At Michael P.'s suggestion, I surfed over to the Commonweal blog for David Gibson's post on "abortion and the Catholic voter". I have to admit, I'm not sure there's all that much to be said or done, or much movement to be expected, on the "Catholic voter" question. We are where we are, and that's where I expect we'll stay. Still . . .
It seems to be a premise of many of these "for whom should Catholics vote?" discussions that "on every issue that matters, other than abortion, the election of Sen. Obama will actually yield meaningful policy actions that are edifyingly in concert with the Church's social teaching, while the election of Sen. McCain will actually yield meaningful policy actions that are distressingly in conflict with the Church's social teaching." But, this premise is false.
It is false because it ignores, or at least downplays, the political, social, cultural and economic realities that will almost certainly prevent dramatic changes with respect to most matters, and so it overestimates the "good" stuff about an Obama administration that, it is proposed, outweighs the "bad" stuff. It is also false because Sen. McCain's views (or, more precisely, the policies likely to be pursued by his administration) on a number of matters -- not just abortion -- are, in terms of consonance with the Church's social teaching, preferable to Sen. Obama's. Or, so a faithful, reasonable, informed, non-duped, non-Republican-hack, Commonweal-and-First Things-reading Catholic could conclude. It's a sad thought, but . . . I'm not sure that productive conversations -- even among friends -- are possible so long as this false premise is assumed.
David Gibson's post is a discussion of this New York Times piece -- read my colleague Gerry Bradley's analysis of the piece, here -- which quotes my longtime friend Doug Kmiec as urging Catholics to ask, "not ‘Can I vote for him?’ but ‘Why shouldn’t I vote for the candidate who feels more passionately and speaks more credibly about economic fairness for the average family, who will be a true steward of the environment, and who will treat the immigrant family with respect?’”? (I assume Doug is not talking here about Gov. Romney, the previous object of his enthusiasm? Sorry. Couldn't resist.) Put aside, but just for now, the facts that it is not at all obvious that Sen. Obama's "feel[ings]" -- on anything -- are more admirable than Sen. McCain's, that Sen. McCain's record on environmental "stewardship" is a responsible and reasonable one, and that Sen. McCain -- who has taken real political risks supporting fairness for immigrants, while Sen. Obama (feelings and all) has not yet served out a full term in the Senate -- would not "treat the immigrant family with respect". For what it's worth, here's a possible answer to Doug's question: Because Sen. Obama voted against a law banning the killing of infants that survive abortions, he voted to filibuster Justice Alito (in a context where the leading arguments against the nominee involved his vote upholding abortion regulations) and would probably nominate judges and justices who, though entirely competent and decent, would have misguided views on religious-freedom and church-state matters, he opposes school choice, he would roll back the faith-based initiative, and his election means the certain passage into law of the awful Freedom of Choice Act. He looks great when he raises his chin, and some of what he says -- when he is not thundering in support of abortion rights -- sounds nice, but that's just not enough. For me. For what it's worth. . . .
On an entirely different matter . . . I've been vacationing in the Pacific Northwest, am returning to "Michiana" tomorrow, and can report that (a) Whistler is beautiful and (b) the Kautz route up Mt. Rainier was -- for this aging law prof, anyway -- too hard. Back to the drawing board . . . .
Thursday, August 7, 2008
Jim Wallis reports from Australia that in their election of a Labor government last November, a "pivotal" cause was the swing in votes of some evangelicals and pentecostals (see here), based on "new" issues like climate change, global poverty, and the Iraq war and on the presence of an openly religious (Catholic) party leader. Those factors are operating here, although we don't know how strongly and you'd want to compare Obama's specific positions with how Kevin Rudd as PM has handled similar issues.
At any rate, the Australian headline "On a swing and a prayer" is clever.
Interesting post (including comments) over at dotCommonweal: here.
