Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, August 31, 2010

Retribution and Capital Punishment

Thom Brooks has posted a short paper laying out a retributivist argument for rejecting the retributivist justification of the death penalty.  His argument is epistemological; it does not rely on the notion that capital punishment is not proportionate to murder or that it constitutes cruel or unusual punishment.  Here's an excerpt: 

A determination of punishable desert may be substantially a determination concerning the state of mind of another. We cannot read the minds of others, but we can bear witness to their actions against an explanatory narrative that may give us some insight into why another did what they did. The claim here is not that we can never grasp guilt, but that our certainty is always in doubt. This does not mean that retributivism cannot justify punishment because it can offer us ‘no perfectly just judgements’. However, it would mean that capital punishment is especially problematic. When we impose capital punishment on a convicted murderer, there cannot be room for error as the murderer can never be brought back to life afterwards. If there remains a substantial risk of error demonstrated by advances in scientific testing in cases where a person has been sentenced in a fair trial beyond reasonable doubt, then we have good reason on retributivist grounds to reject capital punishment in favour of an alternative sanction.

Should Sarah Palin thank Ruth Bader Ginsburg? (And can CLT help her do so?)

I don't always agree with Dahlia Lithwick, but I do appreciate this short essay on the feminism of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and how her contributions to the law helped make the public and professional careers of women like Sarah Palin more feasible.  Can Palin express appreciation for Ginsburg's achievements without endorsing the entire legacy of those achievements?  Maybe Palin has, in fact; I don't know, but I do know that there is a tendency to demonize categorically entire worldviews and the folks who hold them, whether they be labeled "radical feminists" or "the religious right."  It seems to me that one valuable contribution of Catholic legal theory is its embrace of nuance and complexity; in its refusal to be captured by any particular ideological or partisan political position, CLT should have the capacity to stand back and applaud figures coming from a wide array of perspectives, even while speaking out about where those figures have lost sight of foundational values and/or the fundamental reality of the human person.  In other words, what can make CLT seem frustratingly elusive equips it to reach across today's sharply drawn lines and affirm the good, wherever it is found.   

Monday, August 30, 2010

Trust and the Global Law Firm

This may not fit squarely within the Catholic legal theory genre, but I'm guessing that attorneys who derive value from the Catholic legal theory project are, not coincidentally, more likely than not to see the practice of law as a moral and relational endeavor.  In this regard, readers might be interested in my new paper, Trust and the Global Law Firm: Are Relationships of Trust Still Central to the Corporate Legal Services Market?  Here's the abstract:

This article explores the concept of trust as it relates to the lawyer’s role and explains how recent trends in the structure, operation, and regulation of law firms may make the traditionally “thick” type of attorney-client trust more elusive, particularly in the context of corporate legal practice. Trust may lose its place as a defining element of the attorney-client relationship as the relationship itself becomes less personal, more distant, and more fungible. At the same time, trust may become even more important to consumers in a globalized economy, thereby giving lawyers an opportunity to reassert their value against increasing competition from providers from other jurisdictions and disciplines. In this regard, the article draws an important distinction between cognitive and affective forms of trust, and suggests that attorney-client trust cannot be captured fully in the language of cost-benefit calculation, for the lawyer’s role presumes a relationship of willingly encountered vulnerability. The story of trust’s marginalization in corporate legal practice may resonate most powerfully with lawyers themselves, who may increasingly struggle to find meaning in their work, and with clients, who may discover that technicians work efficiently until a problem calls for counsel that is not strictly technical. More broadly, though, the story of trust’s marginalization should be of interest to a society that has long empowered attorneys to function as quasi-public actors, for the weakening of trust directly compromises the attorney’s capacity and inclination to introduce public values into the representation. After analyzing the market and regulatory trends exerting pressure on a more relationship-centered type of trust, the article offers some tentative suggestions on how the profession can keep relational trust at the center of the lawyer’s role, even in a globalized, efficiency-driven profession.

I welcome feedback, either in the comments or by email.

Friday, August 27, 2010

Quote of the day

From Spencer v. World Vision, in defense of religious liberty in hiring:

The core of Judge Berzon’s dissent is the idea that performance of activities that are often performed in a secular context cannot be religious. That is mistaken. When the Pope washes feet on the Thursday before Easter, that is not secular hygiene, and the Pope is not a pedicurist.

