Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, August 14, 2007

Religion and Human Rights (cont'd)

In response to Jonathan Watson's comment, Brian Tamanaha reiterates his point about the connection between religion and human rights:

There is no doubt that human rights can be traced back historically to religious influences (and the same can be said of aspects of European culture).  There is no doubt that much of morality generally has important religious influences (past and present).  There is no doubt that religion can and does lend important support to human rights today. I did not and would not argue against any of these points.  My post does not diminish the significance of religion in any of these respects. These points do not, however, establish that atheists are less moral or less able to support human rights, which was the focus of my post.

Specifically, my post defends the soundness of non-religious commitments to human rights against Perry's arguments that, because atheists lack a foundation for believing in human dignity, religious grounds for human rights are more coherent and hence superior.  The thrust of my argument is that both religious folks and atheists are equally vulnerable to the assertion that we lack a foundation for our beliefs.  In the end, I assert, we both get beyond this by making a commitment (an act of faith) to embrace our beliefs.

Are Human Rights Always Based in Religion?

In response to Brian Tamanaha's post challenging Michael Perry's thesis about the religious dimension of human rights, Jonathan Watson observes:

Prof. Tamanaha is aware, no doubt, that the current human rights focus in European law is due in no small part to influences from the ius commune, the combination of canon and Roman law that flourished in Europe throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Does Prof. Tamanaha believe that human rights sprang fully-formed from the head of the Enlightenment, with no prior and important influences from Christian thinkers? Modern Europe may be athiestic, and may wish to ignore such contributions, but they are in deep debt to the normative influences of Christian thought on the matter.

And he asks: "[C]an he point to any human rights laws, any human rights discussions, anywhere, where the implicit normative bases do not grow from religious thought?"

Monday, August 13, 2007

Human Rights and Belief in God

We have, in the past, discussed the connection between belief in God and human rights.  Today Brian Tamanaha directly challenges Michael Perry's assertion that human rights can only be grounded in religious beliefs.  The entire post is worth reading -- and reflecting on -- so I won't tempt you to take the easy way out with a mere excerpt.

Freedom's Orphans

A new book by David Tubbs looks like a must-read for anyone interested in the state of the American family.  Titled Freedom's Orphans: Contemporary Liberalism and the Fate of American Children, the book asks:

Has contemporary liberalism's devotion to individual liberty come at the expense of our society's obligations to children? Divorce is now easy to obtain, and access to everything from violent movies to sexually explicit material is zealously protected as freedom of speech. But what of the effects on the young, with their special needs and vulnerabilities? Freedom's Orphans seeks a way out of this predicament. Poised to ignite fierce debate within and beyond academia, it documents the increasing indifference of liberal theorists and jurists to what were long deemed core elements of children's welfare.

Evaluating large changes in liberal political theory and jurisprudence, particularly American liberalism after the Second World War, David Tubbs argues that the expansion of rights for adults has come at a high and generally unnoticed cost. In championing new "lifestyle" freedoms, liberal theorists and jurists have ignored, forgotten, or discounted the competing interests of children.

To substantiate his arguments, Tubbs reviews important currents of liberal thought, including the ideas of Isaiah Berlin, Ronald Dworkin, and Susan Moller Okin. He also analyzes three key developments in American civil liberties: the emergence of the "right to privacy" in sexual and reproductive matters; the abandonment of the traditional standard for obscenity prosecutions; and the gradual acceptance of the doctrine of "strict separation" between religion and public life.

MoJ and the Bible

While Rick was observing the occasion of our 5,000th post, I was on my annual pilgrimage to an evangelical Bible conference in northwest Iowa.  Devoting a week of vacation to learning more about the Bible with 1,000 other people might be a distinctly evangelical phenomenon, but it gives me a different frame of reference for reflecting on the MoJ experience thus far.  I am struck by the infrequency with which we discuss scripture in formulating Catholic legal theory -- indeed, I would venture to say that we could count on one hand the number of MoJ posts that have delved into the substance of particular Bible passages.  I have recently read Regent law prof (and MoJ-friend) Michael Schutt's wonderful new book Redeeming Law: Christian Calling and the Legal Profession, which is full of Bible references.  So why hasn't the Catholic legal theory project made more space for the Bible?  Is it because the Church's social teaching has already incorporated the biblical narrative, making our explicit appeal to scripture superfluous?  Is it because we don't know the Bible well enough to bring it to bear on our legal analysis?  Or is it something else? 

