This blurb of mine appears on the dust jacket of Rob's new book (or so I have been told):
"There is no freedom more essential to the flourishing of a truly liberal democracy than the freedom to live one's life in accord with the yield of one's conscience--that is, with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments. And yet, the nature and implications of that freedom--which we may call freedom (or liberty) of conscience, and which of course cannot be absolute--are not well understood. Conscience and the Common Good is an excellent, engaging discussion of how to understand freedom of conscience and of how to protect it in a contemporary democracy, such as the United States, whose citizens disagree deeply among themselves about such morally fraught matters as abortion and same-sex marriage. Robert Vischer's book is must reading for citizens and scholars interested in freedom of conscience."
A few thoughts on the present colloquy between Michael and Robby.
1. The first point is that it's probably worth maintaining, at least as a regulative ideal, the goal of neither attempting to be, nor even of conceiving of ourselves, as 'liberals' or 'conservatives,' at least as those terms are conventionally employed in contemporary American political discourse. Indeed it has long seemed to me one of the great virtues of Catholic social and political thought that it proceeds from a coherent normative orientation toward the world, in such a way as often renders it at odds on various critical matters with most if not all of the dominant secular political parties and orientations, which latter do not appear to operate under any constraints of theoretic coherence. Most conspicuously, of course, the tradition of Catholic social and political thought has tended in recent decades to find itself at odds with Democratic Party platforms in respect of such pre-birth 'life' issues as abortion and stem-cell research, and with Republican Party platforms on such post-birth 'life' issues as capital punishment, elective war, and the social safety net. And that means, it seems to me, that most Catholics will tend not to be able to think of themselves as univocally 'Democrat' or 'Republican.' (I for my part used to fantasize about founding something that might be called a 'Christian Socialist' party, save that I'd want to make clear that the 'socialism' I'd have in mind would be some form of 'market' socialism, while the 'Christian' I'd have in mind would, for these political as distinguished from ecclesial purposes, be such as to embrace all, in the wonderful Vatican locution, 'people of good will.' That would doubtless include hundreds of millions of our Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Jain, Buddhist, and ... sisters and brothers. This party, as I dreamed of it, would have been pro-life both before and after the birth of the living being, and would cherish all forms of life on the earth, while viewing the human form of life as the 'steward' or 'servant' form. But enough of that for now.)
2. The second point is that it would seem to be quite consistent with, if not indeed a mandate of, our participation in the Catholic community of faith that we participate in that community's 'prophetic' function in addition to its sacramental and liturgical functions. Now I for one have often recoiled, perhaps as a consequence of a (non-politically) conservative temperament, at the oft-seeming self-flattery involved in locutions like 'our prophetic mission' and so forth, at least when heard from people whose involvements with their faiths seemed to be more or less like the involvements of casual sports-viewers with their televisions. But the fact is nevertheless that our Church acts as a witness and as a light unto the world, and certainly one altogether legitimate channel through which it does so is by providing a voice to the unjustifiably voiceless in our larger polity. Affording that voice, it seems to me, is not 'point-scoring' for a political party or political block in any cheap, gamey sense unless one's aim is to advance the cause of that party or block, as distinguished from that of those unjustifiably voiceless of God's creatures on whose behalf the Church is charged with the task of speaking. Now there can surely be times when one judges that the cause of a particular political party or bloc is more in snych with the cause of one's Church than is that of another. And so there can often be times when one might (a) reasonably 'take sides' with that party or bloc on the relevant 'issues,' buth also (b) in so doing for a sustained period of time, risk confounding the ally in that side-taking with the Church itself. I therefore tend to think it's incumbent on all of us to take special care to avoid the ever-present danger that is (b), while recognizing and prudently acting upon the sensible course of action that is (a). And one sign that one is not adequately avoiding the pitfall that is (b) would presumably be that one overlooks the errors of the political groups with which one is making common cause while triumphally trumpeting the errors of those political groups with which one is not.
