Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, November 23, 2005

Gay Seminarians

By Eduardo Penalver

Count me among those who are profoundly confused, disappointed, and alienated by the Vatican's latest foray into the question of homosexuality.  Having read the document, here are a small subset of the questions it raises.

(1) Given the requirement of celibacy, what is it that makes "deep rooted homosexual tendencies" more troubling for candidates than any other deeply rooted sexual drives? 

(2) Is there some evidence, unmentioned in the document, that people with such "homosexual tendencies" are more likely to break their vows than people with deeply rooted heterosexual tendencies?  If so, why isn't the evidence referenced?  (In fairness, I'd be skeptical of the evidence if offered, but none is.)

(3) How are we supposed to resolve the tension between the Vatican's statement that people with deeply rooted homosexual tendencies are to "avoid every mark of unjust discrimination with respect to them" followed by a document whose sole purpose is apparently to impose such status-based discrimination in its treatment of applicants to the seminary?

(4) What in the world does it mean to be a "support[er]" of "gay culture"?

(5) What exactly is the relationship between the timing of this document and the pedophilia scandal?  (If the lesson the Church has learned from that scandal is that we need fewer gay priests, I'd say we're in for many more scandals to come.) 

(6) Does a gay priest who breaks his vows cause any more scandal to the faithful than a priest who, say, carries on an illicit relationship with a female parishioner?

(7) How, as a practical matter, is a bishop to distinguish between someone with "transitory" homosexual inclinations and "deep rooted" tendencies? 

(8) Presumably, those who "support the so-called gay culture" includes a number of straight seminarians who disagree with Church teaching on homosexuality.  What other ethical teachings are elevated to such a level that disagreement with the official Church teaching categorically disqualifies a candidate for the priesthood?

(9) Given the serious threat this document ascribes to gay priests, why is this document limited to gay seminarians (as opposed to gay priests already ordained)? 

(10) What is the connection between the document's treatment of homosexuals and its discussion, early in the document, of the priest's role as sacramental representation of Christ?  Is this a suggestion that those with "deep rooted homosexual tendencies" cannot perform such a role (in the same way that the Church uses this role -- one that is problematic for any number of scriptural and theological reasons -- to categorically exclude women from the priesthood)?

Signs of the Apocalypse Dep't

By Rick Garnett

Check out this story, "The Problem with an Almost Perfect Genetic World," in a recent issue of the New York Times:

MIA PETERSON is not a fan of tests. Because she has Down syndrome, she says, she cannot always think as fast as she would like to and tests end up making her feel judged. A recent driving test, for instance, ended in frustration.

Ms. Peterson, 31, the chief of self-advocacy for the National Down Syndrome Society, prefers public speaking and travel. And her test aversion extends to the latest one designed to detect Down in a fetus. "I don't want to think like we're being judged against," Ms. Peterson said. "Not meeting their expectations."

Heralded in the Nov. 10 issue of The New England Journal of Medicine, the new prenatal test provides earlier, more reliable results for all women than the current test, which is routinely offered to only older women who are at higher risk. But for people with Down syndrome and the cluster of other conditions subject to prenatal screening, the new test comes with a certain chill.

Because such tests often lead to abortions, people with conditions from mental disability to cystic fibrosis may find their numbers dwindling. As a result, some fear, their lives may become harder just as they are winning the fight for greater inclusion.

"We're trying to make a place for ourselves in society at a time when science is trying to remove at least some of us," said Andrew Imparato, president of the American Association of People With Disabilities, who suffers from bipolar disorder. "For me, it's very scary."

Some bioethicists envision a dystopia where parents who choose to forgo genetic testing are shunned, or their children are denied insurance. Parents and people with disabilities fear they may simply be more lonely. And less money may be devoted to cures and education. . . .

Rick

Anti-religious Admissions Standards?

