Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, September 17, 2013

Happy Constitution Day?

Today, September 17, is Constitution Day. I think that the Constitution is worth celebrating, but I also worry that this "holiday" feeds into a problematic understanding of the Constitution as sacred. The Constitution is our fundamental law, but it is positive law; it is not sacred. Yet the idea that the Constitution is sacred is taken seriously enough that the Casey plurality, for example, concludes its opinion using quasi-theological "covenant" terminology:

Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation must learn anew that the Constitution's written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one. We accept our responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents. We invoke it once again to define the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the promise of liberty.

The idea of the Constitution as a covenant is not inherently problematic, but it is when used to prop up the authority of a Supreme Court that serves as what Steven Smith has described as an anti-Magisterium. Smith's description of the "aggressively Catholic and radically Protestant" self-understanding of the Supreme Court is worth pondering this Constitution Day. Near the conclusion of his paper, The Supreme Court as (Anti)Magisterium, he writes:

We might say, then, that the Casey Joint Opinion was both aggressively Catholic and radically Protestant in its presentation of itself, the nation-church, and the constitutional orthodoxy. The opinion contemplates a nation that is institutionally Catholic--in which one institutional body (namely, the Supreme Court) has ultimate authority to say what is orthodox and what is not. Indeed, the fact that some citizens have been so obstreperous--so faithless, really--as to question that authority, or at least to question the correctness of the Court's past pronouncements, is cited as an additional reason for the Court to stand firm in maintaining what it has previously said, lest its monopoly on the orthodoxy-declaring prerogative come to seem vulnerable, and lest those who have trusted in the Court should have their tender faith betrayed. But the substantive content of the orthodoxy declared by the Court holds that on the most central questions, nobody--nobody in government, at least--gets to tell us what is orthodox; like it or not, we each must figure that out for ourselves.

Smith goes on to question whether it is really possible to separate "ecclesiology and substantive doctrine" in this way. He asserts that "[i]nsofar as we are skeptical about the separation, the Catholic-Protestant conflation of Casey will seem not a hybrid but rather a mongrel--a monster, perhaps. And the Court's attempt to seize the role of (anti-)magisterium will seem destined to promote not legitimacy and unity but rather confusion, resentment, and the very fragmentation that a magisterium is supposed to avoid."

Friday, September 6, 2013

"All programmes of economic assistance aimed at financing campaigns of sterilization and contraception . . . are to be morally condemned as affronts to the dignity of the person and the family."

In reviewing the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church during my stroll through its discussion of “law,” I was reminded earlier this week of a passage that I encountered when I first began thinking about the contraceptives mandate currently being challenged in the federal courts. It is the second paragraph of no. 234, the opening sentence of which is the title of this post. Here is the whole number: 

234. The judgment concerning the interval of time between births, and that regarding the number of children, belongs to the spouses alone. This is one of their inalienable rights, to be exercised before God with due consideration of their obligations towards themselves, their children already born, the family and society[528]. The intervention of public authorities within the limits of their competence to provide information and enact suitable measures in the area of demographics must be made in a way that fully respects the persons and the freedom of the couple. Such intervention may never become a substitute for their decisions[529]. All the more must various organizations active in this area refrain from doing the same.

All programmes of economic assistance aimed at financing campaigns of sterilization and contraception, as well as the subordination of economic assistance to such campaigns, are to be morally condemned as affronts to the dignity of the person and the family. The answer to questions connected with population growth must instead be sought in simultaneous respect both of sexual morals and of social ethics, promoting greater justice and authentic solidarity so that dignity is given to life in all circumstances, starting with economic, social and cultural conditions.

Is this aspect of Catholic teaching “out there” in the discussion of the HHS Mandate already, and I’ve just missed it? Or has the focus on individual conscience connected with how the legal claims have largely been framed and litigated thus far caused us to neglect the structural dimension of this issue? We do not need to choose between these two kinds of understanding of the problem in pressing for legal relief, and we should not. The problem with the HHS Mandate is not either/or, but both/and.

