Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, December 7, 2009

Chip Lupu's reply to Robby George

[Chip has indicated that this will be his final comment in the to-and-fro with Robby.]

There is no point in beating up on the New York Times.  The reporter read to me in advance what she was attributing to me.  I did not know that "fear-mongering" was in quotation marks.  But, in the rush of the conversation, I was more concerned with the accuracy of the rest of the quote, and so did not focus on the offending word until it was too late.  And I do believe -- and I said this to the reporter, which led her to choose that word -- that the Declaration, like the anti-Prop 8 campaign, stokes unfounded fears among religious conservatives, whether or not it is designed to do so.

Robby thinks that I am insufficiently sensitive to pro-life convictions and rights to religious liberty.  I think he is utterly insensitive to competing rights and interests -- those of pregnant women, and of members of same-sex couples.  I try to balance the competing rights; he doesn't.  Enough said.

As to the purely religious content of the Declaration -- at whom were the passages on marriage aimed?  If they were aimed at the faithful, they are unobjectionable. If, however, they were aimed at lawmakers, they are entirely objectionable as an attempt to persuade those who exercise state power to impose an exclusively religious view on the law of marriage.  The Constitution forbids the state from restricting liberty based on exclusively religious reasons. Robby, I believe, was a defender of the regime that was legitimated by Bowers v. Hardwick, which allowed for the criminalization of same-sex intimacy.  Until Bowers was overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, that too involved the use of legal machinery to impose a view that had no secular justification. If aimed at lawmakers, the Declaration's passages on marriage -- wholly devoid of any secular justification for prohibiting same-sex marriage -- are a replay of that.

Cert Grant in Christian Legal Society Leadership-Selection case

See the press release from CLS and the Alliance Defense Fund.  It is excellent news for organizational freedom that the Court is willing to look at overturning the Ninth Circuit decision in this case.

The U.S. Supreme Court Monday agreed to decide whether a public university can refuse to recognize a religious student group because the group requires its leaders to share its religious beliefs. Attorneys with the Christian Legal Society and the Alliance Defense Fund Center for Academic Freedom represent a student chapter of CLS, which Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco refused to recognize because the group requires all of its officers and voting members to subscribe to its basic Christian beliefs.

Robby replies to Chip (where's Fred MacMurray when you need him?)

I'm grateful to Chip Lupu for responding to Michael Perry's request for a comment on his post and my reply.  I'm glad that Chip regrets the use of the word "fear-mongering" that, he says, was wrongly attributed to him by the New York Times reporter.  He says that he didn't use the word.  It must be frustrating to him, as it is to me, that the reporter claimed to be quoting Chip directly.  Indeed, the reporter singled out the word for placement in quotation marks.  It is outrageous conduct on the part of the reporter, and another black mark against the Times.

Having expressed regret about the rhetoric attributed to him, Chip nevertheless closes his reply by accusing me of not having a "balanced" view of the subject of religious liberty and the claims of conscience.  Looking closely at Chip's third paragraph, we can easily see the worth of this accusation.  One has a "balanced" view when one sides with Chip on such questions as whether physicians should be required to refer for abortions and in some cases perform them, and whether pharmacists ought to be required to dispense abortifacient drugs,  One doesn't have a "balanced' view when one disagrees with Chip.

