Mark has asked an important question about the relationship between Catholic and Jesuit in the context of The Heights editorial from a couple of days ago. The link is inextricable. As then Father Avery Dulles said in 1999, the second, Jesuit, is an intensification of the first, Catholic. I also believe that a way of understanding this connection is to think and pray about the election between the two standards in the second week of Saint Ignatius's Spiritual Exercises. As the Mullan translation puts it: "The one of Christ, our Commander-in-chief; the other of Lucifer, moral enemy of our human nature." I am not sure if the editors who wrote the piece quoted by Mark are familiar with this part of Jesuit spirituality. It would be a good place to start for any of us interested in the vital relationship. RJA sj
Wednesday, December 7, 2005
A Response to Mark's Invitation
Slavery, Part II
Given Pius IX's other shenanigans, I have little reason to doubt the British observer. But I don't think anti-Catholicism among abolitionists excuses the Church's failure to support abolition. It certainly explains the reluctance of Catholics to join forces with the Republicans. As a descriptive matter though, I agree with your take on this. The Church saw abolition as linked to liberalism, which it opposed (in part because of anti-Catholicism among liberals), and so it, for the most part, was hostile to abolition. Sort of an "enemy of my enemy" kind of thing. But that is, in my view, reprehensible.
If you need a non-web cite for the Holy Office instruction, it's quoted in Readings in Moral Theology No. 13, Change in Official Catholic Moral Teachings (Charles E. Curran ed. 2003) (Paulist Press). See page 69. I think it is also discussed in John Francis Maxwell's book, Slavery and the Catholic Church (1975).
Finally, I don't think Hayes's point is that the Church enslaves the faithful as a general matter, but rather that its support for slavery was without regard to whether the slaves in question were in fact Catholic. In Catholic countries, as I understand it, most slaves were baptized. But the Church did not, as a consequence of that baptism, require their emancipation.
Slavery again
Thanks to Eduardo for his posting. I am not sure where to begin responding to his diverse points, but I shall try my best. Professor McGreevy’s work to which Eduardo refers is “Catholicism and American Freedom.” I think it fair to say that many Catholics, including bishops, were dealing with strong anti-Catholic sentiments in the US in the ante-bellum period. Thomas Nast’s cartoon characterizations of Catholics after the Civil War was over demonstrate that this antipathy did not end with the Civil War. Professor McGreevy mentions that the Northern abolitionists were also public in their distaste for Catholics. Under such conditions, it would be hard to imagine an alliance between Catholics and the abolitionists. During the American Civil War, Catholic loyalties were divided. But I must respectfully disagree with the unnamed British observer who offered the view that Pius IX “could not conceal from me that all his sympathies were with the Southern confederacy.” The diplomatic correspondence between the Holy See and the U.S. minister to Rome and the U.S. Department of State demonstrates that Rome and the Pope supported the Union. As the American Minister reported to the U.S. Secretary of State in 1863, “His Holiness, as well as the Cardinal Secretary of State, are decided friends of The Union and ardently desire that its integrity may be preserved. The latter was strong in the expression of his Hopes that the North would speedily subdue the Rebellion.” Dispatch no. 8, to Washington, April 4, 1863. Earlier, in June of 1862, Pius IX wrote to Mr. Randall the then Minister of the United States to Rome assuring him of the Holy See’s intention of friendly relations with the United States. It was the British who were divided in their support of the Union and the Confederacy as the March 23 parliamentary debates demonstrate. Lord Campbell urged recognition of the Confederacy, but Earl Russell counseled against action that would antagonize the Union. I have attempted to verify the accuracy of 1866 instruction from the Holy Office. At this stage I am not willing to accept the veracity of the sources available on websites that refer to it. With regard to Professor Diana Hayes comments, I must disagree with what appears to be her contentions. If she is asserting that the Church continues to enslave, I again must also disagree. I suggest that a person today freely chooses to follow the Church or not. To be free for its teachings is not enslavement but the greatest exercise of freedom. To seek freedom from something is rather easy, but to be free for something requires considerable effort on the part of the person who claims and practices this kind of freedom. RJA sj
