy way to resolve the theoretical tension between respect for
moral truth and respect for consciences which disagree with the majority's best
assessment of truth. A crude moral relativism that allows everyone to do their
thing is no answer. If most abortions are unjust killing, then those who support
it are perpetuating a real injustice. If discrimination against same sex couples
is irrational, those who promote it are trading in harmful prejudice. But a
moral majoritarianism that proclaims error has no rights isn't the solution
either. History tells too many tales of the majority being mistaken on matters
such as slavery, religious liberty, and the rights of aboriginal peoples.
Furthermore no one group of people, religious or secular, has been exempt from
making mistakes.
But practically, here and now, all parties have strong reason to work out a
compromise that respects the integrity of everyone involved. Such a compromise
was worked out in San Francisco with respect to providing employment benefits;
the Archdiocese provided benefits to households, including but not limited to
same-sex partners.
The Catholic bishops, on the one hand, and pro-choice and gay rights
activists, on the other, all need to the win minds and hearts of ordinary
Americans before they can accomplish their very different goals of social
reform. And you don't win the minds and hearts of ordinary Americans by holding
the food, shelter and medical care of needy people hostage to moral principle.
At least not in the holiday season.
Yes, Michael, thanks. I thought it was the case that he may have entered the Church. Thus I was all the more intrigued and mystified by his 2005 essay published in the New Humanist. It makes some of the matters we discuss here at the Mirror of Justice all the more interesting. But, we do live in interesting times. As always, thanks, Michael. I appreciate our exchanges.
RJA sj
When I was in law school, I became friendly with a Unitarian minister--a really impressive guy--who was willing to baptize in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, believed in the real presence of Christ in the eucharist, and was firmly pro-life. I remember thinking at the time that a trade was in order. In return for my friend, we could offer the Unitarians a couple of priests who believe what Unitarians are supposed to believe (and Catholics are not supposed to believe), plus two future draft choices.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Yes, well, don't we all, Robert, don't we all. You may be interested to learn: Shannon Gilreath is a convert to Roman Catholicism.
The world is complicated, isn't it?
Thanks to Michael P. for bringing to our attention Shannon Gilreath’s article “Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty.” Unlike Mr. Gilreath who cannot make the distinction between “religious objections to interracial marriage, as well as religious justification for other forms of inequality, and religious objections to same-sex marriage”, I believe that many can. I would be one. First of all, I think he has offered an interesting but deficient interpretation of the claims made by people, who happen to be religious, against same-sex unions/marriages. Thus, he fails to comprehend their arguments. Second, he leaves a great deal out of the picture. I have attempted to do this when I address the issues that he addresses. Third, as his Wake Forest bio states, he has a horse in the race, so to speak:
Shannon Gilreath
Wake Forest Fellow for the Interdisciplinary Study of Law
Shannon Gilreath is nationally recognized as a leading young scholar on issues of equality, sexual minorities, and constitutional interpretation. His book, Sexual Politics: The Gay Person in America Today (2006), was nominated for two prestigious awards: the ALA Stonewall Prize for Non-Fiction and the Lambda Literary Foundation Award. His innovative casebook, Sexual Identity Law in Context: Cases and Materials, published by Thomson-West (2007), is designed to put the law concerning lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people into a social context. An advocate of interdisciplinary study, he teaches courses in Sexuality and Law, Religion and Law, and Gender Studies in the law school, serves as an associated professor at the Wake Forest Divinity School and has taught various courses as part of the Women’s and Gender Studies faculty of the undergraduate college. He is an active speaker for gay rights causes, frequently consults on cases, and has been widely cited in journals and the popular press.
Fourth, the matter that he claims not to be a moral issue is in fact a profound moral issue, as it is a pressing legal issue, as it is a crucial social issue, and as it is an important political issue. I look forward to our further MOJ discussion of this topic.
RJA sj
Yesterday I linked to an article by a former student (Northwestern Law). Today I link to an article by another former student (Wake Law), who is now on the faculty at Wake Law:
"Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious
Liberty"
SHANNON GILREATH, Wake Forest
University - School of Law
Email: [email protected]
Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Emerging Conflicts is a new book of
essays edited by Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., and Robin Fretwell
Wilson. In this Book Review, I focus on the book’s intellectual center of
gravity, Professor Wilson’s essay, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex
Marriage from the Healthcare Context, and Professor Laycock’s Afterword. The
authors purport to offer a solution that will give Gays and Lesbians access to
the benefits of marriage while also recognizing religious objectors’ rights to
oppose Gay marriage. The authors endorse specific statutory exemptions in
emerging marriage equality legislation allowing anyone asserting individual
moral opposition to Gay and Lesbian couples to opt out of the facilitation of a
same-sex marriage. The authors want such explicit exemptions for everyone from
state employees to individuals providing services in the general stream of
commerce.
I argue that Professors Wilson and Laycock’s nearly exclusive
focus on individual rights analysis in their approach to the same-sex marriage
question fails to consider seriously the group-based equality issues at stake. I
argue that, contrary to Professors Wilson and Laycock’s assertions, one cannot
easily distinguish between religious objections to interracial marriage, as well
as religious justification for other forms of inequality, and religious
objections to same-sex marriage. I argue that we must analyze the claims of Gays
and Lesbians for civil marriage under a substantive equality paradigm, and that
the group-based equality interests of Gays and Lesbians should not be
subordinated to the individual desires of religious objectors through resort to
the descriptive moral counterbalancing inherent in typical, liberal individual
rights analysis.
[Downloadable here.]
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2009), pp. 729–755
Faith in the Future: Sexuality, Religion and the Public Sphere
CARL F. STYCHIN
Abstract—The clash between religious freedom and equality for lesbians and gay men has become a controversial legal issue in the United Kingdom. Increasingly, claims are made that compliance with anti-discrimination norms impacts upon conscientious, faith-based objectors to same-sex sexual acts. This article explores this issue and draws insights from North American case law, where this question has been considered in the context of competing constitutional rights. It raises farreaching issues concerning the distinction between belief and practice, as well as the role of identity in the public sphere. The author advocates that courts and tribunals should adopt a fact-specific approach which is sensitive to the rights in a particular context, and which focuses upon the values of accommodation, tolerance and mutual respect.