Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, February 16, 2010

SSM and moral opposition to same-sex sexual conduct

Michael Perry asks a good question, "Who but one who believes that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral will think it is  legitimate, that it is just, to deny access to civil marriage to the same-sex couples who intend for their unions to be lifelong, monogamous unions of faithful love, because there are other same-sex couples who do not so intend?"  I'm interested in the related but broader question: what percentage of people who oppose SSM believe that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral?  I'm guessing that it's a pretty high percentage, but there are noteworthy exceptions.  David Blankenhorn, for example, writes:

I reject homophobia and believe in the equal dignity of gay and lesbian love. Because I also believe with all my heart in the right of the child to the mother and father who made her, I believe that we as a society should seek to maintain and to strengthen the only human institution -- marriage -- that is specifically intended to safeguard that right and make it real for our children.

Legalized same-sex marriage almost certainly benefits those same-sex couples who choose to marry, as well as the children being raised in those homes. But changing the meaning of marriage to accommodate homosexual orientation further and perhaps definitively undermines for all of us the very thing -- the gift, the birthright -- that is marriage's most distinctive contribution to human society. That's a change that, in the final analysis, I cannot support.

I still struggle with the move from "adoption as concession to fallen world = very good" to "adoption as the child-rearing norm for a new type of marital relationship = so bad that the relationship threatens the well-being of children."  But it is this type of argument on which the SSM debate will rise or fall, I think.  In public policy debates, for better or for worse (and I know Robby would say for worse), it seems that everyone is a consequentialist now.  Are some of the consequentialist arguments shaped by moral opposition to same-sex sexual conduct?  No doubt.  But they still need to be engaged on the merits.  In the end, the outcome of the debate may turn on the question, "Who bears the burden of proof?"  Those who wish to change the longstanding definition of a social institution to include citizens who currently cannot participate given their sexual orientation, or those who believe that the institution's value to society derives in significant part from the nature of the procreative relationship between a man and a woman?

Thursday, February 11, 2010

Should Judge Walker's sexual orientation matter?

There has been a bit of controversy over the last couple of days regarding the revelation that Vaughn Walker, the federal judge presiding over the challenge to Proposition 8 (the California ban on SSM), is gay.  Even those who believe that Proposition 8 should be struck down on constitutional grounds confess that "If I were on the side supporting the ban and found it struck down by a supposedly gay judge, I'd have some questions about whether the judicial deck had been stacked from the start."  In the event that the ban is struck down, I really hope that the ban's supporters will not pin the outcome on the sexual orientation of Judge Walker.  I haven't followed the proceedings closely, but I know that there have been some very controversial rulings that seem to favor the plaintiffs.  Of course those rulings are fair game to raise on appeal.  But challenging the rulings is one thing; piercing the judicial veil is quite another.  One premise of the rule of law is that we maintain public confidence in the ability of judges to do their jobs impartially; even if pure impartiality is a fiction, it's a very important fiction. 

Sexual morality and global Christianity

Philip Jenkins, one of the leading experts on global Christianity, has written a short essay on polygamy among Christians in Africa.  An excerpt:

For the sake of argument, let us assume that polygamy is widespread among African believers, even within global churches like the Anglican Communion. Given that fact, a liberal American might well ask: By what right can they lecture Episcopalians or Lutherans on sexual morality or insist that homosexuality should bar a person from holding church office? That question makes sense for many Americans in a way that it does not for Africans, because it treats all sexual sins as morally equivalent.

Yes, an African Christian might reply, the domestic practices of some of our members violate church law, and we must struggle to end this regrettable situation. But polygamy in itself does not violate God's law—or else we could not celebrate David, Solomon and all the ancient kings, prophets and patriarchs. The fact that this practice is now forbidden to Christian believers reflects the higher standards of holiness prevailing under the new dispensation. In terms of legal language, polygamy is a mala prohibita offense, something forbidden by law in some societies but not others, rather than something evil in itself, mala in se, which all reasonable people know to be wrong. And while traditional African societies have historically had quite diverse attitudes toward homosexuality, the Bible shows no such tolerance.

For many African Christians, then, polygamy can properly be accepted in some social situations, whereas homosexuality is regarded as sinful always and everywhere. Americans might puzzle over what seems like a contradiction; Africans would likely ask why Westerners can't understand the plain difference. And the arguments will go on.