Thursday, September 5, 2013

CSDC 33: The commandment of love, law of life

The third analytical index entry for "Law" in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church points to no. 33. This appears in chapter one ("God's Plan of Love for Humanity"), section II ("Jesus Christ the Fulfilment of the Father's Plan of Love"), subsection b ("The revelation of trinitarian love"). Among other things, no. 33 grounds human solidarity in a particular kind of unity that reflects the Trinity:

33. The commandment of mutual love, which represents the law of life for God's people[32],must inspire, purify and elevate all human relationships in society and in politics. “To be human means to be called to interpersonal communion”[33], because the image and the likeness of the Trinitarian God are the basis of the whole of “human ethos', which reaches its apex in the commandment of love”[34]. The modern cultural, social, economic and political phenomenon of interdependence, which intensifies and makes particularly evident the bonds that unite the human family, accentuates once more, in the light of Revelation, “a new model of the unity of the human race, which must ultimately inspire our solidarity. This supreme model of unity, which is a reflection of the intimate life of God, one God in three Persons, is what we Christians mean by the word 'communion'”[35].

[32] Cf. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution Lumen Gentium, 9:AAS 57 (1965), 12-14.

[33] John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem, 7: AAS 80 (1988), 1666.

[34] John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem, 7: AAS 80 (1988), 1665-1666.

[35] John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 40: AAS 80 (1988), 569.

Wednesday, September 4, 2013

CSDC 24: The law of the sabbatical year and of the jubilee year

The second analytical index entry for “Law” in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church points to no. 24. This appears in chapter one (“God’s Plan of Love for Humanity”), section I (“God’s Liberating Action in the History of Israel”), subsection a (“God’s gratuitous presence”). Among other things, no. 24 points to two examples of divine positive law, “legislation … designed to ensure that the salvific event of the Exodus and fidelity to the Covenant represents not only the founding principle of Israel's social, political and economic life, but also the principle for dealing with questions concerning economic poverty and social injustices”:

 24. Among the many norms which tend to give concrete expression to the style of gratuitousness and sharing in justice which God inspires, the law of the sabbatical year (celebrated every seven years) and that of the jubilee year (celebrated every fifty years) [27] stand out as important guidelines — unfortunately never fully put into effect historically — for the social and economic life of the people of Israel. Besides requiring fields to lie fallow, these laws call for the cancellation of debts and a general release of persons and goods: everyone is free to return to his family of origin and to regain possession of his birthright.

This legislation is designed to ensure that the salvific event of the Exodus and fidelity to the Covenant represents not only the founding principle of Israel's social, political and economic life, but also the principle for dealing with questions concerning economic poverty and social injustices. This principle is invoked in order to transform, continuously and from within, the life of the people of the Covenant, so that this life will correspond to God's plan. To eliminate the discrimination and economic inequalities caused by socio-economic changes, every seven years the memory of the Exodus and the Covenant are translated into social and juridical terms, in order to bring the concepts of property, debts, loans and goods back to their deepest meaning.

[27] These laws are found in Ex 23, Deut 15, Lev 25.

Tuesday, September 3, 2013

CSDC 3: Social doctrine and the new law of love

The first analytical index entry for “Law” in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church points to paragraph no. 3. This paragraph appears in the Introduction (“An Integral and Solidary Humanism”). Among other things, it describes the "profound unity" of the Church’s social doctrine, "which flows from Faith in a whole and complete salvation, from Hope in a fullness of justice, and from Love which makes all mankind truly brothers and sisters in Christ":

3. To the people of our time, her travelling companions, the Church also offers her social doctrine. In fact, when the Church “fulfils her mission of proclaiming the Gospel, she bears witness to man, in the name of Christ, to his dignity and his vocation to the communion of persons. She teaches him the demands of justice and peace in conformity with divine wisdom”[3]. This doctrine has its own profound unity, which flows from Faith in a whole and complete salvation, from Hope in a fullness of justice, and from Love which makes all mankind truly brothers and sisters in Christ: it is the expression of God's love for the world, which he so loved “that he gave his only Son” (Jn 3:16). The new law of love embraces the entire human family and knows no limits, since the proclamation of the salvation wrought by Christ extends “to the ends of the earth” (Acts 1:8).