3. Finally third, I think it fair to recognize, prior to any leap to the conclusion that somebody has fallen into 'trap (b)' as I've just characterized it, that there are times in the political life of our nation where the inconsistencies, hypocrisies, or other errors of one political party or bloc can be more abundant, or conspicuous, or dangerous, or otherwise salient than at other times, and than those of other political parties or blocs. There is no doubt what ever that the inconsistencies and hypocrisies of the Democratic Party in particular were especially evident in the early and mid-1990s, for example. Many who know me know that I fulminated quite furiously about the silencing of Governor Casey in the 1992 Democratic Party Convention. (I still do!) They also know that I was so disgusted by regular dissembling on the part of President Clinton, on a multitude of non-trivial political 'issues,' in the mid-1990s that I actually wrote in the name of Casey in the 1996 election, rather than vote for the Democratic candidate on whom I had quite given up, or the Republican candidate who I'd always found exceptionally dark, sinister, and opportunistic. (Asked whether the stance on abortion would matter to him in his selection of a running mate, some of you might recall from that time, Dole replied something like, 'no more than if he is left or right handed.') But to all appearances as I perceived them, something truly 'flipped' in the later 1990s. The idea that an all-out constitutional crisis should be opportunistically induced, all in order to score gratuitous political points in respnse to an undisciplined man's excruciatingly embarrassing if not indeed disgusting sexual blunder, by an opposition political party many if not most of whose seat-holders in Congress had been serial adulterers as well as serial husbands themselves, was just too much to tolerate any longer. For me, that marked the day that this party officially became a grave danger to the governability and long-term existence of our thus far remarkably successful experiment in pluralist republican democracy. And things have only grown worse from that quarter since those days, all while the Democratic Party has landed a multitude of 'pro-life' members in Congress and has just wrought the Stupack Amendment (which many appear to believe goes much further than any constitutionally plausible Republican 'pro-life' measure of recent years). If you add to all this the fact that Republican leaders, members of Congress, and 'grass roots' rank & file have since the summer routinely been (a) lying - yes, lying - about the President's place of birth, about the President's taking 'In God We Trust' off of the coinage, about health insurance legislation of the kind for which the Bishops themselves have been calling for decades, and a multitude of other important public matters, all while (b) whipping up paranoid fantasies and seditious intentions which actually are inducing armed - yes, armed - crazies to attend 'tea party' rallies, and (c) literally shouting down and shutting down public fora - including not only 'town hall' meetings, but the floor of the House of Representatives itself - to prevent people from taking part in public deliberations, ... it grows very difficult indeed not to view today's Republican Party, which looks more like a sibling, within the same holding company structure, of Fox 'News' every day, as Threat One to the governability and longterm sustainability of our polity. What is Threat Two? Why, right now, that might well be the Democratic Party, which appears to be owned in significant measure by a Wall Street consortium. And while Michael, I, and many others here are attending to the clear and present danger that is the RNC, I have no doubt - and no worry - that Robby and many others will attend to that momentarily lesser danger that is the DNC. I say thank goodness -- and Robby et al -- for that.
Yesterday, I moderated a panel discussion on our colleague Rob's forthcoming book, "Conscience and the Common Good." (Pre-order it here!) The participants included MOJ's Patrick Brennan, as well as Michael Moreland and Nora O'Callaghan. It was a really nice event, featuring tough questions and thoughtful answers. I hope Rob and Patrick will share, here on MOJ, some of what went on during the discussion.
Here, just to refresh your recollection, is the book's animating idea:
Our society's longstanding commitment to the liberty of conscience has become strained by our increasingly muddled understanding of what conscience is and why we value it. Too often we equate conscience with individual autonomy, and so we reflexively favor the individual in any contest against group authority, losing sight of the fact that a vibrant liberty of conscience requires a vibrant marketplace of morally distinct groups. Defending individual autonomy is not the same as defending the liberty of conscience because, although conscience is inescapably personal, it is also inescapably relational. Conscience is formed, articulated, and lived out through relationships, and its viability depends on the law's willingness to protect the associations and venues through which individual consciences can flourish: these are the myriad institutions that make up the space between the person and the state. Conscience and the Common Good reframes the debate about conscience by bringing its relational dimension into focus.
Certainly, there have been few such moments on the football field this season. But, on Friday morning, at the Center for Ethics & Culture's (wonderful) Fall Conference, "The Summons of Freedom," I attended a very interesting panel on Maritain, Murray, Pope Pius XII, and religious freedom. The papers presented were all very enlightening. During the Q & A, while we were talking and thinking about Murray, my esteemed colleague Bob Rodes shared an intervention. (Here is a paper I did, a few years ago, on Bob's church-state work.) Then, it hit me: "We are talking about Murray, with a legal scholar whom Murray cited in 'We Hold These Truths'!"
. . . my point was clear enough, dear Michael, and you understood it perfectly well, I suspect. We shouldn't use MoJ for purposes of partisan point-scoring. Do you not agree? As a matter of fact, I do not keep a file on "conservative hypocrisy." There is no need to. Living as you and I do in a milieu in which people overwhelmingly hold liberal views and in many cases loathe conservative ones, I know that I'll hear about every instance of conservative hypocrisy that comes to light. These instances will not go unmentioned or be forgotten. The failings of, say, Newt Gingrich will be constantly recalled; those of Teddy Kennedy, rarely if ever mentioned. You know that as well as I do. I don't think you or I, dear Michael, should jump on every opportunity to point out the hypocrisy of politicians and political organizations on MoJ. You, dear Michael, say I should have pointed out the latest instance of Republican hypocrisy ("it would have been much more powerful"). Then "anticipating" my possible counterpoint, you claim that had MoJ been around in 1996 you would have trumpeted your disgust with Bill Clinton. But that won't do, dear Michael. You had an instance of liberal Democratic (and, as it happens, Catholic) hypocrisy staring you in the face just this week, and you did not post about it on MoJ (unless I somehow missed it). Tim Kaine, the liberal Democractic Catholic governor of Virginia, trumpeted by the Catholic left as a true pro-life Democrat (despite his support for legal abortion) in part because of his avowed opposition to the death penalty, declined to stop the execution of John Allen Muhammad. Why, dear Michael, did you say nothing? It would have been very powerful if you had pointed out the hypocrisy of a liberal Catholic Democrat with national political ambitions, no? The truth, Michael, is that I don't think you had any obligation to use MoJ to point out this case of hypocrisy and I had no obligation to use MoJ to point out the hypocrisy of the RNC. I'm new to MoJ, but I don't think it is meant to be some sort of register of the hypocrisy of politicians and political parties. In any event, I'm glad that you do not believe that there is more hypocrisy on the right than on the left. Perhaps I've missed some cases of your posting on liberal hypocrisy. If I have, then you have some strong evidence that your post on the RNC was not partisan point-scoring. Can you point me to some cases?