The most important thing to see about that paragraph is that Chip doesn't deny that the impositions on conscience that I catalogued are coming at Catholic and other pro-life physicians, nurses, and pharmacists.  It's just that he thinks some or many of these impositions on conscience are justified.  Pro-life health care workers, Chip says, "cannot just ignore those women's interests [in obtaining an abortion] because they dislike what the women plan to do."  Note Chip's characterization of the ground of pro-lifers' objections to implicating themselves in the deliberate taking of innocent unborn human life:  they "dislike" what the women plan to do.  That characterization, if Chip can get the reader to buy it, even if only implicitly, would be very helpful to his effort to weaken the moral force and intellectual plausibility of conscience claims by pro-life health care workers (and people like me who lack a "balanced" view).  After all, governments legitimately require people to do things they "dislike" all the time.  But the truth is that pro-lifers don't merely "dislike" abortion.  That is at best a tendentious and grossly inadequate characterization of their view.  They reasonably believe that abortion is the deliberate taking of innocent human life.  That should matter in thinking about whether it is just to compel pro-life health care workers to implicate themselves in abortions.  Now, Chip is entitled to his view that the impositions on conscience he favors are justifiable.  What no one is entitled to do, in my opinion, is to deny what is a plain matter of fact, namely that these impositions are indeed coming at pro-lifers in the health field.  So I'm glad that Chip didn't deny it.  The fact that he didn't deny it is, to my mind, the most telling and important thing about his comment.

I was a bit puzzled by Chip's claim that the Manhattan Declaration's sections on marriage are "obviously a statement of theological views dressed up in sort-of secular talk."  What's the charge here?  Is it that the Manhattan Declaration pretends to be a secular statement while in reality it is a theological statement?  Could the Manhattan Declaration have possibly made it clearer that it is a religious statement.  Its subtitle is "A Call of Christian Conscience."  It says that "[w]e, as Orthodox, Catholic, and Evangelical Christians . . . act together in obedience to the one true God, the triune God of holiness and love, who has laid total claim on our lives and by that claim calls us with believers in all ages and all nations to seek and defend the good of all who bear his image. We set forth this declaration in light of the truth that is grounded in Holy Scripture, in natural human reason (which is itself, in our view, the gift of a beneficent God), and in the very nature of the human person."

In my own scholarly writings, I usually analyze moral problems as matters of natural law.  That's the business I'm in.  I present arguments that do not appeal to revelation, theological convictions, or authority of any type beyond the authority of reason itself.  The Manhattan Declaration is a different kind of project, however.  Although the sanctity of human life in all stages and conditions, the dignity of marriage as the conjugal union of husband and wife, and the right to religious freedom are certainly defensible as matters of natural law, they are also principles of Christian faith (as the Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Evangelical Protestant traditions understand the faith), and the Manhattan Declaration presents them as such.  The signatories, far from hiding (or "dressing up") their Christian convictions in "sort-of secular talk," place these convictions in the foreground. 

Sunday, December 6, 2009

Taking a break from political controversy

[We can watch it on television December 29.

If my Irish Catholic maternal grandmother--ever, and understandably in her time, insecure about the place of Catholics in the United States--were alive and posting this item, she would emphasize that Dave Brubeck and Bruce Springsteen are Catholic.  For all I know, De Niro is too.  Mel Brooks, however, I am confident, is not!]

NYT, 12/7/09

Kennedy Center Honors 5 With Awards

WASHINGTON — Political and entertainment luminaries gathered here over the weekend for the 32nd annual Kennedy Center Honors, a two-day celebration that brings together some of the most influential figures in Washington and Hollywood.

The recipients of the award this year were Robert De Niro, Mel Brooks, Bruce Springsteen, the mezzo-soprano and soprano Grace Bumbry and the jazz musician Dave Brubeck. A gala performance on Sunday night at the Kennedy Center capped off a busy weekend for the recipients, who also attended a dinner Saturday hosted by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and a Sunday reception with President Obama at the White House.

The performance, which was scheduled to include appearances by Meryl Streep, Aretha Franklin, Sting and Herbie Hancock, will be broadcast on CBS on Dec. 29.

In remarks at the White House, Mr. Obama thanked the honorees for “the joy and the beauty” they brought to people’s lives.

“In times of war and sacrifice, the arts — and these artists — remind us to sing and to laugh and to live. In times of plenty, they challenge our conscience and implore us to remember the least among us,” Mr. Obama said. “In moments of division or doubt, they compel us to see the common values that we share; the ideals to which we aspire, even if we sometimes fall short. In days of hardship, they renew our hope that brighter days are still ahead.”

