Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, June 13, 2008

Robert Miller's response

Robert Miller responds to Michael Perry's critique of his testimony on SSM as follows:

I thank Michael Perry for his comments on my testimony before the Pennsylvania Senate re S.B. 1250, a proposed amendment to the state constitution that would limit marriages to unions of one man and one woman.

First, I agree with Professor Perry that, given my arguments in the testimony, the best solution would be an amendment that strips the courts of the power to decide the same-sex marriage issue and leaves the issue to the normal legislative process. I would happily vote for such an amendment. In fact, however, the political realities in Pennsylvania are such that if the legislature approves any amendment to the Pennsylvania constitution, it’s very likely to be in the form of S.B. 1250. Hence, for practical purposes, it’s S.B. 1250 or nothing. Since, as I argued in the testimony, the issue is very likely to be constitutionalized one way or another by the courts, if there is to be a genuine public debate on this issue and a democratic resolution, the only practical option is S.B. 1250.

Second, when I said that a decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the state constitution does not require same-sex marriages or civil unions would “for all practical purposes” have “roughly” the same effect as the passage of the proposed amendment, every word there counts. I was not speaking of *legal* purposes. Professor Perry is obviously right that S.B. 1250, but not a decision of the supreme court, would disable the legislature from creating same-sex marriages or civil unions in future. I said as much myself about S.B. 1250. But, as I expressly said, in the language Professor Perry quotes, I was speaking not about legal effects but “practical purposes.” I meant, that is, that given such a decision from the Pennsylvania supreme court and given too the political realities in Pennsylvania, there would be little chance in the foreseeable future of the state changing its laws from the status quo, i.e., no same-sex marriages and no civil unions. That statement, I still think, is correct.

Should Catholic legal theory have more to say?

This is the time of year when I confess to feeling some blawg envy.  Most blawgs are scrambling to offer immediate and insightful commentary on the Supreme Court decisions as they're handed down, as happened today with Boumediene v. Bush.  At MoJ, we tend not to have much to say, for the understandable reason that Catholic legal theory, whatever value it has in some contexts, is wildly indeterminate when it comes to analyzing judicial decisions that do not directly implicate natural law principles (e.g., abortion, marriage, parental rights).  In analyzing a case like Boumediene, we can (and should, in my view) point out that any meaningful conception of human dignity compels us to provide fair and effective procedures to detainees, but that might prompt the retort, "Yes, but you can't apply CST principles directly to court rulings as you might with legislative or executive actions."  There always seems to be a "limited role of the judiciary" defense available, and there does not seem to be a Catholic theory of constitutional interpretation (at least not yet).

So is this what keeps MoJ from weighing in as part of the annual Supreme Court festival of armchair judging?  Does Catholic legal theory have anything distinctive to say about Boumediene?

SSM and the expansive state

Given my recent posts on SSM, readers have been providing me with some good reading material on the subject.  Here's an interesting essay from the National Catholic Register addressing the religious liberty fallout from the creation of SSM.  The essay is overstated in spots, but in general I agree that the threat to religious liberty is serious.  (Though I'm not sold on the notion that the threat to religious liberty is itself a persuasive reason to oppose SSM.)  In any event, here's an insightful snippet about the the tendency of SSM to come with a more statist orientation than traditional marriage:

Marriage between men and women is a pre-political, naturally emerging social institution. Men and women come together to create children, independently of any government. The duty of caring for those children exists even without a government or any political order. . . .

Because marriage is an organic part of civil society, it is robust enough to sustain itself, with minimal assistance from the state.  By contrast, same-sex “marriage” is completely a creation of the state.

Thursday, June 12, 2008

The case for a marriage amendment

Villanova law prof Robert Miller has posted his testimony before the Pennsylvania Senate in support of a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage.  It's well worth reading; here's an excerpt:

Based on my work in moral and legal philosophy, I have views on many of the considerations that these arguments [about same-sex marriage] raise. In general, I think the first [traditional] view is more likely to be correct. That, however, is not what is important here. What is important is that I recognize, and I think any honest person who looks at the arguments has to recognize, that the issues surrounding same-sex marriage are both very complicated and very deep. Any definitive view of the matter requires that a person, at least implicitly, take positions on any number of moral, philosophical, political, sociological, and empirical questions. As I consider these matters, my overwhelming impression is that the only thing obvious and certain about the question of same-sex marriage is that reasonable people can in perfect good faith disagree about this question.