By Rick Garnett

This recent New York Times article, "University Is Accused of Bias Against Christian Schools," reports that, according to one evangelical Christian family:

[California's] public university system, which has 10 campuses, discriminates against students from evangelical Christian schools, especially faith-based ones like Calvary Chapel Christian School in Murrieta, where [Cody] Young is a senior.

Mr. Young, five other Calvary students, the school and the Association of Christian Schools International, which represents 4,000 religious schools, sued the University of California in the summer, accusing it of "viewpoint discrimination" and unfair admission standards that violate the free speech and religious rights of evangelical Christians.

The suit, scheduled for a hearing on Dec. 12 in Federal District Court in Los Angeles, says many of Calvary's best students are at a disadvantage when they apply to the university because admissions officials have refused to certify several of the school's courses on literature, history, social studies and science that use curriculums and textbooks with a Christian viewpoint.

There is more -- check it out.  It strikes me that Charles Haynes gets it about right:

Charles C. Haynes, a senior scholar at the First Amendment Center at the Freedom Forum, which studies press and religious freedom, said the university was sending a chilling message to religious schools. "If you have to clean up your religious act to get courses accepted, that's a problem," said Mr. Haynes, who has reviewed the long complaint.

Discussing the university, he said: "They certainly have a right to say the student needs to take foundational courses. That's fair. But when you get into the business of saying how a particular subject is taught or if it has too much of a religious overlay, then I think you are crossing a line."

Rick

PRE-THANKSGIVING COMMENTS ON CAPITAL PUNSIHMENT

By Michael Perry

Thanks to Rick, Tom, and Patrick for their comments.

This is what I have learned from E. Christian Brugger, who wrote his book—Capital Punishment and Roman Catholic Moral Tradition (Notre Dame, 2003)--under the watchful eye of no less a master than John Finnis.

1. The traditional position of the Roman Catholic Church has been that one may never intentionally kill an *innocent* human being.

2.  John Paul II’s position was more radical: One may never intentionally kill a human being. The “innocent” has dropped out.

3.  Why may one never intentionally kill any human being (according to John Paul)? Because to do so is to act contrary to the charity we are called to have for every human being.

4. To execute a criminal under a system of capital punishment is intentionally to kill a human being—something that John Paul’s position does not allow. (Intentionally to kill a human being--and, so, to execute a criminal--if it is not necessary to do so for reasons of self-defense is not to treat the human being lovingly.)

5.  The Church’s (i.e., the magisterium’s) position on capital punishment is in a state of transition—and, as it now stands, is incoherent. The      Catechism tells us that the state may use capital punishment only if      necessary to do so for reasons of self-defense. Why incoherent? Because to engage in a legitimate act of self-defense is never intentionally to kill a human being, but to execute a criminal is always intentionally to kill a human being.

As I said, this is what I learned from Brugger’s book. I wish that Rick, Patrick, Tom, and I—and anyone else interested—could read the book together in a discussion group. What a fruitful discussion that would be!

As Rick knows, my own views on capital punishment do not presuppose that John Paul was right in his belief that one may never intentionally kill a human being. But that’s a story for another day.

Finally, about the retributive theory of punishment. I stand by what I said in my earlier posting. Having read Patrick’s posting, it seems that I stand with Michael Moore on this.

But let’s move past that point to the following inquiry: I assume that Rick and Patrick do not believe that the retributive theory of punishment could justify torturing a criminal (i.e., torturing him as punishment, not as a method of interrogation). Why, then, should we think that the retributive theory could justify executing a criminal? Is it because torturing him necessarily violates his inherent dignity but executing him does not? (If so, it would seem that the inherent dignity of every human being is a limit on what would otherwise be justifiable according to the retributive theory, yes?) But why does executing him not violate his inherent dignity?

