Still more on Raich and subsidiarity

I appreciate Rob's response to my own to his.  (Thanks also to Tom Berg).  Rob writes:

I resist the notion that subsidiarity allows the higher collective to usurp lower bodies whenever the collectivizing impulse is in service of a policy deemed "wise." Rather, it would seem that a critic of lower bodies' efforts to address a problem should show that the effort is misguided or inadequate in some significant sense -- i.e., that human flourishing, properly understood, requires the higher body to step in. In the context of this case, then, we can't just say that state-by-state opt outs make a national drug policy more difficult; don't we need to identify and articulate why a broader availability of state opt outs in this area would hinder human flourishing in particular and significant ways?

I'm not sure, actually, that Rob and I disagree.  First, let's put aside the (very important) question of Congress's Article I power to regulate the possession of locally produced marijuana.  Second, the "wisdom" of a national ban on possession of marijuana remains relevant, normatively speaking, because, as I see it, every prohibition, and regulation should be evaluated for its "wisdom" (by legislators and voters, if not judges); otherwise, such a prohibition or regulation is a useless and expensive imposition of force.  Third, as Rob says, the conclusion that an exceptionless ban on marijuana possession -- assuming, again, that it is constitutionally permissible -- is "wise" does not end the subsidiarity inquiry into whether it should nonetheless give way to a "lower" body's contrary or conflicting policy (such as a medical-marijuana opt-out).  But, and finally, it does seem to me that somone committed to subsidiarity to conclude that (a) the use of marijuana is, generally speaking, contrary to the common good and bad for persons; (b) a ban on that use is therefore wise and normatively attractive; (c) a ban on marijuana, to be effective at achieving and promoting its ends, must be comprehensive and exceptionless (otherwise it will be undermined, etc., as Justice Stevens argued); and, therefore, (d) a local contrary policy may and should be overridden, because (in Rob's words) "a broader availability of state opt outs in this area would hinder human flourishing [i.e., by undermining the flourishing-promoting policy] in particular and significant ways."

Rick

UPDATE:  Here's another post of mine on the matter, a contribution to a big discussion of Raich going on at SCOTUSblog.