A Stroll through "Law" in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church

The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church seems as good a place as any to start in understanding and appreciating the richness of Catholic teaching about human positive law. One glance at its analytical index reveals that an important part of that project is understanding the relationship of human positive law to other types. For there are many kinds of law.

The analytical index contains more than 60 entries underneath the heading of "Law" and also includes cross-references to the headings for "International Law" and "Natural Law," which together contain 25 entries. The entries for each of these headings are pasted in below the jump.

In the coming months, I hope to take advantage of the episodic nature of blog posts to take a stroll through the Compendium's statements about law. I propose to progress linearly from beginning to end of the Compendium, linking to each index entry in numerical order. My own commentary will be light. But perhaps things worth singling out for a closer look will come into view on this stroll. This piecemeal approach has many limitations,but lacking the capacity at present to present the whole as a whole, I aim to lay out some pieces. (For those who may be uninterested, these posts will be easy to identify and skip. Their titles will all follow the format: "CSDC [#]: [index entry].") 

Continue reading

Wednesday, August 28, 2013

Cavadini on Augustine on eros and marriage

Here's another Augustine-related link. This one is to "The Sacramentality of Marriage in the Fathers," by Notre Dame's John Cavadini. A short excerpt:

To Augustine’s mind, there is something naïve about a view of marriage that treats sexual desire as a relatively uncomplicated eros which education and ascetic living can easily channel into the pleasures of home and family. For Augustine, sexual desire as we know it now is anything but uncomplicated. To people accustomed to thinking that sexual desire and the pleasure it seeks are obvious and uncomplicated goods that contribute, in a straightforwardly positive way to the bonding and happiness of a married couple, Augustine’s views will look pessimistic. Yet Augustine would probably insist that it is simply realistic. Sexual pleasure is not a fixed quantity, unambiguously and obviously good as we experience it in a fallen world. 

Tuesday, August 27, 2013

White House: "An extra measure of evil" in Christopher Lane's killing

St. Augustine describes evil as the deprivation of good. Although I am usually on firmer footing when discussing matters of law rather than theology (caveat lector!), I believe that Augustine's understanding of evil can help us comprehend the White House's statement that there was "an extra measure of evil" in Christopher Lane's killing.There are two senses in which evil as deprivation of good can help us understand this idea of "an extra measure of evil." The first sense is on the surface of the White House's statement: "[T]here is an extra measure of evil in an act of violence that cuts a young life short." The extra measure of evil is the further deprivation of the good of Christopher Lane's life, because he was young. The second sense appears from consideration of the killers' (lack of) motivation. They killed because they were "bored"; our perception of the evil of this senseless killing is heightened by the sense of wasted goodness of young life that led to it.

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

Words on gays cost bishop post at Dartmouth

That is the headline of this Boston Globe article from last week few days ago about the appointment and the rescinding of appointment of Bishop James Tengatenga of the Anglican Diocese of Southern Malawi as dean of the Tucker Foundation at Dartmouth College. I find it surprising that one often-astute observer of Dartmouth College affairs praises the college's new president, Philip Hanlon, for not flinching in pulling the appointment. It sure seems to me like he flinched. At least that's what I take away from the comments of the chair of the search committee, Professor Irene Kancades. According to The D's story today:

Calling the decision “bizarre,” Kacandes said reversing a provost and president-approved decision after a seven-month search might deter faculty from volunteering to sit on future search committees.

“The way that the accusations unfolded is something that we should be very alarmed about,” Kacandes said. “This man was tried in a court of partial public opinion, and it was not clear that people who wanted to weigh in could do so.”

Kacandes said she felt the strong reaction was perpetrated by a small group of students, blog posts and in emails between some faculty members.