Tuesday, December 6, 2005
The Death Penalty, Deterrence, and Desert
The debate never gets old . . . Here is a link to Carol Steiker's new article, "No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required." And, here is the abstract:
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have argued that, if recent empirical studies claiming to find a substantial deterrent effect from capital punishment are valid, consequentialists and deontologists alike should conclude that capital punishment is not merely morally permissible, but actually morally required. While there is ample reason to reject this argument on the ground that the empirical studies are deeply flawed (as economists John Donohue and Justin Wolfers elaborate in a separate essay), this response directly addresses Sunstein and Vermeule's moral argument. Sunstein and Vermeule contend that recognition of the distinctive moral agency of the government and acceptance of "threshold" deontology (by which categorical prohibitions may be overridden to avoid catastrophic harm) should lead both consequentialists and deontologists to accept the necessity of capital punishment. This response demonstrates that neither premise leads to the proposed conclusion. Acknowledging that the government has special moral duties does not render inadequately deterred private murders the moral equivalent of government executions. Rather, executions constitute a distinctive moral wrong (purposeful as opposed to non-purposeful killing), and a distinctive kind of injustice (unjustified punishment). Moreover, acceptance of "threshold" deontology in no way requires a commitment to capital punishment even if substantial deterrence is proven; rather, arguments about catastrophic "thresholds" face special challenges in the context of criminal punishment. This response also explains how Sunstein and Vermeule's argument necessarily commits us to accepting other brutal or disproportionate punishments, and concludes by suggesting that even consequentialists should not be convinced by the argument.
Larry Solum (thanks, Larry, for the link) comments:
I highly recommend this article which takes on the now famous (or infamous) Sunstein-Vermeule life-life thesis. Steiker is absolutely right that Sunstein & Vermeule do not have an argument to collapse the moral distinction between intentional killing--executions are surely that--and nonintentional killings, but I do not see how this point damages the Sunstein-Vermeule thesis in the way that Steiker claims. I am currently in Guangzhou China & I don't have enough time to give this the comment it deserves, but briefly, I think that the key argument that Sunstein and Vermeule could make--whether they are clear about this, I am not sure--is that more wrongful killing of innocents results from failure to deter than from accidentally execution of innocents. This is assuming their empirical hypothesis is correct--which is controversial, of course. When the government executes an innocent person by mistake, the action is intentional under the description "killing the person sentenced to death by execution," but it is not intentional under the description "killing an innocent person." So, while the government acts intentionally, it does not kill innocents intentionally. Hence, Steiker's point, although correct, does not really defeat the "innocent life-innocent life" point, which is the point that Sunstein and Vermeule should be making. I don't think the Sunstein-Vermeule argument works, but my reasons are entirely different than Steikers. Maybe more on this later! Read Steiker's piece!
Deciphering Sullivan
The other day, Andrew Sullivan wrote this:
Re-reading the theocons for my book on conservatism, I have been struck by how, in recent years, they have come to a consensus that in order for their political-theological project to be coherent, they may have to undermine Darwin and evolution. This political Pope may help provide cover. You cannot restore Aquinas as the central figure for the West's understanding of its own politics without dethroning Darwin. For the neocons, this will present a real challenge: to say things they know are untrue in order to promote a political reordering that they approve of. Some will balk, like Krauthammer. But others will find a way to be tactically silent, or worse. Power is at stake.
Put aside the fact that Pope Benedict is not (and does not purport to be) a Thomist. And put aside the merits of Sullivan's often-repeated, deliberately tendentious characterization of this Pope as "political." I am genuinely curious as to what he meant, or could possibly mean, with the statement, "You cannot restore Aquinas as the central figure for the West's understanding of its own politics without dethroning Darwin." Seriously -- no snark intended. What is he talking about?