Friday, August 3, 2007

Material Cooperation with Barbie

Last week my dear friend Amy asked some very unsettling questions about the Barbie Girls website.  To be clear, most of my seven year-old daughter's waking hours during the summer are spent reading aloud from William Bennett's Book of Virtues, writing heartfelt letters imploring American automakers to raise their fuel efficiency standards, and sewing her own school clothes out of recycled hemp.  But let's hypothesize, just as a thought experiment, that there may have been a time or two when her father might have facilitated her entry into the virtual world of Barbie, with all the sexism dressed up as consumerism that resides there.  Has her father formally cooperated with evil?  I think not.  And I will venture to say that her father's material cooperation with evil was justified by a proportionate reason: his ongoing efforts to delay the day when she falls under the sway of the hegemonic empire that, if it had existed in 1965, would surely have been mentioned by name in paragraph 27 of Gaudium et spes.  I am speaking, of course, of the dreaded Bratz.

Thursday, August 2, 2007

At our best

A wonderful local blogger, James Lileks, has beautifully captured one human dimension of last night's bridge collapse:

I’m listening to a story on the news about a man who survived the fall – then ran to help the kids on the bus. I’d guess the fellow never considered what he might do in such a situation. Never thought about it much. Who would? But then you find yourself on a bridge that’s crashed down into the Mississippi, and you’re struggling with the seat belt buckle. It works , but your hands feel thick. You’re alive – which doesn’t seem that odd, really, you’ve always been alive, so this is just different, but you have strange thoughts about insurance and a mad swirl of panic and there’s blood in your hair but you can stand – and then you see a school bus. So you go to the bus. Of course you go the bus.

Most of us would. It’s a remarkable instinct that wells up and kicks in, and it’s something you never expected to experience. As someone said about humans: We’re at our best when things are worst.

Would you have run to the bus? I'll answer for you: yes.

Tuesday, July 31, 2007

Abortion as Infanticide

In response to my post (and Abby Johnson's comments) suggesting that a post-Roe abortion regime could focus more on providers than on the women obtaining abortions, Jonathan Watson suggests that the approach to punishment should borrow from the approach to punishing infanticide:

I do think that abortion is infanticide. I cannot see a reasonable legal argument for assigning a different punishment for ending the life of a human being at X point versus Y point, unless one argues as I have in the last paragraph of this letter.

Some arguments I have seen include:
1) A fetus is less of a person than an infant. Of course, one might argue that this would also entail different punishment for killing an adult than a child than an infant. I don't find this compelling, as it raises the possibility of being able to assign various individuals "personhood" based on arbitrary characteristics (race, nationality, and so forth).

2) The quickening argument, whereby killing the body before movement could be felt by the mother (or some similar argument), thus indicating ensoulment. The image and likeness to God, upon which true personhood ought to be based, is not limited I would say to any point during the developmental process. The quickening line of thinking was also abandoned by the Church once technological advances made determination possible that life was beginning on its own at conception.

3) A fetus has less of an appeal than an infant, as it doesn't physically appear human. I see the same problems inherent here as in the personhood argument in regards to the handicapped, old, and infirm.

Perhaps one could argue that the purpose of criminal punishment of this sort is based not on an object external norm (e.g., all killing is wrong, and therefore, killing a fetus warrants the same punishment as killing an infant, child, adult, etc.) but on internal subjective depravity ( e.g., a person should be more emotionally attached to a born infant), and therefore punished for the greater depravity of the act required to kill an infant than kill an unborn. But, this again makes hash of Catholic arguments in this direction.
On a related note, do you think that one can say that all life is deserving of equal protection of the law, and continue to argue that that life is receiving equal protection when the punishment for destroying that life at different stages is different? It's not something which I have considered before - is it possible that equal protection of two different people under the law might entail different punishment? Would that be the basis of hate crime laws?
I think one could argue that since it is the weakest who need the most protection from external law against physical violence that one could plausibly argue that fetuses and infants, the old, the handicapped, etc., deserve greater protection through deterrance  via imposition of harsh punishments than others in society.