Maybe there's more to the story, which I am viewing from a distance (though not as much a distance as students in Hanover, NH might view the statements of a Bishop in Malawi). But the way this unfolded is troubling. As an alumnus of Dartmouth and AQ, I appreciate now in a way that I did not appreciate as a student the benefits of the institutional independence of Aquinas House, the Catholic student center at Dartmouth, from the governance of the Tucker Foundation.

For more background: The college's statement on Bishop Tengatenga's initial appointment is here, a statement by Bishop Tengatenga on his views on gay rights is here, and a statement by Dartmouth's new President on rescinding the appointment is here. (See also this story from Episcopal News Service and this story from the Valley News.) Earlier news coverage about the controversy is available from the Valley News and Dartblog

A perspective piece from Patheos, titled "Scapegoating Bishop James Tengatenga," concludes with a quotation from the Globe's coverage and the observations of an unnamed faculty member:

The fears voiced in the Globe article by Zambian exile the Rev. Kapya John Kaoma:

“This is a big blow, because it leaves African activists on the ground wondering if they can work with Westerners,” Kaoma said. “All human rights defenders in Africa are working under very, very hard conditions, and the violence against them is always there. What they have done is exposed Bishop Tengatenga and then dumped him back into Malawi.”

Were echoed by a member of the Dartmouth faculty, who told me:

The idea of the left taking care of their own calls to mind the Republican friendly fire of the Spanish Civil War.  In this case, the left refused even to recognize him as one of their own.  He unwittingly and in circumstances scarcely imaginable here violated their language code; their own moral pride compelled them to relegate him to the status of outcast, unfit to exercise moral leadership in our community.  I don’t think my perception is entirely distorted when I notice a Leninist streak in the American liberal arts left.

Tuesday, August 20, 2013

How should the town's lawyer answer "the Lemon/endorsement question" in Town of Greece v. Galloway?

I am preparing this evening for an argument simulation that we are doing tomorrow for the incoming 1Ls as part of orientation. I have been assigned the task of arguing for the petitioner (the town government) in Town of Greece v. Galloway. The process has caused me to appreciate the difference in perspective that comes from my stance as an academic lawyer rather than a government lawyer. But I find myself in need of orientation because switching between these two perspectives is disorienting.

Michael Moreland posted a little while back about the amici curiae brief headlined by Gerard Bradley that he had joined (along with several other constitutional scholars). Soon after that posting, I read that brief, along with the Obama Administration's brief, and others. I found the Bradley brief refreshing in its insistence that what the brief referred to as the Lemon/endorsement test "is inapposite to legislative prayer." The brief argued that: (1) legislative prayer necessarily has a religious purpose; (2) the concept of neutrality underlying the Lemon/endorsement test makes no sense of legislative prayer; (3) legislative prayer does not comport with the Lemon/endorsement test because that cannot apply to a continuing and perhaps long-time government practice with the same force as it may apply to a single act or display; and (4) applying the Lemon/endorsement test to legislative prayer could itself lead to an unconstitutional result. But considering the arguments from the perspective of the town's lawyer (my role for the simulation), I am not sure that I would or should present the arguments in precisely the same way. I do not want to admit that the town loses if the Lemon/endorsement test applies.

I cannot deny, of course, that the purpose of seeking Divine guidance is a religious purpose. But I will be less willing to treat that purpose as incompatible with the purpose of solemnizing the proceedings. I do not want to have to agree that "[t]o apply [the Lemon/endorsement] test to legislative prayer is simply to overrule Marsh v. Chambers, and thereby to eradicate a practice cherished by Americans since the founding." But maybe I need to, because I need to explain why the town shifted in 1999 from beginning with a moment of silence (which seems sufficient for solemnizing) to beginning with an invocation from an invited volunteer. And in making that explanation, perhaps I will find myself back in agreement with the Bradley brief anyhow. Maybe I should embrace its approach to begin with.

Let us now put aside the simulation and ask the question directly. Suppose the town's lawyer is asked at oral arguments in the actual case: "Does the town lose if the Lemon/endorsement test applies?" How should the town's lawyer answer? The town's brief says that the town wins under any test. But is that right?