A 19-time Grammy winner firmly rooted in the Jersey Shore, Mr. Springsteen has made top-selling albums including 1975’s “Born to Run” — which, in addition to the title track, included “Thunder Road” and “Tenth Avenue Freeze-Out” — and 1984’s “Born in the U.S.A.” He has also won an Academy Award.

At the State Department dinner, which was emceed by the comedienne and 2003 honoree Carol Burnett, the violinist Itzhak Perlman spoke of how Mr. Springsteen, 60, who is known for his famously long concerts with his E Street Band, connected with his audience.

“He gives his audience what it wants, but he also lets them know what they want and helps teach them to want more,” said Mr. Perlman, also a 2003 honoree.

The dinner was also attended by Jon Stewart, Martin Short, Caroline Kennedy and Melissa Etheridge.

Mr. De Niro, 66, who was born in New York, won Oscars for his portrayal of Vito Corleone in the 1974 film “The Godfather: Part II” and 1980’s “Raging Bull,” in which he played the boxer Jake LaMotta under the direction of his longtime collaborator Martin Scorsese, a 2007 Kennedy Center Honor recipient. The two also worked together on, among other movies, “Goodfellas,” “Mean Streets” and “Taxi Driver.”

Mr. Brooks, who was born in Brooklyn, is among an elite group of performers who have won Emmy, Grammy, Oscar and Tony Awards. “The Producers,” a 1968 film that was retooled as a musical and brought to Broadway more than three decades later, captured 12 Tony Awards and won Mr. Brooks an Oscar for Best Original Screenplay. At the State Department dinner, Mr. Brooks said becoming an honoree at age 83 was “better late than never.”

Susan Stroman, who directed the musical version of “The Producers,” said, “I don’t know anyone who loves being themselves as much as Mel Brooks loves being Mel Brooks.”

Mr. Brubeck is perhaps best known for “Time Out,” the 1959 album he made with the Dave Brubeck Quartet that included the single “Take Five.” According to event organizers, Mr. Brubeck, who turned 89 on Sunday, is believed to be the first honoree to celebrate a birthday on the day of the gala performance.

On Saturday night, former President Bill Clinton spoke of humming a portion of Mr. Brubeck’s “Blue Rondo a la Turk” to prove to the jazz pianist he was a fan.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Clinton recounted, he received a signed picture from Mr. Brubeck and the chart to the song. “It hangs in the music room of my home today,” Mr. Clinton said. “It hung in the White House every single day I was there.”

Ms. Bumbry, 72, made her debut at the Paris Opera in 1960, playing Amneris in “Aida.” She performed in honor of Marian Anderson at the first Kennedy Center Honors in 1978.

Chip Lupu responds to Robby George

[I sent my post and Robby's response to Chip Lupu for possible comment.  Here is Chip's comment:]

Thank you very much for sharing this exchange with me.  It might surprise you (and perhaps make Robby feel better) to learn that I was not happy with the attribution of the word "fear-mongering" to me in that story.  I never used it in talking to the reporter.  I did say, as I do believe, that the concerns and fears of the anti-same sex marriage movement are vastly overstated—that's an objective reference, relating their statement to the actual state of the law, and is not a subjective imputation of motives.  And, as I recall, I also said to the Times reporter that the Manhattan Declaration was of a piece with articles that had been published in law journals and elsewhere, and with ads that ran in connection with Prop. 8 in California, that did indeed play upon the anxieties of religiously conservative voters.  The best example is the suggestion that pastors would be prosecuted for anti-gay sermons.  In the recent debate over federal Hate Crimes legislation, this was repeated.  Was that "in good faith"?  Or was it designed to stir up irrational opposition to a law that does not and could not (see the First Amendment) criminalize expression of the view that homosexual intimacy is sinful?

So I do regret the use of the word "fear-mongering," but I do not regret the objective point that religious liberty is well-protected, by Constitution and statute, against most of the onslaughts referenced in the Declaration.