Slavery and the Church
In response to Fr. Araujo’s question, I suppose I had the following things in mind:
First, these observations by John McGreevy:
Only a handful of American Catholic bishops supported immediate emancipation, along with some liberal Catholics in Brownson’s circle. . . . Only one Jesuit, Francis Weninger, publicly defended emancipation, perhaps because he had personally witnessed the horror of a New Orleans slave auction.
From the beginning of the [Civil War], Vatican officials maintained a studied neutrality, but the Jesuits at Civilta Cattolica traced the origins of the conflict to the mania for liberty and disrespect for authority endemic in liberal political culture . . . . The increasingly drastic measures by the Lincoln administration further alienated Roman observers. Pius IX, according to one 1864 British observer, ‘could not conceal from me that all his sympathies were with the Southern confederacy,’ and an American diplomat claimed that the Jesuits opposed negotiations with Garibaldi even ‘as they are and were, with few exceptions [opposed] to the cause of the Union.’ . . . In perhaps the surest sign of the Vatican’s disfavor, a writer for L’Osservagtore Romano compared the Republicans, or ‘radicali,’ to French revolutionaries and characterized Republicans as ‘inflamed by puritan and abolitionist fanaticism and motivated by a poisonous hatred.’
I also had in mind the following 1866 statement by the Holy Office:
Slavery itself . . . is not at all contrary to the natural and divine law. . . . For the sort of ownership which a slave owner has over a slave is understood as nothing other than the perpetual right of disposing of the work of a slave for one’s own benefit – services which it is right for one human being to provide for another . . . .
It is true that the Church did condemn certain means of enslavement, but, to quote Diana Hayes, “[b]efore the end of the slave trade in the nineteenth century, with few exceptions, the Roman Catholic Church did support and maintain with all its power, secular and spiritual, the enslavement not only of non-Catholics but of its own Catholic faithful.”
Are Jesuits Catholic?
An interesting take on this question from the student editors of BC's campus paper -- the assumption seems to be that Catholic and Jesuit "values" are different. There are also a number of unexamined assumptions about what being "Catholic" means to BC, and about the relation of its Catholicism to BC's ambitions to be one of the "top" or "premier" schools in the country. The particular issue discussed in this editorial (a GLBT dance at BC) is less important than the cluster of un-thought-through assumptions about what it means for the college to be Catholic. Perhaps Father Araujo may have some thoughts on the Jesuit vs. Catholic notion. This is from the BC Heights, 12/5/05:
Cancelled GLBT dance challenges BC's focus
By Heights Editorial Board
The Issue: BC denies GLBT dance due to conflict with the church
What we think: BC should follow Jesuit values, not Catholic doctrine
The battle for equality on campus has been a long and arduous one. Last
semester, the Rally for Equality showcased not only how far the campaign for
equal rights has come, but also how important this cause is to a large
portion of the Boston College community.
The cancellation of a GLBT "safe zone" dance by the administration last week
has only done damage to this crucial campaign. While some may see the
University's decision as insignificant, for many it is an issue of great
importance, and one that may have grave consequences in the quest for equal
rights on BC's campus.
Though there are many potential motives for the cancellation, the University
has made it clear that this decision was based primarily on BC's role as a
Catholic university, and the seeming implications that follow that. A
statement by Jack Dunn, University spokesman, said that BC "cannot sanction
an event that is exclusive and that promotes a lifestyle that is in conflict
with church teaching and the Jesuit, Catholic mission and heritage of Boston
College."
This decision was not made by the church, but by the administration. Office
of the Dean for Student Development (ODSD) and Student Affairs concluded
that this dance was against the Catholic and Jesuit ideals of BC. The
decision by the University was not, however, a breach of the somewhat
misleading non-discrimination policy conceived just last year, which
actually provides little protection in regard to discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
As much as people might want to place the blame solely on the University,
there is a central issue beyond simply the actions of the administration
that must be addressed: the church and BC's relationship to it.