... do you also maintain a file titled "conservative hypocrisy"? If not, why not? Is it only "liberal hypocrisy" that matters .. or that engages you? What, dear Robby, is your point? I can't fathom why anyone would think--and I am sure that Rob Hockett does not think, and was not intimating--that hypocrisy is more on the right than on the left. What is the point in maintaining a file just on "liberal hypocrisy"? In any event, are you suggesting that it was wrong to point out, on MOJ, the hypocrisy of the RNC? Granted, it would have been much more powerful if *you* had pointed it out. Did it occur to you that *you* should point it out? Does it occur to you now that instead of posting as you did, *you* should weigh in on the hypocrisy of the RNC? (Just to anticipate: If there had been an MOJ in 1996, I would have trumpeted--I am a congenital trumpeter--that I was disgusted with Bill Clinton--this, well before Monicagate!--and I would have explained why I could not vote for him. Just one example.)
My understanding is that Sarah Palin's parents left the Catholic Church while their children were still at home and joined the Assemblies of God -- a Protestant pentecostal denomination. Sarah remained in that denomination until a few years ago when she and her family joined the Wasilla Bible Church, which is, I believe, an independent evangelical church.
On a different matter, after my former political party denied pro-life Pennsylvania governor Robert P. Casey the opportunity to address the 1992 Democratic National Convention, I began maintaining a file entitled "Liberal Hypocrisy." That file is now very fat. Over the past couple of days I've been struggling to resist the temptation to unload its contents on MoJ. I know that it would be wrong to use MoJ as a forum for partisan point-scoring, but the flesh is weak. Pray for me.
As an academic associate dean, I can handle about one substantive scholarship/advocacy area at a time, and right now it's religious liberty and gay-marriage recognition. This past Thursday saw a fine conference at Northwestern Law School on the topic, and I gave the "keynote" talk, on "What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common."
I personally have come to find the case for legislative recognition of same-sex marriage to be strong (a position that should in no way be imputed to the co-authors of our letters advocating strong religious exemptions). But my conclusion on the underlying question in no way lessens my commitment to strong accommodations for religious objectors, both organizations and individuals. Indeed, the gravamen of my NU talk was that the very arguments that support recognition of SSM also strongly support accommodation of religious objectors unless they are in a position substantially to block access to marriage. I'll post the full piece when it's written, but here's a summary:
Both same-sex couples and religious objectors argue that they should be able, free from state interference or discouragement, to engage in conduct that is fundamental, in a pervasive way, to their personal identity. . . . Both gay-rights and religious-liberty proponents have had to confront the counterargument that their interests involve only conduct, which the state can presumptively regulate [as opposed to, respectively, orientation or belief]. Both set of proponents respond that when conduct is fundamental to personal identity, the state should weigh that heavily and not burden, discourage, or disfavor the conduct without strong, concrete reasons for doing so. . . . If the centrality of conduct to personal identity supports recognizing same-sex marriage, it also supports broad recognition of rights of religious conscience.
Related to this first commonality is a second: that both same-sex marriage and religious claimants seek to live out their identities in ways that are public in the sense of socially apparent and socially acknowledged. . . . When same-sex couples are told they will receive no more than toleration of their private behavior, they are asked to keep their identities in the closet. But when traditional religious believers are told to keep their beliefs to themselves, or to leave them behind upon entering the world of social services or the commercial marketplace, they too are told to keep their identities in the closet.
This combination of arguments makes a strong case for recognizing same-sex marriage but also recognizing significant religious accommodations [unless] the objector's refusal to serve would impose substantial hardship on the same-sex couple seeking services. . . . This approach presumptively allows both sides to live out their identity without state interference or discouragement. . . . Denials of service do affect gay couples by causing them disturbance and offense, [but] the harm to the objector from legal sanctions is far greater. In most cases, the offended couple can go to the next entry in the phone book or the Google result. The individual or organization held liable for discrimination, by contrast, must either violate the tenets of the faith or exit the service area or livelihood in which she/it has invested time, effort, and money. The state simply does not give the religious objector's identity equal weight if it overrides the living out of that identity on the basis of symbolic harm or offense.
