Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Saturday, November 14, 2009

Iowa Debate on Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Accommodations

Readers in and around Des Moines, IA, might be interested in a debate between Georgetown Law prof Nan Hunter and me, this Tuesday at 3 p.m. at Drake Law School.  The topic is "Religious Liberty Exemptions and Iowa's Same-Sex Marriage Decision."  The topic is of great importance nationally, of course, and in Iowa as the approaching legislative session will consider the implementation of the state supreme court decision legalizing gay marriage.

I'll be defending, broadly speaking, the model religious-exemption provision proposed by a group of scholars including Rick and me.  Our letters setting forth and defending that approach, as applied to various states including Iowa, are collected here.

Hope to see some Iowa readers!

Sarah Palin's 'Left Behind' Catholicism

I don't know whether anything important hinges on it, but does anyone happen to know why Ms. Palin left the Church?

Many thanks, Bob

Friday, November 13, 2009

Two new pieces by MOJers!

"Excluding Religion Excludes More than Religion"

Matters of Life and Death: Religion and Law at the Crossroad, Boston College Law School, 2008

RICHARD STITH, Valparaiso University School of Law
Email:

This Article contends that excluding apparently religious perspectives from public debate may inadvertently exclude non-religious perspectives as well, consequently impoverishing public discussion. This contention is demonstrated through an examination of the current debate over embryonic stem cell research, in which the pro-life position is often declared unacceptably religious. The truth is that those who envision the unborn as under construction in the womb do not find a human being present when gestation has just begun, while those who understand the unborn to be developing see an identity of being from conception. But neither view is based on religion. To disqualify the pro-life view as religious would exclude from public debate an important secular perspective.

[Downloadable here.]

"Vocation, Formation and the Next Generation: The Role of Catholic Law Schools in Light of Catholic Social Thought"

Villanova Journal of Catholic Social Thought, Forthcoming
U of St. Thomas Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-21

SUSAN J. STABILE, University of St. Thomas - School of Law (Minnesota)
Email:

There are two separate aspects to what is distinctive about a Catholic law school as opposed to a secular one – one having to do with formation and the other having to do with the transmission of the Catholic intellectual tradition. The focus of this article is on the first of the two distinctive aspects of Catholic legal education – formation. It addresses the question how Catholic social thought informs (or should inform) our thinking about the formation role of Catholic law schools. I argue that from the perspective of Catholic thought, Catholic law schools must do more than merely train students to practice law. In addition to educating students to become lawyers, Catholic law schools have a formation and development task that involves at least several related aspects – creating a vocation-based culture and understanding of success, helping students discern their place in the legal profession, and giving them the tools they will need to carry out their calling in a manner consistent with the Gospel. In talking about these roles, the article also suggests some ways this formation and development mission of the Catholic law school might be carried out and briefly identifies some of the challenges that will be faced by Catholic law schools in trying to carry out this role.

[Downloadable here.]

And then there is this piece, which looks quite interesting:

"The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State" 

Utah Law Review, Forthcoming

FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School
Email:

The question of groups for liberal theory and constitutional doctrine is not new. For at least the last half century, every time some unguarded Supreme Court language has hinted at group rights, academics have responded with law review articles arguing that the Court should confirm such rights in doctrine. But the Court never has.

The Court's lack of enthusiasm for group rights is undoubtedly related to their paradoxical quality of simultaneously protecting and threatening individual liberty. This paradox requires analytic touchstones to guide the decision when the liberal state should intervene in the internal affairs of groups, such as groups’ lack of foundational status in constitutional doctrine, whether group membership is consensual, and the extent to which group rights impose external costs on nonmembers. It also suggests the need for a more nuanced approach to group rights than is suggested by the binary choice between recognition or nonrecognition. Constitutional doctrine might make greater use of intermediate measures, such as revocation of tax exempt status or other state privileges, for groups whose beliefs and practices threaten the rights and interests of nonmembers. This enables the state to preserve the pluralist contributions that groups make to liberal democracy without subsidizing anti-liberal values and practices.

This Essay is part of a symposium on non-state action held at the University of Utah College of Law on February 6, 2009.