Robby's long list of examples in his post is impressive—until you break it down and reflect upon its details.  First, some of what he describes may well be unlawful; does he think the First Amendment is insufficient protection of religious liberty just because states sometimes violate it?  Second, most of his comments on abortion-related exemptions ignore entirely the competing, constitutionally based interests of women who seek abortions.  State-granted religious exemptions cannot unduly burden their rights.  That takes some juggling in at least some of the cases that Robby describes—his side won't always win the balancing match.  Doctors and nurses and pharmacists who treat pregnant women have professional obligations to them—they cannot just ignore those women's interests because they dislike what the women plan to do.  Compare the situation of those who were exempt as conscientious objectors from the draft in WWII—they did not have to be part of the fighting force, but they did have to perform alternative service (e.g., work in hospitals caring for the wounded) in the war effort.  And, unlike medical professionals, they had not voluntarily entered the relevant class; they were conscripted.

I hope that Robby has read the Lupu-Tuttle paper on same sex marriage and religious liberty (it's on SSRN).  [The paper is downloadable here.]  If he has, he will see that we are quite respectful of the concerns of religious institutions, and we acknowledge the concerns of wedding industry vendors (though we think exemptions for them from an obligation to serve gay couples cannot be squared with the long-standing American tradition of creating only very narrow exemptions, especially for business firms, from civil rights laws.)

I'm tempted to say much more about that Declaration—the sections about marriage were so obviously a statement of theological views dressed up in sort-of secular talk (e.g., sexual complementarity of males and females).  Robby's church, and all religious communities, of course may have that view as an internal matter.  (Whether or not it is a bigoted view, bigots will seek its comfort.)  No one is forcing religious communities to perform or celebrate same-sex marriages.  When they "go public" with social services, however, they may open themselves up to regulation.  Even there, exemptions (see the Connecticut legislation) may be advisable.  Because of the force of the interests on both sides of this debate, it is good to have a balanced view of this subject.  Robby's message suggests that he does not.