Rick’s suggestion (in an e-mail to me) is this: “[An adequate] justification [for capital punishment is] supplied by the need to communicate adequately the magnitude of [the convict’s] wrong and to redress the disorder caused by his offense.” But I suspect that few of us would agree that of the available punishments for even the most depraved crimes, only capital punishment can “communicate adequately the magnitude of the wrong and redress the disorder caused by the offense.” Have all the jurisdictions that have forsaken capital punishment—Michigan, for example, or England—thereby forsaken their only means of communicating adequately the magnitude of the wrong and of redressing the disorder caused by the offense? Is that a plausioble position? Is it plausible to believe that the only way to restore the disorder caused by some heinous murders is by killing—executing—the murderers? Isn’t it at least as plausible to believe that killing the murderers obscures the magnitude of the wrong they did rather than communicates it, by obscuring the value of human life—of every human life? That is the position of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in their recent statement of opposition to the death penalty.

So, I agree with Michael Moore and disagree with Rick and Patrick on the retributive theory of punishment. But even if I were to agree with Rick and Patrick on that issue, I would still disagree with their claim that the retributive theory of punishment can justify capital punishment.  I agree with the bishops' (implicit) claim, in their recent statement, that it cannot.

(Only my friends will appreciate the irony of my defending the bishops against Rick and Patrick.)

Happy Thanksgiving!

Michael

More on "gay culture"

By Rob Vischer

I'm still looking for guidance on what the Vatican means in its statement that individuals cannot be admitted to seminary if they "support the so-called gay culture."  Amy Welborn offers this:

[W]hen it comes to guidelines, as reasonable as it might seem to do the "no homosexuals in the seminary thing," it doesn't get at the problem. The problem is not, in simple terms, the homosexual priest. The problem is priests who don't believe what the Catholic Church teaches on sexuality, who don't preach it, who don't witness to it in the confessional, and who don't live it in their private lives. . . .

I've already heard lots of little snide remarks and questions about the "gay culture" aspect of the document. Well, this is an attempt to get at what I'm talking about, and to me, the whole thing would be far simpler if the document simply emphasized that a candidate for priesthood is indicating his sense that he is being called to minister to God's people as a Catholic priest. Brilliant. Which means that when it comes to this foundational revelation of what the creation of man and woman as man and woman implies, symbolizes and concretizes - they are on board. Completely. And they will embrace what the Church teaches, will teach it themselves, and will commit to helping, with compassion and understanding, Catholics live this out themselves. Again, brilliant.

I guess I have trouble seeing how targeting "gay culture" does the trick.  Maybe I'm missing the nuance because I don't have a firm enough grounding in moral theology, but I see the Vatican providing more fodder for those who wish to caricature the Church's teachings on sexuality as driven in large part by anti-gay prejudice and fear.  The question remains, in my mind, why not focus on celibacy?  Why not focus on the "sexually permissive culture," instead of the "gay culture?"

Rob

Religion, Division, and the Constitution

By Rick Garnett

I have posted a new paper, "Religion, Division, and the Constitution," on SSRN (it's forthcoming in the Georgetown Law Journal).  Here is the abstract:

Nearly thirty-five years ago, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief Justice Warren Burger declared that state programs or policies could “excessive[ly]” – and, therefore, unconstitutionally – “entangle” government and religion, not only by requiring or allowing intrusive public monitoring of religious institutions and activities, but also through what he called their “divisive political potential.” Chief Justice Burger asserted also, and more fundamentally, that “political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.” And from this Hobbesian premise about the “inten[t]” animating the First Amendment, he proceeded on the assumption that the Constitution authorizes those charged with its interpretation to protect our “normal political process” from a particular kind of strife and to purge a particular kind of disagreement from politics and public conversations about how best to achieve the common good.

This Article provides a close and critical examination of the argument that observations or predictions of “political division along religious lines” should supply the content, or inform the interpretation and application, of the Religion Clause. The examination is timely, not only because of the sharp polarization that is said to characterize contemporary politics, but also because of the increasing prominence of this “political division” argument.

