Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, February 20, 2012

More conflicts to come?

Potential conflicts between religious institutions and mandated health coverage are not limited to the area of reproductive rights.  The Washington Post, for example, reports on a growing area of clinical medicine:

A small but growing number of teens and even younger children who think they were born the wrong sex are getting support from parents and from doctors who give them sex-changing treatments, according to reports in the medical journal Pediatrics. . . .

Discussing one particular case, the article recounts:

Private schools refused to enroll him as a boy, and the family’s pediatrician refused to go along with their request to treat him like a boy. They found a physician who would, Dr. Jo Olson, medical director of a transgender clinic at Children’s Hospital Los Angeles.

Olson said the journal reports should help persuade more doctors to offer these kids sex-changing treatment or refer them to specialists who will. “It would be so nice to move this out of the world of mental health, and into the medical world,” Olson said.

Wednesday, February 15, 2012

The Dangers of Anti-Sharia Laws

In the new issue of First Things, I have an essay on the anti-Sharia movement.  Here's an excerpt:

Even though the First Amendment has now forced anti-Sharia advocates to frame their proposed laws so broadly as to be meaningless, these initiatives should be vigorously contested by the defenders of religious liberty. When state legislators across the country line up behind such bills, the aim is not primarily legal reform—it is political grandstanding aimed at reassuring nervous constituents that Sharia law will be kept out of our courts. This serves only to fan the flames of religious intolerance while nurturing public acceptance of the notion that the religious commitments of our citizens have no place in our courts. Law has a pedagogical function—as cases such as Roe v. Wade have painfully taught us—and anti-Sharia legislation harms the social fabric by its very premise: the presumption that the deepest core values and convictions of religious Americans threaten the legal order by virtue of their source, without reference to their substance.

Comments are welcome.  Also be sure to check out pieces in this issue by Rick Garnett and Carter Snead.

Tuesday, February 14, 2012

Dazed and confused (on the HHS mandate)

I confess that I remain confused about President Obama's proposed "compromise" on the HHS mandate.  It seems to me like it might do more than nothing, but not a lot more than nothing.  Let's put to the side the issues created by the administration's failures 1) to exempt self-insured employers from the contraceptive mandate; 2) to exempt religiously affiliated insurance providers.  For objecting employers who rely on outside insurance providers, I still have questions:

If the insurer did not pass on any increased cost for contraceptive coverage to the objecting employer (either because there is no increased cost or because the insurer was required to spread the costs among all non-objecting insureds), and if the transaction by which the contraceptive coverage is procured would take place without any communication or action by the objecting employer, would the revised Obama rule still be objectionable?  It seems like the risk of scandal is lower, but that's not the only consideration, I realize.  What would the precise objection be under that scenario? 

If the answer is yes, to what extent does the remaining objection turn on whether any universal access to contraception is objectionable?  In other words, would the same objections persist if the government agreed to pay the cost of contraceptive coverage?  If not, what is the difference between an insurer paying for the coverage and spreading the costs among all insureds versus the government paying for the coverage and spreading the costs among all taxpayers?  Is the difference only one of degree? 

The initial HHS rule was so egregious that it was easy to criticize it without getting into deeper questions about the goods and services covered -- e.g., whether contraception should be considered as a core element of "health care," whether some of the covered drugs cause abortions, etc.  Judging from how the debates have been unfolding since Friday, it seems (to me) that some of those deeper questions are coming closer to the surface.  That's not necessarily a bad thing, but does it suggest that President Obama's strategic move on Friday has made the straightforward religious liberty argument less obvious?

Friday, February 10, 2012

Rep. Lesch puts the Church in its place

I've come to expect to hear weak arguments about how the Church should stop concerning itself with issues outside the sanctuary, but when they're made by a member of my state's legislature and given prominent placement on my local paper's op-ed page, it still raises my blood pressure before I've even finished my breakfast.  Consider this gem from Rep. John Lesch in today's Star-Tribune:

No one begrudges a bishop's role in squaring away his own flock. But when he runs a large hospital upon which a city relies for jobs and health care services, he need not be wagging his finger as you walk in the emergency-room door.

