Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, December 31, 2004

Tsunamis and Divine Revelation/Presence

I find Susan's posts on the Buddhist perspective on disasters to be appealing, but isn't there considerable tension between that perspective and the Catholic tradition, at least as that tradition discerns and articulates the natural law? I would love to say that the tsunamis just "are," or that tsunamis show us nothing about God, but isn't that a bit self-serving if we also claim that nature reveals qualities of God to all who are willing to look? If, for example, we can learn about God's creative genius by studying DNA, or can discover God's intentions for sex through the physical differentiation of the genders, can we suddenly call off the inquiry when it comes to tsunamis? If the "heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands," (Psalm 119) aren't tsunamis part of the divine declaration?

I don't claim to know what that declaration might be. For my own faith journey, the problem of tsunamis is not overcome by figuring them out, but by focusing on the Emmanuel ("God is with us") of this Christmas season. If not for my belief in the Incarnation, I'd likely be some sort of deist, believing in a distant God, a non-intervening, non-caring creative force who started things rolling and then moved on. But the Incarnation changes everything. By way of clumsy analogy, if I was living in an apartment with no heat, no electricity, and no plumbing, I'd bear some righteous anger toward the landlord. But what if the landlord moved in with me, subjecting himself to the same conditions? It certainly wouldn't take away my questions about the apartment's failings, but it would change my righteous anger into something else entirely.

Rob

Suffering vs. Separation

In our continuing discussion of the tsunamis, a reader forwarded me some apt words from Bishop Robinson:

"God is in the cancer as he is in the sunset, and is to be met and responded to in each.  Both are among the faces of God, the one terrible, the other beautiful.  The problem of evil is not how God can will it (that is not even touched on in Romans 8) but its power to threaten meaninglessness and separation, to sever and to sour, to darken our capacity to make the response of Thou. 

If this is the case, the first task for theology is to restate the problem rather than to look for a solution.  So much of the conventional presentation of the problem of evil, both from the Christian and the anti-Christian side, assumes a Being who is 'personally responsible' for directing the course of events.  Such a being is declared by the atheist to be morally intolerable, and I find myself concurring.  I have no wish to defend such a conception of God.  One senses the genuine agony that lies behind, say, the innocent suffering of a child, but to define the problem in terms of how this can be 'meant' in terms of an almighty Being who permits it, is to distort the issue from the beginning. 

We have to start from the other end.  The concatenation of events that produces earthquakes and accidents....are not to be seen in terms of prevenient intention.  That is to introduce categories of interpretation as foreign as those of the old teleologists who argued that fleas were made black so that men could see to swat them against white sheets.  In the dense world of subpersonal relationships, the purposiveness of love works itself out through 'blinder' categories.  There is no intention in an earthquake or an accident.  But in and through it it is still possible to respond to the Thou that claims even this for meaning and personal purpose."

Rob

Wednesday, December 29, 2004

Tsunamis and the Moral Anthropology: Paths of Reconciliation

In addition to Susan's and Rick's posts, I've received many thoughtful responses to my earlier post on the seemingly inescapable tension between a theologically grounded moral anthropology and the tsunamis in Asia. Ralph the Sacred River directs our attention to the following quote from Richard Swinburne:

A theodicist is in a better position to defend a theodicy such as I have outlined if he is prepared also to make the further additional claim — that God knowing the worthwhileness of the conquest of evil and the perfecting of the universe by men, shared with them this task by subjecting himself as man to the evil in the world. A creator is more justified in creating or permitting evils to be overcome by his creatures if he is prepared to share with them the burden of the suffering and effort.

Patrick O'Hannigan at the Paragraph Farmer offers a string of worthwhile observations, and then challenges the premise of my post:

Earthquakes are neither moral nor immoral, and to ask whether God is "culpable" for them is to presume a prosecutorial stance that didn't work for Job and won't work for us, either. Moreover, the Christian worldview is anchored in the person of Jesus; it's not an abstraction subject to disproof by tidal waves, Nazis, Stalinist famine, molested children, or shocking numbers of legally aborted babies.