Wednesday, August 6, 2008
I think that Susan and Greg have articulated well the reasons why the proposed boycott at AALS is a bad thing, and they help me put details on my not-fully-articulated question about whether the presence of "market power" makes this wrong. (I think we agree that the boycott is legal -- an exercise of the boycotters' own speech and other freedoms -- except perhaps for Fr. Araujo; I'm not sure how to read his argument that the boycotters "are challenging [Mr. Manchester's] right to exercise his political voice"). I do think we have to be careful about saying that "it's not within [an organization's] nature or purpose" to engage in a given expression of conscience in the marketplace. That's the argument that's used to say landlords shouldn't refuse to rent to unmarried couples, pharmacists shouldn't refuse to dispense Plan B, and federally funded soup-kitchen program shouldn't consider religion in hiring: their purpose, the argument goes, is simply to provide commercial and social services, not to express conscience. But I agree that the presumption should be different when a scholarly organization with a wide membership, i.e. encompassing the whole legal academy in a given subject matter, takes an official stance based on someone's expression of views. Such organizations should have a much stronger ethos of maintaning a neutral stance between people (including their own members) of fundamentally different political views. I was pointing toward something like that with the "market power" question, but the others articulate it much better.
I think Greg is also right to recognize that SALT, which is an an ideologically grounded rather than an umbrella subject-matter organization, presents different questions. In response to Greg's charge that SALT is contradicting its professed commitment to freedom of speech, I imagine SALT would say that if Mr. Manchester's giving his money to a cause based on his belief is speech, then so is their members' withholding their money based on their beliefs.
Now if Mr. Manchester repeatedly expressed racist views, or contributed $125,000 to a constitutional-amendment drive to reverse the right to interracial marriage, would Greg, Susan, et al. respond differently to a proposed boycott? If so, that would bring us back again to the argument, which recurs in all of these disputes, that opposing same-sex marriage and seeking to reflect that opposition in the law, should not be treated the same as racism. There is, at the least, enough room for good-faith debate about this issue that those with whom one disagrees ought not to be marginalized, not just in the academic sphere directly -- this is not a boycott against academic speakers who oppose same-sex marriage -- but in closely related spheres like where to hold a conference. Thus Patrick's post on the same-sex marriage/racism comparison is highly relevant.
Tuesday, August 5, 2008
Tom Berg and Susan Stabile have raised some important questions about decisions by groups that are eager to boycott the hotel the AALS, long before the California Supreme Court decided that there is a right in law to same-sex marriage, chose to house the organization's January 2009 meeting. The stated object of the boycott is the hotel owner's use of his personal resources to influence political judgments and law. I'm sure reasonable minds can differ on many of these questions.
A statement by my distinguished Villanova colleague Louis Sirico, who in his capacity as an AALS section chair speaks for many, raises a question of a different order of magnitude. Here's what the National Law Journal Reports:
'Also on Monday, Louis Sirico, chairman of the AALS Section on Legal Writing, Research and Reasoning, said that if the AALS does not move the meeting, his group will not attend events at the hotel. "It's a matter of principle," he said. "We just don't believe in this kind of discrimination." Sirico is director of the legal writing program at Villanova University School of Law.
"Discrimination?" Does Professor Sirico -- and do those for whom he (apparently) speaks -- believe that those who adhere to the traditional view that marriage is the union of a man and a woman engage in "discrimination?" It would seem so, if the NLJ and Professor Sirico are telling the truth.
But there's discrimination (I discriminate between ripe and overripe tomatoes), and there's discrimination. The latter is of the sort condemned in Loving v. Virginia (1967), in which the Court declared Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute a violation of our Constitution. Is the suggestion, allegation of Sirico et al. that those who oppose legal recognition of same-sex marriage engage in the invidious sort of discrimation that Loving outlawed?
Cannot reasonable minds differ on the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized in law? The crazy-quilt of national discourse would indicate a positive answer. The reactionary hurling of epithets only tends to preempt the possibility of civil discourse on a question that is vigorously and vibrantly disputed in our society.
But perhaps it's more than the hurling of epithets. Perhaps Sirico et al. are sitting in solemn moral judgment on all those people who conscientiously conclude that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage is not a morally tenable option. Perhaps they're sure that the rest of us are surely wrong.
The allegation of "discrimination," when it's not varieties of tomatoes that we're talking about, is a debate stopper. Should we admire -- or should we not question -- the moral certainty that leads people to rule out the voices of those who are not convinced that same-sex marriage is a morally tenable option? Has the question tackled by Sirico et al. in fact been decided with the finality and certainty that leave all the others in the realm of moral opprobrium?
John C. Murray was right that civil disagreement is a monumental achievement. The anti-reasoning sloganism of "discrimination," in advance of deep and certain judgment, prefers intimidation to civic discourse.