The inquiry and analysis that follow have empirical, doctrinal, and normative components: What, exactly, is “religiously based social conflict” – or, as the Court put it in Lemon, “political . . . divisiveness on religious lines”? What, exactly, is the relevance of such conflict to the wisdom, morality, or constitutionality of state action? How plausible, and how normatively attractive, are the political-divisiveness argument and the “principle” it is intended to vindicate? How well do this argument and this principle cohere with the relevant text, history, traditions, and values? And what does the recent resurfacing of this argument in the Religion Clause context reveal and portend about the state and trajectory of First Amendment theory and doctrine more generally?

Working through these questions, I am mindful of John Courtney Murray’s warning that we should “cherish only modest expectations with regard to the solution of the problem of religious pluralism and civic unity,” and also of his observations that “pluralism [is] the native condition of American society” and the unity toward which Americans have aspired is a “unity of a limited order.” Those who crafted our Constitution believed that both authentic freedom and effective government could be secured through checks and balances, rather than standardization, and by harnessing, rather than homogenizing, the messiness of democracy. It is both misguided and quixotic, then, to employ the First Amendment to smooth out the bumps and divisions that are an unavoidable part of the political life of a diverse and free people.

The Bishops, the Death Penalty, and Michael Perry (whom I love)

By Patrick McKinley Brennan

I think we're all (as Rick put it) "with the Bishops" on this one, so long as "this one" is defined narrowly enough.  No one carries a weighty brief for capital punishment as it carried out in the U.S. today.  Further, I'm with the Bishops when they write (p.10): "We look forward to the day when our society chooses not to answer violence with violence."  (They might have quoted Lonergan here: "Is everyone to use force against everyone to convince everyone that force is beside the point?").  And I'm still with them when they go on to write (p.10):  "The Catholic Campaign to End the Use of the Dean Penalty is about more than how to respond to violent crime; it is about justice and about what kind of society we want to be."  But the Bishops lose this loyal son when they write (p.9):  "Our prisons must be transformed from warehouses of human failure and seedbeds of violence to places of responsibility, rehabilitation, and restoration."  Though, as I shall mention below, the Bishops elsewhere in the document (p.6, e.g.) acknowledge the right and the duty of the state to punish malefactors, the Bishops' hope to transform prisons into laboratories of rehabilitation is in tension with the justification for incarceration, viz., punishment.  We send people to prison as (not for) punishment.  Again, I don't carry a brief for the state of American prisons, but I agree with Michael Moore (Law and Psychiatry):  "Recasting punishment in terms of 'treatment' for the good of the criminal makes possible a kind of moral blindness that is dangerous in itself.  As C.S. Lewis pointed out some years ago, adopting a 'humanitarian' conceptualization of punishment makes it easy to inflict treatments and sentences that need need bear no relation to the desert of the offender."

Michael Perry writes that "the retributive theory of punishment tells us whom we may punish . . . , but it does not tell us what punishment is justified. . . . .  If one wants to justify executing a criminal, one must look beyond the retributive theory of punishment."  Rick counters that "the retributive theory speaks to the distribution of punishment and to the character/amount of punishment."  I'm with Rick on this one.  The retributivist gives a malefactor what is his due.  While M. Moore is right (The Moral Worth of Retribution) that the retributivist punishes exactly because the offender deserves it, Moore errs in thinking that the question of the quantum of punishment is severable from the question of desert.  They rise and fall together; no one "deserves" to be punished an unspecified quantum.  The traditional way of describing the quantum is as "proportionate."  What I said before, and I'm sticking to it, is that "even John Paul II never said that the death penalty is always and everywhere disproportionate."  Michael "read[s] John Paul very differently," but he does not tell us on what basis.  (Unfortunately, I haven't read the Brugger book Michael mentions, though I shall now). 