Live By Not Lies suggests that:

In each of Vischer’s models the basic assumption is that God’s role is to keep us safe and prosperous. Yet, that makes God subject to us. He becomes the one who fulfills our needs and wants. When he does not do this then God in that model is not being God. God becomes dead as Nietzche says he is. Yet, when we understand the teachings of Jesus, we see that his message was not one of telling us who God is, as much as telling us who we are in light of the existence of God.

John DiGregorio focuses on the far-reaching consequences of free will, proposing that:

one of the consequences of Original Sin was the loss of our ability to understand how to live on the home God created for us. My guess is that earthquakes rumbled and volcanoes erupted and tornadoes spun wildly before The Fall, but human creatures, still living in the beatific vision, understood how to live with these natural phenomena. How? I can't imagine. I'm too filled with concupiscence to properly imagine Paradise. Why would God allow the decision of one man, Adam (who was probably one of many men), to bring death (even the death of complete innocents) permanently into the world? I think God takes the true freedom he gives us very seriously and there is no true freedom without true, and lasting, consequences--both for good (when we follow God's will) and for bad (when we choose to sin).

Teresa Collett wisely recommends John Paul II's apostolic letter on suffering. Not suprisingly, C.S. Lewis and Peter Kreeft are other sources of wisdom commonly cited in the responses.

None of these are likely to do the heavy lifting demanded by those who do not find faith in God to be otherwise tenable, but they may help illuminate the path of reconciliation for those who know both God and tsunamis to be unmistakable elements of their lived realities.

Rob

Tuesday, December 28, 2004

Tsunamis and the Moral Anthropology

The tsunamis that have spawned mind-boggling human suffering across Asia represent perhaps the most difficult challenge to the anthropological presumptions driving the project that we've undertaken on Mirror of Justice. How can we insist on the theologically grounded dignity of the human person when the natural order itself appears to defy such dignity? Nature's challenge is especially poignant during this Christmas season, as the divine concern for humanity promised by the Incarnation seems relatively meaningless given the utter absence of concern embodied in the shifting of the earth's plates deep under the ocean.

Clinging to a belief in an all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good deity appears hopeless in the wake of these deadly waves. Invoking human free will offers little help, as the earthquake (unlike all war, much famine, and many diseases) is not causally related to any human act or omission. Chalking it up to the mystery of God is understandably seen as a cop-out. Another common response is to insist that creation fell along with humanity, and this world is obviously not as God desired. But why would God have wired the earth itself to unleash death and destruction once humanity rejected Him? Murder is a human creation; plate tectonics are not. Is not God culpable for earthquakes? And if God is culpable, is not the entire Christian worldview proved to be the illogical relic portrayed by critics?

It seems to me that if we want a moral anthropology rooted in the Incarnation to be taken seriously, we must try to offer an explanation of a world in which tsunamis rip children from their mothers' arms. This is an age-old question, but it must lie at the heart of any effort to engage a culture made skeptical of our "Catholic legal theory" project, at least in part, by pervasive human suffering seemingly caused by the God we embrace.

So I'll ask readers and co-bloggers: What do we have to say for God (and ourselves)?

Rob

Friday, December 24, 2004

Christmas and Humility

Andy Crouch has written a thoughtful essay for Christianity Today highlighting the tension between the celebration of Christmas and the coming age of genetic enhancement. For some reason I can't link to it, but here's an excerpt:

"A Christian might put [the case against genetic enhancement] more plainly: If you no longer see life as a gift, you are no longer able to love.

But I suspect that the most eloquent arguments of columnists and philosophers will be fruitless. Name one technology that human beings have developed but not used. If we were willing to use the awesome and awful technology of nuclear weapons, why would we prevent people from "enhancing" their descendants?