If I want to hear moralizing, I'll go to church. If I want to access legal health care, I'll go to my health care provider. And I think my conscience is adequate to understand the difference between the two.

And then, of course, a history lesson:

The pilgrims fled England because they prized individual conscience over the Church of England's mandates. The founding fathers recognized this and ensured that the First Amendment afforded individual freedom from religion.

Catholic or non-Catholic, our hard-won freedoms cannot afford another election-year intrusion.

Limiting the mandate to "large hospitals" would certainly be a step in the right direction (though still problematic, in my view).  I repeatedly see pro-mandate arguments ignoring the vast array of Catholic institutions that will be affected.  The broader point that pervades the piece, though -- that church is the building where worship services are held -- is troubling, especially coming from the "progressive" left (as Tom Berg eloquently argued in the Christian Century recently).  And the suggestion that "conscience" is what guides us in knowing that the Church oversteps its bounds when it enters into the realm of social services?  Ugh.

On a positive note, however, it appears increasingly likely that the Obama administration will be revising the rule, perhaps even later today.  Unfortunately, the reasoning employed by our pro-mandate elected officials is unlikely to disappear anytime soon.

Thursday, February 9, 2012

Churches no longer welcome in NYC schools

You might already know that New York City public schools can no longer be the venue for "religious worship services," a decision that forces several dozen churches out of their longtime homes.  They will be kicked out, in fact, on "Darwin Day."  After criticizing the Second Circuit's failure to grant equal access as guaranteed by the Supreme Court in the past, Christianity Today offers a nuanced take on the reasoning:

"When worship services are performed in a place, the nature of the site changes," Judge Pierre Leval wrote. "The site is no longer simply a room in a school being used temporarily for some activity. The church has made the school the place for the performance of its rites, and might well appear to have established itself there. The place has, at least for a time, become the church."

As a point of law, Leval's argument is untenable, straying widely from what the First Amendment means when it bars "establishment of religion." But as a point of Christian theology, Leval is on to something. There is something special about God's people coming together in worship. Worship does change the nature of a place. Christian traditions may differ on theological specifics, but we all agree that when we worship we participate in God further establishing his eternal kingship in this world.

As the magazine's editors would acknowledge, this may be an important point to consider for congregations making decisions about their worship space, but it shouldn't be of concern to a federal judge.

Wednesday, February 1, 2012

West on Waldron on the Rule of Law

Robin West has written an interesting critique of Jeremy Waldron's take on the rule of law. (HT: Solum)  The abstract:

This article presents four major objections to Jeremy Waldron’s claim that for “Rule of Law” to exist it we must move beyond basic formal requirements that laws be general and knowable rules we can all comply with, towards substantive requirements that when the law imposes its censorial and punitive will upon us, it is applied in a way that acknowledges our intelligence and respects our individual dignity. After challenging Waldron’s claim, the author suggests that if Rule of Law theorizing is intended to capture our ideals of law, then the three paradigms of Rule of Law scholarship that Waldron has usefully identified and distinguished — formal, procedural, and substantive — need to move beyond identifying the Rule of Law as a means to counter the pernicious abuse of power by a too-fierce state besotted by its own political will, and acknowledge the ways in which the law expresses the will of the state to protect weaker parties harmed not by the state but by powerful private entities.

Monday, January 23, 2012

Can a President call himself pro-religious liberty if he's anti-Muslim?

I have no doubt that Newt Gingrich would be a strong advocate for defending the religious liberties of Catholic groups currently threatened by Obama administration policies.  When it comes to the religious liberties of Muslims, though, Gingrich takes a sharp turn toward intolerance. 

[A]sked if he would ever endorse a Muslim running for president[,] "It would depend entirely on whether they would commit in public to give up Shariah," Gingrich said.

