A couple of thoughts to follow Rick's and Rob's comments on subsidiarity and the medical marijuana decision:
1. When I teach federalism to Constitutional Law students, I also have them read materials on subsidiarity (including excerpts from Rob's terrific "Subsidiarity as a Princple of Governance," posted over on the right). But I emphasize, like Rick did in his post, that the contours of congressional power and the principles of subsidiarity are two different things. Whether a given action comports with subsidiarity turns in significant part on the policy wisdom or necessity of the action -- in particular, whether the issue requires a higher-level as opposed to local solution. By contrast, the constitutional question -- as Raich reaffirms -- is "not whether it is wise to enforce the statute in these circumstances; rather, it is whether Congress' power to regulate interstate market[s] . . . encompasses the portions of those markets that are . . . produced and consumed locally." That's from the Raich majority opinion, page 6. Power, not wisdom, is the constitutional question; Congress can have power even if it overreaches or acts unwisely. The courts' general reluctance, or impotence, to judge the wisdom of statutes may also make them reluctant or impotent to do much with notions of subsidiarity.
2. Well, let's qualify that. Actually there might be a significant overlap between subsidiarity and the kind of commerce-power inquiry involved in a case like Raich, where the issue is -- or can be seen as -- whether local activity (home growing medical marijuana) will have effects outside the locality (effects on the supply and price of illicit marijuana in national markets). When there is such an effect, then subsidiarity probably will allow the higher-level regulation -- on the ground that localities alone can't address the issue because each will be frustrated by the effects coming in from other localities. And constitutional doctrine will also allow federal regulation, under the theory of "aggregating local activities" bolstered by the power of Congress to make laws "necessary and proper" (Art. I, section 8, cl. 18) to the execution of its other powers such as regulating interstate commerce. So maybe subsidiarity and constitutional federalism do parallel each other, at least when the issue colorably involves "commerce" and thus Congress's commerce-regulating power.
Except that there remains a question of how confident we have to be about such a cross-locality (i.e. interstate) effect in order to justify higher-level (congressional) regulation. Here's what Raich says about that (majotity opinion, page 19):
In assessing the scope of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a rational basis exists for so concluding.
In other words, judicial deference and "modest[y]" apply not only to the policy wisdom of the statute in general, but to the question whether local activities (aggregated as a class if need be) will have an interstate effect (i.e. on interstate commerce). Can such a deferential approach to that question be squared with subsidiarity? I would have thought that before local regulation is superseded, subsidiarity would require some level of proof that local activities will have interstate effects -- not just that it be "rational" to think that such effects will occur.
The precise standard may not matter in Raich, because both the majority and Justice Scalia (concurring) argue that it's not just plausible, but very likely, that home-grown medical marijuana, as a "fungible" commodity, will seep into the national, interstate market. On the other hand, Justices O'Connor and Thomas, in dissent, argue that these effects hadn't been proven: Thomas, for example, says that there's been no showing "that California’s controls [on non-medical uses or disposition of medically prescribed marijuana] are ineffective." So the difference between "a rational basis for expecting an interstate effect" and "proof of a likely interstate effect" may be important to the case -- and to other Commerce Power cases as well.
Tom B.
Here is a short, informative essay by law professor and Religion Clause expert Carl Esbeck, "Church-State Relations in America: What's at Stake, and What's Not":
It seems religious freedom has become an object of perpetual litigation. As a consequence, the struggle over church-state relations is vulnerable to a high level of crisis-mongering-especially in those ubiquitous fund-raising appeals. It is difficult to sort out real threats from mere shadows, and even harder to know where best to invest one's time and other resources for the long term. Although few people have been as free to practice their religion as present-day Americans, there are still crucial jurisprudential matters at stake. These matters get elbowed into the background when the spotlight is thrown on hot-button issues such as eliminating "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance or removing the Ten Commandments from a courthouse lawn.
In this article I identify those truly important issues that, in my judgment, will prove crucial to securing religious freedom well into mid century. I will close with two highly emotional issues of mere superficial importance-except that they rile the masses and cause them to reach for their checkbooks to finance the wrong battles in the culture war.
Rick