So followers of Christ will have to decide whether to join our culture in its quest for mastery. It's hard to see how we can do so and still celebrate Christmas. To grasp the meaning of that event, early Christians turned to the language of fulfillment. Even in the cradle this baby was "fully" God, they said. But he was also fully human. He lacked nothing essential to the good human life, even in that dark night where the best available technology was fire to heat the water for his birth. He lacked nothing, Luke says, as he grew in wisdom and stature and favor with God and man. He lacked nothing when he died in violent pain in that long-ago age before anesthesia. Even now, we believe, he is still fully embodied, fully human, yet more truly embodied and more truly human than ever before. He has the divine life, the perfect human body that our technology feverishly and vainly seeks to achieve.

Do we want his life? Or do we want technology's alluring facsimile? Are we willing for our children to be less than normal, that they may understand something essential about humility, responsibility, and love?"

Tuesday, December 21, 2004

The Church and Toleration

The article cited in Rick's earlier post states that the Catholic Church supports Australia's Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, as well as the prosecution of the preacher who made anti-Islam statements. This strikes me as a remarkable disregard of subsidiarity's import, as well as the Church's own ultimate self-interest. On what basis would the Church cede to the state its authority to define and pursue its own vision of appropriate religious discourse, especially as applied to the expression of the Gospel? If the Church is convinced that its own articulation of differences among religious communities will never run afoul of the modern state's idea of how religious folk should talk about each other, does the Church's support of the law suggest (at least in Australia) a broader abdication of its prophetic role?

Rob

Wednesday, December 15, 2004

Stem Cells and Subsidiarity

William Safire points out that the debate over embryonic stem cell research is bypassing the federal government, as states and universities clamor to follow California's lead and get their share of this 21st century "gold rush."  Supporters of the research (like Safire) may hold this out as an example of subsidiarity in action; skeptics (like me) will remind supporters that certain absolutes, such as the sanctity of life, are not be devolved to local communities for redefinition, no matter how enthusiastic our embrace of subsidiarity might be.

Rob

Tuesday, December 14, 2004

The Coming Vatican Policy

Two recent news reports (both emanating from the same reporter) offer a bit of insight into the Vatican's efforts to formulate a policy on homosexuals as priests. One states that:

The Vatican has confirmed several times that men with homosexual sexual orientations should not be ordained. The December 2002 bulletin of the Vatican's Congregation for Divine Worship and the Sacraments contained a letter signed by Cardinal Jorge Medina Estevez, who has since retired as the head of the Congregation, which said ordaining such men would be imprudent and "very risky."

A prominent Vatican document dealing with the issue was released as early as 1961. The 1961 document from the Sacred Congregation for Religious prohibits the admission of homosexuals to the diocesan priesthood and religious orders. The document states: "Those affected by the perverse inclination to homosexuality or pederasty should be excluded from religious vows and ordination," because priestly ministry would place such persons in "grave danger".

. . . .

Commenting on the coming document which has been more than five years in the making, Bishop Nienstedt said, ""I think it's going to be a balanced document, because the whole question of homosexuality not only has psychological dimensions but also has varying degrees of a person acting out or not acting out." He added, "So the whole question has to be nuanced considerably: 'What is homosexuality?' 'What are the homosexual attractions?' and that sort of thing. I think this document will be helpful because it is going to address those questions."

(Thanks to MOJ reader Jason Adkins for the link.)

The other suggests:

The document on homosexuality has been in the works for more than five years. An early draft of the document took the position that homosexuals should not be admitted to the priesthood; in its current form, the document takes a more nuanced approach to the whole issue, sources said.

(Thanks to Teresa Collett for the link).

