Here's an insightful response from Gerald J. Russello to my query as to whether there's a double standard if we insist that Gonzaga recognize the Christian Legal Society chapter, but don't insist that Seton Hall recognize the gay student group:
The difference between Gonzaga and Seton Hall, to my mind, is that between "old fashioned" liberalism and something new. Seton Hall presents the traditional academic freedom dilemma: should a Catholic institution allow students to advocate on an issue in a school-approved group that is not compatible with its self-understanding as a Catholic institution. I believe Seton Hall is right not to permit such groups, because from a Catholic perspective that issue has been discussed and a conclusion reached. The issue can be discussed in a classroom, but not treated as an "expression" equivalent with other approved student groups. (We had similar debates when I was a student at Georgetown over pro-choice student groups).
With Harvard and InterVarsity, the issue is different. The "expansive view of non-discrimination" you rightly identify as the motivating force here conditions the identity of the participants in the debate. The particular issue is, in some sense, irrelevant. In other words, the discrimination against InterVarsity is not because of the point of view (advocating Christian legal principles in law), but because of the internal structure of the group itself (restricting leadership to Christians). Harvard may publicly proclaim that it has no "bias" against Christianity, but it believes all groups should reflect the student body, i.e., Christian groups should be subject internally to non-discrimination as a condition to recognition, even if the self-understanding of the group does not permit such non-discrimination. The secular ideology controls the way groups can understand themselves, even if (as in the case with a secular university) it disclaims any interest in the outcome of the debate. If this analysis is right, I think we can develop a principled distinction between the way we approach these two forms of pluralism.
As to your point on liberalism-as-religion, I disagree, not because it is not true, but primarily because liberals do not see it that way. From the perspective of liberalism, there is no "religious level" truth except tolerance, which cannot press its own truth claims. Crediting liberalism with the conviction of religion imports our own religious values to a system that, while deeply held, cannot come to conclusive answers to ultimate questions.
Gerald J. Russello
Friday, March 12, 2004
There is some appeal to Rick's suggested approach (posted below) to the specter of a double standard when it comes to Gonzaga rejecting the Christian Legal Society student group versus Seton Hall rejecting the gay student group. We could support Seton Hall's action, but not Gonzaga's action, with an eye toward the Catholic identity of the institution.
But that approach is of limited help when it comes to non-Catholic institutions. Many schools, including Harvard, have resisted InterVarsity Christian Fellowship's official presence on campus because the group limits leadership to Christians. Most of us probably think Harvard should allow such groups to operate in a way that is consistent with the group's own religious identity. But if schools like Harvard have any core identity these days, it's arguably an identity rooted in an expansive vision of non-discrimination. So isn't InterVarsity's Christian-only leadership requirement inconsistent with Harvard's identity, just as a gay student group's mission is (arguably) inconsistent with Seton Hall's identity? Do we think secular schools are obligated to embrace a more robust form of pluralism than Catholic schools?
I certainly don't pretend to have an easy answer to this, but it seems that if we're going to invoke principles of pluralism and liberty to second-guess institutional decision-making shaped by a secular worldview that cuts against religious groups, we also have to invoke it when institutional decision-making shaped by a religious worldview cuts against non-religious groups. (I'm not speaking in constitutional terms here, just as a matter of public argument.) Either that, or we have to offer a double standard for pluralism and associational liberty depending on whether the school has a secular or religious worldview, and I'm not sure how to defend that, especially given that many tenets of modern liberalism have risen to the level of religious belief in the eyes of many adherents, especially in the realm of higher education.
Rob
Thursday, March 11, 2004
Yesterday a student filed suit against Seton Hall University after the school rejected his request to establish a gay student group on campus. I'm not sure as to the details of the student's request or the school's denial, but it raises an interesting point to follow up on Rick's post about Gonzaga. To the extent we value expressive liberty and associational identity, whose identity and expression should we support: the student group's or the university's? If the Gonzaga student government is trying to impose a collective, identity-squelching anti-discrimination norm on its student groups, isn't Seton Hall doing the same thing when it tries to enforce standards based on the Church's teaching? Besides the fact that we might favor the substance of one collective norm over the other, is there any principled reason for supporting the students trying to create a Christian Legal Society chapter at Gonzaga, but not the student trying to create a gay student group at Seton Hall?
Rob