Powerful stories . . . of choice?

William Saletan's follow-up on the Tebow ad and accompanying Focus on the Family stories is worth reading.  (And if you haven't watched the full video of the Tebow story, you should.)

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

An argument about SSM and "open" relationships

Michael asked if someone could lay out the argument underlying Robby's posting of the New York Times article setting forth findings about a perceived tendency of same-sex couples to adopt "open" relationships, including open marriages.  I would never purport to speak for Robby, but here's my best stab at the argument:

One's view of same-sex marriage turns, at least in part, on one's estimation of how malleable the institution of marriage is.  Many people who support SSM strongly favor marriage as a foundational social good in that it promotes, among other things, mutual caregiving, stable relationships for child-rearing, and the total and exclusive self-giving of one person to another.  Don Browning, for example, argues that marriage is particularly important for males because “paternal investment in children, paternal certainty, and monogamy tend to go together.”  If SSM is understood to maintain these functions of traditional marriage, and if the gender of the participants is incidental to those functions, then maybe there's no problem.  (I'm putting to the side the ontological arguments about marriage made by Robby and others.)

But what if the gender of the participants is not incidental to those functions?  This possibility could take two forms: 1) biological -- i.e., the suggestion that men are, on average, more inclined toward sexual promiscuity, and marriage's "restraining" function may be less powerful when the marriage is made up of two men; or 2) sociological -- i.e., same-sex couples will tend to be less committed to the traditional understanding and functions of marriage.  If, say, half of same-sex couples will end up adopting an "open" marriage, does the pedagogical dimension of marital practices mean that open marriages will be more likely to gain mainstream acceptance, with monogamy viewed as simply another possible marital characteristic to be bargained for by the spouses, rather than an intrinsic part of marriage?  To wildly overstate the factual premises of the argument, if a crystal ball could show that the widespread adoption of SSM would lead, in 40 years, to nearly half of all marriages being intentionally non-monogamous, should that give SSM supporters pause?  I believe it should. 

The problem, of course, is that there is no way to know what marriage will look like in 40 years.  I'm not even sure what the state of committed same-sex relationships is right now.  The Times article reported on gay couples in San Francisco.  I'd be interested in the practices of same-sex couples in Chicago, Minneapolis, or Atlanta.  I'd also be interested in exploring cause and effect.  Does the apparent tendency of same-sex couples, at least in the Bay Area, to reject  monogamy (relative to heterosexual couples) reflect a deliberate devaluing of marriage, or does it reflect a subculture that has been excluded from the social mechanisms that help foster and encourage monogamy?  Will the monogamy gap eventually shrink if same-sex couples are included in marriage?  And would the closing of the gap be driven by rising rates of monogamy among same-sex couples or by falling rates among heterosexual couples? 

So can the practices depicted in the Times article carry the weight that SSM opponents might assign it?  I'm doubtful, though to be fair, I don't think their entire argument would rest on that depiction.  Does SSM represent changes to marriage beyond the gender of the participants, and if it does, are the changes likely to impede the essential social functions of marriage?  In my estimation, that's the crux of the argument that needs to be engaged by both opponents and proponents of SSM.

Tuesday, February 9, 2010

When is a Catholic doing legal theory doing "Catholic legal theory?"

I've just posted a new paper with that title on SSRN.  Here's the abstract:

What does it mean for me to be a Catholic doing legal theory, even when I am not self-consciously trying to do “Catholic legal theory?” One simple response is methodological: I might be describing the Christian tradition, I might be proclaiming its truth, I might be speaking prophetically to power, or I might be speaking pragmatically about reasonably debatable methods by which to cultivate the common good. At different points, if I want to contribute to the full flowering of the Catholic legal theory project, I hope that I do all of these. At a deeper level, articulating what I do as a Catholic legal scholar must also account for what I do as a legal scholar. One concern is that the religious label, especially the Catholic label, will be an easy way to pigeon-hole me and more easily dismiss my opinions as pre-ordained conclusions dictated by my faith tradition, rendering them less authentic and even less human. In reality, though, my faith should be the impetus to delve even more deeply into the heart of what it means to be human, to grapple unflinchingly with the reality of our existence. When I use faith as an escape, when I toss off trite prayers to numb myself to the tragedy that unfolds around me, rather than praying to express and share in the depth of that grief, I am rightly dismissed by the grieving. Similarly, when I use faith in my scholarship as a bludgeon to wield against those who reject my worldview, or when I dress up my unsupported assertions as self-evident simply because they come from my faith tradition, I am rightly dismissed by those legal scholars who are authentically struggling with the question of how imperfect people should govern themselves in an imperfect world. The Catholic legal theory project has much to contribute to legal scholarship, starting with the anthropological question of what it even means to be human. (This essay is based on a presentation at Seton Hall’s conference, “Religious Legal Theory: The State of the Field” in November 2009.)