[Downloadable here.]

Catholic Charities D.C. and same sex marriage

The Catholic Archdiocese of Washington D.C. is threatening that Catholic Charities will  withdraw from city contracts that fund services to homeless and other poor people in the dead of winter if D.C. approves same sex marriages. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/11/AR2009111116943.html The bill would not require that the Church marry same sex couples or make space for such marriages, but D.C. law requires that recipients of funds not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. “Fearful that they could be forced, among other things, to extend employee benefits to same-sex married couples, church officials said they would have no choice but to abandon their contracts with the city.” Id.

Although I do not agree with the leadership of the Church on same sex marriage, that is not my point. I am puzzled about Catholic Charities' policies. Does Catholic Charities currently hire gays and lesbians, but wants to draw the line against married gays and lesbians? Why is that the place to draw the line? Does Catholic Charities hire Catholics who are divorced and remarried? If so, why are same sex couples different under Catholic theology?

"If the city requires this, we can't do it," Susan Gibbs, spokeswoman for the archdiocese, said Wednesday. "The city is saying in order to provide social services, you need to be secular. For us, that's really a problem." Is that really what the problem is? Catholic Charities is the recipient of federal funds all over the country. For years (much to the chagrin of Rick Garnett and others) they have been required not to discriminate on the basis of religion with respect to their employees (the Directors are either a formal or informal exception to this) and Catholic Charities has complied. If the concern is secularity, Catholic Charities succumbed to that a long time ago. One columnist charges that the Church is using the poor as a political tool to stop gay marriage.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/12/AR2009111210561_2.html?sub=AR

Maybe that is what is going on. If so, the Church has lost its grip on the gospel. But I do not know what is going on. I am mystified.

For other criticism, see Eduardo’s post on this. http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/blog/?p=5377. For a defence of the Church in this matter, see http://www.examiner.com/examiner/x-9452-DC-Catholic-Living-Examiner~y2009m11d12-Samesex-marriage-law-forces-Washington-Archdiocese-to-reconsider-city-social-service-partnerships.For the language of the religious exemption, see http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/sexist/2009/11/11/dc-marriage-bills-religious-exemption-finalized/

 

 

RNC on Health Care and Abortion

Question for the RNC: Can you spell 'Pharisee'? 

The Republican National Committee and Abortion

<p>Salon.com Life | RNC's insurance covers abortion</p>

RNC's insurance covers abortion

By the reasoning behind the Stupak amendment, the committee might have paid to terminate employees' pregnancies

Tracy Clark-Flory

Nov. 13, 2009 |

Holy hypocrisy, GOP: The Republican National Committee's health insurance plan covers abortion. This news comes by way of Politico's Meredith Shiner and Jonathan Allen, who appropriately point out the obvious conflict here: "The party’s own platform calls [abortion] 'a fundamental assault on innocent human life.'" The RNC didn't opt out of abortion coverage, though, even though that is allowed by Cigna, its insurer. Worse yet, though, is the fact that 176 House Republicans voted for the Stupak amendment, which restricts federal funds from going toward insurance plans that cover abortion. God forbid the government help you to get an insurance plan just like the one enjoyed by the RNC.

When Politico called up RNC spokeswoman Gail Gitcho to ask about this funny little wrinkle, she explained that, oh, uh, the policy was instituted before Michael Steele became the RNC chairman. What about philosophical consistency, though? According to the reasoning behind the Stupak amendment, by paying for a plan that covers abortion, the RNC itself just might have paid for abortions.

More "church and state" silliness regarding Stupak

Check out (and then groan at) this "animated cartoon" in The Washington Post.  What we are seeing, I fear, is an ugly re-emergence of Blanshard-ism.  "The Bishops", or "The Catholic Church", is -- for some -- simply an all-purpose bug-a-boo; that "the Bishops" speak for or support something is -- for the new Blanshards -- seen as, and used as, a reason to oppose that something. Their support for something is presumed to be part of a nefarious plot against American values (unless, of course, their support is convenient, in which case it is happily exploited).  Troubling.

