Here's a deeply cynical article in the New York Times on the bishops' new religious liberty committee (mentioned here by Rick). A few points bear noting:
First, focusing on religious liberty is not simply a "recasting" of the Church's existing opposition to abortion and SSM. These are related but distinct issues. I'm pretty sure that the bishops are not dropping opposition to abortion or SSM from their agenda, and supporting the religious liberty cause does not require consensus on the merits of abortion or SSM.
Second, I don't think it's fair to say that abortion and SSM have now "eclipsed" poverty and economic injustice as important issues to the bishops. I don't think there's any comparison between the amount of resources the bishops devote to combating poverty versus combating abortion or SSM. The fact that more of the bishops' teaching platform has been devoted to abortion and SSM in recent years may not reflect changes in relative importance as much as changes in social circumstances.
Third, the suggestion that the bishops' teachings on politics and morality have "been met with indifference even by many of their own flock" does not necessarily follow from the cited statistic that only 16% of Catholics had heard of the document, "Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship." I'm guessing that the statistics for documents issued by the bishops to address economic injustice would not be much rosier. The implication that Catholics care less about the bishops' teaching on an issue like religious liberty than on an issue like poverty needs more evidentiary support.
Finally, I tend to be leery of cherry-picked quotes to close off an article. They often seem to be carefully chosen laundering devices to allow the expression of the author's own opinion without (explicitly) violating journalistic standards. So the article ends with this: “The bishops speak in hushed tones when it comes to poverty and economic justice issues, and use a big megaphone when it comes to abortion and religious liberty issues.” This is an unfairly sweeping statement, especially as the final word in a "news" article. To take one of many examples: Archbishop Nienstedt, no shrinking violet on SSM and abortion, was front and center over the summer in opposing the GOP's efforts to balance the Minnesota state budget through draconian cuts to social services. It didn't sound too hushed to me.
Monday, November 14, 2011
At Notre Dame over the weekend, I presented a paper on the rise of secularism within the legal profession, which I see as the triumph of the technical over the transcendent. It's evidenced in part by a move from the "moral law" approach of the 1908 Canons to today's "ethics" codes, which are primarily technical regulations. There are some good reasons for this move, but it is by no means costless. There are several market, regulatory, and cultural developments that have contributed to put tremendous pressure on lawyers' ability to see themselves as anything more than technically competent mouthpieces. I'd be happy to email a draft to interested readers.
In a related paper, I take on the thin conception of human dignity that prevails within the legal profession. This paper is now online and available for comment. Titled How Do Lawyers Serve Human Dignity?, here's the abstract:
The conception of human dignity that prevails within the legal profession is roughly interchangeable with individual autonomy. That is, lawyers serve the cause of dignity by facilitating the client’s autonomy. In this regard, the legal profession’s dignity discourse lacks the nuance and depth that is found in the discourse occurring in other fields, bioethics in particular. As far as it goes, autonomy is a key component of individual dignity, but autonomy does not exhaust the nature or implications of dignity, particularly the narrow conception of autonomy employed widely within the legal profession. The narrowness results, in significant part, from lawyers’ failure to invest in the dialogue necessary to pursue a fully relational sense of client autonomy, rather than a simplistic autonomy of individual self-interest secured through the maximization of legal rights and privileges. In reality, there are multiple layers of human dignity, not all of which are centered on individual autonomy. Whether or not a more authentically relational conception of autonomy can be reclaimed, it is important to articulate how the human orientation toward relationship can help provide substantive content to, and draw professionally relevant implications from, the elusive concept of human dignity.