Any feedback readers have will be welcomed enthusiastically.

Sunday, February 7, 2010

The most depressing protest ever takes a strange turn . . .

Folks probably feel a little bit silly getting all worked up about that Tim Tebow ad before they had even seen it, right?  Maybe the protesting groups would issue a statement saying something like, "While this ad is unobjectionable, it is important to remain steadfast in our defense of a woman's right to choose."  Save some face, stand up for the cause, move on.  Right?  Wrong:

The 30-second "Celebrate family, celebrate life" ad starring Heisman winner Tim Tebow ended with a surprise -- Tim Tebow tackling his mother after she says she nearly lost him during her pregnancy. The pair jokes that they have to be "tough" with all the family has been through. . . .

The Women's Media Center, which had objected to Focus on the Family advertising in the Super Bowl, said it was expecting a "benign" ad but not the humor. But the group's president, Jehmu Greene, said the tackle showed an undercurrent of violence against women.

Thursday, February 4, 2010

Koppelman on Leiter on Religion

Andy Koppelman has posted his new paper, No Respect: Brian Leiter on Religion.  Here's the abstract:

In two recent papers, Brian Leiter argues that there is no good reason for law to single out religion for special treatment, and that religion is not an apt candidate for respect in the “thick” sense of being an object of favorable appraisal. Both arguments depend on a radically impoverished conception of what religion is and what it does. In this paper, I explain what Leiter leaves out, and offer an hypothesis about why. I also engage with some related reflections by Simon Blackburn and Timothy Macklem, both of whom influence, in different ways, Leiter’s analysis.

New journal of interest

MoJers might want to check out DePaul's new Journal of Religion and Business Ethics.  The inaugural issue features articles by my St. Thomas colleagues Bob Kennedy ("The Practice of Just Compensation") and Mike Naughton ("Culture as the Basis of the Good Entrepeneur") (with Jeff Cornwall).

Tuesday, February 2, 2010

Is the Tebow ad dangerous?

As I've stated before, I think it's great that there will be an ad during the Super Bowl celebrating life, and I thank Tim Tebow and his mom for having the courage to step up on an issue like this.  To be honest, though, I wish that the ad featured a single mom who raised her child in a poor neighborhood, and watched her child struggle to find steady work as an adult, or parents who want to express their love and thanksgiving for their child with special needs.  Choosing life is its own blessing; the blessing is not that you'll receive a world-conquering hero in return.  I know that the Tebows would be celebrating life regardless of the Heisman Trophy, but I think the life-affirming message is even more powerful when life is celebrated in circumstances where the culture is prepared to see only hardship and regret.

The other wrinkle is that Pam Tebow ignored her doctor's advice about her health.  This makes the message a bit more complicated, it seems.  William Saletan writes:

Pam's story certainly is moving. But as a guide to making abortion decisions, it's misleading. Doctors are right to worry about continuing pregnancies like hers. Placental abruption has killed thousands of women and fetuses. No doubt some of these women trusted in God and said no to abortion, as she did. But they didn't end up with Heisman-winning sons. They ended up dead. . . .

On Sunday, we won't see all the women who chose life and found death. We'll just see the Tebows, because they're alive and happy to talk about it. In the business world, this is known as survivor bias: Failed mutual funds disappear, leaving behind the successful ones, which creates the illusion that mutual funds tend to beat market averages. In the Tebows' case, the survivor bias is literal. If you're diagnosed with placental abruption, you have the right to choose life. But don't be so sure that life is what you'll get.

And:

If Pam Tebow's abruption had taken a different turn, her son would be just another perinatal mortality statistic, and she might be just another maternal mortality statistic. And you would know nothing of her story, just as you know nothing of the women who have died carrying pregnancies like hers.

Thoughts?