But if resolving the issue of whether the state should recognize same-sex marriages or the equivalent requires us to make many difficult judgments in, among other areas, morality, philosophy, and politics, and if the question is one about which reasonable people can disagree in good faith, then it is clear to me that the issue is not one that should be resolved by courts. Courts are composed of judges, and judges are lawyers, and lawyers have expertise in the law. Legal knowledge and legal skills of the kind we convey in law schools will not resolve deep moral, philosophical, and political issues like those involved in the same-sex marriage dispute. The issues involved in same-sex marriage are much bigger than legal issues. They touch on profound questions such as the foundations of morality and meta-ethics, the relationship between the individual and the state, and the meaning of human sexuality. Lawyers, even judges, are no better than anyone else in forming opinions on such profound questions. In fact, on average, lawyers may even be worse than other people in dealing with such questions, for lawyers are often tempted to apply legal methods, at which they are adept, to philosophical problems, for which such methods are necessarily inadequate.

Wednesday, June 11, 2008

"You've been left behind."

Christian compassion knows no limits: a Rapture-triggered email service for only $40 per year.

UPDATE: No, this service is not a joke.

Legal ethics forum

Since Steve, Rick, Eduardo, and Susan have paved the way for MoJers to plant the flag elsewhere in the blogsophere, I feel comfortable giving a quick plug for the Legal Ethics Forum, a group blog that I've joined this week.  In addition to blogging about more traditional questions of professional responsibility, I'll be doing my best to expand the conversation to include a more deliberate focus on the moral dimension of professional identity. 

The Lawrence mess

Yesterday the Tenth Circuit ruled that Lawrence v. Texas struck down state sodomy laws under a rational basis test.  The Ninth and First Circuits have ruled that Lawrence recognized a fundamental right to private adult sexual intimacy.  Dale Carpenter comments: "There is a real and growing circuit split on this basic doctrinal issue with potential consequences to a range of governmental policies. Whatever one thinks of the result in Lawrence, the Supreme Court has created a mess that only it will be able to clean up."

Tuesday, June 10, 2008

Stuntz on survival

In the course of updating readers on the progress of his cancer treatment, Harvard law prof Bill Stuntz offers a powerful and challenging reflection on the objectives of medical care:

Doctors see their job as fixing the broken places in our ailing bodies. When it comes to the kinds of brokenness that can be repaired, that is as it should be. But there is another set of medical problems that cannot be fixed: cancers that won’t disappear, pains that will last as long as life does. When it comes to those problems, repair is not the proper goal. A better word is redemption: the enterprise of carving out some space, however small, for life—not mere survival—in the midst of diseases that seek to squelch it. . . .

That mind-set follows naturally from my faith, I believe—but a good many of my fellow believers seem to disagree. One of the more surprising aspects of Christian culture in our time and place is the widespread embrace of longevity and survival not just as moral goods, but as moral imperatives. That embrace seemed all too evident in the Terri Schiavo controversy of a few years back, and in the long-running conversation about medical treatment of dying patients. I’m no fan of euthanasia, but I’m also no fan of the idea that physical longevity is a morally proper goal in circumstances like Schiavo’s—or in circumstances like mine. Just because medicine can sustain the body for awhile longer, that doesn’t mean it should always do so. Life is more than a beating heart. And life is what we should be seeking. The good news is, if you look in the right places, it’s usually there to be found.

Just a bit more on SSM

Regarding my earlier post, a readers asks why I have a problem with renaming civil marriage as "civil unions" and leaving marriage to religious communities.  My problem is with the set of norms (or lack thereof) that come with civil unions.  "Marriage" comes with a lot of cultural baggage -- some bad, but mostly good.  The expectations of permanence, exclusivity, and openness to child-rearing are hugely important signals and encouragements to marriage participants.  Maybe we could load some of that into the institution of "civil unions," but I'm not sure how.

I have two comments on Fr. Araujo's helpful response to my post.  First, if we're going to convince society to reject same-sex marriage, I'm not sure that it's enough to argue that, in light of the natural differences between the genders, marriage must consist of different genders.  There needs to be a nexus between the biological fact and the function/purpose of marriage, doesn't there?  With the prevalence of adoption and assisted reproduction technology, the nexus is not as obvious as it once was.  If studies could show that same-sex parenting leads to sub-optimal outcomes in children, we might have that nexus.  But I don't think we can know that at this stage.

