In response to Richard, I concede
that Veritas Splendor, for example, takes the objective conscience position, but I wonder
what significance should be attached to the widespread willingness of faithful
Catholics to reject some moral teachings of the Church. As Eduardo observes,
this is most conspicuously true of birth control (not only in the U.S. and Europe, but also in Latin America from
my reading (I would guess that support for the Church’s position in Africa is also weak though I have not seen any data on
this). Even if the teaching of the magisterium is thought to be settled
(instead of mixed, as I, rightly or wrongly, believe it is) on the issue of
conscience, it seems clear that there is not acceptance of the claim of
objective conscience by the faithful.
Of course, whatever the degree of
authoritativeness of the objective conscience view, it does not purport to be
an infallible teaching of the Church, and the issue before us is the degree to
which one is required to assent to such teachings. There is a pastoral issue
here that I think is of great importance. Father Sullivan, Magisterium:
Teaching Authority in the Catholic Church 171-72, makes this point
extremely well in my opinion:
“I am convinced that it is
important for Catholics to be aware of the difference between infallible and
non-infallible teaching by the magisterium, and of the corresponding difference
between the kinds of assent that each of them calls for. Ignorance of these
differences can have several unhappy consequences. One is that Catholics who
have actually fulfilled their obligation to practice docility regarding such
teaching, and have been really unable to give their interior assent to it, may
still feel themselves guilty of disobedience to the pope because they do not
follow his teaching on a particular point. Another is that Catholics who do
accept such teaching may judge all others who do not, to be disobedient or
disloyal, and may be scandalized to know that even priests or theologians have
reservations about certain points of ordinary papal teaching.
“The tendency to obscure the
difference between the infallible and the non-infallible exercise of
magisterium, by treating papal encyclicals as though they were practically
infallible, has, I believe, been largely responsible for the fact that many
people, when they learn that encyclicals are not infallible after all, jump to
the conclusion that one need pay no attention to them. If people have been led
to think of the infallibility of the pope as the basic motive for giving their
assent to his teaching, it is not surprising that when this motive is no longer
available, their assent will fail as well.”
As to some of the points made about
dissent, I agree with Michael that the question of whether to publicly dissent
is different from the question whether to privately disagree. In my view, it may be morally wrong, morally permissible,
or morally obligatory to dissent. It depends on the situation. I also agree with
Patrick and Father Araujo that it is logically possible to have a tradition
which corrects error without dissent. I just do not think human institutions
successfully work that way. We have a whole free speech tradition that speaks
to the contrary. I do not understand Patrick and Father Araujo to be
recommending the absence of dissent in political democracies. (If they are I
hope they will come lecture to my class of first amendment students, who, at
least, seem to start out as knee jerk cheerleaders for the first amendment on
any and all issues). My guess, however, is that Patrick and Father Araujo are
recommending limiting dissent on many, but by no means all subjects, within the
Church, because of the role of the Holy Spirit guiding Church leaders, and they believe it works well.
Our difference may be an assessment of Church history in terms of what accounts
for the errors and corruption that have been a part of its past. I believe it
more likely and more attractive to consider that the work of the Holy Spirit
best thrives in a community of discourse in which subjective consciences are
not stifled, in which dissent is encouraged, in which difference is respected,
and the search for truth is an ongoing collaborative effort that takes full account
of the collective experience and wisdom of the People of God.
Beliefnet has a fascinating interview with Richard Dawkins. An excerpt:
You criticize intelligent design, saying that "the theistic answer"--pointing to God as designer--"is deeply unsatisfying"--presumably you mean on a logical, scientific level.
Yes, because it doesn’t explain where the designer comes from. If they’re going to emphasize the statistical improbability of biological organs—"these are so complicated, how could they have evolved?"--well, if they’re so complicated, how could they possibly have been designed? Because the designer would have to be even more complicated.
Now I'm sure I lack half the brain power of Richard Dawkins, but this seems to be a distinctly unsatisfactory answer. Of course the designer would have to be more complicated. And of course we cannot explain where the designer comes from. The notion of God, it seems to me, flows from our conviction that there must be an entity that stands over everything, above, beyond, and prior to it all. Nature is not nearly as satisfying as the ultimate source of everything because nature cannot not stand above and beyond itself; if the first appearance of the natural universe has a cause (and how could it not?), it makes much more sense (to me) to identify it as a supernatural designing force beyond comprehension than as a random natural occurrence beyond comprehension.
Another excerpt:
Obviously, a lot of people find the theistic answer satisfying on another level. What do you see as the problem with that level?
What other level?
At whatever level where people say the idea of God is very satisfying.
Well, of course it is. Wouldn’t it be lovely to believe in an imaginary friend who listens to your thoughts, listens to your prayers, comforts you, consoles you, gives you life after death, can give you advice? Of course it’s satisfying, if you can believe it. But who wants to believe a lie? . . . .
How would you feel if your daughter became religious in the future?
Well, that would be her decision and obviously she’s her own person, she’s free to do whatever she likes. I think she’s much too intelligent to do that, but that’s her decision.
This exchange gives some grounding to Gregg Easterbrook's charge that:
Dawkins complains . . . that so many people believe things about science that are off the wall--for example, that early humans co-existed with dinosaurs--because their science educations are poor. He’ll get no argument from me on that. But I suspect one reason so many Americans have a poor understanding of evolutionary theory is that overbearing figures such as Dawkins talk down to them and act contemptuous of their religious beliefs. So people respond--perhaps quite rationally--by screening out the views of scientists whose motives they distrust. In this regard, it is telling that polls show Americans overwhelmingly accept many findings of modern research, such as the theories of relativity and of cosmic expansion. The scientists who favor these ideas generally aren’t in the habit of mocking peoples’ faiths, and so they are believed by the general public. If Dawkins’s professional goal is “public understanding of science,” he is a flop, seemingly trying his best to make worse what he is supposed to fix.