Thursday, November 12, 2009

Religious Legal Theory at Seton Hall

I'm in beautiful Newark, where Seton Hall is hosting a marvelous conference titled Religious Legal Theory: The State of the Field.  Most of the conversations are of direct interest to MoJers.  In my own remarks, I tried to lay out some of the methodologies marking Catholic legal theory, distinguishing CLT that proclaims from CLT that describes, and distinguishing the prophetic from the pragmatic.  I also described my hesitation when a newspaper reporter interested in my forthcoming book asked "So are you Catholic?" after we had discussed a couple of cases involving Catholic Charities:

Perhaps my fear is that the religious label, especially the Catholic label, will be an easy way to pigeon-hole me and more easily dismiss my opinions as pre-ordained conclusions dictated by the fact of my submission to an authority beyond reason, rendering them less authentic and even less human.  In this regard, my hesitation likely reflects my own misconception of what it means to be a Catholic legal scholar and about what it means to be a Catholic.  My faith should be the impetus to delve even more deeply into the heart of what it means to be human, to grapple unflinchingly with the reality of our existence.  In a real sense, Catholic legal theory exhibits much of the same promise and peril of my own personal faith journey.  When I use faith as an escape, when I toss off trite prayers to numb myself to the tragedy that unfolds around me, rather than praying to express and share in the depth of that grief, I am rightly dismissed by the grieving.  Similarly, when I use faith in my scholarship as a bludgeon to wield against those who reject my worldview, or when I dress up my unsupported assertions as self-evident simply because they come from my faith tradition, I am rightly dismissed by those legal scholars who are authentically struggling with the question of how imperfect people should govern themselves in an imperfect world.  The Catholic legal theory project has much to contribute to the legal academy, starting with the anthropological question of what it even means to be human.  Our contribution depends not just on the relevance of our answers, but also on the humanity with which we extend those answers.

Being asked to reflect -- and articulate those reflections publicly -- on the Catholic legal theory project was a helpful impetus to step back and wrestle with the question, what is the difference, if any, between a Catholic doing legal theory and "Catholic legal theory?"  A further impetus is David Skeel's articulation this afternoon of (evangelical) Christian legal theory, which sounded, as Skeel framed it, a lot different than Catholic legal theory -- i.e., directed toward an audience of one's co-religionists, best pursued as a side-interest to "regular" scholarship (at least pre-tenure), and still difficult to discern except on the margins of the legal academy.  (On this last point, the rollicking response to Skeel's article on Christian legal scholarship continued today, with David Caudill's "On Skeel's Rhetorical Invention of a Failed Project.")  A recurring issue for me is the extent to which Christian (or Catholic) legal theory needs to be explicit about its underlying religious commitments in order to fit within the genre (and should it even be a genre?).  I also enjoyed listening to thoughtful papers from Bob Cochran, John Coverdale, John Nagle, Marc Poirer, and Sam Levine.  More tomorrow . . .

Religion and Adjudication: An Interesting Perspective


Religion-Based Arguments in Juvenile Life Without Parole Cases

-- Joan Gottschall

[Joan Gottschall is a United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, a member of the Visiting Committee to the University of Chicago Divinity School, and a member of the Martin Marty Center Advisory Board.]

Those interested in the intersection of religious values and public policy, and particularly criminal justice policy, should take note of a brief filed this past summer in the Supreme Court of the United States in the joined cases of Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, and Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621, on behalf of approximately twenty religious organizations as amici curiae or friends of the Court (see endnotes for a full list of organizations).  These two cases present the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment proscribes the sentencing of juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, as occurred in these two cases.  Oral argument for the cases took place on Monday, November 9.

The brief is noteworthy for a number of reasons.  First, it represents an effort by the diverse religious groups involved to speak in one voice on a matter of faith and conviction.  Second, the brief locates as central to each of these faith traditions the values of mercy, forgiveness and compassion, and the link between these values and concepts of justice and charity: “In short,” the brief states, “religious texts make clear that each of these three values–mercy, forgiveness, and compassion–must guide interpersonal and societal relations, and are to serve as the bedrock principles for a just and fair society.”  Third, amici make the claim, rarely heard in contemporary culture, that the duty of a judge, and of a society imposing judgment, is to make adequate provision for these values.