"Fear-mongering" and conscience protection

So, Michael, let me get this straight.  Chip Lupu accuses me and others of "fear-mongering," thus explicitly impugning our motives, without giving the slightest bit of evidence for the alleged insincerity of our expression of concerns about possible impositions on conscience. You quote him and then say:  "Chip Lupu is a highly respected religious liberty scholar.  If he is wrong -- as Robby asserts -- why is he wrong?"  Well, what would you consider valid evidence that Chip is wrong in suggesting (which I assume he is, with this talk about "fear-mongering") that there is no threat to conscience protection for medical professionals who, for example, object to being compelled to refer for, participate in, or perform abortions?  What if there existed a Report of the Committee on Ethics (let's call it Opinion 385--entitled Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine) of, say, an influential professional association in the field of women's health (perhaps it could be called the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists), that proposed a formal obligation of doctors to refer for abortions and in certain "emergency" situations (not defined, but possibly including circumstances in which no other physician is available in an area to provide an elective abortion) to perform abortions even against their pro-life moral convictions?  Would that be pretty good evidence?  Then what if we found that there are respected scholars in philosophy, law, medicine and other fields who not only support this imposition of obligation on physicians, but in some cases argue that it does not go far enough in protecting a woman's right to abortion?  What if there were mainstream liberal academics writing in important academic journals who said that even the limited conscience protections proposed by the ACOG constituted an imposition of the morality of the physician on a woman who wants an abortion?  Would that be pretty good evidence that there are reasons for pro-life people to be concerned and vigilant?  Then what if we learned that there are cases in places like the state of Washington in which the right of pro-life pharmacists to decline to dispense abortifacient drugs was under attack?  Then what if we learned that eleven nurses in Alabama in 2004 resigned their positions rather than bend to a requirement that they provide abortifacients?  Then what if we learned that a nurse in Louisiana was fired for refusing to administer an abortifacient?  Then what if we learned that a pro-life Catholic nurse in New York was forced under a threat of disciplinary action and possible termination of employment to participate in a late-term abortion -- the child was twenty-two weeks along in development.  Then what if we found that the right of Catholic hospitals to decline to give privileges to physicians who perform abortions was being legally challenged?  I could multiply the examples, but instead let me just refer you to the following websites of organizations that defend religious liberty and freedom of conscience:  http://www.becketfund.org/; http://aclj.org/; http://www.clsnet.org/; http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/main/default.aspx.  Fear-mongering?  Hardly.  In light of the evidence, one would be a great deal more justified in suspecting that people who try to dismiss concerns about threats to conscience as "fear-mongering" are the ones who are in less than perfectly good faith.  As for concerns for religious liberty growing out of the legal recognition of same-sex sexual partnerships as marriages, the letter you joined in sending to the New Jersey legislature wouldn't be necessary if no serious dangers for religious liberty existed.  Whether the protections you and your colleagues propose for protecting religious liberty if you get your way about re-defining marriage would be adequate, is a debatable proposition.  It is clear to me from what has happened in Massachusetts and elsehwere that once marriage is re-defined there will inevitably be burdens on the liberty of those of us who dissent.  Schools, for example, will present marriage as a union of two persons irrespective of whether they are of opposite sexes or the same sex.  Parents who don't want such beliefs to be inculcated in their children as part of the package you accept when you send your children to public school, will be out of luck.  After all, how could it be otherwise?  If a certain form of relationship is a "marriage" under state law, then most people will agree that there is no alternative to schools teaching that whenever they teach about marriage (as in family life curricula).  So this is an area where no possibility of neutrality exists. Someone's view is going to be taught, i.e., the view of the side that prevails on the issue of how marriage is to be legally defined, and religious liberty protections won't be viable.  And there are other such areas.  Whether even the religious liberty and conscience protections you and your colleagues support would hold for very long even if they were accepted (as they may be in some places as part of a deal to get the re-definition of marriage through the legislature) is also debatable.  As to whether a majority of your liberal colleagues in the legal academy and beyond would support your proposed protections, I seriously doubt it (though, again, some might accept them, at least in the short term, as part of a deal).  Just this week I was present at a meeting at which a strong and very capable defender of your position came under severe attack in defending the kinds of protections you propose from a highly credentialed advocate of redefining marriage who teaches at one of the top law schools in the United States.  I have no doubt that had the matter dividing the two scholars been put to a vote of the faculty of the law school of either interlocutor, the decision would have gone overwhelmingly for the critic of the conscience protections being proposed.  That should not be surprising.  The overwhelming majority are liberals.  It has become a matter of orthodoxy in the liberal camp that opposition to same-sex marriage is a form of bigotry, on a par with opposition to interracial marriages.  (Honestly, now, how many liberals do you know who don't believe that the analogy is valid?)  Now, if opponents of re-defining marriage are just like racists, why should they not be treated the way we treat racists?  We don't put racists in jail, but we stigmatize them and marginalize them and impose on them, where we can, legal disabilities in a wide variety of areas.  If clergy or public officials who refuse to officiate at same-sex ceremonies are just like clergy or public officials who refuse to officiate at interracial wedding ceremonies, why should they retain the right to act on behalf of the state in validating marriages?  Lots of liberals I know think they shouldn't have that right.  They should have to give it up.  Sure, bigoted clergy who refuse to perform same-sex ceremonies can continue performing religious ceremonies for opposite sex couples only, if they like--that is protected by the First Amendment.  But their right to act as agents of the state ("by the power vested in me by the state of Michigan, I now pronounce you , , , "), many liberals will point out, certainly isn't.  Assuming that belief in marriage as the conjugal union of sexually complementary spouses is a species of prejudice, and that refusing to serve opposite sex couples who request one's services is therefore a form of invidious discrimination, they have a pretty darn good argument.  As you know, Chai Feldblum of Georgetown Law School, has been nominated by President Obama for a seat on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  She is not a marginal figure.  Her views are scarcely regarded by her academic colleagues or the Obama administration as outside the mainstream. Before her nomination, she commented on the public record about the multitude of cases in which she, like your co-author Marc Stern, saw conflict coming between gay rights and religious liberty.  With exemplary candor, Professor Feldblum said something that anybody who cares about conscience and religious liberty should take very seriously -- even at the risk of being labeled a "fear-monger" by liberal law professors in newspapers like the New York Times.  "I'm having a hard time," she said, "in coming up with any case in which religious liberty should win." 

