Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, December 3, 2009

Romney, religion, politics, etc.

A few days ago, my friend and colleague Dave Campbell (and some co-authors) published this piece in USA Today.  He observed that Mitt Romney faced -- and will face again, in 2012 -- "a major obstacle that should concern all Americans: religious intolerance":

 Polls showed that anywhere from one-quarter to one-third of Americans openly said they would not vote for a Mormon candidate for president. Mormons are hardly the only religious group to face such overt hostility. Polls show that Muslims, Buddhists and people without a religion are all viewed more warily by Americans. And as America becomes more religiously diverse, we can expect still more candidates from faiths that might be unfamiliar to many Americans, or those who profess no religion at all.

The good news is that accurate information about such unpopular religious groups can help the cause of religious tolerance in America. . . .

Yesterday, at First Things, Joe Carter discussed a self-described atheist's claim that, because all religions are bizarre, we should of course ask questions about, and take into account, Romney's (and others') beliefs: 

If freedom requires religion, if his Mormon faith sustains his life and he will be true to those practices, then I’m at an utter loss as to why we should ignore Romney’s religious beliefs when evaluating his fitness for the White House. . . .

To this, Carter responds:

[I agree] that religious beliefs—indeed I would include all beliefs of any type—should be considered fair game when evaluating a candidate. The question Knepper leaves unanswered, though, is how such beliefs are to be evaluated in the public square. Where is the line between reasonable criticism and irrational bigotry?

Personally, I’m open to being exceedingly tolerant of raw religious bigotry as long as its accompanied by a healthy portion of religious liberty. When we enter the public square I’m willing to allow anyone to make whatever nasty remarks they like about evangelicalism as long as I can presents arguments that are rooted in my faith and that are given a fair hearing.

Not everyone, however, is willing to offer such a compromise. How do we accommodate those who believe both that their religious convictions shape their thinking and that these beliefs are too personal to be scrutinized in public? . . .

Thoughts?

"Reminding Caesar of God's Existence": An Interview with Robby George

A few days ago, a few of us noted the "Manhattan Declaration."  At National Review, Kathryn Lopez has this interview with our own Robby George, one of the Declaration's co-authors.

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

A few thoughts on Prof. Kaveny's "Clashes of Conscience"

Thanks to Michael P. for linking to my Notre Dame colleague Cathy Kaveny's timely and thought-provoking Washington Post op-ed.  

I am not entirely sure what I think about Cathy's observation that "you don't win the minds and hearts of ordinary Americans by holding the food, shelter and medical care of needy people hostage to moral principle."  Descriptively, this seems right.  But, I'd want to hold on to a distinction between holding these things "hostage to moral principle" and insisting, even when it's costly, on the need and right to act with integrity.  How that distinction -- assuming there's something to it -- "maps" onto the two debates that Cathy discusses (abortion funding in the healthcare-funding proposals and same-sex-spousal benefits by religious social-welfare organizations that cooperate with government) is a tricky question.

I disagree, I think, with Cathy's suggestion that "in the enforcement of anti-discrimination law in Washington, D.C gay rights activists are in exactly the same position as the bishops are with respect to abortion."  I guess I think the merits do matter, as does the "framing" of the issue.  To say this is not to say that "error has no rights," and Cathy is, obviously, correct to note that history tells "many tales of the majority being mistaken on matters such as slavery, religious liberty, and the rights of aboriginal peoples."  But, it is a deep injustice -- wholly apart from tricky questions about taxpayers' culpability for the wrongs done by their governments -- for a political community to permit, let alone to fund, abortions, because abortion is a grave wrong.  (The problem is not, in other words, that Catholics are being made to pay for a practice they oppose; it is that the political community is funding and facilitating abortions, thereby helping to entrench the unjust exclusion of unborn children from the law's protections.)  On the other hand, it is not a deep injustice for religious institutions to take religious teachings -- including religious teachings on sexual morality -- into account when hiring and firing.  (To be clear:  to say this is not to deny that it would be wrong for the government to take religious teachings on sexual morality into account when hiring and firing.)

Of course, a lot depends on how one "frames" or describes what it is that is being funded:  I think that what the District funds when it cooperates with Catholic Charities (say) in the provision of social-welfare services is, well, "social welfare services", or even "social-welfare services by an organization that serves all comers but hires and fires in accord with its animating principles."  It is, I think, wrong for governments to discriminate, but it is not (I think) wrongful discrimination for a religious institution to hire and fire in accord with religion -- even when that institution is cooperating with the government to provide social-welfare services.  But, a health-funding proposal that says "public funds will be used to pay for abortions" is, it seems to me, harder to re-frame.

In any event, Cathy is entirely right to remind everyone that "[t]here is no easy way to resolve the theoretical tension between respect for moral truth and respect for consciences which disagree with the majority's best assessment of truth."  This -- stated at a general level -- is a vexing question, as anyone who thinks about conscience, religious liberty, and politics knows.