Yes, the "not excluding, in cases of extreme gravity, the death penalty" language was dropped from (sec. 2266 of) the 1997 edition of the Catechism, but yes, the 1997 edition, having in sec. 2266 reiterated the traditional teaching on the state's right and duty to inflict "proportionate" penalties (poenas gravitati delicti proportionatas) on malefactors, goes on in sec. 2267 to say: "Assuming that the guilty party's identity and responsibility have been fully determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude recourse to the death penalty (ad poenam mortis), if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor." How this can be read to say that the death penalty (poena mortis) is always and everywhere disproportionate, I cannot see.  Cardinal Dulles's famous First Things article of 2001 on the Church and capital punishment contained this proposition in his group of ten summarazing the Church's current position:  "The State has the right, in principle, to inflict capital punishment in cases wehre there is no doubt about the gravity of the offense and the guilt of the accused."

Now, I still haven't read the Brugger book, and I know that the Catechism complicates things by proceeding, in the passage quoted above, from an assertion of the right to punish with death (poena mortis) to a conditional limitation on that right to situations of "self-defense" on the part of the state (ad personarum securitatem ab aggressore defendendam).  Michael resolves this by agreeing with Brugger that "capital punishment is never an instance of self-defense, because capital punishment is always the intentional killing of a human being, etc."  I agree that the self-defense rationale does not save capital punishment, because capital punishment is always the intentional killing of a human being.  But does capital punishment (sic) need to justified in terms other than punishment?

What I haven't heard the Roman Magisterium say, what I haven't heard the USCCB say is that the penalty of death (poena mortis) is always and everywhere a disproportionate punishment.  Indeed, the Bishops said this just last week (p. 6):  "Recourse to the death penalty is not absolutely excluded (see no. 2267): the death penalty is not intrinsically evil, as is the intentional taking of innocent life through abortion or euthanasia."  The Bishops' next sentence, to the effect that the death penalty should not be used in contemporary society because the state has non-lethal means to protect its citizens, is a non sequitur.  Punishment does not need to be justified in terms of self-defense, though I understand that, in a halting and incoherent way, the Catechism has moved in that direction.  The Catechism continues to speak of poena mortis, and the justification of defense of self or of others has never been in terms of inflicting a poena on the aggressor.

As to the Bishops' statement that generated this discussion, for my part I don't need persuading that "we" don't need to use the death penalty today (unless of course we conclude that it is exactly what a malefactor deserves).  But because I am not persuaded that the state is ever obligated to punish with death (another penalty is always proportionate), and because the American penal system so readily loses sight of punishment as properly showing respect for human dignity, I welcome much in the Bishops' effort. 

Score?

     

Tuesday, November 22, 2005

The Holy See on "Persons with Homosexual Tendencies" in the Priesthood

By Patrick McKinley Brennan

As posted at Catholic Culture:

Instruction Concerning the Criteria of Vocational Discernment Regarding Persons with Homosexual Tendencies

Introduction

Following the teaching of Vatican II and, in particular, the decree Optatam Totius on priestly formation, the Congregation for Catholic Education has published different documents to promote an adequate formation integral of future priests, offering guidance and precise norms regarding their several aspects. In the meantime also the Synod of Bishops in 1999 reflected on the formation of priests in the present circumstances, with the intent to bring to fulfillment the conciliar doctrine on the subject and to render it more explicit and incisive in the contemporary world. Following this Synod, John Paul II published the post-Synodic apostolic exhortation Pastores Dabo Vobis.

In light of this rich teaching, the present Instruction does not intend to linger on all the questions by nature emotional or sexual that require careful discernment throughout the whole period of the formation. It contains norms regarding a particular question, made more urgent by the present situation, that is that of the admission or non-admission to the seminary and Holy Orders of candidates who have profoundly deep-rooted homosexual tendencies.

I. Emotional maturity and spiritual fatherhood

According to the constant Tradition of the Church, baptized males alone may validly receive Holy Orders. By means of the sacrament of Orders, the Holy Spirit shapes the candidate, to a new and specific role, to Jesus Christ: the priest, in fact, represents sacramentally Christ, Head, Pastor, and Spouse of the Church. Because of this shaping to Christ, the entire life of the holy priest must be alive with the gift of his whole person to the Church and with an authentic pastoral love.