Church doctrine is certainly important to many Catholics, and it is
especially so for University President Rev. William P. Leahy, S.J., and BC
as a Catholic university. BC's Catholic tradition is not something to be
taken lightly, as it defines the college as a premier university and an
institution that educates men and women not simply through book knowledge,
but through service and hands-on experience in the community.
The Vatican recently released a statement saying that it "cannot admit to
the seminary or to holy orders those who practice homosexuality, present
deep-seated homosexual tendencies, or support the so-called 'gay culture.'"
Though some support the report, that announcement has caused quite a stir
and much anger among supporters of homosexual rights.
Because it has long been a goal of BC's to be not only one of the country's
top universities, but also the premier Catholic university in America, it
would seem not only logical, but required that the University should abide
by these doctrines.
But the problem isn't that simple.
The question at this point is whether BC is willing to sacrifice its Jesuit
ideals of compassion and understanding in order to stay in the good graces
of the Vatican. In a message titled "Answering society's call" on the BC Web
site, Leahy said that "Boston College endeavors to educate a new generation
of leaders for the new millennium - men and women who will be capable of
shaping a new century with vision, justice, and charity - with a sense of
calling, with concern for all of the human family."
Certainly justice, charity, and a "concern for all of the human family" are
not consistent with banning GLBT students from holding a dance as an AIDS
Awareness Week fundraiser simply because of their sexual orientation.
Whatever the ultimate goal is, BC sits at a crossroads. On the one hand, it
can remain devout to each and every doctrine of the church, even if that
means treating members of the aforementioned "human family" as if they are
something less than that. On the other hand it can educate students in the
values of tolerance and understanding that seem to get lost far too often.
BC is an incredible institution because it remains faithful to the Jesuit
ideals of "men and women for others" and social justice for the greater
glory of God - not because it follows church doctrine to the letter.
BC's rise in national prominence has been fast and significant, but the
University can go much farther. As BC aspires to become one of the top
universities in the country - and steps have certainly been made to do so -
it has a choice to make. Regardless of varying views on homosexuality, every
BC student wants their BC diploma to mean more 20 years down the line as BC
becomes an even more respected university.
But will that be possible if a school that claims to espouse the values of a
man who accepted prostitutes as his equals cannot give the same respect to
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals?
The answer will become clear as BC decides what path it will take.
Kant and Cloning
Rick asks whether Kant's "persons are ends, not means" dictum really works as a basis for opposing cloning without the assistance of religious arguments. I agree that a religious worldview provides a much richer foundation for opposing cloning, but for those who do not accept the premises of a religious worldview, Kant may be the only game in town. And if the only viable choices in the public discourse over cloning are a religious worldview and a well-intentioned utilitarianism, I'm afraid that the latter may come out on top more often than not. I'd welcome Kantian secularists to the conversation with open arms.
This leads to a broader question regarding the benefit we gain from establishing the shallowness of non-religious foundations of human rights. (And thus may best be directed at Michael Perry and others who have thought more deeply than I have about this area.) I see the obvious benefit if the religious voices are being deprived of a place at the table, but absent that, don't we want to ensure that the table is open to as many foundational premises as possible, religious and non-religious alike, provided that they are advocating for views that embody Kant's dictum?
Rob
UPDATE: Oglethorpe University politics prof Joe Knippenberg has sent me his fascinating essay, "Liberalism and Religion: The Case of Kant," in which he argues that:
Kant’s [work suggests] that if liberalism is to avoid overweening and prideful “Prometheanism,” there must be some sort of insistence upon human finitude. Human beings who are unaware of their fallibility and finitude might place too much stock in their own efforts to transform nature and human nature. In so doing, they might (in Kantian terms) be tempted to regard others merely as means to their own ends. Thus if liberalism is not to give way to what was once called the totalitarian temptation, it must pay heed in theory and in practice to this human fallibility and finitude. Kant’s treatment of religion is . . .a finely tuned attempt both to insist upon human finitude and to avoid the despair and lassitude that might accompany that recognition.