Saturday, December 5, 2009

Same-sex unions and religious freedom, con't

The Manhattan Declaration, which several posts here at MOJ concern, and which was co-authored by MOJer Robby George, states:  “We will not comply with any edict that purports to compel our institutions to participate in abortions, embryo-destructive research, assisted suicide and euthanasia, or any other antilife act; nor will we bend to any rule purporting to force us to bless immoral sexual partnerships, or treat them as marriages or the equivalent.”  In announcing the release of The Manhattan Declaration, the New York Times reported:  "Ira C. Lupu, a law professor at George Washington University Law School, said it was 'fear-mongering' to suggest that religious institutions would be forced to do any of those things. He said they are protected by the First Amendment, and by conscience clauses that allow medical professionals and hospitals to opt out of performing certain procedures, and religious exemptions written into same-sex marriage bills."  The Times then added:  "Mr. George, the legal scholar at Princeton University, argued that the conscience clauses and religious exemptions were insufficient, saying, 'The dangers to religious liberty are very real.'"

So, two questions:

1.  Chip Lupu is a highly respected religious liberty scholar.  If he is wrong--as Robby asserts--why is he wrong?

2.  With respect to same-sex unions in particular:  If all the recommendations in the letter sent earlier this week to Senator Paul A. Sarlo, New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman--the letter sent by by two MOJers (Tom Berg and Rick Garnett) and four others--were adopted, would *that* be sufficient?  If not, why not?  To read the letter, click here.

See also the letter sent earlier this week to New Jersey State Senator Baroni by Doug Laycock (Michigan Law), Andy Koppelman (Northwestern Law), Marc Stern (American Jewish Congress), and myself: 
here.  (Marc Stern is also a signatory to the Berg-Garnett-et al. letter.)  In our letter, we state:  "We heartily endorse a religious-liberty amendment legislation on the lines proposed in the separate letter that Professor Thomas C. Berg and others sent you yesterday.  We come to these issues from a rather different perspective from some of the signers of that letter, but their analysis of potential legal conflicts is accurate, and their proposed statutory language is necessary to legislation that is fair and just to all sides."

(Rick Garnett and I do agree about a few things!)

The Center for American Progress pronounces on Catholicism

The Center for American Progress is a "progressive" think tank, which offers well executed, if predictably partisan talking points and messaging for left-leaning politicians and activists.  (Not that there's anything wrong with that . . .)  What is perhaps more surprising, though, is the confidence with which this political-action organization opines on the content and implications of Catholic teaching.  In this "fact sheet", the CAP explains that and how the health-funding measures currently winding around Congress "measure up to Catholic social teachings."  As Ramesh Ponnuru notes, though: 

You'd never guess it from the "fact sheet," but the bishops have repeatedly affirmed that Catholic teaching considers abortion and euthanasia particularly grave injustices and warned against treating them as items on a checklist. That's why the bishops' first and most specific comment in their statement is about abortion and euthanasia. . .

The fact sheet simply assumes that the Reid and Pelosi bills will improve the quality and affordability of health care and suggests that they therefore comport with Catholic teaching. It is certainly true that a Catholic may in good faith believe these things and support the legislation. But a Catholic might also reasonably conclude that the Pelosi and Reid bills will reduce the quality and raise the cost of health care and oppose them on that basis. . . .

One hears often the complaint that Catholic Social Teaching has been hijacked and distorted by Theocons and other undesirables -- even bishops -- in service of a right-wing political agenda.  (The complaint is misplaced, I think, but one hears it anyway.)  I would assume that those who level this charge would, at least, recoil similarly from the CAP's effort to baptize its question-begging and simplistic political advocacy.