Rob
From the Washington Post (a few weeks ago):
"The Montgomery County Council sided with environmentalists instead of church leaders yesterday, voting unanimously to place development limits on federally tax-exempt institutions in the county's 93,000-acre agricultural reserve.
Council members closed a loophole in a 25-year-old policy that had exempted institutions including churches, private schools and day-care centers from a ban on public water and sewer service within the nationally known reserve in northwestern Montgomery."
Put aside (for now) the merits of so-called "smart growth" development restrictions, and also the question whether, under any relevant religious-freedom laws, churches are entitled to exemptions from bans like this. Here's my question / concern: Religious freedom requires (doesn't it?) the realistic (i.e., financially realistic) ability to construct and maintain churches and other places of worship. So, should we worry that, at some point (I do not think we are there yet), a combination of smart-growth restrictions, zoning regulations, historic-preservation rules, sprawl, and NIMBYism will undermine religious freedom by making it increasingly difficult to construct and maintain such places?
"Religious conservatives have a cause this holiday season: the commercialization of Christmas. They're for it." So claims Adam Cohen in this recent New York Times opinion piece. Commenting on the various boycotts of some retail outlets that shy away from using the word "Christmas," Cohen continues:
Christmas's self-proclaimed defenders are rewriting the holiday's history. They claim that the "traditional" American Christmas is under attack by what John Gibson, another Fox anchor, calls "professional atheists" and "Christian haters." But America has a complicated history with Christmas, going back to the Puritans, who despised it. What the boycotters are doing is not defending America's Christmas traditions, but creating a new version of the holiday that fits a political agenda. . . .
This year's Christmas "defenders" are not just tolerating commercialization - they're insisting on it. They are also rewriting Christmas history on another key point: non-Christians' objection to having the holiday forced on them. . . .
The Christmas that Mr. O'Reilly and his allies are promoting - one closely aligned with retailers, with a smack-down attitude toward nonobservers - fits with their campaign to make America more like a theocracy, with Christian displays on public property and Christian prayer in public schools.
It does not, however, appear to be catching on with the public. That may be because most Americans do not recognize this commercialized, mean-spirited Christmas as their own. . . .
Now, there is no denying that Cohen makes some good points. That said, I cannot help thinking that his "theocracy" charge is at least as "mean-spirited" as Fox News's campaign to resist "Happy Holidays." Some "War on Christmas" partisans overstate the matter, but still . . . it is certainly my impression that some of the scrubbing away of the word "Christmas" has a "politically correct" (not a respectfully pluralist or anti-commercialism) tone to it, or owes too much to a misunderstanding of church-state separation. And, at least in some cases, it strikes me that the anti-"Christmas" crowd is at least as caught up in mean-spirited culture-warrior-ing as the "boycott 'Happy Holidays'" gang.
Jesse Walker has an interesting article, "Hooded Progressivism: The Secret History of the Ku Klux Klan," in Reason magazine. It brings up a lot of things that Philip Hamburger explored in more detail in his recent (excellent) book, "Separation of Church and State." Here's a snippet:
The progressives and the Klan shared an interest in mandating public education and eliminating urban political machines. The civic-activist historians tell us that the rank-and-file Klansman's interest in such reforms was frequently a sincere response to corruption and inadequate schooling, though it's clear that their urban proposals owed at least something to their fear of immigrants, and that their education proposals were transparantly anti-Catholic. If the Klan's motives were not purely nativist, then neither were the progressives' purely benign: Just as the Klansmen sometimes shared the progressives' hopes, the latter sometimes shared the Klansmen's fears.
"Wal-Mart Is Good for the Poor," Dan Drezner suggests, commenting on a new paper, "Wal-Mart: A Progressive Success Story," by a former Kerry advisorOur own Professor Bainbridge replies, here. Matt Yglesias also chimes in, making explicit what I tend to think is the concern that drives many of Wal-Mart's critics, i.e., that by standing up to labor unions, Wal-Mart poses a political threat to liberal democrats:
[I]f you believe that progressive politics needs unions, then you need to believe that there needs to be organizing of big box retail. Again, my wonky self would really prefer this not to involve picking on some one company, complaining a lot about it, making documentaries and so forth. Fundamentally what's needed is first a policy shift in terms of labor law and its enforcement, and then people to do organizing work. But be that as it may, this is the issue that's behind the campaign against Wal-Mart and that's the thing that needs to be talked about.
(Yglesias does not get into another factor that is, I think, at work: Wal-Mart tends to take -- I assume for financial, and not philosophical, reasons -- the "conservative" side on "culture wars" matters).
On the other hand, Amy Welborn asks:
For the life of me I cannot understand the reflexive response of some conservatives to defend every single aspect of the Wal-Mart experience. Lower prices on goods=a good thing, yes. Employment=good thing, yes.
But there is a price for everything, and the price of a Wal-Mart culture is great, not just on local businesses, but on product manufacture and marketing, period. The control that Wal-Mart exerts in this area is great and has a wide impact, and, among other things, may lower the price on many goods, but because what Wal-Mart offers is wide but not deep, it impacts what manufacturers determine what is worth their time to produce and market.
[W]hy are conservative Wal-Mart defenders so reluctant to acknowledge any problems with the company and the system? I thought conservatism was all about realism, against mindless sunny prognostications. Right?
Wednesday, December 7, 2005
On the topic of allowing the surrounding culture to define what it means to be the body of Christ, here is reason #312 why I do not attend a "seeker-sensitive" megachurch.
Rob