The legal position advanced by the brief is also remarkable, for amici argue that their shared religious values require the Supreme Court to reverse the Florida judgments and to hold that it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses to life without the possibility of parole.  The brief reasons as follows:  First, it reviews traditional religious recognition of the distinction between children and adults, both in religious teachings regarding crime and punishment and in other aspects of religious law.  It then summarizes the growing scientific support for this distinction and reviews the widespread cultural recognition that “the physical and mental immaturity of youth requires special treatment.”  Third, it argues that ignoring the special status of youth and condemning juveniles to die in prison contravenes the fundamental religious values of mercy, forgiveness, and compassion.  The brief points out that all individuals are entitled to these, but that the weak and vulnerable (such as children) have a special entitlement to compassionate treatment.  Indeed, it states that “[J]uveniles who commit serious crimes often come from disadvantaged backgrounds: many are poor, and frequently they have been the victims of abuse and neglect.  These are exactly the type of children the amici’s faith traditions stress are most deserving of kindness and compassion.”

Finally, the brief discusses the religious problem posed by a natural life sentence imposed on a juvenile offender.  Such a sentence is unjust, the brief argues, because it fails to recognize the potential of juveniles to grow, develop, and be rehabilitated; it thus contravenes the foundational concept of rehabilitation within each of the amici’s faith traditions.  The brief quotes the Florida judge who sentenced Terrance Jamar Graham (sixteen years old when he committed the crime for which he was sentenced) to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The judge noted Graham’s “escalating pattern of criminal conduct,” and concluded, “[T]here is nothing we can do for you.”  This “nihilistic view,” the brief argues, “is antithetical to the perspectives of amici’s faith traditions and of American society at large.”

The amici observe that their religious traditions recognize that “just punishment must allow for the offender to be rehabilitated and restored to the community when possible.”  Each of their traditions, they write, embraces the principle of “restorative justice,” which involves establishing a system of justice that, in the words of Michael L. Hadley, “moves from punishment to reconciliation, and from vengeance against offenders to healing for victims, from alienation and harshness to community and wholeness, from negativity and destructiveness to healing, forgiveness, and mercy.”  The brief describes with detailed examples how the concept of restorative justice is rooted in the faith traditions of the amici.

Anyone who has read the news of the last several months is aware of the controversy ignited by the President’s remark that among his criteria in selecting judges was empathy.  As the pundits are fond of pointing out, on this issue, even his Supreme Court nominee “threw him under the bus.”  In the context of our contemporary public discourse, the importance of the argument of these amici curiae cannot be overstated.  Their insistence on the religious centrality of mercy, forgiveness, compassion, and rehabilitation, and the relevance of these values to our system of justice, is a message rarely heard.

Notes:

Quotations come from the Brief of Amici Curiae, and from Michael L. Hadley, “Multifaith Reflection on Criminal Justice”, introduction to The Spiritual Roots of Restorative Justice, ed. Michael L. Hadley (SUNY Press, 2001).

The religious organizations joining in the amicus curiae brief  include the American Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, the American Catholic Correctional Chaplains Association, the American Friends Service Committee, the Buddhist Peace Fellowship, the Engaged Zen Foundation, the General Synod of the United Church of Christ, the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, the Mormons for Equality and Social Justice, the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, the Office of Restorative Justice of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, Prison Fellowship Ministries, and the General Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church, among others.  The brief was prepared by lawyers at the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, LLP, led by Michael B. deLeeuw.

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Sightings comes from the Martin Marty Center at the University of Chicago Divinity School.

Kevin Flannery S.J. on capital punishment

I think Father Kevin Flannery's article on capital punishment is well worth reading. Here. He discusses problems with the explantion of the teaching on capital punishment in Evangelium Vitae and in the Catechism. In particular, he explains the errors in discussing capital punishment as analogous to personal self-defense and as resting on the principle of double effect.

Richard M.