Religious liberty and SSM in New Jersey

As MOJ readers are probably aware, Tom Berg and I, along with several other law professors -- experts in religious freedom and family law -- have submitted letters to legislators and other political leaders in several jurisdictions that are considering adopting same-sex-marriage.  The point of this letter has not been to weigh in on the merits of that move, but instead to urge that these jurisdictions include meaningful protections for religious freedom (institutional and individual) in any such adoption.  The text of the most recent letter, addressed to the Chair of the Judicial Committee in New Jersey, is available here.  Here is the introduction:

We write to urge the New Jersey legislature to ensure that any bill legalizing same-sex marriage—such as the "Freedom of Religion and Equality in Civil Marriage Act" (or "New Jersey Marriage Bill")1—does not infringe the religious liberty of organizations and individuals who have a traditional view of marriage. It is not only possible to legalize same-sex marriage without infringing on religious liberty, it is the wise course. The contentious debate in Maine, California and elsewhere surrounding same-sex marriage proves the wisdom of constructive, good-faith attempts both to grant legal recognition to same-sex marriage and to protect religious liberty for conscientious objectors. Unfortunately, the current version of the New Jersey Marriage Bill provides less protection for religious liberty than the same-sex marriage legislation of every other state to address the issue.

This letter analyzes the potential effects of same-sex marriage on religious conscience in New Jersey and proposes a solution to address the conflicts: a specific religious liberty protection that can be added to the New Jersey Marriage Bill, clarifying that people and organizations may refuse to provide services for a wedding if doing so would violate deeply held beliefs, while ensuring that the refusal creates no undue hardship for the couple seeking the service. We write not to support or oppose same-sex marriage in New Jersey. Rather, our aim is to define a "middle way" where both equality in marriage and religious liberty can be honored and respected. . . .

Another letter, signed by our own Michael Perry and others, endorses the analysis and conclusions set out in the letter that Tom and I signed, but makes clear the authors' support for the adoption of same-sex-marriage.

Back to the debate about healthcare reform

Robby is right, of course:  our judgments on this important issue should be informed.

Here's what Nobel economist Paul Krugman had to say yesterday about the proposed healthcare reform:

Some background: Long-term fiscal projections for the United States paint a grim picture. Unless there are major policy changes, expenditure will consistently grow faster than revenue, eventually leading to a debt crisis.

What’s behind these projections? An aging population, which will raise the cost of Social Security, is part of the story. But the main driver of future deficits is the ever-rising cost of Medicare and Medicaid. If health care costs rise in the future as they have in the past, fiscal catastrophe awaits.

You might think, given this picture, that extending coverage to those who would otherwise be uninsured would exacerbate the problem. But you’d be wrong, for two reasons.

First, the uninsured in America are, on average, relatively young and healthy; covering them wouldn’t raise overall health care costs very much.

Second, the proposed health care reform links the expansion of coverage to serious cost-control measures for Medicare. Think of it as a grand bargain: coverage for (almost) everyone, tied to an effort to ensure that health care dollars are well spent.

Are we talking about real savings, or just window dressing? Well, the health care economists I respect are seriously impressed by the cost-control measures in the Senate bill, which include efforts to improve incentives for cost-effective care, the use of medical research to guide doctors toward treatments that actually work, and more. This is “the best effort anyone has made,” says Jonathan Gruber of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A letter signed by 23 prominent health care experts — including Mark McClellan, who headed Medicare under the Bush administration — declares that the bill’s cost-control measures “will reduce long-term deficits.”

The fact that we’re seeing the first really serious attempt to control health care costs as part of a bill that tries to cover the uninsured seems to confirm what would-be reformers have been saying for years: The path to cost control runs through universality. We can only tackle out-of-control costs as part of a deal that also provides Americans with the security of guaranteed health care.

That observation in itself should make anyone concerned with fiscal responsibility support this reform. Over the next decade, the Congressional Budget Office has concluded, the proposed legislation would reduce, not increase, the budget deficit.

[You can read Krugman's entire column here.]