Yet another former student of mine, ...

... this one--Cathy Kaveny--well known to many MOJers, has just published something of interest to MOJers, namely, the following op-ed.  (Cathy was a student in a course I co-taught with Robin Lovin at the University of Chicago Divinity School back in my Chicago days.  Cathy then headed off to Yale, where she received her JD and PhD, and then to a clerkship with John Noonan, who, despite his critique of the magisterial position on contraception, Robby probably wouldn't want to trade.)  Cathy is the John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law and Professor of Theology at the University of Notre Dame, where she studies the relationship of law, religion, and morality.

The Washington Post
December 1, 2009

Clashes of conscience

Should American lawmakers refuse to give government funding to those who object to the current moral consensus on controversial issues, or should they be generous in making allowances for conscience?

In recent weeks the U.S. Catholic bishops have been on both sides of this question, as they have dealt with the thorny issues of abortion, on the one hand, and gay rights on the other. Nationally, they don't want health care reform dollars to subsidize abortion, and in the District of Columbia, they don't want to lose public funding for Catholic Charities because they conscientiously object to providing equal benefits to gay couples.

Ironically, abortion and discrimination against gays with respect to employment benefits have roughly the same moral status in American life. Both practices are legal, but widely disapproved. Many people, nationally or locally, don't want tax dollars to go to organizations that practice or promote them. At the same time, significant - although often different - minorities think they have a moral right to seek or provide an abortion, or to treat heterosexual couples more favorably than homosexual couples.

The Catholic bishops have opposed any health reform package which would allow tax dollars to be used to support a policy a health plan that covers abortion. It does not matter how small the government subsidy is compared to the personal contribution, or how low a percent of the premium cost actually goes to abortion coverage. It is not merely the money, it is the principle at stake. In response to the claims of Planned Parenthood and NOW that the conscience of the policyholder ought to be respected, the bishops reply, "we are not prohibiting people from getting abortions entirely with their own money. But we, the majority of Americans, do not want our tax dollars used to support practices or organizations that contravene our basic values." If push comes to shove, some bishops would let health care reform go and leave millions without necessary medical treatment, rather than subsidize abortion, however tenuously.

But in the enforcement of anti-discrimination law in Washington, D.C gay rights activists are in exactly the same position as the bishops are with respect to abortion--and the Catholic bishops are making the pro-choice argument, so to speak. Gay rights activists maintain that no public funds whatsoever ought to go to an organization that practices or promotes discrimination against gay people. In response to the claim of Catholic Charities that the conscience of the service provider ought to be respected, the activists argue, "we are not prohibiting people from establishing programs that discriminate against gay people using only their own money. But we, the majority of citizens in Washington, D.C., do not want our tax dollars used to support practices or organizations that contravene our basic values." If push comes to shove, some gay rights activists would let Catholic Charities go and leave thousands in Washington, D.C. homeless and hungry, rather than subsidize discrimination against same sex couples, however indirectly.

Very different groups in our pluralist democracy try to "enforce morality" -- or at least to encourage it -- by using public funds as an incentive. In this respect, the bishops on abortion are no different from the gay rights activists on employment discrimination. But when they are in the minority, these groups all want space to act according to their consciences without sacrificing participation in public programs. Pro-choice activists don't want some benefit plans to be excluded from all public support because they cover abortion, and bishops don't want Catholic Charities to be excluded from all public support because they practice discrimination against gay couples in granting employment benefits.

There is no easy way to resolve the theoretical tension between respect for moral truth and respect for consciences which disagree with the majority's best assessment of truth. A crude moral relativism that allows everyone to do their thing is no answer. If most abortions are unjust killing, then those who support it are perpetuating a real injustice. If discrimination against same sex couples is irrational, those who promote it are trading in harmful prejudice. But a moral majoritarianism that proclaims error has no rights isn't the solution either. History tells too many tales of the majority being mistaken on matters such as slavery, religious liberty, and the rights of aboriginal peoples. Furthermore no one group of people, religious or secular, has been exempt from making mistakes.

But practically, here and now, all parties have strong reason to work out a compromise that respects the integrity of everyone involved. Such a compromise was worked out in San Francisco with respect to providing employment benefits; the Archdiocese provided benefits to households, including but not limited to same-sex partners.

The Catholic bishops, on the one hand, and pro-choice and gay rights activists, on the other, all need to the win minds and hearts of ordinary Americans before they can accomplish their very different goals of social reform. And you don't win the minds and hearts of ordinary Americans by holding the food, shelter and medical care of needy people hostage to moral principle.

At least not in the holiday season.


Further complications

Yes, Michael, thanks. I thought it was the case that he may have entered the Church. Thus I was all the more intrigued and mystified by his 2005 essay published in the New Humanist. It makes some of the matters we discuss here at the Mirror of Justice all the more interesting. But, we do live in interesting times. As always, thanks, Michael. I appreciate our exchanges.