Let's get this straight: you're welcome to participate in our public life if you "give up Shariah."  Sounds like the sort of treatment given to Rocco Buttiglione by the EU (and rightly criticized by many conservatives).  Or consider this piece of red meat he happily threw out to voters:

Gingrich also called the Ground Zero mosque "a deliberate and willful insult to the people of the United States who suffered an attack by people who are motivated by the same thing."

What exactly is the "same thing" that motivated the 9/11 hijackers and Muslims who want to have a mosque near their homes and places of work?  Is it the "same thing" that motivates Catholics and abortion clinic bombers?  We must resist efforts to paint religious believers with a single broad brush.  When it comes to Muslims, Gingrich appears ready to do just that.

Is Gingrich anti-Muslim?  Well, he does generously concede that "A truly modern person who happened to worship Allah would not be a threat." It is "a person who belonged to any kind of belief in Shariah, any effort to impose it on the rest of us, [who] would be a mortal threat."  So are religious believers welcome to participate in public life in Newt Gingrich's America?  Yes, as long as you're "a truly modern person" who just happens "to worship Allah."  Not reassuring.

Friday, January 20, 2012

Obama holds firm on contraceptive coverage mandate

The Obama administration is refusing to broaden the exemption from the new rule requiring religious employers to cover contraceptives:

The Obama administration will allow religious organizations a one-year delay before they must comply with a new rule requiring employers that offer workers health insurance to include access to contraception with no out-of-pocket cost, according to people familiar with the decision.

But the rule itself and the employers covered by it remain unchanged.

I am (a little) surprised and (a lot) disappointed that the administration didn't budge.  I'm also not sure what the purpose of the one-year delay is.  My cynical side can't help but notice that it conveniently postpones any enforcement dramas until after the election.  If you need a refresher on the merits of the exemption debate, check out Rick's op-ed from a couple of months ago.

Monday, January 16, 2012

Martin Luther King Jr.'s theology of action

My current project looks to draw insights from Martin Luther King Jr.'s theological claims by which to better critique the presumptions underlying the predominant narrative of the modern legal profession.  The core of that insight flows from King's belief in the inescapably social nature of the human person. 

The accessibility of King’s anthropological claim is magnified by the fact that King did not require agreement “all the way down” in order to join in the struggle to see the moral implications of the anthropological claim lived out.  King worked out those implications within a particular worldview, and the theological and philosophical sources of King’s worldview are not as widely accessible as the resulting claims themselves.  This does not make the sources marginal to King, for his moral claims could not have been formed in a vacuum, apart from those sources.  But King did not ask his listeners to embrace all of his sources (though many did); he asked listeners to embrace the moral claims themselves.  Whether or not someone in the 1960s would have shared King’s admiration for Walter Rauschenbusch’s interpretation of the Old Testament prophets, for example, they could have understood, appreciated, and (in most cases) affirmed King’s resulting exhortation to resist Sheriff Bull Connor’s violent suppression of peaceful protests in Birmingham.  In this regard, King’s moral claims were embodied in action. 

To illustrate Christians’ tendency to pay only lip service to justice, he told a story about visiting an imaginary city where no one wore shoes even though it was cold and snowy.  He asks a local resident why no one wore them:

“But what is the matter?  Don’t you believe in shoes?”

“Believe in shoes, my friend!  I should say we do.  That is the first article of our creed, shoes.  They are indispensable to the well-being of humanity.”

“Well, then, why don’t you wear them?” said I, bewildered.

“Ah,” said he, “that is just it.  Why don’t we?”

After I checked in the hotel I met a gentleman who wanted to show me around the city . . . [and pointed to a huge brick structure]  “You see that?” said he.  “That is one of our outstanding shoe manufacturing establishments!”

“A what?” I asked in amazement.  “You mean you make shoes there?”