The candidate for ordained ministry, therefore, must reach emotional maturity. That maturity renders him able to put himself in the proper relation with men and women, developing in him a true sense of spiritual fatherhood in confrontation with the ecclesiastic community that will rely upon him.

II. Homosexuality and ordained ministry

From Vatican II until today, several documents of the Magisterium—and especially the Catechism of the Catholic Church— have confirmed the teaching of the Church on homosexuality. The Catechism differentiates between homosexual acts and homosexual tendencies.

Regarding acts, it teaches that, in Sacred Scripture, these are presented as grave sins. Tradition has constantly considered them to be intrinsically immoral and contrary to natural law. These, consequently, may not be approved in any case.

Concerning profoundly deep-rooted homosexual tendencies, that one discovers in a certain number of men and women, these are also objectively disordered and often constitute a trial, even for these men and women. These people must be received with respect and delicacy; one will avoid every mark of unjust discrimination with respect to them. These are called to realize the will of God in their lives and to unite to the Sacrifice of the Lord the difficulties that they may encounter.

In light of this teaching, this department, in agreement with the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, holds it necessary clearly to affirm that the Church, while profoundly respecting the persons in question, may not admit to the seminary and Holy Orders those who practice homosexuality, show profoundly deep-rooted homosexual tendencies, or support the so-called gay culture.

The above persons find themselves, in fact, in a situation that gravely obstructs a right way of relating with men and women. The negative consequences that may derive from the Ordination of persons with profoundly deep-rooted homosexual tendencies are by no means to be ignored.

If, instead, one were to examine homosexual tendencies that might only be the expression of a transitory problem, as in, for example, one whose adolescence is not yet complete, he must however pass clearly at least three years before ordination to the diaconate.

Discernment of qualification of the candidates on the part of the Church

There are two indissociable aspects in every priestly vocation: the free gift of God and the responsible liberty of the man. Vocation is a gift of divine grace, received through the Church, in the Church and for the service of the Church. Responding to the call of God, the man offers himself freely to Him in love. The desire alone to become a priest is not sufficient and there is no right to receive Ordination. It is the duty of the Church— in Her responsibility to define the necessary requisites for the reception of the Sacraments instituted by Christ— to discern the qualification of he who wishes to enter the seminary, to accompany him during his years of formation and to call him to Holy Orders, if he be judged to be in possession of the requisite qualities.

The formation of future priests must articulate, in an essential complimentarity, the four dimensions of formation: human, spiritual, intellectual, and pastoral. In this context, it is necessary to reveal the particular importance of the human formation, the necessary foundation of all formation. To admit a candidate to the ordination to the diaconate, the Church must verify, among others, that he have reached emotional maturity of a candidate for the priesthood.

The call to Orders is the personal responsibility of the Bishop or the major superior. Holding present the opinion of those to whom the responsibility of the formation is entrusted, the bishop or the major superior, before admitting a candidate to ordination, must reach a morally certain judgment on their quality. In the case of a serious doubt in this respect, they must not admit him to ordination.

The discernment of the vocation and the maturity of the candidate is also a grave duty of the rector and the other teachers of the seminary. Before every ordination, the rector must express his judgment on the quality of the candidate required by the Church.

In the discernment of qualification for Ordination, there is a grave duty for the spiritual director. While being bound by secrecy, he represents the Church in the entire forum. In meetings with the candidate, the spiritual director must especially remember the demands of the Church regarding priestly celibacy and the emotional maturity specific of a priest, as well as help him to discern if he has the necessary qualities. He has the obligation to assess all the qualities of the personality and to ascertain that the candidate does not present sexual troubles incompatible with the priesthood. If a candidate practices homosexuality or present profoundly deep-rooted homosexual tendencies, his spiritual director, like his confessor, must dissuade him, in conscience, from proceeding towards Ordination.