RJA sj

The world is complicated . . .

When I was in law school, I became friendly with a Unitarian minister--a really impressive guy--who was willing to baptize in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, believed in the real presence of Christ in the eucharist, and was firmly pro-life.  I remember thinking at the time that a trade was in order.  In return for my friend, we could offer the Unitarians a couple of priests who believe what Unitarians are supposed to believe (and Catholics are not supposed to believe), plus two future draft choices.

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

"Third, as his Wake Forest bio states, he has a horse in the race, so to speak."

Yes, well, don't we all, Robert, don't we all.  You may be interested to learn:  Shannon Gilreath is a convert to Roman Catholicism.

The world is complicated, isn't it?

Another interesting article on closer examination

 

 

Thanks to Michael P. for bringing to our attention Shannon Gilreath’s article “Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty.” Unlike Mr. Gilreath who cannot make the distinction between “religious objections to interracial marriage, as well as religious justification for other forms of inequality, and religious objections to same-sex marriage”, I believe that many can. I would be one. First of all, I think he has offered an interesting but deficient interpretation of the claims made by people, who happen to be religious, against same-sex unions/marriages. Thus, he fails to comprehend their arguments. Second, he leaves a great deal out of the picture. I have attempted to do this when I address the issues that he addresses. Third, as his Wake Forest bio states, he has a horse in the race, so to speak:

 

Shannon Gilreath

Wake Forest Fellow for the Interdisciplinary Study of Law

Shannon Gilreath is nationally recognized as a leading young scholar on issues of equality, sexual minorities, and constitutional interpretation. His book, Sexual Politics: The Gay Person in America Today (2006), was nominated for two prestigious awards: the ALA Stonewall Prize for Non-Fiction and the Lambda Literary Foundation Award. His innovative casebook, Sexual Identity Law in Context: Cases and Materials, published by Thomson-West (2007), is designed to put the law concerning lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people into a social context. An advocate of interdisciplinary study, he teaches courses in Sexuality and Law, Religion and Law, and Gender Studies in the law school, serves as an associated professor at the Wake Forest Divinity School and has taught various courses as part of the Women’s and Gender Studies faculty of the undergraduate college. He is an active speaker for gay rights causes, frequently consults on cases, and has been widely cited in journals and the popular press.

 

Fourth, the matter that he claims not to be a moral issue is in fact a profound moral issue, as it is a pressing legal issue, as it is a crucial social issue, and as it is an important political issue. I look forward to our further MOJ discussion of this topic.

RJA sj

 

Another article (of interest to MOJers) by a former student of mine

Yesterday I linked to an article by a former student (Northwestern Law).  Today I link to an article by another former student (Wake Law), who is now on the faculty at Wake Law:

"Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty"

SHANNON GILREATH, Wake Forest University - School of Law
Email:

Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Emerging Conflicts is a new book of essays edited by Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., and Robin Fretwell Wilson. In this Book Review, I focus on the book’s intellectual center of gravity, Professor Wilson’s essay, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context, and Professor Laycock’s Afterword. The authors purport to offer a solution that will give Gays and Lesbians access to the benefits of marriage while also recognizing religious objectors’ rights to oppose Gay marriage. The authors endorse specific statutory exemptions in emerging marriage equality legislation allowing anyone asserting individual moral opposition to Gay and Lesbian couples to opt out of the facilitation of a same-sex marriage. The authors want such explicit exemptions for everyone from state employees to individuals providing services in the general stream of commerce.

I argue that Professors Wilson and Laycock’s nearly exclusive focus on individual rights analysis in their approach to the same-sex marriage question fails to consider seriously the group-based equality issues at stake. I argue that, contrary to Professors Wilson and Laycock’s assertions, one cannot easily distinguish between religious objections to interracial marriage, as well as religious justification for other forms of inequality, and religious objections to same-sex marriage. I argue that we must analyze the claims of Gays and Lesbians for civil marriage under a substantive equality paradigm, and that the group-based equality interests of Gays and Lesbians should not be subordinated to the individual desires of religious objectors through resort to the descriptive moral counterbalancing inherent in typical, liberal individual rights analysis.

[Downloadable here.]



Reading of interest to MOJers, Part 753

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2009), pp. 729–755

Faith in the Future: Sexuality, Religion and the Public Sphere

CARL F. STYCHIN

Abstract—The clash between religious freedom and equality for lesbians and gay men has become a controversial legal issue in the United Kingdom. Increasingly, claims are made that compliance with anti-discrimination norms impacts upon conscientious, faith-based objectors to same-sex sexual acts. This article explores this issue and draws insights from North American case law, where this question has been considered in the context of competing constitutional rights. It raises farreaching issues concerning the distinction between belief and practice, as well as the role of identity in the public sphere. The author advocates that courts and tribunals should adopt a fact-specific approach which is sensitive to the rights in a particular context, and which focuses upon the values of accommodation, tolerance and mutual respect.