If anyone would like a copy of the essay, please contact me and I'll forward it to you.
Monday, December 5, 2005
"What Would a Clone Say?"
Like Gary Rosen, I read and thoroughly enjoyed Kazuo Ishiguro's recent novel, "Never Let Me Go." (See Rosen, "The Way We Live Now: What Would a Clone Say?", N.Y. Magazine, Nov. 27, 2005, available here). The novel is, in a nutshell, a coming-of-age story about Kathy H., who (along with her boarding-school classmates) a clone created entirely for organ-donation purposes.
Rosen uses "Never Let Me Go" as the starting point for what he characterizes as a Kantian, non-religious argument against "therapeutic" cloning:
[Y]ou don't have to be a raving Bible-thumper to entertain moral doubts about so-called therapeutic cloning . . .. All you need is a bit of Kant from Ethics 101, especially the part about treating other people, presumably even proto-people, not as a means to your own ends but as ends in themselves. It is an injunction hard to square with the literature on S.C.N.T., with its talk of "harvesting" and "programming" stem cells. The language of the scientists and their supporters is clinical, meliorative and humane, but it gives off an unmistakable whiff of cannibalism.
Some see the cloning debate as just another skirmish in the abortion war. After all, if it is permissible to abort an embryo, what could be wrong with putting it to some lifesaving use instead? But abortion is an ordeal unsought by the woman who faces it, a tragedy of circumstance. There is, by contrast, nothing accidental or contingent about creating nascent human life with the declared aim of destroying it. It is the deliberate use of one (developing) person as the instrument of another, a practice that should give pause even to those who ardently favor abortion rights.
I agree with Rosen's bottom line, I suppose. Still, I guess I regret what appears to be his premise, namely, we should be relieved to learn that naked Kantian assertions about "not using persons as means" -- which, Rosen (too quickly?) assumes also apply to "proto-people" (???) -- provide a basis for opposing cloning, since we would otherwise be stuck with the foundationless "moral doubts" of "raving Bible-thumpers." Rosen is the editor of Commentary, and he knows better: The argument about the morality of human cloning is far richer than his "Kant v. the Rubes" account suggests. And, I'm curious: Does anyone else have doubts about whether Kant's "persons are ends, not means" dictum really works, without the help of (the raving Bible-thumpers') religious arguments?
Religious Freedom and Anti-Discrimination Law . . . again
Here is an op-ed worth reading, by John Leo, on a matter we've discussed often here at MOJ: "Religious Freedom Must Trump Anti-Discrimination Law":
The case of Michelle McCusker, the unmarried and pregnant teacher fired by a Catholic school, may turn out to be an important one, with a heavy impact on our understanding of religious liberty. The New York Civil Liberties Union is handling her suit, and if the school and the local diocese don't fold their cards and settle, the NYCLU will lose in court. And it deserves to.
McCusker, 26, is suing the Diocese of Brooklyn and St. Rose of Lima school in Queens for dismissing her as a pre-kindergarten teacher last fall. That was two days after McCusker told her principal that she was three months pregnant and had no intention of marrying the father.
The civil liberties union made a mistake in taking this case, because it is now in the position of arguing that an anti-discrimination law overrides the First Amendment right of free exercise of religion. Among other things, free exercise means that a church has an absolute right to designate those who speak in its name. If it can't do this, then its religious message is corrupted and the constitutional rights of its members violated. . . .
It strikes me that (a) McCusker should lose, under any meaningful notion of religious freedom, but (b) it is not entirely clear, under present-day doctrine, that the First Amendment requires her to lose. Do any other MOJ church-state experts have a take?
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