Second, I agree that racial differences are a superficial distinction on which to base a marriage ban.  But propopents of those bans did not think so.  If they viewed marriage as the means by which to propagate the race, keeping marriage within the race might be an understandable (but erroneous) limitation flowing from marriage's purported nature.  There is a much stronger case for marriage, by its very nature, being limited to a man and woman, but we still need to connect the dots, and that's where it becomes trickier.  We can't just assert a biological fact as the public policy conclusion.

Finally, I hope that I do not come across as purporting to possess all the answers to these very difficult questions.  I'm struggling not only to articulate where I stand on these huge socio-legal-political-moral issues, I'm struggling to discern where I stand.  I greatly appreciate the constructive feedback and challenging perspectives offered by others.

More on friends with benefits (and same-sex marriage)

In response to the thoughtful observations/questions by Elizabeth and Michael, my concern with the push to recognize friendships legally is not so much focused on the good-faith desire to remedy a particular case of injustice, say where a friend cannot gain hospital visitation privileges; my concern derives from the extent to which the push is part of a broader effort to end the law's "privileging" of marriage.  Here's a quote from Laura Rosenbury's paper, Friends with Benefits:

"[A] more radical aspect of this type of proposal would be its rejection of private contracting to readjust the current consequences of marriage determined by the state. Instead, some or all of the benefits, obligations, and default rules currently reserved for spouses would be available alike to spouses, friends, or the other individuals designated. Such a proposal would therefore allow all individuals, not just married couples, to decide how they would like the state to support their personal relationships, if at all. Unlike the current state of the law, marriage or a marriage-like relationship would not be a prerequisite for taking on the packages of benefits, obligations, and default rules provided by federal, state and local governments. Instead, individuals could choose to apply those packages to other types of personal relationships without engaging in private contracting."

For a real-world example of the movement's vision, read the "Beyond Same-Sex Marriage" statement from 2006. 

Participating in a state-registered marriage entitles you automatically to certain benefits and privileges. In my view, participating in a state-registered friendship should not. I support the possibility of allowing individuals to contract with each other or with third parties to attain some of the benefits that automatically flow to married couples. Such contracts do not require the state to elevate friendship as a relationship of equal importance to marriage -- indeed, they do not require the state to do anything except to refrain from invalidating the contracts. I oppose the suggestion that groups of friends should be able to register their relationships and receive a certain set of benefits by operation of law (as opposed to the operation of the agreements they reach on a case by case basis).  Marriage should be privileged because of its channeling function: it calls us to a commitment (or at least should call us to a commitment) that is greater than our own cost-benefit maximizing episodic calculation.

Michael also asks why I assert that "It is difficult to imagine marriage maintaining its privileged status (as I believe it should) twenty years from now if a significant portion of the population is ineligible."  Our society is on the path toward extending full citizenship to gays and lesbians, and I do not think there is anything that can knock us off that path at this point.  I have not seen compelling arguments as to how full citizenship can be maintained without extending the same rights and privileges as heterosexuals enjoy in terms of the state's support of their intimate relationships. (I'm talking about as a matter of politically persuasive justification, not as a matter of constitutional right.)   For those who oppose SSM, the challenge will be to articulate (in secularly accessible terms) a distinction between opposition to SSM and opposition to interracial marriage.  The categorically procreative / biologically unitive argument is unlikely to do the trick.  If the compromise position becomes civil unions for same-sex couples, my fear is that civil unions will become the non-discriminatory norm, and that the state will eventually get out of the marriage business entirely, leaving it as a relic of "illiberal" religious communities.  For some, maybe that's the "least bad" choice, but to me, that would be a shame.

The status quo will not hold.  Gays and lesbians are visible, and they (and their relationships) are rapidly gaining acceptance as more Americans encounter them in their everyday circles.  The shift in attitudes on homosexuality from my parents' generation to mine has been remarkable, but I would predict it will be nothing compared to the shift in attitudes from my generation to the next.  From what I've seen thus far, moral opposition to homosexual relationships is just not conceivable to 98% of the law students I've taught.  I don't think a two-tier system is a long-term solution: eventually the most inclusive form of state-sanctioned commitment will win out, either because citizens vote with their feet or because the state decides that it no longer has a legitimate justification for maintaining the two-tier status.  My question is, what do we want marriage to look like 20 or 50 years from now, and what is the most likely path by which it will even remotely approximate that vision?  If same-sex marriage is not an option, what path should we take?