“Well, not exactly,” said he, “we talk about making shoes there, and believe me, we have got one of the most brilliant young fellows you have ever heard.  He talks more thrillingly and convincingly every week on the subject of shoes. . . . Just yesterday he moved the people profoundly with his exposition of the necessity of shoe wearing.  Many broke down and wept.  It was really wonderful!”

“But why don’t you wear them?” said I, insistently.

 “Ah,” said he, “that is just it.  Why don’t we?”

In tracing King’s intellectual legacy, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that his was a theology of action.  He was not interested primarily in theology as a theoretical inquiry or systematic explication.  King’s passion was a rigorous exploration of theology as applied.  History’s narrative did not call for his cognitive assent; it called for his active participation.  In most situations, King’s moral worldview was discernible primarily through the courses of conduct he embarked on directly or recommended to his audience; he did not spend much time in his ministry debating the fine points of philosophical or theological theory.  King cared less about how a person arrived at her commitment to justice as long as they arrived at it somehow.  Because action follows from commitment, the path of commitment matters greatly to the actor herself, but King never espoused a particular path as a litmus test for participating in the struggle for justice.  The protest march photos of King locked arm in arm with leaders from various religious and political traditions bear witness to this fact. 

By the same token, lawyers are not hired to opine on prevailing currents in academic thought; if their worldview is going to matter, it has to matter in the world of concrete action items.  For example, the mammoth (and now defunct) energy futures trading company, Enron, focused relentlessly on share price – to the exclusion of any more fulsome measure of corporate well-being and accountability.  This narrow conception of self-interest stands in tension with a variety of moral truth claims and traditions.  From whatever perspective Enron’s lawyers would have approached the problem, though, it was important for them to flag for management the concern that the company was neglecting its broader responsibility to constituents.  The lawyer’s moral framework is both more efficacious and more accessible to the extent that it expresses itself in the world of action.  King is a powerful model on that front. 

Friday, January 6, 2012

Could civil unions be good for marriage?

My student Phil Steger offered the following response to my question about the impact of civil unions on marriage:

It is possible that an increase of civil unions may actually strengthen the institution of marriage by distinguishing contractual partnerships made for mutual benefit from sacramental unions that bear witness to divine reality and provide a "school of love" (to borrow St. Benedict's term) through which two people can labor toward holiness. People can then make a clear and conscious choice between the two, based on their actual intent and motive for joining their life with another person.
This, to me, is the key distinction between civil unions and marriage. Both civil unions and marriages can provide a stable framework for having and raising children. And both civil unions and marriages can also be childless. The sociological argument for marriage--it's best for children and the social order--is important, but it is not the heart of the meaning and reality of marriage, at least as illuminated by revelation and tradition.
In the Bible, the structure of marriage and its role in creating or contributing to the social order are somewhat fluid. What is consistent in the Bible, as well as the Apostolic and Patristic sources, is marriage a potent sign of God's love and union with his people. It encourages our faith in the biblical promise that we are each created for perfect union in God, by showing us examples of how two people can grow deeply in union with each other, even in our fallen state. It also provides a training ground of self-giving and self-denial for cultivating the practices and dispositions to prepare us for our destiny of union in God. It resembles the Eucharist and the Liturgy in these ways: as living signs of spiritual reality and as "arenas" in which to practice living according to that reality.
There is no question that the potential for children and family are the natural outgrowth of this union. But this potential doesn't become actual in every marriage. The sacramental union, on the other hand, is actually present in every marriage, though its fullness remains a potentiality requiring commitment and effort and grace to develop. Neither the actuality, nor even the potential, for this sacramental union is ever present in civil unions, even though the potential for children and family are.
I question whether our anxious concern for the sociology of marriage is obscuring our faithful witness to its sacramentality, which might do more to undermine marriage then civil unions. I think if we Catholics were to begin there, our encounters with both civil unions, same or opposite sex, and same-sex marriage, would cause us less fear and anxiety over the fate of marriage. It might also equip us with greater discernment about the essential truths of marriage that we want to preserve and protect and how best to do so.