Nussbaum on educating for democracy

At the consistently wonderful Books & Culture, check out Christopher Benson's review of Martha Nussbaum's Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities.  Benson was optimistic ("What's not to love about a title that promises to argue for a humanistic ideal of education . . .?"), but his hopes were soon dashed.  An excerpt:

[E]ven if we accept Nussbaum's contestable telos of education, we should ask if her progressivism is well equipped to achieve it. And the answer, I submit, is "No" for one principal reason. Lacking Augustine's grammar of love and sin, which constrain each other, her vision overestimates the possibilities and underestimates the limitations of education. Nussbaum's case for the humanities perpetuates the modern divorce between faith and reason, relegating faith to the private domain of family and church while elevating reason to the public domain of school. It assumes exclusive participation in the City of Man, ignoring citizenry in the City of God . . . And finally, despite Nussbaum's welcome attention to the emotional life, it views the human being primarily as a thinking thing rather than a desiring animal. Education should produce lovers and not merely democrats. To achieve this, our schools—extending the work of families and churches—will need to rightly order the affections (Augustine) and increase the power of holy attention (Simone Weil).

Spencer v. World Vision

I missed this, but on Monday the Ninth Circuit issued a reassuring (but not unanimous, unfortunately) decision for those of us who care about religious liberty in hiring.  You can read the opinion here.

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

More on the Catholic adoption agency ruling

British human rights attorney Aidan O'Neill responds to my skeptical post regarding the closure of the last Catholic adoption agency in the U.K.  He notes that "things are a little more complex on the facts than my post implied":

It is of some note that the Charity Commission considered specific evidence as to the effect of the closure of the Catholic Care adoption agency on children seeking adoption, noting on this that the facts as found by the Commission did not support the claims by Catholic Care that if the charity had to close its adoption service, there were no other alternatives for the hard-to-place children who were matched with parents approved by the charity.    The charity had on average provided parents for 10 children per year and the local authorities who placed children through them stated that there were in fact other agencies with as good a track record of finding adoptive parents and homes for such hard-to-place children.

 

The Commission also noted that as a matter of general child welfare law it is in the interests of children waiting to be adopted that the pool from which prospective parents are drawn is as wide as possible.  The Commission heard and accepted evidence to the effect that same sex couples who registered for adoption were significantly more ready than opposite sex couples wishing to adopt to accept a sibling group as adoptees as well as children over 5.

 

In effect, then, hard to place children were more likely to be considered as potential adoptees by same sex couples and so it could not be said to be in the in best interests of a child seeking adoption that such potential adoptive parents should be screened out without consideration of the merits of placement with them by the application of an a priori rule such as Catholic Care sought to apply – i.e. no same sex couples accepted on their books as potential adoptive parents, albeit that single persons as adopters (without reference to sexual orientation) were considered by and sought by the charity.

 

I would also say that in my opinion the decision from Briggs J. which resulted in this case being remitted for the Charity Commissioners for reconsideration - seems to me to have been a masterly Solomon judgment if I may say so.   Briggs J. came up with a well-thought out analysis for what he suggests is the correct interpretation of the relevant UK law prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation – in particular Regulation 18 - which is to allows charities to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation if - in the particular circumstances of their case - the public benefits of their so doing outweighed the disbenefits of the fact that they are so discriminating.  The weighing of benefits against disbenefits was a matter which Parliament has entrusted to the Charity Commission which is why he ordered a to remit of the case back to it to allow it to conduct this exercise, which it has now done.

As Briggs J. notes - that if one accepts that in principle charities can properly be operated and provide their services having regard to sexual orientation issues (for example in providing help lines targeted at gay teenagers, or support to the heterosexual parents of gay children) then, in principle, there must be circumstances in which a charity may be justified in consciously targeting or restricting itself to a heterosexual majority.  He suggest that such a targeting might be lawful if, on balance, good works resulted from it, regardless of the faith/motivation behind the targeting (all sounding rather like the Letter of James).