Rob

More on Homosexuality and the Priesthood

Teresa Collett offers the following thoughts in response to Michael Perry's and Pat Brennan's earlier posts:

I appreciate the nature of Michael P. and Pat Brennan's engagement with me on the question how the Church should view homosexuality in considering a candidate for ordination and apologize for my delay in responding. Let me answer Michael's comments first. Because I believe sexual identity is intrinsic to human nature and part of the divine plan, I believe as a woman, I image God in a manner different from men and therefore cannot represent Christ in the celebration of the Eucharist. See sec. 26 in Mulieris Dignitatem. This is not, however, because the female is by nature "disordered" or a "misbegotten male," but rather because we image the receptive and generative nature of God - the bride, rather than the bridegroom.

As for there being other characteristics that should disqualify heterosexual candidates for ordination -- without question! Yet that does not establish that the Church should disregard its own teaching that "[The] psychological genesis [of homosexual attraction] remains largely unexplained. Basing itself on Sacred Scripture, which presents homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity, tradition has always declared that homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered." It seems a sensible policy that someone with a persistent attraction toward something that is a grave depravity should be disqualified from ordination. However, if you begin from the position that Michael does (that homosexual sexual desire is not disordered in any theologically relevant sense), the policy would be inappropriate.

As for Pat's comments, I agree that we are awaiting magisterial determination and hope nothing I have written suggests the contrary. However the question Michael posed earlier was whether the policy that has been reported to be in effect in some American dioceses and under consideration by the Vatican would be a sin against the men it excluded from ordination (a "sin against the Gospel" in Michael's words). It was in that context that I quoted the provision of section 1849, so I am somewhat confused by Pat's discussion of personal sin and disordered desires. If I understand Pat's point (and I am not certain I do) personal culpability for wrongdoing is not the only reason the Church declines to ordain candidates. Lack of age, lack of maturity, mental illness, and lack of faith are all reasons that do not involve the will of the person, yet disqualify candidates for ordination. Similarly homosexuality need not involve the will of the person, but may be determined by the Vatican to disquality men from ordination.

In the end, I honestly don't know exactly whether I believe the Vatican should adopt this policy, but I am reasonably certain that it is not sinful to do so. I think there are both theological and ontological meanings to be drawn from the fact that we are created as man and woman, and procreation requires our union. What the Holy Father calls the nuptial meaning of the body is denied by homosexuality, and that denial has theological significance.

Friday, December 10, 2004

Sexual Disorder and the Priest as Image of Christ

Teresa Collett provides the following response to Michael Perry's question on the exclusion of homosexuals from the priesthood:

I am uncertain exactly what Michael means by a "sin against the Gospel," but I assume he means something like the definition of sin given by section 1849 of the Catechism: "an offense against reason, truth, and right conscience; it is failure in genuine love for God and neighbor caused by a perverse attachment to certain goods."

Assuming we have a shared definition of sin, I think the Church would be justified in adopting a policy of excluding men who experience an exclusive or predominant sexual attraction toward men from ordination to the priesthood because of the nature and function of the ministerial priesthood, which is to act in the person of Christ in the sacrifice of the Mass and in proclaiming Christ's mystery.

While all of us, and therefore every candidate for ordination, will be subject to various temptations (Romans 3:23), the question is whether the Church is justified in seeing disordered sexual desires as grounds for disqualification from ordination. John Paul II has advanced our understanding of how our sexual nature images God in much of his writing, but perhaps most particularly in his book, "Love and Responsibility". While this text primarily focuses on the nature of married love, it provides a deep understanding of the nature of human sexual identity properly ordered. The priest who is to image Christ to his parish, and be a father to his parishioners must have a rightly ordered sense of the gift of generative partnership that is sexual love.

Compounding the theological difficulty of a priest who has an exclusive homosexual orientation, is the practical problems that confront all of us in living a chaste life in contemporary society. By making the choice to live in accordance with God's law for our lives, we should order our lives to avoid occasions of sin. For a man entering the priesthood, his living conditions may (like those of the military) be "spartan, primitive, and characterized by forced intimacy with little or no privacy." It is both unwise and sinful to place people in positions of temptation.