It remains understood that the candidate himself has the first responsibility for his own formation. He must offer himself with faith to the discernment of the Church, the bishop who calls to Orders, the rector of the seminary, the spiritual director, and the other teachers of the seminary to whom the bishop or the superior general has entrusted the duty of forming future priests. It would be gravely dishonest if a candidate were to hide his own homosexuality to enter, notwithstanding everything, to Ordination. An attitude so inauthentic does not correspond to the spirit of truth, allegiance, and availability that must characterize the personality of he who believes to be called to serve Christ and His Church in the priestly ministry.

Conclusion

This Congregation confirms the necessity that the bishops, the superior generals, and all the responsible involved fulfill a painstaking discernment regarding the qualification of candidates for Holy Orders, from the admission to the seminary until Ordination. This discernment must be done in light of a conception of the ministerial priesthood in concordance with the teaching of the Church.

The Bishops, the Episcopal Conferences, and the Superior Generals must be vigilant that the norms of this Instruction be observed faithfully for the good of the candidates themselves and always to guarantee to the Church suitable priests, true pastors according to the Heart of Christ.

The Sovereign Pontiff Benedict XVI, August 31 2005, approved this Instruction and ordered its publication.

Rome, November 4, 2005, Memorial of Saint Charles Borromeo, Patron of Seminaries

- Cardinal Zenon Grocholewski, Prefect

- Archbishop J. Michael Miller, CSB; Secretary

This item 6717 digitally provided courtesy of CatholicCulture.org

Rooting out "gay culture"

By Rob Vischer

Apparently the Vatican document on gays in the priesthood was posted on an Italian news service website prior to next week's official release:

The long-awaited document is scheduled to be released by the Vatican next Tuesday. A church official who has read the document confirmed the authenticity of the Internet posting by the Adista news agency.

The document said that "the Church, while deeply respecting the people in question, cannot admit to the seminary and the sacred orders those who practice homosexuality, present deeply rooted homosexual tendencies or support so-called gay culture."

I'm anxious to read the document itself, especially the reference to the support of "gay culture."  I'm assuming that the Vatican is not particularly concerned with our pop-culture conceptions of that term, but I'm wondering what it means in particular: Support for civil rights for gays?  Support for gay marriage?  Support for equal treatment of the gay lifestyle within the Church?  Embracing the gay lifestyle as an equally viable alternative to heterosexuality in general?  An unabashed devotion to Queer Eye?  Or something else?

Rob

CULTIVATING HOPE IN TROUBLED TIMES: CATHOLIC COLLEGES

By Michael Perry

[This from M. Cathleen Kaveny, Professor of Law and Theology at Notre Dame.]

Cultivating Hope in Troubled Times: Catholic Colleges

By: M. Cathleen Kaveny (Catholic News Service article)

M. Cathleen Kaveny"In these very troubled times in our church and in our world, each and every human being lives by hope. Each and every human being ... is waiting for hope," M. Cathleen Kaveny, professor of law and of theology at the University of Notre Dame, said in a speech in Baltimore Oct. 21. She spoke at the inauguration of Loyola College in Maryland's new president, Jesuit Father Brian Linnane. In discussing what hope is and what it entails, Kaveny told why she believes a Catholic college's most urgent task today is to nurture this virtue. "Hope is not to be equated with a sunny, cockeyed optimism. Hope does not pertain to easy or certain things," she said. Thus, hope requires hard work. And hope "is not solitary. The fulfillment of my hope frequently requires activity or assistance from others." Solidarity and imagination are needed to cultivate hope, she commented. Kaveny noted that two vices, according to Thomas Aquinas, are opposed to hope: presumption and despair; she related each to current concerns in higher education. For example, she said, in the context of discussions of intelligent design and evolution "presumption results in attempting to harmonize the truths of faith and the truths of reason too quickly so that all tension is dissolved here and now." She said, "The virtue of hope gives us the strength to be patient and to pursue knowledge confidently with integrity and humility. We don't need to know everything right now." Kaveny's text follows.

[To read Cathy's text, click here.]

Previous Articles More Articles

Recent Posts

Categories

Monthly Archive