As it turns out the Charity Commission found in fact that the good work done by Catholic Care could in fact be done by other Voluntary Adoption Agencies which did not as a matter of policy discriminate on grounds of the sexual orientation of prospective adopters and which therefore thereby maintained the widest possible pool of adopters, which was clearly within the best interests of any children prospectively seeking adoption.

Tuesday, August 24, 2010

The meta-cognition deficit

I rarely link to David Brooks on MoJ, but I find today's column on the meta-cognition deficit to be especially fascinating: "Very few in public life habitually step back and think about the weakness in their own thinking and what they should do to compensate."  It seems to me that members of religious communities are equally (if not more) susceptible to this problem, particularly to the extent that we dress up our thinking about an issue with fixed language of theological absolutes.  I'm wondering whether, for example, the Church's slow embrace of religious liberty was, in the end, a cognitive problem.  Other churches that I have attended have shown a reluctance to step back and acknowledge the extent to which their social positions had become affixed with one political party's platform (churches on both the "left" and the "right").  I have always explained these tendencies as a product of cultural osmosis where we lack the will to rise about our surrounding culture, but I suppose it may also stem from a lack of mental toughness, an unwillingness to think honestly about the path we're on and how our easy assumptions have led us astray.

The vanishing Catholic adoption agency

The last Catholic adoption agency in the U.K. has closed after losing its legal challenge to anti-discrimination laws that require agencies to consider same-sex couples as adoptive parents:

Since Labour’s homosexual rights law came into effect in January 2009, all the other 11 Catholic adoption agencies in England have either had to close down or sever their ties with the church hierarchy. Catholic Care was the last to hold out as it launched its legal bid.

Apparently, in certain "compelling circumstances," discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is permitted, but the Catholic agencies have failed to establish such circumstances.  Andrew Hind, the Chief Executive of the Charity Commission, explained:

“This has been a complex and sensitive decision which the Commission has reached carefully, following the principles set out by the High Court, case law and on the basis of the evidence before us. Clearly the interests of children are paramount."

Hmmm. . . I understand that there are other values motivating anti-discrimination laws, but I have a hard time figuring out how "the interests of the children are paramount" unless we are assuming that excluding same-sex couples from any single agency's pool of adoptive parents so compromises the pool's quality that it jeopardizes children's best interests.  I haven't heard anyone make that argument, so I'm not sure what Hind means.  I'd prefer if he said, "Look, we know we're losing an important service to children here, but our government has decided that equal treatment of same-sex and opposite-sex couples is so important that we're willing to make some hard trade-offs." 

Friday, August 20, 2010

Reaching closure (at least as to substance of the anti-mosque arguments)

I do not want to turn MoJ into the "mosque near Ground Zero blog," but I do think this is an issue that is close to the heart of this blog's mission, so I want to take one more stab at clarifying the potential (non-bigoted) opposition arguments.  It seems to me that there are four:

1) Muslims share some degree of collective guilt for 9/11 due to some element(s) within their tradition's teaching, the failure to sufficiently condemn 9/11 using resources wtihin the tradition, or some other reason related to the nature, teachings, and/or practice of Islam. 

2) The particular Muslims who are proposing Park51 share some degree of guilt for 9/11, not due to their status as Muslims, but due to some specific acts or omissions that they have committed as Muslims. 

3)  Even if #1 and #2 are false, fallible human beings, when faced with evils committed in the name of a religion / group / movement, will tend to attribute guilt to other members of that religion / group / movement, and thus those other members should exercise self-restraint in a way that would be more consistent with #1 being true, even if it is not actually true.  

4) Even if Muslims in general, and these Muslims in particular, do not share in the guilt for 9/11, there is something about Islam that exacerbates, in an ongoing way, the hurt Americans feel as a result of 9/11, and Americans are justified in feeling this way.  Unless someone can articulate that justification, I think #4 veers directly into bigotry. 

As for the other three, I reject #1, and I have not seen evidence to persuade me of #2.  The unjustified attribution of guilt under #3, though not necessarily bigoted, seems to be a dicey ground for moving the mosque, as actions consistent with collective guilt would seem to be bolster the perception of collective guilt.  Are there any other non-bigoted arguments against the mosque?