How Much Jail Time?

Writing in Newsweek, Anna Quindlen believes that pro-choice groups have found a winning strategy:

Buried among prairie dogs and amateur animation shorts on YouTube is a curious little mini-documentary shot in front of an abortion clinic in Libertyville, Ill. The man behind the camera is asking demonstrators who want abortion criminalized what the penalty should be for a woman who has one nonetheless. You have rarely seen people look more gobsmacked. It's as though the guy has asked them to solve quadratic equations. Here are a range of responses: "I've never really thought about it." "I don't have an answer for that." "I don't know." "Just pray for them."

You have to hand it to the questioner; he struggles manfully. "Usually when things are illegal there's a penalty attached," he explains patiently. But he can't get a single person to be decisive about the crux of a matter they have been approaching with absolute certainty.

A new public-policy group called the National Institute for Reproductive Health wants to take this contradiction and make it the centerpiece of a national conversation, along with a slogan that stops people in their tracks: how much time should she do? If the Supreme Court decides abortion is not protected by a constitutional guarantee of privacy, the issue will revert to the states. If it goes to the states, some, perhaps many, will ban abortion. If abortion is made a crime, then surely the woman who has one is a criminal. But, boy, do the doctrinaire suddenly turn squirrelly at the prospect of throwing women in jail. . . .

The great thing about video is that you can see the mental wheels turning as these people realize that they somehow have overlooked something central while they were slinging certainties. Nearly 20 years ago, in a presidential debate, George Bush the elder was asked this very question, whether in making abortion illegal he would punish the woman who had one. "I haven't sorted out the penalties," he said lamely. Neither, it turns out, has anyone else. But there are only two logical choices: hold women accountable for a criminal act by sending them to prison, or refuse to criminalize the act in the first place. If you can't countenance the first, you have to accept the second. You can't have it both ways.

I agree with Quindlen that pro-life advocates need to work harder on articulating what the post-Roe world should look like.  Understandably, though, the focus has been on changing a legal system where most regulation, much less criminalization, of abortion is a non-starter given the governing interpretation of the Constitution.  I also assume that many within the pro-life community would favor government regulation to shut down abortion providers without requiring that women who obtain abortions be thrown in jail.

UPDATE: St. Thomas law student Abby Johnson laments:

Too bad those documentary folks didn't interview me -- I would have had no problem answering a question about penalties for women who have abortions. As you suggested, I think the most reasonable course of action is regulating providers rather than criminalizing women seeking abortions. There are plenty of reasons women shouldn't be criminalized for seeking abortions, not the least of which is that abortion is in many cases a last resort for women who see no feasible way of bearing and raising a child ... it's almost a "necessity" defense.

No one is arguing that women seeking abortions do so because it's fun, or because it's something they want to do. In many cases, they see it as the best of the available solutions to a very difficult situation -- and none of the alternative solutions are very palatable. Friends I've known who have had abortions did so because they were scared of the life-changing consequences of bearing children and of their ability to raise and provide for these children, and didn't have (or didn't think they had) the necessary support systems to be able to adequately care for and support a child. When our answer to these fears is to kill the child rather than find ways to assist in building adequate long-term support, we've failed not only the children but also their mothers.

The "culture of life," Putin style

Apparently there is a huge youth organization in Russia called Nashi, sponsored by the Kremlin, that encourages its members to procreate for the sake of the Motherland.  The Daily Mail reports:

Nashi's annual camp, 200 miles outside Moscow, is attended by 10,000 uniformed youngsters and involves two weeks of lectures and physical fitness.

Attendance is monitored via compulsory electronic badges and anyone who misses three events is expelled. So are drinkers; alcohol is banned. But sex is encouraged, and condoms are nowhere on sale.

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